Will Content Companies Fair Better than Telcos with Content Business Separations?

With Warner Brothers Discovery slitting into two companies, one containing the linear video networks and the other the studies and streaming business, some of us might recall similar splits in other industries intended to separate low-growth, cash-flow-generating businesses from higher-growth activities. 

It might seem, in retrospect, an odd thing that telecom executives at AT&T and Rochester Telephone Co., for example, once considered “long distance calling” the growth business, where the local telecom operations were seen as the low-growth entities. 

As it turned out, long distance calling was not much of a business at all, once internet calling developed. Competition was an issue, of course, but the real profit killer was free and nearly-free IP-based calling, plus the rise of mobile calling that simply included domestic long distance calling as a feature. 

Period	Market Structure	Estimated Profit Margin
1985-1990	Post-AT&T Breakup Transition	60-80%
1990-1995	Early Competition	45-60%
1995-2000	Intense Competition	25-40%
2000-2005	Market Maturation	15-30%
2005-2010	Mobile Disruption	5-20%
2010-2015	VoIP/Internet Disruption	0-10%
2015-2020	Legacy Service	-5-5%
2020-2025	Vestigial Market	-10-0%

The point is that, as logical as it seems, such asset separations often do not work out as expected. 

The fundamental problem, some will argue, is that linear TV networks are experiencing accelerating decline rather than stable cash flow. 

source: PwC 

Year	Share of TV Households Without A Traditional TV Connection
2026*	75%
2023	60%
2022	53%
2021	47%
2020	41.70%
2019	36.10%
2018	30.60%
2017	26.20%
2016	22.60%
2015	20%
2014	18.80%

The theory behind separating growth and harvest assets assumes the declining business can generate predictable cash flows while the growth business receives focused investment. But some might note that linear TV's decline appears too steep for reliable cash generation.

The moves might still be “rational” from a management perspective, as it offloads assets in terminal decline (allowing a “harvesting” strategy) while unburdening the potential growth assets (reducing debt, boosting revenue growth rates, reducing overhead). 

Sure, people are going to propose all sorts of new business models or products that might be created. That sort of advice has been common since the 1990s for telecom service providers. And, fortunately, mobility service rose to become the driver of revenue and profits, with the rise of internet access helping replace lost voice revenues as well. 

It might be harder to envision what changes of product or revenue model could develop for linear video.

Bye Bye Skype

As Microsoft retires Skype in favor of Teams, it might be useful to recall just how impactful “voice over IP” services such as Skype were in dismantling the telco profit engine.

For example, looking only at revenue, in 2000 global international call revenues were in the range of $80 billion to $100 billion, with very-high profit margins. By 2020, international calling revenues had dropped to about $15 billion to $20 billion, with profit margins compressed. 

 

Decline in International Calling Revenue with VoIP Adoption (2000–2020)
Year	Est. Int'l Calling Revenue (Billion USD)	VoIP Adoption & Skype Milestones	Notes
2000	~80–100	Minimal VoIP presence; traditional PSTN dominates	High tariffs for international calls; telecom monopolies prevalent.
2003	~75–90	Skype launched; 11M users by 2004	Skype introduces free VoIP calls and low-cost PSTN calls, challenging telecom pricing.
2005	~70–85	Skype acquired by eBay ($2.6B); 54M users	VoIP gains traction; telecoms begin lowering rates to compete.
2008	~60–75	Skype grows to 405M users	Economic recession impacts telecom revenue; VoIP alternatives expand (Viber, WhatsApp emerging).
2010	~50–65	Skype disables third-party integrations; 663M users	Telecoms lose market share to VoIP; mobile data plans begin reducing VoIP dependency.
2013	~40–55	Skype-to-Skype int’l traffic up 36% (214B minutes)	TeleGeography notes VoIP capturing significant call volume; traditional revenue continues to decline.
2015	~30–45	WhatsApp, Viber, and others compete with Skype	Mobile apps erode Skype’s dominance; telecoms shift to data-driven models.
2018	~20–35	Skype daily users at 40M (2020 peak)	VoIP services saturate the market; telecom firms  focus on broadband and mobile data revenue.
2020	~15–25	Skype usage spikes 70% during COVID-19	Despite Skype’s decline to 36M daily users by 2023, VoIP remains dominant; traditional int’l calling revenue nears obsolescence.

Profit margins were an important part of the early, pre-VoIP story. Net profit margins on international voice were as high as 25 percent back in 2000. Current net margins are in the range of three percent to possibly five percent. 

In a real sense, VoIP services including Skype disrupted the telecom industry profit driver. 

Year	Domestic Long-Distance Margin (%)	International Long-Distance Margin (%)	Discussion
2000	~12–18%	~15–25%	High margins due to limited competition and high per-minute rates. Domestic margins are slightly lower than international due to local competition. Estimated from telecom sector data and peak long-distance revenue.
2001	~12–17%	~15–24%	Stable margins but early pressure from mobile and VoIP adoption. International margins are higher due to termination fees. Estimated from sector trends.
2002	~11–16%	~14–23%	Decline in domestic voice revenue began as mobile plans offered "bucket" minutes. International margins remained higher but faced VoIP competition. Estimated from sector data.
2003	~10–15%	~13–22%	Continued erosion from mobile and VoIP (e.g., Skype). International margins supported by high termination rates. Estimated from sector trends.
2004	~9–14%	~12–20%	VoIP and internet-based calling reduced costs and rates, squeezing margins. Domestic margins lower due to flat-rate plans. Estimated from sector data.
2005	~8–13%	~11–18%	Long-distance business peaked in 2000; by 2005, revenues were declining rapidly. International margins are higher due to mobile international calling demand. Estimated from sector data.
2006	~7–12%	~10–17%	Domestic margins hit by unlimited calling plans and VoIP. International margins supported by slower price erosion in mobile long-distance. Estimated from sector trends.
2007	~6–11%	~9–16%	Domestic long-distance became commoditized; international margins pressured by OTT apps (e.g., WhatsApp). Estimated from sector data.
2008	~5–10%	~8–15%	Long-distance revenues halved from 2000 peak. Economic recession and VoIP adoption further reduced margins. Estimated from sector data.
2009	~5–9%	~8–14%	Smartphone adoption and VoIP apps (e.g., Skype) eroded margins. International mobile long-distance retained higher margins. Estimated from sector trends.
2010	~4–8%	~7–13%	Domestic long-distance margins near sector average (~4.82%). International margins are higher due to termination fees and mobile demand. Estimated from sector data.
2011	~4–7%	~7–12%	Domestic margins low as carriers bundled unlimited long-distance. International margins declined due to VoIP growth. Estimated from sector trends.
2012	~3–7%	~6–11%	Domestic long-distance fully commoditized; international margins affected by outsourcing and fraud. Estimated from sector data.
2013	~3–6%	~6–10%	Mobile data surpassed voice revenue; domestic long-distance margins were minimal. International margins supported by the wholesale voice market. Estimated from sector trends.
2014	~3–6%	~5–10%	Voice over LTE and VoIP reduced standalone voice profitability. International margins pressured by low-cost VoIP providers. Estimated from sector data.
2015	~3–5%	~5–9%	Domestic long-distance margins were negligible as unlimited plans dominated. International margins declined due to OTT apps. Estimated from sector trends.
2016	~3–5%	~4–8%	Voice services bundled with data; domestic margins near zero. International margins are low but supported by wholesale carriers.
2017	~2–5%	~4–8%	Domestic long-distance margins minimal; international margins affected by grey routes and fraud. Estimated from sector trends.
2018	~2–4%	~4–7%	Domestic margins near zero as voice bundled with data plans. International margins low due to VoIP and 5G adoption. Estimated from sector data.
2019	~2–4%	~3–7%	Voice commoditization is complete; international margins slightly higher due to wholesale voice demand. Estimated from sector trends.
2020	~2–4%	~3–6%	COVID-19 increased communication demand, but voice margins remained low due to free VoIP apps. Estimated from sector data.
2021	~2–4%	~3–6%	Domestic long-distance margins negligible; international margins low but supported by enterprise demand. Estimated from sector trends.
2022	~2–4%	~3–6%	Telecom services margin ~4.82%; domestic voice margins near zero. International margins are low due to wholesale price wars. Estimated from sector data.
2023	~2–4%	~3–5%	North America wholesale voice market faced intense competition, eroding international margins. Domestic margins are negligible. Estimated from sector trends.
2024	~2–4%	~3–5%	Wholesale voice market valued at $40.26 billion in 2025, but margins low due to VoIP and 5G. Domestic margins near zero. Estimated from sector data.

Also, VoIP was not the only huge driver of a shift in consumer behavior. “Calling” became something most people did on their mobile phones. 

Fixed-network revenue dropped from $200 billion globally in 2000 to under $50 billion by 2020, while mobile revenue grew from $500 billion to $1.6 trillion, for example. U.S. telco revenues likewise shifted from fixed to mobile; legacy voice to VoIP. 

U.S. Telco Revenues 2000 to 2024
Year	Mobile Voice	PSTN Voice	VoIP
2000	10	100	1
2010	60	60	21
2020	110	20	41
2024	130	4	49