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Monday, October 28, 2024

Build Versus Buy is the Issue for Verizon Acquisition of Frontier

Verizon’s rationale for acquiring Frontier Communications, at a cost of  $20 billion, is partly strategic, partly tactical. Verizon and most other telcos face growth issues, and Frontier adds fixed network footprint, existing fiber access and other revenues, plant and equipment. 


Consider how Verizon’s fixed network compares with major competitors. 


ISP

Total Fixed Network Homes, Small Businesses Passed

AT&T

~70 million

Comcast

~60 million

Charter

~50 million

Verizon

~36 million


Verizon has the smallest fixed network footprint, so all other things being equal, the smallest share of the total home broadband market nationwide. If home broadband becomes the next big battleground for AT&T and Verizon revenue growth (on the assumption mobility market share is being taken by cable companies and T-Mobile from Verizon and At&T), then Verizon has to do something about its footprint, as it simply does not have enough ability to compete for customers across most of the Untied States for home broadband using fixed network platforms. 

And though Frontier’s customer base and geographies are heavily rural and suburban, compared to Verizon, that is characteristic of most “at scale” telco assets that might be acquisition targets for Verizon. 


Oddly enough, Verizon sold many of the assets it now plans to reacquire. In 2010, for example, Frontier Communications purchased rural operations in 27 states from Verizon, including more than seven million local access lines and 4.8 million customer lines. 


Those assets were located in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia, shown in the map below as brown areas. 


Then in 2015, Verizon sold additional assets in three states (California, Texas, Florida) to Frontier. Those assets included 3.7 million voice connections; 2.2 million broadband internet access customers, including about 1.6 million fiber optic access accounts and approximately 1.2 million video entertainment customers.


source: Verizon, Tampa Bay Business Journal 


Now Verizon is buying back the bulk of those assets. There are a couple of notable angles. First, Verizon back in the first decade of the 21st century was raising cash and shedding rural assets that did not fit well with its FiOS fiber-to-home strategy. In the intervening years, Frontier has rebuilt millions of those lines with FTTH platforms.


Also, with fixed network growth stagnant, acquiring Frontier now provides a way to boost Verizon’s own revenue growth.


For example, the acquisition adds around 7.2 million additional and already-in-place fiber passings. Verizon already has 18 million fiber passings,increasing  the fiber footprint to reach nearly 25 million homes and small businesses​. In other words, the acquisition increases current fiber passings by about 29 percent. 


There also are some millions of additional copper passings that might never be upgraded to fiber, but can generate revenue (copper internet access or voice or alarm services, for example). Today, Frontier generates about 44 percent of its total revenue from copper access facilities, some of which will eventually be upgraded to fiber, but perhaps not all. 


Frontier already has plans to add some three million more fiber passes by about 2026, for example, bringing its total fiber passings up to about 10 million. 


That suggests Frontier’s total network might pass 16 million to 17 million homes and small businesses. But assume Verizon’s primary interest is about 10 million new fiber passings. 


Frontier has estimated its cost per passing for those locations as between $1000 and $1100. Assume Verizon can also achieve that. Assume the full value of the Frontier acquisition ($20 billion) was instead spent on building new fiber plant outside of region, at a blended cost of #1050 per passing. 


That implies Verizon might be able to build perhaps 20 million new FTTH passings as an alternative, assuming all other costs (permits, pole leases or conduit access) were not material. But those costs exist, and might represent about 25 percent higher costs. 


So adjust the cost per passing for outside-of-region builds to a range of $1300 to $1400. Use a blended average of $1350. Under those circumstances, Verizon might hope to build less than 15 million locations. 


And in that scenario Verizon would not acquire the existing cash flow or other property. So one might broadly say the alternative is spending $20 billion to build up to 15 million new fiber passings over time, versus acquiring 10 million fiber passings in about a year, plus the revenue from seven million passings (with take rates around 40 percent of passings). 


Critics will say Verizon could do something else with $20 billion, to be sure, including not spending the money and not increasing its debt. But some of those same critics will decry Verizon’s lack of revenue growth as well. 


But Verizon also sees economies of scale, creating projected cost synergies of around $500 million annually by the third year. The acquisition is expected to be accretive to Verizon’s revenue, EBITDA and cash flow shortly after closing, if adding to Verizon’s debt load. 


Even if the majority of Verizon revenue is generated by mobility services, fixed network services still contribute a quarter or so of total revenues, and also are part of the cost structure for mobility services. To garner a higher share of moderate- to high-speed home broadband (perhaps in the 300 Mbps to 500 Mbps range for “moderate speed” and gigabit and multi-gigabit services as “high speed”), Verizon has to increase its footprint nationwide or regionally, outside its current fixed network footprint. 


One might make the argument that Verizon should not bother expanding its fixed network footprint, but home broadband is a relative growth area (at least in terms of growing market share). The ability to take market share from the leading cable TV firms (using fixed wireless for lower speed and fiber for higher speed accounts) clearly exists, but only if Verizon can acquire or build additional footprint outside its present core region.


And while it is possible for Verizon to cherry pick its “do it yourself” home broadband footprint outside of region, that approach does not offer immediate scale. Assuming all else works out, it might take Verizon five years to add an additional seven million or so FTTH passings outside of the current region. 


There is a value to revenue Verizon can add from day one, rather than building gradually over five years.


Wednesday, October 23, 2024

Will AI Have Impact More Like the PC or the Internet? Why it Matters

One reason it is conceptually hard to imagine the impact of artificial intelligence is that it is likely to have business impact along the same lines as did Moore’s Law or the internet: removing key cost barriers and enabling new business models. 


And though some outcomes are easy to envision, such as automating functions or removing geographic barriers, others are hard to grasp because they simply did not exist before. Search and social media are examples. 


In other words, as Moore’s Law led to the elimination of key constraints regarding the cost of computing and software, while the internet created new possibilities for product distribution and sales,, AI might well eliminate key barriers in a value chain.


That will allow lots of industries to evolve in ways that were not possible before, and possibly also create a few new industries that had not existed previously, as the search and social media businesses emerged with completely-new business models (ad supported technology and user-generated content). 


The way to think about it is to ask, in the context of any business, process or industry, what could be different if the key cost constraint, or a major cost constraint, were reduced to a point where it no longer was a constraint or barrier. .


In other words, the question is something like “what would my business look like if a key input were nearly free?” 


Perhaps the best example is Netflix. It is not entirely clear whether Netflix founder Reed Hastings initially and “always” thought the company would evolve into a video streaming service, but it is clear that he did believe a “deliver your DVDs by mail” service was viable in 1997. 


According to Barry McCarthy (Netflix's CFO from 1999 to 2010) and Neil Hunt (Netflix's Chief Product Officer from 1999 to 2017), they were at a 2005 dinner with Reed Hastings where they sketched out projections of bandwidth costs and speeds on a napkin. They plotted Moore's Law-like curves showing:

  • Internet speeds would keep increasing

  • Video compression technology would improve

  • The cost of bandwidth would continue falling


The key insight from their napkin math was that these trends would intersect at a point where streaming video would become economically viable for a mass market service. Netflix launched video streaming in 2007. 


So think of the ways AI might eventually remove key cost constraints in many industries, as the internet eliminated barriers in retailing.


Retailer Cost Constraint

Traditional Retail

Internet Retail

Inventory Costs

High costs associated with maintaining physical inventory, including storage, handling, and obsolescence

Reduced inventory needs due to drop-shipping models and virtual warehouses, leading to lower storage and handling costs

Real Estate Costs

High costs for physical store locations, including rent, utilities, and maintenance

Lower costs associated with online stores, as they require minimal physical space

Distribution Costs

High costs for shipping and transportation of products to physical stores

Lower costs for shipping directly to customers, especially for digital products

Marketing Costs

High costs for traditional advertising methods, such as print, television, and radio

Lower costs for online marketing, including search engine optimization, social media, and email marketing

Customer Service Costs

High costs for in-store customer service, including staffing and training

Lower costs for online customer service, often automated or outsourced


And we can note many similar constraint removals in other industries, including the creation of entirely-new business and revenue models for search and social media. Both search and social media were examples of “advertising-supported technology” models, something that had not been conceivable or possible before. 


But the internet also enabled a rearrangement of business models in most industries, often focused heavily on distribution methods. 


Industry

Traditional Cost Barriers

Internet Solutions

Retail

High overhead costs (rent, utilities), inventory management, distribution

E-commerce platforms, drop-shipping, digital products

Media

Printing costs, distribution logistics, limited reach

Online publishing, streaming services, social media

Software

Physical distribution, licensing costs

Digital distribution, SaaS models, open-source software

Education

Infrastructure costs, geographical limitations

Online courses, MOOCs, virtual classrooms

Finance

Branch network costs, transaction fees

Online banking, mobile payments, cryptocurrency

Travel

Agency fees, booking limitations

Online travel agencies, direct bookings, peer-to-peer platforms

Entertainment

Production costs, distribution channels

Digital content creation, streaming platforms, social media

Manufacturing

Supply chain costs, inventory management

3D printing, on-demand manufacturing, global sourcing

Customer Service

Infrastructure costs, geographical limitations

Online help desks, chatbots, AI-powered support

Professional Services

Geographical limitations, overhead costs

Remote work, online collaboration tools, freelance platforms


Consider the importance of Moore’s Law for the software industry’s “forward pricing” of its products.


Forward pricing is a strategy of setting prices for current products based on anticipated future costs and market conditions, rather than just current costs. 


Microsoft in the 1980s and 1990s, for example, is said to have deliberately released new products that both required more-powerful hardware and also with the expectation that the hardware would catch up. 


In the gaming Industry, products often were designed around advanced hardware that had not yet become mainstream, assuming that would happen and that costs for the platforms would drop. 


Suppliers of enterprise software arguably made the same assumptions, building features that required better hardware and platform upgrades.


On the other hand, initial high prices were expected to fall rapidly, creating the potential for mass market adoption though initially focusing on early adopters. 


The key issue at the moment is that it is very hard to conceive of entirely new ways an existing industry can innovate using AI, to revamp its value chains. It arguably is even harder to envision the emergence of at least a few entirely-new industries that do not presently exist. 


The personal computer and the internet have enabled the emergence of entirely industries or industry segments. For example, the independent software industry was enabled by the PC, along with lots of “PC-specific” industry functions. 


The internet arguably has had more-profound impact, enabling e-commerce, social media, search, cloud computing, digital advertising and streaming media. 


Personal Computer

Internet

PC Manufacturing

E-commerce

Operating Systems

Social Media

PC Software

Cloud Computing

Computer Peripherals

Digital Advertising

PC Gaming

Streaming Media

Desktop Publishing

Online Education

Computer-Aided Design (CAD)

Cybersecurity

PC Repair Services

Web Hosting

PC Retail

Search Engines

PC Magazines/Media

Digital Payment Systems


That should raise questions about the potential AI impact: will it mostly create new industry sub-sectors that support the use of AI itself, as did much of the PC ecosystem, or will it transform whole functions and industries, as arguably was the case for the internet?


Tuesday, September 24, 2024

Copper to Fiber Asset Value Hinges on Take Rates

It can be difficult to appreciate the business strategy behind purchasing telco copper access networks and then upgrading them for fiber-to-home services, especially when those assets are primarily rural networks with lower home densities, higher capital investment per location and generally lower revenue per account.


The other issue is the wide variance in such costs, based on the scale of acquisitions and the various estimated “value” of the assets (location density, revenue per account, growth potential, competition, value to acquirer of synergies and upgrade potential). 


Still, as a rule, we can estimate that cost per account has grown since 2000 for either telco network assets or application assets (users). 


Acquired Company

Acquiring Company

Year

Deal Value

Cost per Location

Estimated Cost per Account

BellSouth

AT&T

2006

$86 billion

N/A

~$632

Time Warner Cable + Bright House

Charter Communications

2016

$67 billion

N/A

~$2,680

GTE

Bell Atlantic (became Verizon)

2000

$52.8 billion

N/A

~$555

Lumen's ILEC assets (Brightspeed)

Apollo Global Management

2022

$7.5 billion

$1,154

$2,885 - $5,769


Also, internet service provider acquisition costs (organic or by acquisition) vary dramatically based on take rates (the percentage of passed locations where customer accounts exist). For any given network cost per customer at 20-percent take rates (20 locations out of 100 are paying accounts) is roughly twice as high as that same network at 40-percent take rates (40 locations are customers out of each 100). 


At least that is what Hum estimates, looking only at potential multiple dwelling unit accounts (apartments or condos). Somewhat similar ratios arguably hold for single family residences as well, in urban areas, though magnitudes will vary in rural or very-rural areas. 

source: Hum


 

source: Hum


As a rule, the “average” cost of upgrading a telco copper access line to fiber is roughly $1,000 to $1,500 per passing (location), assuming 50-80 homes per mile, a suburban density. Costs arguably are lower for urban densities and higher for rural passings. 


But the key point is that the financial opportunity is to rebuild networks for fiber access and boosting take rates for those assets. The cost per passing is one figure, but even after spending the money to upgrade to fiber, if take rates climb, the value of the assets still exceed the cost of acquisition and upgrade. 


Year

Acquiring Company

Acquired Company

Deal Value

Cost per Location

Cost per Account (20% take rate)

Cost per Account (40% take rate)

2000

Bell Atlantic (Verizon)

GTE

$52.8 billion

N/A

$555

$555

2006

AT&T

BellSouth

$86 billion

N/A

$632

$632

2016

Charter Communications

Time Warner Cable + Bright House

$67 billion

N/A

$2,680

$2,680

2022

Apollo Global Management

Lumen Brightspeed assets

$7.5 billion

$1,154

$5,769

$2,885


For Apllos Global, for example, the acquisition of “mostly” copper access lines from Lumen in 2022 was about $1154 per passing. Once upgrade for fiber access (boosting per location investment to between $2154 and $2654), and assuming take rates can be boosted to 40 percent, the financial value of the assets still grows.


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