Showing posts sorted by date for query most do not buy gigabit. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query most do not buy gigabit. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Monday, October 28, 2024

Build Versus Buy is the Issue for Verizon Acquisition of Frontier

Verizon’s rationale for acquiring Frontier Communications, at a cost of  $20 billion, is partly strategic, partly tactical. Verizon and most other telcos face growth issues, and Frontier adds fixed network footprint, existing fiber access and other revenues, plant and equipment. 


Consider how Verizon’s fixed network compares with major competitors. 


ISP

Total Fixed Network Homes, Small Businesses Passed

AT&T

~70 million

Comcast

~60 million

Charter

~50 million

Verizon

~36 million


Verizon has the smallest fixed network footprint, so all other things being equal, the smallest share of the total home broadband market nationwide. If home broadband becomes the next big battleground for AT&T and Verizon revenue growth (on the assumption mobility market share is being taken by cable companies and T-Mobile from Verizon and At&T), then Verizon has to do something about its footprint, as it simply does not have enough ability to compete for customers across most of the Untied States for home broadband using fixed network platforms. 

And though Frontier’s customer base and geographies are heavily rural and suburban, compared to Verizon, that is characteristic of most “at scale” telco assets that might be acquisition targets for Verizon. 


Oddly enough, Verizon sold many of the assets it now plans to reacquire. In 2010, for example, Frontier Communications purchased rural operations in 27 states from Verizon, including more than seven million local access lines and 4.8 million customer lines. 


Those assets were located in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia, shown in the map below as brown areas. 


Then in 2015, Verizon sold additional assets in three states (California, Texas, Florida) to Frontier. Those assets included 3.7 million voice connections; 2.2 million broadband internet access customers, including about 1.6 million fiber optic access accounts and approximately 1.2 million video entertainment customers.


source: Verizon, Tampa Bay Business Journal 


Now Verizon is buying back the bulk of those assets. There are a couple of notable angles. First, Verizon back in the first decade of the 21st century was raising cash and shedding rural assets that did not fit well with its FiOS fiber-to-home strategy. In the intervening years, Frontier has rebuilt millions of those lines with FTTH platforms.


Also, with fixed network growth stagnant, acquiring Frontier now provides a way to boost Verizon’s own revenue growth.


For example, the acquisition adds around 7.2 million additional and already-in-place fiber passings. Verizon already has 18 million fiber passings,increasing  the fiber footprint to reach nearly 25 million homes and small businesses​. In other words, the acquisition increases current fiber passings by about 29 percent. 


There also are some millions of additional copper passings that might never be upgraded to fiber, but can generate revenue (copper internet access or voice or alarm services, for example). Today, Frontier generates about 44 percent of its total revenue from copper access facilities, some of which will eventually be upgraded to fiber, but perhaps not all. 


Frontier already has plans to add some three million more fiber passes by about 2026, for example, bringing its total fiber passings up to about 10 million. 


That suggests Frontier’s total network might pass 16 million to 17 million homes and small businesses. But assume Verizon’s primary interest is about 10 million new fiber passings. 


Frontier has estimated its cost per passing for those locations as between $1000 and $1100. Assume Verizon can also achieve that. Assume the full value of the Frontier acquisition ($20 billion) was instead spent on building new fiber plant outside of region, at a blended cost of #1050 per passing. 


That implies Verizon might be able to build perhaps 20 million new FTTH passings as an alternative, assuming all other costs (permits, pole leases or conduit access) were not material. But those costs exist, and might represent about 25 percent higher costs. 


So adjust the cost per passing for outside-of-region builds to a range of $1300 to $1400. Use a blended average of $1350. Under those circumstances, Verizon might hope to build less than 15 million locations. 


And in that scenario Verizon would not acquire the existing cash flow or other property. So one might broadly say the alternative is spending $20 billion to build up to 15 million new fiber passings over time, versus acquiring 10 million fiber passings in about a year, plus the revenue from seven million passings (with take rates around 40 percent of passings). 


Critics will say Verizon could do something else with $20 billion, to be sure, including not spending the money and not increasing its debt. But some of those same critics will decry Verizon’s lack of revenue growth as well. 


But Verizon also sees economies of scale, creating projected cost synergies of around $500 million annually by the third year. The acquisition is expected to be accretive to Verizon’s revenue, EBITDA and cash flow shortly after closing, if adding to Verizon’s debt load. 


Even if the majority of Verizon revenue is generated by mobility services, fixed network services still contribute a quarter or so of total revenues, and also are part of the cost structure for mobility services. To garner a higher share of moderate- to high-speed home broadband (perhaps in the 300 Mbps to 500 Mbps range for “moderate speed” and gigabit and multi-gigabit services as “high speed”), Verizon has to increase its footprint nationwide or regionally, outside its current fixed network footprint. 


One might make the argument that Verizon should not bother expanding its fixed network footprint, but home broadband is a relative growth area (at least in terms of growing market share). The ability to take market share from the leading cable TV firms (using fixed wireless for lower speed and fiber for higher speed accounts) clearly exists, but only if Verizon can acquire or build additional footprint outside its present core region.


And while it is possible for Verizon to cherry pick its “do it yourself” home broadband footprint outside of region, that approach does not offer immediate scale. Assuming all else works out, it might take Verizon five years to add an additional seven million or so FTTH passings outside of the current region. 


There is a value to revenue Verizon can add from day one, rather than building gradually over five years.


Friday, August 2, 2024

Many Consumers Will Always Buy "Good Enough Value" Home Broadband

Some question the long-term viability of 5G fixed wireless services, arguing that, eventually, it will prove unable to compete with ever-higher capacities supplied by cabled networks, especially fiber to home platforms. 


Supporters might make the case that “eventually” is the key phrase, as the market potential for fixed wireless between “today” and “tomorrow” is likely to be quite extended. At the moment, perhaps 51 percent or 52 percent of all U.S. homes or dwelling units have service available from at least one provider. 


By 2030 that percentage might increase to 76 percent to 80 percent. 


At the moment, perhaps 10 percent to 15 percent of U.S. homes have FTTH service available from at least two providers, growing to possibly 30 percent to 40 percent by 2030. 


For starters, FTTH is expensive enough that no single service provider can afford to build new networks ubiquitously, even if the customer demand is present. By some estimates, the cost to pass one urban home might be just $1,000, but the cost to pass suburban locations might range up to $3200, while rural passings can easily cost $7,000 or more. 


Area Type

Density

Estimated Cost per Home/Passing

Metropolitan

High

$1,000

Suburb (Flat Terrain)

Medium

$2,700

Suburb (Hilly Terrain)

Medium

$3,240

Rural (Flat Terrain)

Low

$6,300

Rural (Hilly)

Low

$7,000


And that is construction cost only, not including the cost to activate an account, which can add costs between $300 to $500 for each install. 


An equally-important issue is the take rate for such networks. It has been common for any new FTTH provider that is a telco to get up to 40 percent take rates over a few years, with initial uptake in the 20-percent range, often. Independent ISPs competing with both cable operators and a telco might expect take rates not exceeding 20 percent (where the cable operator can offer gigabit service and the telco does not offer FTTH). 


So the longer-term issue is how big the market might be for wireless service offering speeds in the lower ranges (100 Mbps to 200 Mbps now; undoubtedly higher speeds in the future), as more fiber access is available. To the extent that fixed wireless is taking market share from cable operators (perhaps even operators able to sell gigabit-per-second connections), we can infer that a substantial portion of the market is happy to pay the prevailing rates for access at such speeds, especially when able to bundle home broadband with their mobile access services. 


When comparing fixed wireless to either cable modem or FTTH service, many consumers might not be especially interested in services operating the 500-Mbps and faster ranges, much less gigabit ranges, when the slower speeds cost less. 


But demand will continue to shift over time, with most consumers eventually buying services operating faster than 200 Mbps, and in many instances much faster than 200 Mbps (gigabit to multi-gigabit ranges, for example). To be sure, fixed wireless providers are likely to find ways to increase their speed tiers as well, beyond 200 Mbps in the future, even if virtually all observers suggest wireless will continue to lag cabled networks in terms of speed. 


Speed Tier Take Rates, in Percentage

2023

2030

2040

Less than 100 Mbps

20-30

5-10

1-2

100 Mbps to 200 Mbps

30-40

10-20

5-10

Faster than 200 Mbps

30-40

70-80

85-90


Perhaps the best analogy is what cable operators have been able to do with their hybrid fiber coax networks, boosting speeds over time. 


Keep in mind that cable networks and FTTH networks back around 2000 were only offering top speeds in the 10-Mbps range. Fixed wireless networks also will be able to increase speeds over time, if never on the scale of cabled networks. 


Year

Typical Cable Operator Maximum Speed

1996

1.5 Mbps

Early 2000s

10 Mbps

Late 2000s

50 Mbps

2010

100 Mbps

2015

300 Mbps

2016

1 Gbps

2024

2 Gbps


But absolute ability to match cabled network speeds is not the question. The issue is what percentage of customers will, in the future, be willing to buy fixed wireless home broadband, at then-prevailing speeds, prices and offers. 


Wednesday, October 25, 2023

C-Band is a Huge Deal for Verizon: Extends Home Broadband Addressable Market from 25% to Virtually 100%

One iron rule for internet access services is that if one has enough bandwidth, access speeds can be very high. For mobile operators, bandwidth expansion can come in a few ways: adding more spectrum, building smaller cells or deploying better modulation techniques or radios.


In that regard, for 5G, mid-band spectrum has been key for firms such as Verizon, which have had less mid-band spectrum than others. The difference is striking. 


After deploying C-band spectrum, Verizon mobile peak speeds “go from 9 Mbps to an amazing 2.4 gigabits per second,” said Hans Vestberg, Verizon CEO.


That has implications for home broadband as well, as, in principle, peak speeds might reach gigabit per second levels. And that, in turn, is important because it dramatically extends the addressable market for fixed wireless from perhaps 25 percent of buyers to perhaps 99 percent of buyers (those who buy home broadband at speeds up to about 2 Gbps, and do not require symmetrical access)


True, Verizon has millimeter wave assets to deploy in urban areas, but C-band means fixed wireless has higher bandwidth in suburban and rural areas as well. 


For Verizon, which has a smaller fixed network footprint than many of its leading competitors, that really does matter, as it means Verizon can compete for home broadband customers who want higher speeds in most U.S. geographic areas. 


Of a total of 140 million U.S.  homes, AT&T’s landline network passes 62 million. Comcast has (can actually sell service to) about 57 million homes passed.


The Charter Communications network passes about 50 million homes, the number of potential customer locations it can sell to.


The number of Verizon homes passed might be 27 million. Lumen Technologies never reports its homes-passed figures, but likely has 20-million or so consumer locations.


The point is that Verizon cannot easily expand its fiber to home footprint outside its historic service areas, for reasons of investment magnitude. So fixed wireless makes eminent sense for a firm that can presently reach only about 19 percent of U.S. homes using its fixed network. 


The same sort of logic holds for T-Mobile, which historically has had zero access network fixed network footprint. There is neither time nor money for T-Mobile to wire the entire country, or even a substantial part of it, using FTTH. 


So C-band is a really big deal. It extends Verizon’s home broadband addressable market from about 25 percent of homes to up to 100-percent of homes.


Wednesday, October 11, 2023

Private Equity FTTH Interest is About Asset Growth, As Always

One lesson observers might have learned from past investment bubbles in the computing and connectivity businesses is the importance of maintaining sanity when evaluating the prospects for sustainable financial returns. 


Granted, many investments are either designed to be short term. The investors assume they can build an asset that is expected to be acquired by some larger entity before the issue of sustainability must be addressed. 


In the software business, the example is a small start-up whose financial backers believe is destined to be acquired before it must actually scale up as a sustainable business. 


Some observers might find it odd that private equity capital is being invested in fiber-to-home networks. Under present conditions, these investments have very-long payback cycles (10 years or more), which would seem unsuited to the private equity need to sell off assets within about a five-year horizon. 


Still, as always, private equity investments are about growing asset values, not operating businesses long term. And that explains the investment thesis. 


But the assumption seems to be that willing buyers can be found. Consider take rates and monthly revenue for Google Fiber, which targeted areas where it would be the first FTTH supplier in each city. Results suggest that Google Fiber is getting market share from customers who want faster speeds and are willing to pay for it, as its average monthly revenue is higher than incumbent ISPs (telcos and cable TV) generate. 


Google Fiber prices range from $70 for gigabit service up to about $125 per month for 5 Gbps service. And speeds of up to 8 Gbps are being offered in several of the markets, for about $150 a month. 



City

Years of marketing

Take rate

Average monthly revenue per home per account (ARPU)

Austin, TX

6

25%

$120

Kansas City, MO

8

30%

$110

Provo, UT

7

35%

$100

Salt Lake City, UT

6

40%

$90

West Des Moines, IA

5

45%

$80


That suggests a calculation has been made that the assets can be created and then sold to other owners over a relatively short period, before full payback on the investment has occurred. 


Consider the generic example of a PE firm buying an existing telco with little to no FTTH footprint, and then rebuilding using FTTH. 


Assume the asset can be purchased for about $1,000 per home location, and then the owner can build a new FTTH network for about $1,000.


I am skeptical of the payback model for private equity funding of fiber to home (FTTH) networks, especially in cases where the PE firm has to buy an existing telco and then invest another $1000 per household to build the FTTH network.


Assume the firm can get 40 percent take rates, as it might already have about that level of customer penetration to begin with. Assume its home broadband revenue is about $90 a month. 


So the key high-level assumptions include:

  • Upfront investment: $2000 per household ($1000 to buy the existing telco + $1000 to build the FTTH network)

  • Annual revenue per household: $90 x 12 = $1080

  • Operating expenses: Assume 50% of revenue, or $540 per household

  • Annual operating cash flow: $1080 - $540 = $540 per household

  • Assuming the PE-backed firm can achieve 40% market share, this means it will generate $540 x 40% = $216 in annual operating cash flow per household on average.


To reach operating cash flow breakeven, the PE-backed firm needs to generate enough operating cash flow to cover its upfront investment. This means it needs to generate $216 x 9.26 = $2000 in operating cash flow per household over 9.26 years.


Assuming a 10-percent required rate of return, the PE-backed firm needs to generate $2000 x 10% = $200 in annual profit per household, as well. 


To earn a full recovery of invested capital, the PE-backed firm needs to generate $200 x 10 = $2000 in profit per household over 10 years, assuming the take rates are at 40 percent and customer revenue is $90 a month. 


Of all the assumptions, the take rates at $90 per month, per account, are likely the most challenging. 


Most incumbent ISPs selling FTTH have managed to get only about 40 percent take rates after several years, and at average selling prices closer to $50 a month. 


So builders of new FTTH networks might do best when targeting more-affluent neighborhoods, rather than whole cities. 


In this simplified model we do not include any inflation-related price increases, some amount of business customer revenue (for enterprise or cell tower backhaul, for example) or wholesale revenues from allowing competing ISPs to use the network. 


The observation is simply that private equity firms historically want to sell assets after about five years (the range being three to seven years). 


So such investments--always designed to be sold--will likely have been sold to other investors before full payback is reached. 


On the other hand, at least at the moment, terminal values would seem to warrant the investment. In principle, investments of up to $2000 per home could reach $3000 per home in a sale, assuming present trends hold. 


Year

Transaction value (per home)

Buyer

Seller

2023

$3,250

GIP

Zayo Group

2022

$3,000

Apollo Global Management

Lumos Networks

2021

$2,750

KKR

Hargray Communications

2020

$2,500

EQT

Suddenlink Communications

2019

$2,250

Warburg Pincus

Charter Communications

2018

$2,000

TPG Capital

MetroNet

2017

$1,750

Berkshire Hathaway

OnFiber

2016

$1,500

Goldman Sachs

WaveDivision Holdings

2015

$1,250

Carlyle Group

FiberNet Holdings

2014

$1,000

Providence Equity Partners

Clearwire Communications

2013

$750

Blackstone Group

FiOS Networks


AI Agents are to AI as the Web and Broadband Were to the Internet

In the early days of the internet, people could mostly share text on bulletin boards. Web browsers allowed us to use video, audio and text. ...