What Ails U.S. Student Math and Reading Skills?

Some might claim educational technology is to blame for declining U.S. student capabilities in math and reading. That probably is not the most-common explanation, however. 

U.S. student performance in reading and mathematics has been tracked primarily through the National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP). Overall, scores showed steady improvements from the 1970s through the early 2010s, peaking around 2013. 

Since then, performance has stagnated or declined, with sharp drops during the COVID-19 pandemic (2019–2022) due to school disruptions. Test scores indicate high school scores for the 2024 graduating classes have dropped. 

Many reasons have been advanced, but some might point to a couple of decades of declining scores. 

Post-pandemic recovery has been uneven: math has shown slight rebounds in some grades, while reading continues to decline. 

These trends are more pronounced among lower-performing students, widening achievement gaps. By 2024–2025, 12th-grade scores reached historic lows, with reading 10 points below 1992 levels and math at its lowest since 2005.

Study/Author(s)	Year	Key Proposed Reasons
Scammacca et al	2019	Initial proficiency levels create Matthew effects (higher initial skills lead to faster growth); demographic factors (socioeconomic status, ethnicity) influence starting scores and growth rates; grade-level differences affect trajectories, with lower performers growing slower over time.
Wyckoff (Annenberg Working Paper)	2025	Pre-2013 gains slowed due to policy shifts (reduced accountability post-NCLB); Great Recession funding cuts; Common Core disruptions; rising smartphone/social media use; demographic shifts (more English learners); pandemic accelerated existing declines, especially for low performers.
Malkus (AEI Report)	2025	Similar to Wyckoff: accountability rollback, funding reductions, smartphone proliferation, and out-of-school factors (student well-being) explain stagnation since 2013; pandemic worsened trends but isn't the sole cause; factors outside school (e.g., screens) play a major role.
DeBord (Dissertation)	2026	Post-pandemic: classroom factors (rebuilding routines, teacher adaptability); school collaboration; family/district supports; persistent gaps in foundational knowledge, reduced struggle tolerance, technology habits, and socioemotional needs hinder recovery.
NWEA Brief	2021	COVID-specific: remote learning disruptions led to below-pre-pandemic gains; greater impacts on math than reading; inequities in access (devices, support) affected lower performers more; recovery requires addressing missed foundations.

But there may be lots of other cumulative reasons, including social promotion (advancing students to the next grade despite inadequate performance to maintain age-appropriate grouping) and efforts to avoid stigmatizing learners (through reduced retention or labeling to prevent emotional harm), may contribute to declining academic achievement in U.S. students. 

These practices are often adopted to mitigate short-term social-emotional risks like low self-esteem or dropout likelihood from grade retention, but research suggests they can exacerbate long-term performance issues by allowing students to advance without mastering foundational skills, leading to compounded learning gaps, disengagement, and lower scores on assessments like NAEP.

This is particularly evident among lower-performing students, where declines have been steepest since the early 2010s. It’s complicated.

How Much Do Tariffs Affect Inflation?

Today’s political discussions can be frustrating and unhelpful, in large part because people disagree about what the “facts” of any subject are, beyond the “normal” problem of post-modern rejection of the notion of any such thing as absolute truth. 

Consider the matter of the impact of tariffs on general rates of inflation. In principle, tariffs can result in a one-time increase in prices, but not inflation (a general rise in prices for all goods and services). 

If there are any facts we might not generally disagree about, it is that inflation pressures exist, and have existed for some time. 

The bulk (80 percent to 90 percent) of total inflationary price increases, especially in key areas such as housing, health care, childcare, food and energy, occurred after 2017, but were caused by non-trade shocks. COVID-19 added 10 percent to 15 percent price increases across the economy by 2022, for example.

Other areas where consumers see higher prices are essentially insulating from tariffs, such as child care and healthcare (70 percent or more of costs are entirely domestic). 

Food and energy imports did face tariffs but were dwarfed by global events. Pandemic meatpacking disruptions in 2020 caused at least a 10 percent spike. ) The avian flu (2022-2023) explains 70 percent of rise in egg and chicken prices.  Also, imported food tariffs affected about five percent of U.S. food supply items.

Sector	Pre-Tariff Increase (2016-2017 to End-2017)	Post-Tariff Increase (End-2017 to End-2024)	Total Increase (2016-2024)	Non-Tariff Drivers
Housing (Shelter CPI)	+3.3%	+29.5%	+33.5%	Driven by low inventory (U.S. built 5M fewer homes than needed post-2008) and rent controls in high-demand areas; tariffs on lumber/steel added ~1-2% at most.
Food (Food at Home CPI)	+0.8%	+26.2%	+27.1%	Pandemic meatpacking disruptions (2020: +10% YoY) and avian flu (2022-2023) explain 70%+ of rise; imported food tariffs minimal (~5% of U.S. supply).
Healthcare (Medical Care CPI)	+2.1%	+22.4%	+24.7%	Prescription drug prices up 15% pre-2018 due to patent protections; hospital consolidations added 5-7% annually. Tariffs irrelevant to domestic services.
Child Care (Avg. Annual Cost)	+3.0% (est. from 2016 baseline ~$10,000)	+31.3% (to $13,128 in 2024)	+34.6%	Post-2020 wage hikes for providers (+25%) and 20% capacity loss from closures; exceeds general CPI by 10+ points, per DOL data. No direct tariff link.
Energy (Overall Energy CPI)	-2.5% (oil price dip)	+28.1%	+25.1%	2022 Ukraine war caused +50% gasoline spike; renewables transition volatility. Pre-2018 shale oversupply kept prices low; tariffs on imported oil negligible.

In sum, in each of these key consumer spending categories, there were other forces driving most of the price increases:  

• Housing: Chronic underbuilding since the 2008 financial crisis, zoning restrictions, and rising construction material/labor costs fueled by domestic shortages and low interest rates until 2022.

• Food: Supply chain disruptions (e.g., weather events, labor shortages), the COVID-19 pandemic's lasting effects on processing and transportation, and commodity price volatility from events like the 2022 Ukraine conflict.

• Healthcare: Aging population demands, regulatory complexities, pharmaceutical pricing dynamics, and insurance market consolidations—issues predating tariffs by decades.

• Child Care: Labor shortages in the sector (wages rose 20-30% post-2020 to attract workers), pandemic-related closures leading to reduced capacity, and insufficient public subsidies, with costs outpacing general inflation by 7 percentage points from 2020-2024.

• Energy: Geopolitical tensions (e.g., OPEC decisions pre-2018), the shale boom's volatility, and the 2020-2022 global energy crunch from pandemic recovery and the Russia-Ukraine war—notably, U.S. gasoline prices spiked 50%+ in 2022 before new 2025 tariffs.

Category	Pre-Tariff Increase (2012–2017 Annualized %)	Post-Tariff Increase (2018–Sep 2025 Annualized %)	Key Non-Tariff Drivers	Sources
Housing	+5.2% (FHFA HPI from ~250 to ~320 index)	+6.1% (to ~435 index; +70% cumulative since 2012)	Supply shortages, low rates, zoning	FHFA HPI; FRED USSTHPI
Food	+2.4% (CPI food from ~230 to ~250 index)	+3.8% (to ~290 index; +25% since 2019)	Pandemic disruptions, weather, labor	BLS CPI Food; USDA ERS Outlook
Healthcare	+3.1% (CPI medical care from ~430 to ~480 index)	+3.5% (to ~580 index; +35% since 2010)	Aging population, drug costs, consolidation	BLS CPI Medical Care; US Inflation Calculator
Child Care	+4.1% (Costs up ~25% from ~$9K to ~$11K avg annual/infant)	+5.3% (to ~$15K avg; +67% since 2010)	Provider wages, regulations, demand	EPI Child Care Costs; Living Wage Institute
Energy	+ (-1.2)% (CPI energy volatile, net flat from ~200 to ~195 index)	+2.9% (to ~270 index; +39% since 2019)	Geopolitics, AI demand, grid delays	BLS CPI Energy; BLS CPI Summary

Some point out that only about 20 percent of tariff costs show up in consumer prices, which might still be seen as important, even if the main drivers lie elsewhere:

• Shelter costs have risen close to 34 percent since 2019, outpacing household income growth by more than 12 percentage points

• Egg and beef prices are higher, yes. But in most years, ranchers struggle to earn a profit; the cattle herd shrank and we had a drought in 2022

• Avian flu wiped out millions of hens, quadrupling egg prices overnight

• Child-care costs have risen 10 points faster than overall inflation, driven by rising wages and shifts in the labor market.

Paradoxically, in the sectors where tariffs are in place (cars, bicycles, and washing machines), prices have risen less than overall inflation because durable goods companies compete fiercely for market share and absorb most of the tariff costs rather than passing them on to consumers. 

A Stunning "Controlled Experiment" Shows How Hard "Good Public Policy" Can Be

Students of the effectiveness of public policy might agree, if they thought about it, that we rarely have any way of assessing the effectiveness of policies we devise to solve stated problems, such as protecting students and teachers from Covid infections, for example. 

But sometimes we accidentally do find the closest proxy to a controlled experiment that we are ever likely to find in real life. 

During the COVID-19 pandemic, particularly in the 2020-2021 school year when many public schools in the United States were closed or operating remotely due to lockdowns and health concerns, the majority of Catholic schools remained open for in-person or hybrid instruction. 

According to data from the National Catholic Educational Association, 92 percent of Catholic schools were offering full-time in-person or hybrid learning by early 2021, with most reopening in the fall of 2020 where local regulations permitted. 

This contrasted sharply with large public school districts in cities like New York, Los Angeles, and Chicago, which often stayed closed for the entire year. 

Regarding COVID-19 transmission, there were no reports of major widespread outbreaks or significant spikes in cases attributable to Catholic schools during this period. 

Multiple sources, including diocesan reports and analyses, indicate that infection rates in these open Catholic schools were generally low and comparable to or below community averages, thanks to rigorous health protocols. 

For instance, in the Archdiocese of Washington, officials reported in late 2020 that safety measures were effective even as regional cases rose, with no evidence of school-driven surges. 

Similarly, a 2023 analysis noted that Catholic schools maintained in-person learning without significant increases in infection rates, despite 17 percent of teachers being high-risk. 

Broader studies on school reopenings, such as those tracking U.S. districts in 2020-2021, found that in-person instruction in elementary and secondary settings (including private ones) did not lead to substantial community transmission when mitigation strategies were in place. While isolated cases occurred. Catholic schools were frequently highlighted as models for safe reopening, with no documented "major problems" like mass closures due to outbreaks. 

Title/Publication	URL	Publication Date
Why Catholic schools didn't fail while public ones did during COVID (New York Post)	New York Post	November 15, 2022
While public schools closed on fear and politics, Catholic schools opened on love and science (Washington Examiner)	Washington Examiner	June 28, 2023
Catholic Schools Have Stayed (Mostly) Open During The Pandemic (WGBH)	WGBH	February 25, 2021
COVID heroes: Catholic schools safely reopened (USA Today)	USA Today	February 12, 2021
COVID-19 cluster size and transmission rates in schools from ... (PMC)	NIH	N/A (academic study, circa 2022)
NCEA Releases 2020 - 2021 Data on State of Catholic Schools ... (NCEA)	NCEA	February 2021
ED624233 - Catholic School Enrollment Boomed during COVID ... (ERIC)	ERIC	2022
Analysis of Catholic School Reopening Plans in Fall 2020 (Digital Commons @ LMU)	Digital Commons	2021

It seems fairly obvious now, with our better understanding of Covid transmission, Covid vaccine effectiveness and lethality for people of different ages and health states, that the policies of closing public schools was a mistake. A rather big mistake.