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Wednesday, September 30, 2026

Maybe Higher Interest Rates or High CAPE Ratios Will Not Derail AI Investment

The issue economists and financial analysts always face when attempting to assess the impact of higher interest rates on equity valuations in general or artificial intelligence in specific is that evaluations must be made on the assumption that “all other things remain equal,” which, of course, is rarely the case. Markets are dynamic, so, by definition, all else does not remain equal. 


Consider the expected impact of price-earnings ratios and higher real interest rates. 


The cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio (CAPE) being at a historically-high level suggests lower returns from equity markets over the next decade or so and a possible "reversion to mean" for AI equity values.


But the high CAPE ratio does not mean artificial intelligence public equities are necessarily overvalued or in a “bubble.” It does mean that AI firms must grow into their valuations by continued high earnings growth. 


Observation

What CAPE suggests

U.S. equities are expensive relative to historical earnings

Strongly supported

Long-term expected real returns are probably lower than historical averages

Historically supported

AI stocks specifically are overvalued

Not established by CAPE

AI is a speculative bubble

CAPE cannot establish this

AI earnings expectations are unusually important to market valuation

Yes

A substantial earnings disappointment could have disproportionate market consequences

Yes

Higher interest rates would be especially consequential

Yes

AI productivity could eventually justify some of today's valuation

Possible

Today's valuation requires unusually strong future earnings growth

Yes


Is today's high CAPE a denominator problem or a numerator problem? The denominator problem happens if investors have simply bid up stocks too far relative to sustainable earnings.


The numerator problem happens if today's earnings substantially understate the future earnings power of the companies because AI is about to raise productivity and profits dramatically. Take your pick., 


The second possibility is the "this time is different" argument, an obvious red flag for most of us. Historically, that argument has sometimes been correct economically while still being wrong financially.


In the shorter term, investors will have to evaluate the likely impact of higher interest rates (the “real” rate being the thing that matters) on the AI ecosystem. 


The conventional wisdom is that higher real interest rates (nominal rate minus inflation) tend to slow economic growth. That should mean the AI ecosystem also grows more slowly, as higher financing costs reduce investment and therefore potentially future revenue growth.


Also, the present value of distant future cash flows falls when the discount rate rises. This can be particularly severe for AI companies because much of their expected value is based on future rather than current earnings.


Part of AI ecosystem

Likely effect of higher rates

Why

Hyperscaler AI capex

Moderate slowdown

Higher cost of capital raises the hurdle rate for marginal data centers, GPUs and power projects. But Microsoft, Alphabet, Amazon and Meta have enormous cash flows and strategic reasons to keep investing.

Frontier-model companies

Moderate-to-large pressure

Companies with large compute bills and limited current profits become more dependent on external capital. Higher rates make investors demand a clearer path to monetization.

AI startups

Large pressure

Valuations depend heavily on discounted future cash flows and access to venture capital. Higher rates particularly hurt companies whose revenues are distant or speculative.

Data-center developers

Moderate-to-large pressure

These are extraordinarily capital-intensive, long-duration projects. Financing costs directly affect project economics.

GPU/accelerator suppliers

Initially modest; eventually meaningful

Existing compute shortages and contractual commitments can insulate near-term demand. But slower infrastructure deployment eventually feeds back into equipment orders.

Power/electrical infrastructure

Moderate pressure

Projects with long lead times and large upfront investment become harder to finance, although genuine power scarcity can preserve demand for some projects.

Cloud AI services

Mixed

Higher rates can restrain customers' IT budgets, but AI can also be justified as a way to reduce labor costs or increase productivity.

Enterprise AI software

Mixed/slightly negative initially

Discretionary experiments are vulnerable, while applications with measurable ROI may actually become more attractive if companies are under pressure to improve productivity.

AI applications with little capex

Relatively resilient

Higher rates don't materially change their marginal cost of development or deployment.

AI infrastructure with long-term contracts

More resilient

Contracted cash flows can support project financing even when the general cost of capital rises.

Existing profitable technology companies

Relatively resilient

High cash generation makes them less dependent on external financing.


Also, it matters greatly “why” interest rates are climbing. If rates rise because the economy is strong and inflation remains persistent, that is a very different scenario from rates rising because of a recession. And, at the moment, U.S. gross domestic product is still growing, according to the Federal Reserve.


Higher rates “should” put pressure on some suppliers in the AI value chain, such as high-performance-compute-as-a-service suppliers. But some will argue that better capital investment discipline will result. 


Higher rates might even help suppliers of used graphics processor units, as such units might retain their value better.


Effect of higher rates

Likely impact on AI

Higher cost of debt

Negative for leveraged AI infrastructure

Higher required return on new projects

Negative for marginal data centers and GPU deployments

Lower equity valuations

Negative, particularly for startups dependent on new funding

More expensive private credit

Negative for neoclouds and infrastructure developers

Pressure on hyperscaler free cash flow

Negative, potentially causing capex discipline

Higher discount rate applied to future AI profits

Negative for valuations

Stronger incentive to monetize existing GPUs

Mixed/positive—could increase utilization

Higher hurdle rate for speculative projects

Potentially positive for industry discipline

Cash-rich hyperscalers' ability to self-finance

Mitigates the effect


As usual, higher borrowing costs will be a negative for startups and smaller firms more reliant on borrowed money. 


AI layer

Rate sensitivity

Nvidia/AMD-type highly profitable chip suppliers

Low–moderate

Hyperscalers

Moderate

Large profitable AI software companies

Moderate

AI infrastructure developers

High

Neoclouds

Very high

Frontier-model startups

High

Early-stage AI startups

Very high


Still, ceteris paribus (“all other things being equal”) rarely describes events in the real world. All other things will not remain equal. Higher interest rates “should” slow AI investment. But competitive pressures within the industry, evidence of value and financial impact, capital availability and all sorts of other potential macroeconomic influences are likely to have an effect as well.


So interest rate increases might not have the slowing impact one might otherwise expect. Nor might the impact of a high CAPE necessarily cause the bursting of the "AI bubble." There are simply too many moving parts.


Wednesday, February 25, 2026

Disintermediation, Again

Disintermediation, the removal of elements in a value chain particularly related to distribution, was a primary effect of the internet. 


Artificial intelligence should cause even more disintermediation, as processes and value chain roles dependent on information asymmetry are removed. 


source: WallStreetMojo


Worse, some might fear, there might be no natural restorative mechanism similar to the boom-bust; recession-recovery; supply-demand cycles we commonly see in economies. 


Instead, in a worst-case scenario, AI continually depresses consumer spending (which represents about 70 percent of all economic activity) as AI leads to layoffs, which leads to less consumer spending, which increases the necessity of relying on AI to protect firm profit margins. 



Industry

How AI Removes Friction/Asymmetry

Expected Impact

Real Estate Brokerage

AI agents instantly access MLS data, decades of transaction records, valuations, and matching—eliminating agents' knowledge advantage and buyer/seller search friction.

Commissions drop sharply (e.g., from 5-6% to under 1%); many deals close agent-free or via AI "agent-on-agent"; widespread disintermediation and value loss for traditional firms.

Insurance Brokerage/Underwriting

AI enables instant policy comparison, re-shopping, risk prediction via vast data, and fraud detection—eroding inertia-based renewals and broker expertise.

15-20% premium loss from passive renewals; brokerage spreads compress; shift to direct/AI-driven models; broker selloffs (e.g., triggered by tools like Insurify).

Wealth Management / Financial Advisory

AI delivers personalized portfolio advice, tax strategies, and real-time market analysis—democratizing what once required expensive human experts and proprietary insights.

Erosion of 1% AUM or high advisory fees for basic services; "basic financial advisory" faces collapse; robo-advisors and AI tools dominate routine work.

Legal Services (Routine)

AI automates contract drafting, precedent research, due diligence, and basic navigation of laws—reducing asymmetry between lawyers and clients on standard matters.

Commoditization of routine work; reduced demand for junior/entry-level roles; faster/cheaper services pressure billable hours and firm margins.

Travel Booking Platforms

AI agents autonomously assemble custom itineraries (flights, hotels, etc.) faster/cheaper than platforms, bypassing search friction and default inertia.

Margin compression for intermediaries; habitual booking models disrupted; platforms lose value as direct AI routing prevails.

Logistics / Freight Brokerage

AI optimizes routes, matches shippers/carriers directly, and forecasts with superior data—eliminating broker coordination friction and information edges.

Broker fees collapse; rapid selloffs (e.g., truck brokers like RXO); shift to automated direct platforms.

Consulting / Professional Advisory Services

AI handles research, data analysis, and initial recommendations—eroding human expertise moats and proprietary knowledge asymmetry.

Reduced fees for routine/cognitive tasks; white-collar headcount cuts; productivity gains but revenue destruction for traditional models.

Ratings Agencies / Index Providers / Credit Checks

AI aggregates and analyzes public/proprietary data at scale—undermining exclusive research advantages and manual verification friction.

Proprietary edges erode; commoditization of ratings/indexing; lower barriers and pricing pressure.


Payments also are an obvious place to look for changes, though the changes might come from use of blockchain-based payment processors offering stablecoins.


source: Citrini Research


 


Friday, May 9, 2025

Bye Bye Skype

As Microsoft retires Skype in favor of Teams, it might be useful to recall just how impactful “voice over IP” services such as Skype were in dismantling the telco profit engine.


For example, looking only at revenue, in 2000 global international call revenues were in the range of $80 billion to $100 billion, with very-high profit margins. By 2020, international calling revenues had dropped to about $15 billion to $20 billion, with profit margins compressed. 

 

Decline in International Calling Revenue with VoIP Adoption (2000–2020)

Year

Est. Int'l Calling Revenue (Billion USD)

VoIP Adoption & Skype Milestones

Notes

2000

~80–100

Minimal VoIP presence; traditional PSTN dominates

High tariffs for international calls; telecom monopolies prevalent.

2003

~75–90

Skype launched; 11M users by 2004

Skype introduces free VoIP calls and low-cost PSTN calls, challenging telecom pricing.

2005

~70–85

Skype acquired by eBay ($2.6B); 54M users

VoIP gains traction; telecoms begin lowering rates to compete.

2008

~60–75

Skype grows to 405M users

Economic recession impacts telecom revenue; VoIP alternatives expand (Viber, WhatsApp emerging).

2010

~50–65

Skype disables third-party integrations; 663M users

Telecoms lose market share to VoIP; mobile data plans begin reducing VoIP dependency.

2013

~40–55

Skype-to-Skype int’l traffic up 36% (214B minutes)

TeleGeography notes VoIP capturing significant call volume; traditional revenue continues to decline.

2015

~30–45

WhatsApp, Viber, and others compete with Skype

Mobile apps erode Skype’s dominance; telecoms shift to data-driven models.

2018

~20–35

Skype daily users at 40M (2020 peak)

VoIP services saturate the market; telecom firms  focus on broadband and mobile data revenue.

2020

~15–25

Skype usage spikes 70% during COVID-19

Despite Skype’s decline to 36M daily users by 2023, VoIP remains dominant; traditional int’l calling revenue nears obsolescence.


Profit margins were an important part of the early, pre-VoIP story. Net profit margins on international voice were as high as 25 percent back in 2000. Current net margins are in the range of three percent to possibly five percent. 


In a real sense, VoIP services including Skype disrupted the telecom industry profit driver. 


Year

Domestic Long-Distance Margin (%)

International Long-Distance Margin (%)

Discussion

2000

~12–18%

~15–25%

High margins due to limited competition and high per-minute rates. Domestic margins are slightly lower than international due to local competition. Estimated from telecom sector data and peak long-distance revenue.

2001

~12–17%

~15–24%

Stable margins but early pressure from mobile and VoIP adoption. International margins are higher due to termination fees. Estimated from sector trends.

2002

~11–16%

~14–23%

Decline in domestic voice revenue began as mobile plans offered "bucket" minutes. International margins remained higher but faced VoIP competition. Estimated from sector data.

2003

~10–15%

~13–22%

Continued erosion from mobile and VoIP (e.g., Skype). International margins supported by high termination rates. Estimated from sector trends.

2004

~9–14%

~12–20%

VoIP and internet-based calling reduced costs and rates, squeezing margins. Domestic margins lower due to flat-rate plans. Estimated from sector data.

2005

~8–13%

~11–18%

Long-distance business peaked in 2000; by 2005, revenues were declining rapidly. International margins are higher due to mobile international calling demand. Estimated from sector data.

2006

~7–12%

~10–17%

Domestic margins hit by unlimited calling plans and VoIP. International margins supported by slower price erosion in mobile long-distance. Estimated from sector trends.

2007

~6–11%

~9–16%

Domestic long-distance became commoditized; international margins pressured by OTT apps (e.g., WhatsApp). Estimated from sector data.

2008

~5–10%

~8–15%

Long-distance revenues halved from 2000 peak. Economic recession and VoIP adoption further reduced margins. Estimated from sector data.

2009

~5–9%

~8–14%

Smartphone adoption and VoIP apps (e.g., Skype) eroded margins. International mobile long-distance retained higher margins. Estimated from sector trends.

2010

~4–8%

~7–13%

Domestic long-distance margins near sector average (~4.82%). International margins are higher due to termination fees and mobile demand. Estimated from sector data.

2011

~4–7%

~7–12%

Domestic margins low as carriers bundled unlimited long-distance. International margins declined due to VoIP growth. Estimated from sector trends.

2012

~3–7%

~6–11%

Domestic long-distance fully commoditized; international margins affected by outsourcing and fraud. Estimated from sector data.

2013

~3–6%

~6–10%

Mobile data surpassed voice revenue; domestic long-distance margins were minimal. International margins supported by the wholesale voice market. Estimated from sector trends.

2014

~3–6%

~5–10%

Voice over LTE and VoIP reduced standalone voice profitability. International margins pressured by low-cost VoIP providers. Estimated from sector data.

2015

~3–5%

~5–9%

Domestic long-distance margins were negligible as unlimited plans dominated. International margins declined due to OTT apps. Estimated from sector trends.

2016

~3–5%

~4–8%

Voice services bundled with data; domestic margins near zero. International margins are low but supported by wholesale carriers. 

2017

~2–5%

~4–8%

Domestic long-distance margins minimal; international margins affected by grey routes and fraud. Estimated from sector trends.

2018

~2–4%

~4–7%

Domestic margins near zero as voice bundled with data plans. International margins low due to VoIP and 5G adoption. Estimated from sector data.

2019

~2–4%

~3–7%

Voice commoditization is complete; international margins slightly higher due to wholesale voice demand. Estimated from sector trends.

2020

~2–4%

~3–6%

COVID-19 increased communication demand, but voice margins remained low due to free VoIP apps. Estimated from sector data.

2021

~2–4%

~3–6%

Domestic long-distance margins negligible; international margins low but supported by enterprise demand. Estimated from sector trends.

2022

~2–4%

~3–6%

Telecom services margin ~4.82%; domestic voice margins near zero. International margins are low due to wholesale price wars. Estimated from sector data.

2023

~2–4%

~3–5%

North America wholesale voice market faced intense competition, eroding international margins. Domestic margins are negligible. Estimated from sector trends.

2024

~2–4%

~3–5%

Wholesale voice market valued at $40.26 billion in 2025, but margins low due to VoIP and 5G. Domestic margins near zero. Estimated from sector data.


Also, VoIP was not the only huge driver of a shift in consumer behavior. “Calling” became something most people did on their mobile phones. 


Fixed-network revenue dropped from $200 billion globally in 2000 to under $50 billion by 2020, while mobile revenue grew from $500 billion to $1.6 trillion, for example. U.S. telco revenues likewise shifted from fixed to mobile; legacy voice to VoIP. 


U.S. Telco Revenues 2000 to 2024

Year

Mobile Voice

PSTN Voice

VoIP

2000

10

100

1

2010

60

60

21

2020

110

20

41

2024

130

4

49


The Dalai Lama is Right