One question some of us have about any sale by AT&T of its DirecTV asset is the impact on free cash flow, which might have been as much as 13 percent of total cash flow, or possibly more, by some accounts
In late 2019 DirecTV was said to be spinning off about $4 billion in annual cash flow, which seems low to me, but appears to be about right. In the first full year of ownership, DirecTV likely produced $12 billion of free cash flow.
Some speculate that AT&T could retain a minority interest in the business, and some of the cash flow. The point is that the cash flow implications of selling DirecTV are far less than would have been the case five years ago, when it appears the cash flow was three times higher.
Aside from the need for high cash flow to help pay down debt, the company also requires high cash flow to pay its dividends. Though not a popular position, the DirecTV acquisition made sense to me as the only viable way to add so much cash flow so fast.
Some had suggested the alternative of investing the capital in fiber to home facilities, but I never understood how cash flow could be boosted fast enough that way. Some might argue a massive diversion of capital to FTTH would not have recovered cost of capital, much less begun generating significant new cash flows within a year.
When DirecTV was acquired by AT&T, it would have been easy to find detractors arguing that AT&T should have spent that money investing in fiber to home infrastructure. The new story is hat AT&T should not have done so, as the asset is wasting away.
So what should AT&T have done with $67 billion, assuming a 4.6 percent cost of capital? Cost of capital is the annualized return a borrower or equity issuer (paying a dividend) incurs simply to cover the cost of borrowing.
In AT&T’s case, the breakeven rate is 4.6 percent, which is the cost of borrowing itself. To earn an actual return, AT&T has to generate new revenue above 4.6 percent.
Assume that for logistical reasons, AT&T really can only build about three million locations each year, gets a 25-percent initial take rate, spends $700 to pass a location and then $500 to activate a customer location. Assume account revenue is $80 a month.
AT&T would spend about $2.1 billion to build three million new FTTH locations. At a 25-percent initial take rate, AT&T spends about $525 million to provide service to new accounts. So annual cost is about $2.65 billion, to earn about $720 million in new revenue (not all of which is incremental, as some of the new FTTH customers are upgrading from DSL).
The simple point is that building three million new FTTH locations per year, and selling $80 in services to a quarter of those locations, immediately, does not recover the cost of capital.
So as controversial as the DirecTV buy might be, it at least had the advantage of throwing off cash flow. It is unclear whether the alternative of a big new FTTH build would have done even that well. At the time AT&T made the acquisition, DirecTV likely was throwing off something like