New Low Cost iPhone in Colors?

Remember the iMac? Maybe Apple's new lower-cost iPhones will take their cue from the iMac. 

The lower cost iPhone might then have something going for it other than lower retail price. 

The iMac, some might recall, was the machine that many believe saved Apple at a time when its future was quite cloudy. 

Some might see the analogy to Apple's current situation, in some ways. 

Recall what Steve Jobs said of the iMac, at the time: "The back of this thing looks better than the front of the other guys'."

Aside from the birth of the "i," the iMac probably represented the  first of Apple's recent industrial design innovations. 

D-Day

On June 6, 1944, perhaps the most-important and singular D-Day ever to occur, 160,000 Allied troops landed along a 50-mile stretch of heavily-fortified French coastline to fight Nazi Germany on the beaches of Normandy, France.

More than 9,000 Allied soldiers were killed or wounded on the day some would say World War II in Europe turned in a decisive direction. Some 150,000 died in the western European theater alone, by the end of World War II.

"Unintentional" Market Disruption Now a Growing Possibility?

Market disruption arguably is a very different thing than “competition in a market.” The former often leads to radical reshaping of markets, typically “destroying” much of the former total addressable market revenue.

“Normal” market competition typically puts pressure on retail prices, and causes more market segmentation,  but is relatively incremental in its impact.

Even when the strategic approach is “same service, lower price,” most efforts at competition simply aim for taking some share away from existing providers.

Incumbents may not like competition, but market share shifts, margin pressure and other changes do not necessarily cause the overall market size to shrink.

On the other hand, deliberately disruptive assaults often have an indirect aim of literally destroying a market. The new issue is whether, in a world increasingly based on Internet forms of competition, unintentional market destruction can result, even when a competitor would rather “only” take some market share.

You might argue is more rational for an attacking firm to take the “same service, lower price” approach because that might stimulate overall market growth, even as it creates an opportunity for the new entrant to take market share from incumbents.

That was the tack taken by virtually all U.S. competitive local exchange carriers and is typical of U.S. cable operator assaults on the small business Internet access and voice markets.

Apple is unusual in that regard. It attacked legacy markets by providing a “better experience at a higher price.” That is relatively rare in communications markets, but well understood in many other markets such as automobiles and luxury goods of all sorts.

Still, the more common approach in the communications market is the strategy of “take market share by offering equivalent value at lower prices.”

Some assaults are deliberately disruptive, such as Skype’s attack on long distance calling, collaborative approaches to building networks such as Fon, Republic Wireless or FreedomPop approaches to the mobile business, Some might say SoftBank’s approach in the Japanese mobile market was intentionally disruptive in this sense.

Perhaps the new issue is whether disruption can occur even when market participants “only” want to protect or gain market share. One thinks of the U.S. long distance market, for example. It arguably never was MCI’s strategy to destroy long distance profits to the point where long distance ceased to be an independent product category.

But that is what happened.

More recently, Internet-based attackers have been more willing to radically disrupt pricing in markets, because radically-lower capital, marketing or operating costs make such assaults possible.

Perhaps the new issue is unexpected disruption of markets, when that was not intended.

It probably is true that most of the time, new entrants are viewed as representing only one more source of incremental competition, since the initial value proposition is quite limited, compared to that offered by the market leaders.

Of course, as now is well understood, attackers tend over time to add features and capabilities that make additional market segments take notice. Eventually there can be nearly head to head competition offered by the attacker, across market segments and price ranges.

The perhaps new angle is whether more markets are susceptible to unintentional disruption. SoftBank, for example, might originally only thought it could succeed in taking market share from other incumbents.

But one might wonder whether market disruption now is happening, whatever SoftBank originally thought it could achieve.

Messaging Monetization Remains an Issue for App Providers and ISPs

Monetization long has been a key business challenge for most Internet applications, features and services. 

That is true for new over the top messaging platforms and has started to be a problem for mobile service providers who find text messaging usage and revenues dwindling. 

That remains true for mobile applications such as messaging, with the salient exception of text messaging, among the few messaging services with a clear direct revenue model.

Messaging is viewed by some as mobile's killer app. The problem for access providers is that it might prove a killer app for third party app providers, not Internet service providers. 

Text messaging, though a key source of mobile value in the past, will be so important a direct revenue generator for mobile service providers in the future, either. 

In fact, text messaging is becoming more a key feature than a major revenue source for many mobile service providers. 

In  many ways, that would fit the pattern of email, which drove adoption of dial-up Internet access. Email the feature drove adoption of Internet access the service.

That seems still to be the pattern. More than 50 percent of total commercial email opens occurred on mobile devices in the first quarter of 2013, according to Experian Marketing Services. That is another example of an indirect revenue model. 

U.S. Government Has been Gathering Data from Internet, Telco, Media Firms

Verizon Wireless has been forced to hand over daily call detail records to the U.S National Security Agency. The order, a copy of which has been obtained by the Guardian, requires Verizon on an “ongoing, daily basis” to give the NSA information on all telephone calls in its systems, both within the US and between the US and other countries.

The U.S. Justice Department also secretly obtained Associated Press call records.

Google is fighting efforts by the Federal Bureau of Investigation requesting information about Google users. The secretive and warrantless electronic data gathering also has been declared unconstitutional in a federal court.

Is it all just a coincidence? You don't have to be a "conspiracy" theorist to see a pattern of overreach. What all three efforts seem to have in common is a broad search for information without a specific and clear relationship to an on-going criminal or clear national security investigation. 

Millions of U.S. residents therefore are having their records collected indiscriminately by agencies of the federal government, even when they are not suspected in any way of doing anything remotely criminal or dangerous to national security. 

Civil libertarians are right to be outraged and concerned. 

What France Telecom Interest in Cross Selling Cable Tells You About the Market

France Telecom thinks it has to sell triple-play bundles, but wants to avoid making acquisitions to do so. Why it wants to do so explains much about the strategic context of European communications. 

Basically, the existing market for most fixed network voice, fixed network video entertainment and mobile services is shrinking slowly. When that happens, service providers are faced with higher overhead costs and stranded assets, every year, as fewer customers generate revenue on a fixed base of assets.

While it might make sense in some cases to make acquisitions, either to create more scale, enter a new geography or acquire a needed capability, in some cases an acquirer might not want to deploy capital in that way. 

In other cases, regulators might bar such acquisitions. 

So France Telecom (Orange) is considering cross licensing between itself and cable TV providers, for example. That would allow each party to sell triple-play bundles, a proven way to attract and retain consumer customers, at lower costs than outright acquisitions. 

That approach also arguably avoids significant capital investment (both in network facilities and licensing agreements). 

The point is that rational actors will invest differently in growing businesses than in static or declining businesses. And it is hard to avoid the conclusion that in Western Europe, both mobile and fixed network businesses are not growing. Whether they are static or declining is the relevant issue. 

Must Regulators Choose Between "Competition" and "Investment?"

Though the assertion is contested, European service providers say a fragmented market prevents European Union service providers from achieving economies of scale that would allow them to invest faster, and invest more, in Long Term Evolution and other advanced network platforms.

In other words, regulators have to make a choice. They can continue to regulate in ways that promote competition by setting low wholesale rates, or they can regulate to promote investment by allowing widespread industry consolidation.

Addressing the argument that the markets require robust competition to promote lower prices and better services, the GSM Association argues “there is no statistically significant relationship between market concentration and prices.”

In other words, there is no direct relationship between the number of competitors in markets and the consumer benefits (lower prices, better and more varied services), the GSM Association argues.

At least in European Union countries, that might be explained by scale economics. The typical EU service provider is much smaller than an AT&T or Verizon Wireless, for example, denying EU service providers the ability to scale their operations in ways that enhance revenue and lower costs.

In fact, argues GSMA, the relationship between market concentration and consumer prices is inversely related. In other words, more-concentrated markets tend to have lower retail prices.

That is an argument also made by economists at Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public Policy Studies.

Also, GSMA argues, qualitative improvements (more features, same price; more bandwidth, same price) might also be said to more prevalent where contestants have the ability to invest more, because they earn more.

“Policies that sacrifice long-term dynamic efficiency for short-term gains in static efficiency (setting prices at or near short-term marginal costs) risk being pennywise and pound foolish,” GSMA argues.

In other words, in seeking the lowest-possible wholesale costs, to promote price competition, arguably also sacrifices service provider investment over the long term. That is why, GSMA argues, service provider investment in the EU tends to lag investment levels seen in the United States.

In markets characterized by network effects, such as communications, regulatory policies that limit firms’ ability to capture economies of scale and scope “may be particularly

pernicious,” GSMA says.

The reason is that limiting economies of scale (subscriber mass) and scope (ability to sell more products to the existing customer base) can mean service providers never can justify investing in capabilities to provide new services and features.

There also is no consistent relationship between market concentration and innovation, the GSM Association argues.

In dynamic markets such as mobile wireless, market concentration and performance are not inversely related, the association argues.