You might think our understanding of the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is unambiguous. It is not. “The outstanding fact about the First Amendment today is that the Supreme Court has never developed any comprehensive theory of what that constitutional guarantee means and how it should be applied in concrete cases,” argued Thomas Emerson.
What the First Amendment means, in other words, is far from “settled law” (precedent). It tends to develop on an ad hoc basis, rather than flowing from a comprehensive framework, Emerson notes.
Right now, a growing concern in some quarters is how freedom of expression is protected not from government action but by the actions of platforms. Indeed, some call for greater restriction of free speech on platforms, in the name of so-called hate speech. Others say the restrictions are not equally applied to all speech, and result in the suppression of some political ideas.
If we assume that the purpose of the First Amendment is to protect freedom of expression in a democratic society, then new media formats and new platforms can raise new issues. And, as is common, the matter is complicated.
The First Amendment has generally been interpreted to protect the rights of “speakers. But the owners of new platforms (social media, in particular) say their users are the “speakers,” not the platforms.
That is the basis for Section 230 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The act protects platforms from liability for what is said by users of their platforms. “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider,” the Act states.
In other words, users are the speakers, not the platform. That could have profound implications.
The owners of platforms do not lose their corporate right of free speech as private entities, but the matter of free speech is complicated when the platforms themselves do not claim to be speakers.
The bigger issue might ultimately be that the First Amendment says “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.”
Traditionally, citizens are to be protected from government restriction of free speech.
But the places where “speech” occurs also matter. Public forums--such as public parks and sidewalks--have always been viewed as places where citizens have the right of free speech.
Nonpublic forums are places where the right of free speech can be limited. Examples are airport terminals, a public school’s internal mail system or polling places.
In between are limited public forums, where similar restrictions on speech are lawful, especially when applied to classes of speakers. However, the government is still prohibited from engaging in viewpoint discrimination, assuming the class is allowed.
The government may, for example, limit access to public school meeting rooms to school-related activities. The government may not, however, exclude speakers from a religious group simply because they intend to express religious views, so long as they are in a permitted class of users.
Those protections have been limited to state action, It is government entities (local, state, or federal) that are enjoined from infringing the right of free speech. Protections have not been deemed applicable to private entities.
There has generally been in other words, no First Amendment right of free speech enforceable on private firms or persons, with some exceptions.
Common carriers--such as telcos--must allow communications between any users who are willing to pay the tariffs. Telcos cannot censor what those users say. Such regulation--including public accommodation, water and electrical utilities or railroads--is not generally regarded as a direct “free speech” issue, but an issue of commerce.
A common carrier is a person or company that transports goods or people for a fee, the principle being non-discrimination. A common carrier must provide its service to anyone willing to pay its fee, unless it has legitimate grounds for refusal.
If state governments decide to create laws protecting free speech from social media or other private firms, that would at the very least raise an issue: Can the federal government, acting under the guise of the First Amendment, move to restrict state action extending the zone of free speech to include dominant private platforms?
That might involve a novel regulation of social media platforms as common carriers of a sort. That would plow new ground, but First Amendment law has evolved over the years in an ad hoc way, all along.
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