So if it is Not the Wi-Fi, Might it Also Not be the Access?

Local access gets blamed for all sorts of problems that could come from devices, signaling, server latency, core networks or far-end access, not to mention normal core networ congestion. If Wi-Fi sometimes is not the experience bottleneck, maybe the same is true for mobile or fixed network access.

https://networkingnerd.net/2017/08/04/its-probably-not-the-wi-fi/

Verizon LAA Test shows 953 Mbps 4G Downlink Speed

Why do mobile service providers want to use Licensed Assisted Access (LAA), aggregating mobile spectrum with unlicensed spectrum? Because doing so allows higher speeds.

In what Verizon calls “a U.S. wireless industry first,” Verizon, Ericsson, and Qualcomm Technologies achieved 953 Mbps downlink  speeds on a commercial 4G network in Boca Raton, Fla.

The demonstration used all commercially available Verizon network components including a cell site, hardware, software, and backhaul. Riding on the backbone of Verizon's most reliable network infrastructure, while Ericsson provided an advanced remote radio head in the industry.

The micro Radio 2205 for LAA, designed for unlicensed spectrum use, provides small dimensions, flexible mounting and superior performance, and is a component of the Ericsson Radio System, an end-to-end modular radio network portfolio of hardware and software designed to fit all site types and traffic scenarios as networks grow in scale and complexity on the road to 5G.

Qualcomm Technologies provided a Qualcomm® Snapdragon™ 835 mobile platform test device, with Gigabit LTE capability thanks to the integrated Snapdragon X16 LTE modem.

Inevitably, as near-gigabit speeds are deployed on 4G, some are going to start complaining about “fake 5G.” For human users, for typical applications, it will not matter, no matter what we call it.

There will be some apps that will benefit from 5G lower latency, but most 4G users likely will not much notice the difference between 4G and 5G latency in normal daily use.

The same sorts of complaints were raised when 4G first was introduced. There was the issue of whether WiMAX was really 4G, for example. I used it. So did lots of other people. We just wanted faster speeds. We couldn’t really have cared much which “G” we were using.

Is it Counter-productive to Try to Create Value by "Unlimited Usage" Plans?

As veterans of the computing industry will willingly attest, it is quite difficult to differentiate on the basis of “feeds and speeds.” Advantage, when it can be gained, is rarely long lasting, since all contestants have access to the same fundamental technology.

On the other hand, where different platforms contest, advantage can be more significant. The best example is internet access supplied by hybrid fiber coax or DSL, or HFC and fiber to the home. In the former case, cable simply is “better.” In the latter case, “quality” is not the case, so much as the business case.

From time to time, one mobile supplier or another can claim advantage, either in terms of geographic coverage, or spectrum assets (capacity), or even air interface. All those differences can lead to quantitative advantages for some time.

“Unlimited usage,” though, is proving to be a case where “speeds and feeds” do not seem to offer sustainable advantage.

To be sure, in 2012, when T-Mobile US made unlimited a key pillar of its Un-carrier strategy, the move triggered a massive surge of market share for T-Mobile US. Sprint also had an unlimited usage plan.

Then Verizon and AT&T were  forced to react. The problem is that any claim of “unique value” becomes harder to demonstrate when all the suppliers offer the feature. Marketing advantage was fleeting.

Not surprisingly, “unlimited usage” encourages customers to use more data, which is the corollary of this method of boosting value.

And that means the effort to boost value this way is problematic. As usage grows, carriers eventually have to add more capacity. That means higher capital investment. So unlimited use ceases to be a meaningful differentiator, but results in higher capex requirements and higher operating costs.

Also, not paradoxically, the effort to provide “value” in the form of “unlimited usage” ultimately is muted, but in turn increases costs. Also, end user experience arguably falls, providing less value.

According to OpenSignal, over the last six months, overall 4G speeds for Verizon and AT&T have dropped.

The impact of unlimited was particularly evident for Verizon, which saw its average LTE download connection fall 12 percent, from 16.9 Mbps to 14.9 Mbps.

AT&T's decline was less pronounced, at 12.9 Mbps, down from 13.9 Mbps. OpenSignal says it has recorded steady decreases in average 4G speed each month for both operators since they unveiled their unlimited plans in February.

The most likely and obvious explanation for slower speeds is higher congestion caused by more customers using more data.

Competing on speeds and feeds remains problematic.

Railroads or Transportation; Transportation or Logistics?

An old adage suggests railroad companies missed their chance to enter other big and growing markets because they defined their business as “railroads” instead of “transportation.”

One might surmise that present thinking about the impact of autonomous vehicles could represent a similar opportunity to redefine present businesses, or to miss a big growth opportunity.

In a recent survey of 455 U.S.-based companies across nine verticals, ABI Research found 30 percent  of transportation industry respondents plan to introduce robotics into their business operations within the next year, with another 22 percent actively assessing the technology.

Still, 44 percent  of respondents are not familiar with autonomous vehicle technology for transport. ABI also says there is a a resistance to share data with potential partners who also are competitors.

Only two percent of respondents highly rank sharing operational data with peers and only 14 percent see data sharing  with key partners as being of high importance.

Some 34 percent of respondents favor “freight as a service,” but only two percent of respondents highly anticipate that it will grow their customer bases. Most of the currently-envisoned innovations have to do with improving current operations (vehicle tracking, for example).

Only four percent of respondents rank navigation and guidance applications as a priority.

“Transportation providers may view intelligent transportation technologies as solutions to evolve their existing transportation operations versus opportunities for developing new revenue streams and business models,” says Susan Beardslee, Senior Analyst at ABI Research.

Perhaps we should not be too surprised by the findings. Rare is the executive with profit-and-loss responsibilities who instinctively looks to future opportunities and innovation, when the existing business is where rewards lie.

You might remember we have seen this before. You might argue FedEx saw something other than "transportation" as the foundation of its business model; something more like logistics than transpotation.

"Value" is Key for Internet Access, as for All Telco Access Services: 5G Might be the Answer

Consumer perceptions of the value of internet access largely explain the divergence between telco and cable products since about 2006, when cable operators deployed DOCSIS 3.0 platforms.

But that does raise an important question: telcos have to boost “value” (perceived quality in relationship to price) to compete in the internet access business. That is a “defensive” move, designed to preserve as much consumer access revenue as possible, even if such access revenue is not expected to drive overall revenue growth.

Unless you believe it is possible for a tier-one access provider to divest the consumer assets, and retain only assets to support its enterprise, small business and mobile businesses, ownership of the mass market access network is unavoidable.

So the challenge there is to retain as much legacy revenue as possible, with margin, while focusing revenue growth efforts elsewhere.

That is true even if one also believes that capital must be reserved for other important purposes, such as investing in new apps (and revenue) “up the stack” or making horizontal acquisitions to boost access scale in the near term, plus other business model requirements such as paying dividends.

source: FCC

Consider the key matter of market share. “When overall industry revenue growth is stagnant, as it is with most telco markets, market share movements become the determining factor of an operator’s top-line performance,” says James Sullivan, J.P. Morgan head of Asia equity research (except for Japan).

In other words, telcos cannot afford to sacrifice more consumer internet access market share, as that directly affects top-line revenue performance. That is why there is so much interest in fixed wireless, combined with deep-fiber networks and use of small cells.

Aside from what those investments mean for the health of the mobile business, the same set of core investments should enable a new alternative for consumer internet access, namely gigabit fixed access without full capital investment in fiber to the home.

In that sense, 5G might be the most important innovation in the fixed network access business we have seen to date, as important as G.fast and FTTH are.

If Access Networks are "Not Commoditized," Then Higher Telco Capex is Required

Networks “are not commoditized and therefore value is a function of price and quality,” argues James Sullivan, J.P. Morgan head of Asia equity research (except for Japan). So it is “value” that ultimately drives usage, capex and opex.

If so, then U.S. telcos have a key choice to make: increase the value of their internet access services to keep pace with cable competitors or lose even more market share.

Back in 2004, cable modem and digital subscriber line internet access speeds were fairly similar (average between 3 Mbps and 6 Mbp), even if cable had a speed edge. By 2006, when cable operators introduced DOCSIS 3.0, cable took a lead it has not relinquished,  while DSL only grew speeds a bit.

Still, as recently as 2013, when typical cable modem connections were substantially faster than typical digital subscriber line connections, and by which time U.S. consumers were showing a clear preference for cable modem service, some might still have argued that DSL was competitive, from an end user experience perspective, with cable modem service.

That seems to have changed dramatically in 2014, as cable operators widely deployed DOCSIS 3.0 systems.

To be sure, many would argue that, in some instances (where access lines are short), G.fast will make a difference, closing the performance gap. Others are betting on fixed wireless using 5G.

source: FCC

DOCSIS version[13]	Initial release date	Maximum downstream capacity	Maximum upstream capacity	Features
1.0	1997	40 Mbit/s	10 Mbit/s	Initial release
1.1	2001	40 Mbit/s	10 Mbit/s	Added VOIP capabilities, standardized the DOCSIS 1.0 QoS mechanisms
2.0	2002	40 Mbit/s	30 Mbit/s	Enhanced upstream data rates
3.0	2008	1.2 Gbit/s	200 Mbit/s	Significantly increased downstream/upstream data rates, introduced support for IPv6, introduced channel bonding
3.1	2016	10 Gbit/s	1 Gbit/s	Significantly increased downstream/upstream data rates, restructured channel specifications
3.1 Full Duplex	TBD	10 Gbit/s	10 Gbit/s	Introduces support for fully symmetrical speeds

source: Wikipedia

source: FCC

source: MyBroadband

source: CableLabs

Windstream Takes Another Big Gamble

Windstream already has taken a couple big gambles, betting on becoming a business services provider and spinning off its network assets into a real estate investment trust. It now has taken another big gamble, eliminating its dividend.

It likely is never a good sign when a former dividend-paying company eliminates its dividend, as Windstream now has done. There are two ways to look at the move, and both suggest high degrees of risk.

Nearly two decades ago, a few dividend-paying telcos or platform suppliers had to consider eliminating their historic dividends, so severely had the business model become. The potential upside was that such moves would allow the firms to invest scarce capital in plant and other potential growth initiatives, such as making acquisitions.

The big potential downside was that such moves were a gamble; an effort to replace one whole class of investors (dividend seekers) with a new class of investors (seekers of growth). The big gamble, in that regard, was the ability to make the transition from a utility-like business model to a true “growth” profile.

A few firms in such predicaments did cut dividends. Perhaps more firms decided to sell themselves.

It is not yet clear whether Windstream’s move, which will conserve capital, will succeed, long term. The firm already had spun off its network assets into a separate telecom real estate investment trust. The result is that the Windstream operating business actually does not own the networks it uses to provide its retail services.

Windstream, in essence, is a fixed network version of a mobile virtual network operator. It also is a big competitive local exchange carrier with a big incumbent network, sort of on the CenturyLink model.

And that is the gamble Windstream now appears to have taken: move further in the direction of being a business services specialist.