Wednesday, February 7, 2018

Too Bad Net Neutrality is a Bumper Sticker

There are a number of issues raised by the New Jersey executive order banning contracts, after July 1, 2018,  with communications providers that violate New Jersey’s definition of network neutrality.

Tragically, net neutrality remains a concept that is reduced to a bumper sticker. It is horrifically more complex than that.

As with the national argument over network neutrality, the provisions combine a whole lot of operating practices everybody agrees with, and which internet service providers agree must be followed, including every provision relating to “freedom to use lawful apps.”

Look at the clauses structurally.  In such an order, the only enforceable actions include the phrases “shall” or “shall not.” Everything else is preamble or not strictly enforceable. And, as you would guess, all the clauses relating to “shall” or “shall not” apply to ISPs, not app or content providers.

Logically enough, you might argue, for an order relating to procurement of communications services from firms that operate as ISPs.

At a high level, though, if the genuine intent is to prevent anti-competitive pressures in the internet ecosystem, an argument can be made that such orders are incomplete at best, harmful at worst, and almost always based on questionable, overly-broad premises.

Consider the argument that the core of the net neutrality debate genuinely is about internet freedom. Ignore for the moment the issue of “whose” freedom supposedly or authentically  is enhanced.

There is almost no disagreement--in any quarter--about consumer right to use all lawful apps, without deliberate and unfair application of packet prioritization based on the ownership or category of app. In other words, voice over Internet cannot be blocked or degraded when other apps are not impeded.

Nor can an ISPs own VoIP services be guaranteed better network performance when competitors are not allowed to use those same enhancements. OTT video services owned by rivals likewise cannot operate at “best effort only” when an ISP-owned OTT service uses packet prioritization.

Note, though, that the order only says “paid” prioritization shall not be allowed. It is not clear whether unpaid prioritization of internet traffic is allowable, so long as all internet packets receive such treatment.

There are obviously some practical reasons for such language. Prioritization might not always be a bad thing. Sometimes--and that is why many favor some application-specific forms of packet prioritization--prioritization leads to better app performance and user experience.

That is why content delivery networks are used by major app providers. But the specific language is intended to ensure that content and app providers do not have to pay for any such prioritization. Whether it is a good thing or not is quite another question.

Of the specific clauses, everybody, literally everybody, agrees that consumers must have access to all lawful content, applications, services. They have the right to use non-harmful devices, subject to reasonable network management that is disclosed to the consumer. That never has been what the argument has been about, all rhetoric about freedom notwithstanding.

Instead, the argument always has been about business practices that are hard to describe or implement, in a technical sense. ISPs are prohibited from policies that:
  • “Throttle, impair or degrade lawful Internet traffic based on Internet content, application, or service”
  • Engage in paid prioritization.

Among the problems here is that the difference between allowable network management and impermissible “throttling” is nearly impossible to clearly delineate. Some might even say measurable neutrality rules for the internet are impossible.

Even if you think it is possible to determine that a network neutrality infraction has occurred (some think it cannot even be measured), others believe a generalized  “fast lane” regime is not possible, even if ISPs wanted to implement one.

“These predictions intentionally ignore technical, business, and legal realities, however, that make such fees unlikely, if not impossible,” Larry Downes, Accenture Research senior fellow, has argued. “For one thing, in the last two decades, during which no net neutrality rules were in place, ISPs have never found a business case for squeezing the open internet.”

Some of the confusion comes from the use of IP for both the internet and other managed services, private networks and business services and networks, which often engage in packet prioritization for clearly-understood reasons.

Some of the confusion comes from the notion that differentiating tiers of service--just like consumers are offered speed tiers or usage tiers--necessarily impairs the consumer’s use of the internet.

Perhaps the reality of packet discrimination in the core network, used by virtually all major app providers, and its obvious similar value in the access network, are all too real for app providers.

App providers use content delivery networks routinely to improve end user experience. It does take money to create and operate a CDN. That raises the cost of doing business.

So the fear that end users might also be provided CDN services, all the way to the user endpoints, could have cost implications. It is not clear how this hypothetical system would work.

Would all internet access move to CDN delivery, or just most of it? Cisco analysts, for example,  believe the core internet network are, in fact, moving to use of CDN. So there might still be some apps that operate “best effort” through the core of the network. But Cisco believes most traffic would used prioritization, and much of that “paid.”

Precisely “who” pays can vary. An app provider can pay a third party, or an app provider can build and operate its own CDN. Either way, the costs get paid for (by end users, in all cases).

And other network developments, such as network slicing, have value precisely because some network features can be specifically selected when creating a virtual network.

The point is that there is an increasingly-obvious move to packet prioritization mechanisms for both private and public networks, managed services and “internet” apps, in large part because latency increasingly matters for many important apps, and packet prioritization is fundamentally how we reduce latency problems.

How we prioritize can take many forms, but storing content closer to the edge of the network is one way of prioritizing. Introducing class of service mechanisms is another way of achieving the same goal.

“In broadband, it’s the content providers who have leverage over the ISPs and not the other way around, as Netflix recently acknowledged in brushing aside concern about any “weakening” of net neutrality rules,” said Downes.

The unstated principle is that consumers somehow are harmed, or would be harmed, by any such practices. Ignore for the moment that anti-competitive practices are reviewable both by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission.

In other words, any anti-competitive behavior of the type feared, such as an ISP making its own services work better than third party services, is reviewable by the FTC primarily, and also by the DoJ.

As a practical matter, any such behavior would provoke an immediate consumer and agency reaction.

The other key concern is “paid prioritization.” Let us be clear. The fear, on the part of some app and content providers, is that this would raise their costs of doing business, as they perceive there actually are technical ways to improve user experience by prioritizing packets.

App and content providers themselves already use such techniques for their own traffic. They know it costs money, and the fear is that they might have to pay such costs, if applied on access networks as well as the core networks where app providers themselves already spend to prioritize packets.

The rules also bar ISPs from (preventing) use of a non-harmful device, subject to reasonable network management that is disclosed to the consumer. It is not clear to me that there ever has been any instance where this issue has even risen, but obviously some device suppliers want the clause added.

Every bit of communications regulation, as with every action by public officials, has private interest implications. Some actors, firms or industries gain advantage; others lose advantage, every time a rule is passed.

Nor is it unlawful for any industry to try and shape public opinion in ways that advance its own interests. It happens every day.

But net neutrality is horrifically complicated. It’s reduction to a bumper sticker slogan is unfortunate. You cannot really solve such a complex problem (it is an issue of business advantage and practices) by ignoring its complexity. “Freedom” really is not the issue.

Business practices and perceived business advantage are the heart of the matter.

Tuesday, February 6, 2018

5G Capex Might be Half that of 4G

It might be apparent to all--from regulators to providers to infrastructure and applications providers--that global telecom business models are under duress. That is to say, any honest analysis would conclude that the core business revenue model is under extreme pressure.

So we should not be surprised to find that the telecom supplier base also is under duress. One only has to note the evisceration of the North American core infrastructure industry (Nortel bankrupt, Lucent acquired by Alcatel, acquired in turn by Nokia; the emergence of Huawei as the leading global supplier; financial struggles at Ericsson and Nokia as examples.

At the same time, open source solutions, white box and alternative platforms are emerging, in part because service providers know they must dramatically retool their cost structures, from platform to operations, even as they seek new sources of revenue and roles in the ecosystem.

So 5G “will not be a capex windfall for the vendors,” says Caroline Gabriel, Rethink Technology Research research director. “Operators will prioritize coexistence with 4G and architecture to prolong the life of existing investments.

“There will be heavier reliance on outsourcing and on open platforms to reduce cost and transfer cost further than ever from capex to opex,” Gabriel argues.

In fact, Gabriel believes mobile operators will try to spend as little as half the capex on 5G roll-out that they did on 4G.

That is one answer to the question some raise: whether mobile operators can even afford to build 5G networks.

And many of the network enhancements--virtualized RAN and hyper-densification and massive MIMO antenna arrays--also will be applied to 4G, extending the useful life of advanced 4G.

That might be important in allowing 5G to focus on support for new categories of use cases, apps and revenue models.

Matters are largely the same in the fixed network realm. As a whole, U.S. fixed line service providers have had a tough time generating any net revenue growth since 2008, according to MoffettNathanson figures.


Much the same trend can be seen in Europe’s fixed network markets as well, as there has been zero to negative subscription growth since 1999. And the trend is happening even in the more-developed of South Asia countries, as fixed access declines (voice losses balanced by fixed internet access) and mobile grows.  


That means, if anything, that cost pressures will be even heavier in the fixed network segment of the business, as any incremental capex or opex has to support an arguably-dwindling revenue potential.

U.S. Consumer Internet Access Improves at Moore's Law Rates

In any market, what really matters are the services that customers actually buy. That is as true for internet access as for automobiles. Some 60 percent or more of U.S. fixed internet access customers buy from cable companies. That matters.

In 2015, for example, the slowest peak connection speeds were in the 34 Mbps to 45 Mbps range; the fastest in the 65 Mbps to 86 Mbps range. That matters since, even where telco services were available, most people did not buy them. AT&T and Verizon did better than other telcos, though, holding their market share. The other telcos mostly are losing share to cable competitors.


Also, most of the customers live in areas where speeds are fastest (west coast and Northeast and Mid-Atlantic regions).

By 2016, cable operators were offering speeds in excess of 100 Mbps, while Verizon was offering 88 Mbps speeds.

The key point is that the high end of internet access speeds sold to U.S. consumers has doubled about every year, increasing by an order of magnitude about every five years.

At least for U.S. cable companies, Moore's Law applies to internet access speeds: speeds double about every 18 months.

The point is that, despite nearly-constant criticism, U.S. internet access speeds have improved at Moore’s Law speeds, and U.S. policy on internet access mostly has provided incentives for internet service providers to invest in such growth.



Industry Strategy Now All about Transitions

Former Cisco CEO John Chambers has had a well-known theory about transitions: essentially, managing transitions underpins the business. “What Cisco has always done...is I focused on market transitions,” Chambers has said. “We moved from routing to switching...from switching to voice.”

We did the same thing with video, then we did the same thing in the data center,” he adds.

One might argue that firms such as AT&T are involved in precisely the same sort of management and strategic shift.

In developed markets, the key issue is what actors can do in the face of declining demand and revenue from all legacy services. Beyond efficiencies and acquisitions that increase scale, what fundamental strategy makes most sense.

And that is where opinions diverge. Analysts with a proper “near term” financial focus often urge firms such as AT&T to invest more in internet access capabilities, not content assets, the logic rationally being that if the foundation service of the future is internet access, a leading telco cannot afford to lost the market share battle to competitors.

Others might argue that the business itself is changing, that the key competitors really are app providers, not other access providers, and that the best transition model already has been pioneered by Comcast and firms such as Cisco.

In that scenario, the telecom industry is in a big transition from “access” revenues to “app” revenues (essentially a return to past practice, when nearly 100 percent of revenue was earned from apps such as voice).

So access providers have to diversify their revenue streams from “mostly access” to “access and apps and content.” And that change in industry dynamics is driven from outside, by the likes of Google and Facebook, not necessarily actions taken by access competitors, though that also is happening.

So it is that AT&T executives face questions about the wisdom of that firm’s content strategy. To be sure, AT&T also says it is moving fast towards gigabit network capability, so it is not neglecting investments in the access networks.

On the other hand, AT&T has taken criticism first for its DirecTV acquisition (on fears the linear business was shrinking) and now the Time Warner acquisition (more a move into content assets).

Proponents of the view that tier-one access providers must move up the stack and diversify their core revenues will simply note that revenue growth for most developed market tier-one service providers in recent years has come from video revenues.

“Since the day we bought DIRECTV, we assume that traditional linear video would be in a declining mode since kind of the nature of it, OTT and the ability to consume video on mobile devices, we believe would be the trend and the way where things went, we wanted to be in the leadership position,” said Randall Stephenson, AT&T CEO.

“We run these transitions all the time, right?” said Stephenson. “When you have technology transitions or business model transitions whether it's fixed phone service to mobile, whether it's a private line kind of service for business to VPN, whether it's -- you can kind of go down the list of whether it's feature phones to smartphones, we run these transitions and we think we're pretty good at it.”

Yes, there is a secular change from linear to on-demand consumption modes. But assets in linear are the building blocks for the move into on-demand subscription modes. Yes, there are gross revenue implications. But video entertainment represents the bulk of “new” consumer segment revenue sources larger developed market telcos have uncovered in recent years.

That can be seen in AT&T’s revenue contributors. Between 2013 and 2017, though business solutions and international revenues have grown fractionally, while consumer mobility declined, it was video (entertainment group) that showed clear growth of 134 percent.


That same sort of change will have to happen in the business revenues segment as well, in some ways related to internet of things. It is now all about handling the transitions, as Chambers always said.

Monday, February 5, 2018

FCC Says Common Carrier Regulation Depressed Investment

From 2012 to 2014, the two years preceding the Title II Order, fixed terrestrial broadband Internet access was deployed to 29.9 million people who never had it before, including one million people on tribal lands, the Federal Communications Commission says.

In the following two years, new deployments dropped 55 percent, reaching only 13.5 million people, including only 330,000 people on tribal lands.


My own analysis suggests there was a sharp drop off in 2015, with growth in 2016, but clearly at lower levels than had been seen in 2012 to 2014 periods.



New Fixed Network Connections Added 2012 to 2016
growthrate

1.20%
1.22%
1.81%
2.11%
up to 10 mbps
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
passings
290.7
294.2
297.8
303.2
309.6
net adds

3.5
3.6
5.4
6.4
25 Mbps

2013
2014
2015
2016
passings
254.4
263.9
284.3
286.9
297.8
growthrate

3.73%
7.73%
0.91%
3.80%
net adds

9.5
20.4
2.6
10.9
50mbps





passings
155.7
187.4
270.8
282.4
292.8
growthrate

20.36%
44.50%
4.28%
3.68%
net adds

31.7
83.4
11.6
10.4






total net adds

44.7
107.4
19.6
27.7
source: analysis of FCC data


From 2012 to 2014, mobile LTE broadband was newly deployed to 34.2 million people, including 21.5 million rural Americans. In the following two years, new mobile deployments dropped 83 percent, reaching only 5.8 million more Americans, including only 2.3 million more rural Americans.

And from 2012 to 2014, the number of Americans without access to both fixed terrestrial broadband and mobile broadband fell by more than half—from 72.1 million to 34.5 million.



Directv-Dish Merger Fails

Directv’’s termination of its deal to merge with EchoStar, apparently because EchoStar bondholders did not approve, means EchoStar continue...