Thursday, August 20, 2015

China's Smartphone Market is Saturated

Global smartphone sales grew at the slowest growth rate since 2013 in the second quarter of 2015, according to Gartner.

Worldwide sales of smartphones to end users totaled 330 million units, an increase of 13.5 percent over the same period in 2014.

Emerging Asia/Pacific (excluding China), Eastern Europe and Middle East and Africa were the fastest-growing regions.

But smartphone sales in China fell for the first time year over year, recording a four percent decline.

"While demand for lower-cost 3G and 4G smartphones continued to drive growth in emerging markets, overall smartphone sales remained mixed region by region in the second quarter of 2015," said Anshul Gupta, research director at Gartner. "China has reached saturation — its phone market is essentially driven by replacement, with fewer first-time buyers.”

"China is the biggest country for smartphone sales, representing 30 percent of total sales of smartphones in the second quarter of 2015.

Worldwide Smartphone Sales to End Users by Vendor in 2Q15 (Thousands of Units)
Company
2Q15
Units
2Q15 Market Share (%)
2Q14
Units
2Q14 Market Share (%)
Samsung
72,072.5
21.9
76,129.2
26.2
Apple
48,085.5
14.6
35,345.3
12.2
Huawei
25,825.8
7.8
17,657.7
6.1
Lenovo*
16,405.9
5.0
19,081.2
6.6
Xiaomi
16,064.9
4.9
12,540.8
4.3
Others
151,221.7
45.9
129,630.2
44.6
Total
329,676.4
100.0
290,384.4
100.0
Source: Gartner (August 2015)

Wednesday, August 19, 2015

LTE-U Offers Indirect and Direct Revenue Upside Potential

As always is the case, contestants in the telecom services business will use tools in ways viewed as helpful to their revenue models. Upstarts trying to take market share are more likely to try disruptive tactics. Market leaders are more likely to seek ways to directly monetize new technologies and platforms.

In other words, attackers are likely to “give away value and features” if it helps them grow share, while leaders are more likely to want to try and charge for new value and features to directly boost average revenue per account.

Ways to bond capacity from mobile--Long Term Evolution (4G) and coming fifth generation (5G)--are likely to follow that pattern.

T-Mobile US, for example, already is exploring ways to use pre-standard Long Term Evolution aggregation of mobile and Wi-Fi assets. In part, that is because T-Mobile US arguably has fewer assets in the network coverage area, compared to AT&T and Verizon.

So bonding its mobile network assets with any available Wi-Fi will improve user experience, giving customers an experience equivalent to, or better than, having a mobile network infrastructure that is more developed (capacity and geographic coverage).

As would any challenger, T-Mobile US might see bonding of mobile and Wi-Fi assets as a way to monetize the feature indirectly, in the form of greater customer numbers. Other providers are more likely to try and monetize more directly, such as by charging all access--mobile or mobile plus Wi-Fi--as coming out of the mobile data usage allocation.

Use of Wi-Fi alone, as when a user switches to Wi-Fi access instead of mobile, would continue to be unaffected by the capacity aggregation techniques.

Billing Implications of LTE-U, MuLTEfire or LAA?

The current interest on the part of mobile operators to combine access assets across Wi-Fi and Long Term Evolution and all subsequent mobile networks (fifth generation and beyond) might turn on billing rather than technology or regulatory issues.

Offload of mobile device traffic to Wi-Fi generally is seen as a positive by mobile operators, as it often results in better user experience, while not debiting mobile data allowances.

The ability to combine mobile and Wi-Fi access assets might turn on the potential revenue upside, however. Compared to a scenario where users switch to Wi-Fi for access, not using the mobile network at all, Long Term Evolution-Universal (license assisted access or Qualcomm’s MulLTEfire) could represent some incremental ability on the part of a mobile service provider to directly bill for Wi-Fi usage.

Of course, that also was the hope when mobile operators launched Long Term Evolution as well, so nothing is assured. As it turned out, operators generally are unable to charge any premium for LTE access, compared to 3G.

It might turn out that most consumers continue to simply switch to Wi-Fi, whenever possible, rather than relying on mobile network access.

Winning by Losing or Losing by Winning?

Perhaps this is what winning now looks like, for many service providers: flat revenue, declining earnings and negative operating income. Seriously.


In part, that is viewed as a positive because operating metrics improved, ranging from strong growth of video subscriptions, high speed access and bundled services revenue.


“Despite price cuts for roaming services, currency effects and strong competition, we enjoyed a solid and pleasing result in the first half of the year,” said Swisscom CEO Urs Schaeppi.


Most of those results come in the “units sold” or “next generation services provided” area.


As at the end of June 2015, Swisscom had connected more than 2.5 million homes and businesses to ultra-fast broadband with speeds in excess of 50 Mbps.


By the end of 2016, 99 percent of the Swiss public should have access to bandwidths of up to 150 Mbps. Swisscom also is currently testing 4G/LTE bandwidths of up to 450 Mbps, which are expected to go on offer at the end of 2015.


Roaming data traffic accelerated as a result of a drop in prices. In the first half of the year, volumes rose by a factor of 2.3 in comparison with 2014, and tripled in July.


By the end of June 2015, the number of customers using a bundled package had increased year-on-year by 197,000 or 17.7 percent  to 1.31 million.


Revenue from bundled contracts rose year-on-year by CHF 168 million or 18.5% to CHF 1,077 million.


The number of Swisscom TV connections increased year-on-year by 147,000 or 13.5 percent to 1.2 million (+73,000 in the first half of the year).


The number of retail fixed-line broadband connections  increased 67,000, year over year, up 3.6 percent to 1.92 million.


The growth of TV and broadband connections more than offset the decline in the number of fixed network connections (-133,000 year over year). The number of revenue generating units (RGUs) increased year-on-year by 192,000 or 1.6 percent to 12.4 million.


Swisscom First Half 2015 Financial Results
Net revenue (in CHF million)
5,700
5,758
1.0%
Operating income before depreciation and amortisation, EBITDA (in CHF million)
2,182
2,133
-2.2%
Operating income EBIT (in CHF million)
1,160
1,105
-4.7%
Net income (in CHF million)
806
784
-2.7%




Swisscom First Half 2015 Operating Metrics
Swisscom TV access lines in Switzerland (as at 30 June in thousands)
1,091
1,238
13.5%
Mobile lines in Switzerland (as at 30 June in thousands)
6,460
6,571
1.7%
Revenue from bundled contracts (in CHF million)
909
1,077
18.5%
Broadband lines Fastweb (as at 30 June in thousands)
1,994
2,157
8.2%

Telecom Provider Failure Now is a Possibility

Nothing is less controversial than the assertion that the telecom business is changing in fundamental ways. Much more controversial are the implications of the changes.

Most controversial of all are predictions that failure now is a possibility.

It is not controversial to argue that “the old telco business model is breaking up,” as Dan Bieler, Forrester Research principal analyst, says. In many ways, the legacy business models are challenged because all the legacy revenue streams are under pressure, and many clearly are declining. Those which are not declining face margin pressure.

It would be reasonable to argue that “telcos are at a crossroads.” Nor would it be unusual to argue that fundamentally different new strategies and roles in the ecosystem will be adopted.

Generally speaking, observers believe the fundamental choices revolve around the roles of
“transmission” (“pipe”) and “services” (apps). One choice is to become a low-cost provider of transport and access services, fundamentally eschewing apps.

In other words, one path forward is to embrace the wholesale model, and deemphasize or abandon the retail role.

Some might feel uncomfortable about that choice, but it is the full embrace of the “dumb pipe connectivity” model.

The tougher path, one might argue, is the full transition to a new model built on some combination of IP ecosystems apps and functions. That is harder to describe or achieve, as it requires creating a major new role in the IP ecosystem beyond connectivity services.

Fundamentally, that embrace of the retailer role could include either a new distributor role (like cable TV, where the access provider bundles apps) or an app creator role.

Perhaps obviously, the bundler or distributor role will be easier than the “app creator” role, which essentially requires that a telco become a Facebook or Google. Most agree that will be difficult.

More feasible is to become a Netflix, bundling OTT content or apps created by others.

What also is new is the possibility of complete failure: going out of business.

That would have been unthinkable in the monopoly era. Communications was--and remains--a vital form of infrastructure. There being no other possible providers, the sanctioned monopoly providers could not be allowed to fail.

That no longer is true. Failure is possible, and replacement providers generally are available. That means, in the coming era, the possibility of business failure by virtually any former monopoly services provider.

That possibility will become a reality, Bieler argues. “At this stage, I see few reasons to be optimistic about the prospects for most telcos to recover the ground they’ve lost to other players in the emerging digital ecosystems.”

Bieler cites a few of the shifts that have lessened service provider value.

Consumers care more about apps and devices than connectivity.  than ever. “Consumers care more about which handset and apps they use than which connectivity provider they have,” he says.

That is a simple function of the shift to Internet Protocol, which specifically, and by design, separates app from access. The protocol itself shifts value to “over the top” applications that can be used on any access platform.

That shift opens the way to third party creation of important apps, without the permission of the access and transport suppliers that once owned and controlled the few important consumer apps (voice, mobile voice, messaging, entertainment video) and some of the important business customer apps.

In fact, the future of the consumer segment business might follow the earlier evolution of the business segment, where apps (information technology) largely is supplied by the software providers, while telcos and other service providers mostly supply the transmission function.

That explains the potential importance of the shift to cloud computing, as it provides one new way for traditional telcos to acquire new value. If all computing shifts to the cloud, then not only is role of connectivity heightened, but the physical layer revenue models extend to data centers that become the functional equivalent of the legacy central and tandem switching centers.

In the enterprise segment, which has become more strategic for any number of communications service providers, telcos are not necessarily the top choice where it comes to supplying voice, data or managed services, Bieler points out.

“Business and IT users trust systems integrators and independent solution specialists more than telcos with a wide spectrum of voice, data, and managed services,” he says.

Bieler also says “regulators undermine telcos from adopting new connectivity business models.”

That will be seen as controversial in some quarters, though not likely in the telecom industry.

“As part of the net neutrality debate regulatory bodies oppose various telcos’ attempts to explore commercial relationships with content and service providers regarding the delivery of content via prioritized connectivity,” Bieler says. “At the same time, regulators refrain from applying the same regulation for over-the-top communication services as for telcos.”

One doesn’t have to agree with the notion that OTT apps and services should be regulated as legacy services are. One can argue that service provider apps should have the same freedom as OTT apps, instead.

Advice is easy to give: do a better job with customer service, move faster, partner with OTT providers, embrace wholesale, cut costs, innovate faster. Those are among the common bits of advice typically offered.

In the end, connectivity likely will remain the most valuable cash-generating asset, Bieler argues.

There is one simple reason: the protocol stack specifically creates a role for the physical layer, and telcos traditionally have had that role. The one function where telcos and other service providers have core competencies is the physical layer, the actual means of connecting users and app owners.

One need not insist that the only way forward is a wholesale-type role to insist that the physical layer is the one layer of the protocol stack where access and transport providers have unique functions and core competencies.

Bieler’s fundamental view of options is not unusual. Some telcos will transform in significant ways, adopting new roles in the cloud and IP infrastructure. Most will shift to an accommodation with OTT supply of apps, likely moving more to a wholesale revenue model.

That’s the “glass half full” view. The “glass half empty” view is that some legacy operators will simply fail to make the transition, and will go out of business. Failure is a real possibility, because alternative suppliers are available.



Tuesday, August 18, 2015

For Google, the Network is the Computer

For Google, the network really is the computer. “Ten years ago, we realized that we could not purchase, at any price, a datacenter network that could meet the combination of our scale and speed requirements,” said  Amin Vahdat, Google Fellow. “So, we set out to build our own datacenter network hardware and software infrastructure.”

That network now essentially allows Google to treat all computing resources within a single data center as one giant computer. “This means that each of 100,000 servers can communicate with one another in an arbitrary pattern at 10Gbps,” he said.

The architecture also tries to manage all the resources, everywhere on the network, as part of a single computing fabric.

“Our latest-generation Jupiter network has improved capacity by more than 100x relative to our first generation network, delivering more than 1 petabit/sec of total bisection bandwidth,” said Vahdat.

Google released four papers that details various aspects of its networking architecture, including its reliance on software defined networks.

Video Rate Increases are Nearing a Potential Death Spiral

Annual increases in linear video subscription prices are routine. Virtually every year, video distributors raise rates, citing higher programming contract costs.

For many decades, that worked. The problem now is that consumers are showing resistance to buying the product. That creates a different dynamic.

Increasingly, higher prices drive more customers away, raising the overhead to be borne by fewer remaining customers. That is, in microcosm, the whole problem with dwindling customers for every traditional product sold on fixed networks.

There are, every year it seems, fewer customers to carry all of the overhead of the whole business. Sooner or later, unchecked, that becomes a death spiral.

The video subscription business, for most small providers, is nearing such a danger point.

WideOpenWest  programming costs for the first quarter were up sequentially by 9.8 percent on a per basic subscriber standpoint, the company said. On a year-over-year basis, programming costs climbed 15.2 percent over the first quarter of 2014 on a per customer basis, for example.

The interesting conundrum shaping up is that, as economics would suggest, buyers respond to price hikes by buying less. So, one might argue, every price hike drives incrementally more subscribers to disconnect.

Up to a point, suppliers will behave rationally by hiking prices, to maintain gross revenue in the face of unit declines. That works so long as key competitors also raise their prices, and so long as viable substitute products do not arise.

The former might well be the case. The latter almost certainly will not be the case.

The difficulties arguably are highest for small distributors. WideOpenWest, for example,  “saw an overall decline in subscribers and RGUs” in the first quarter of 2015.

Total customers were down about 9,900, while total revenue generating units were down about 54,000. Some 28,000 of those losses came from subscription video units.

WideOpenWest video average revenue per user increased 15 percent year over year, for example. Prices up, subscribers down, just shy of covering the increased programming costs.

For most--if not all small linear video providers--profit margin is the issue. That has been true even for the largest telcos, such as Verizon and AT&T. That is one reason--not the only reason--why AT&T acquired DirecTV.  

On top of that, most small telcos have a tough time eking out a profit under the best of circumstances.

The point is that the strategy of raising video subscription prices already is becoming counterproductive.

Directv-Dish Merger Fails

Directv’’s termination of its deal to merge with EchoStar, apparently because EchoStar bondholders did not approve, means EchoStar continue...