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Wednesday, April 29, 2026

AI Scarcities and Constraints Keep Evolving

It’s hard to keep up with the evolution of “value” in the artificial intelligence business as scarcities that create value keep shifting.


Between 2017 and early 2024, for example, scarcity and value in the AI value chain were heavily concentrated at the top of the stack:

  • high-quality training data

  • frontier model development(research talent, algorithms like transformers, and initial large-scale training runs). 


Compute, in the form of Nvidia graphics processing units,  was important, but a dominant bottleneck:

  • inference was relatively cheap

  • models were mostly accessed using APIs or research prototypes

  • real-world deployment at scale was limited

  • So value accrued to pioneers in data curation, model architecture, and cloud providers.


By 2026, constraints  have shifted with mass deployment:

  • compute infrastructure (GPUs/accelerators, high-bandwidth memory/HBM, advanced packaging) remains scarce

  • energy is emerging as a new scarcity (data center electricity, grid capacity, and permitting delays)

  • physical infrastructure (data centers, land in power-rich locations, cooling) lags demand

  • data scarcity is resurfacing as high-quality public data exhausts and regulations tighten

  • model weights and foundational capabilities have commoditized somewhat

  • supply chain crunches extend to materials like indium phosphide for optics and memory chips.


Overall, value has "inverted" toward the bottom of the stack, a shift from past decades where value accumulated in applications:

  • infrastructure and physical hardware is scarce (chips, GPUs and accelerators, compute as a service, utilities, and energy firms)

  • application-layer value (SaaS, agents, enterprise workflows) is growing but often depends on cheap/reliable inference, and therefore infrastructure

  • consumer surplus from gen AI has risen sharply, but producer value capture is uneven.



Value Chain Role

Scarcity/Value ~2022–Early 2024

Scarcity/Value in 2026

Potential Future Scarcity/Value (2027+)

Data

High (internet-scale public data as fuel for scaling laws)

Rising (high-quality data "exhaustion"; regulations; shift to synthetic data)

High for specialized/real-time/enterprise/private data; synthetic data generation & curation

Models & Algorithms

Very High (frontier research, talent, architecture breakthroughs)

Moderate/Lowering (open-source closes gaps; commoditization of capable base models)

Lower for base models; High for specialized fine-tuning, agents, reasoning, or domain expertise

Training Compute

High (GPUs, clusters for large runs)

High but shifting (GPU/HBM shortages persist; diversification to custom ASICs)

Moderate (efficiency gains; more distributed/synthetic training)

Inference

Low (early, limited scale)

Very High (80-90% of lifetime costs; latency, memory, energy at scale; "factory" phase)

Extremely High (edge/on-device, long-context agents, real-time applications)

Infrastructure (Data Centers, Power, Cooling)

Moderate (cloud scaling)

Very High (energy/grid bottlenecks; power > chips as limiter; land/permitting)

Highest (energy access, nuclear/renewables integration, grid modernization)

Hardware Supply Chain

Moderate (Nvidia dominance emerging)

High (HBM, advanced packaging, optics, materials like indium phosphide)

High for specialized (inference-optimized, edge, robotics silicon)

Applications & Agents

Low (mostly prototypes)

Growing (enterprise adoption, workflows; value from integration)

High (autonomous agents, physical AI/robotics, real-world actions)

Physical World/Embodiment

Negligible

Emerging (early robotics interest)

Very High (humanoids, autonomous systems, sensors, actuators, real-world data loops)


Among the key shifts so far in 2026:

  • value has moved downstream from "intelligence creation" (models/data) to "intelligence delivery and scaling" (inference and infrastructure)

  • compute shortages have evolved into broader supply-chain and energy issues including

    • power contracts

    • tier-2 locations

    • inference efficiency

    • energy consumed per token.


Future scarcities could develop in the future: 

  • embodied AI (robotics, sensors, actuators, energy storage, and unstructured environment handling)

  • orchestration and decision-making (supply chains, logistics)

  • regulatory compliance

  • valuable applications that leverage abundance (as physical constraints lessen)

  • geopolitics, materials, and talent for physical AI.


And, by definition, we don’t know what we don’t know. So we cannot predict what unknown issues might arise. 


"Known unknowns" in the AI value chain refer to recognized uncertainties or risks whose existence we acknowledge, even if we cannot precisely quantify their timing, magnitude, or full impact. 


These are issues we can model, debate, plan for, and partially mitigate through investment, policy, redundancy or research and development. 


In contrast, "unknown unknowns" are the true blind spots:

  • risks

  • emergent behaviors

  • systemic shifts we do not yet realize exist. 


Unknown unknowns arise from emergent properties and non-linear interactions across the value chain:

  • unpredictable model optimization for objectives not explicitly intended

  • systemic supply chain compromises or cascading failures, such as AI agents acting as unpredictable "insider threats"

  • transformative capability jumps or self-acceleration if AI begins automating large parts of its own R&D, training, or infrastructure design at unexpected speeds or in unforeseen directions

  • disruption of labor markets, trust mechanisms, legal systems, or global power balances

  • AI amplifying or interacting with unrelated disruptions or introducing fragility.


By definition, it is virtually impossible to plan for unknown unknowns, except to retain as much flexibility and adaptability as possible.


Monday, February 2, 2026

AI Impact: Analogous to Digital and Internet Transformations Before It

For some of us, predictions about the impact of artificial intelligence are remarkably consistent with sentiments around the importance of innovation in the technology business we have heard since the 1980s and up through the internet revolution.


“In 2030, I think we will be bringing offerings and solutions to market that we can’t even envision

today because the technology isn’t there yet,” says Maureen Power Sweeny, RapidScale chief revenue officer.” I would say 50 percent of our revenues will come from new offerings.”


Some of us have been hearing that since the 1980s, and the sentiment seems borne out by events, and especially for digital products that can be created and adopted faster than older physical-only products. 


Five to 10 years is now multiple generations of product evolution in software, cloud, data, and AI.


Company

Product generating major revenue today

Year introduced (approx.)

What it displaced or superseded

Amazon (AWS)

Lambda, SageMaker, Bedrock

2014–2023

EC2-only compute, on-prem ML

Microsoft

Azure OpenAI, M365 E5, Copilot

2019–2024

Perpetual Office licenses, on-prem Exchange

Salesforce

Einstein AI, Platform, Industry Clouds

2016–2023

Standalone CRM licenses

NVIDIA

Data center AI accelerators

2017–present

Gaming GPUs as primary revenue driver

Adobe

Creative Cloud subscriptions

2013–2017 ramp

Perpetual boxed software

ServiceNow

Creator workflows, AI ops

2018–2024

ITSM-only positioning

Zoom

Phone, Contact Center, AI Companion

2019–2024

Single-product video meetings

Apple

Services (TV+, Pay, Arcade, Fitness)

2019–present

Hardware-only growth

Google

Cloud AI APIs, Workspace AI

2018–2024

Ad-only monetization model

Netflix

Ad-supported tier, originals

2016–2023

Licensed content distribution


But many industries feature high rates of innovation and product replacement. In many fast-moving consumer categories, 40 percent to 70 percent of active SKUs (stock keeping units) at major retailers are replaced within five years, even though the brand name on the shelf barely changes.


Category

Brand

Current high-volume SKUs (examples)

Introduced (approx.)

What they replaced or supplemented

Beverages

Coca-Cola

Zero Sugar reformulations, mini-cans

2017–2023

Full-sugar flagship SKUs

Snacks

PepsiCo (Lay’s)

Baked, Kettle, limited flavors

2016–2024

Core salted potato chips

Dairy alternatives

Danone

Oat-based yogurts, creamers

2018–2024

Traditional dairy SKUs

Household

P&G (Tide)

Pods, hygienic clean, cold-water

2015–2023

Liquid detergent bottles

Beauty

L’Oréal

Clean beauty, dermocosmetic lines

2017–2024

Mass cosmetic formulations

Food

Nestlé

Plant-based frozen meals

2019–2024

Animal-protein frozen SKUs

Alcohol

AB InBev

Hard seltzers, flavored malt drinks

2018–2023

Core beer SKUs

Personal care

Unilever

Sulfate-free, refill formats

2019–2024

Traditional shampoo bottles

Candy

Mars

Sugar-reduced, portion-controlled

2016–2023

Standard single-serve bars

Pet food

General Mills

Fresh, functional pet foods

2019–2024

Dry kibble-only lines


So one commonality with prior industry changes is rapid and continual product innovation. 


The other perhaps-obvious potential change is industry disruption. 


In 2030, enterprise success won’t be measured by steady progress toward long-term targets but by how much an enterprise disrupts its industry quarter by quarter, IBM researchers argue. 


The biggest risk won’t be making the wrong bets, but making bets that are too small, the authors argue. 


That again will sound familiar to those who witnessed the changes in firms and industries wrought by the internet. Netflix provides an example. 


Netflix disrupted multiple stages of the video entertainment value chain, first by unbundling physical retail rentals and later by collapsing production, aggregation, and direct distribution into a single global streaming platform.

source: Digital Leadership 


Value chain stage

Traditional role

Netflix’s move

Why it was disruptive

Content creation & commissioning

Studios and networks funded, developed, and greenlit shows and films, often for domestic first windows.

Became a major commissioner and producer of originals, including local-language series with global ambitions.academic.oup+1

Shifted power from broadcasters to a data-driven buyer with global reach, reducing reliance on legacy networks and altering bargaining dynamics.academic.oup

Aggregation & programming

Broadcasters and cable networks assembled schedules and channel line‑ups; video stores curated shelves.

Offered a huge on-demand catalog with personalized rows and recommendations instead of fixed schedules or shelves.accio+1

Undermined the value of linear programming and physical curation, making algorithmic discovery the primary gatekeeper of attention.accio+1

Distribution to consumers

Cable/satellite operators and retail chains controlled access via physical locations or set‑top boxes; households subscribed to bundles or rented per title.forbes+1

Delivered content over the open internet to apps on TVs, phones, and PCs via a flat-rate subscription.accio+1

Bypassed cable operators and retail stores, drove cord‑cutting, and shifted consumer spend from channel bundles and rentals to streaming subscriptions.intrinsicinvesting

Retail / rental monetization

Video rental stores monetized individual rentals and late fees, constrained by local inventory and store hours.linkedin+1

Introduced queue-based subscription rentals by mail, then streaming with no late fees and no trip to the store.linkedin+1

Eliminated the core revenue levers of incumbents (late fees, impulse rentals), making their store-heavy model uncompetitive.linkedin+1

Marketing & discovery

Studios and networks relied on mass advertising, trailers, and prominent placement in stores or schedules.

Used in‑product recommendations, personalized homepages, and data-informed promotion of titles.accio+1

Reduced dependence on external marketing funnels, internalized discovery, and extended tail consumption of niche titles.accio

International sales & licensing

Rights sold territory-by-territory with complex windowing across cinema, pay TV, free TV, and home video.

Negotiated multi-territory and global rights and launched near-simultaneous international releases on one platform.academic.oup+1

Collapsed layers of local intermediaries and windows, standardizing global access and weakening traditional territorial carve‑ups.academic.oup


The internet accelerated innovation by making information, markets, and coordination vastly cheaper and faster, turning experimentation by firms into a continuous, global, software-driven process. 


Enablers included:

  • Radically lower information and transaction costs 

  • Continuous software-based iteration, shortening innovation cycles from years to weeks or days.

  • Global market access​

  • Real-time feedback loops

  • Platform and ecosystem effects (e-commerce, app stores, social networks).


The take-away is that, as we have seen before, AI is going to enable more industry and firm disruption. 


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