Sunday, January 14, 2024

How Much Mobile and Telco Success Beyond "Connectivity"?

By some estimates, larger mobile and fixed network connectivity service providers earn substantial percentages of revenue from sources beyond their core connectivity services for consumers and businesses, often in the form of services for business customers, but with some contributions from video entertainment revenues bought by consumers. 


All that matters for service providers as they hope to create more value from their products and services, beyond “dumb pipe” connectivity, though that is the point of home broadband or business data connections. 


Though the role within the internet ecosystem is that of “connectivity” provider, internet service providers often (telcos always) earn significant revenue from applications such as carrier voice and text messaging, device sales and rentals. In many cases, telcos also own and operate application businesses, most often aimed at business customers.


So when forecasters suggest that the bulk of “new service revenues” from 5G will come from business customers, that is a logical extrapolation from the fact that most non-connectivity revenue already earned by connectivity service providers is earned from services sold to business customers, not consumers. 


All that matters when trying to forecast the importance of any proposed new service provider revenue source, whether data centers, internet of things, edge computing, private networks, security, AI as a service or other products. 


Few, if any, service providers provide any detailed breakout of what we might call “ancillary” revenues earned by providing services or products other than “connectivity.”


But many would estimate that many larger telcos earn as much as 22 percent to 27 percent of total revenue in such ways. Consider Verizon, which might earn as much as 20 percent of its total revenue from Verizon Business operations, which primarily sells non-connectivity information technology solutions and services for businesses.


Verizon Connect, the unit providing fleet management and telematics solutions, might generate two percent to three percent of Verizon's overall revenue, perhaps in the same range as Verizon supplied cloud services. 


Rank

Company

Country

Total Revenue (USD Billion)

Non-Connectivity Business Revenue (%)

Examples of Services

1

Deutsche Telekom

Germany

81.0

35%

T-Systems (IT solutions & services), cloud services, cybersecurity

2

AT&T

USA

170.8

30%

WarnerMedia Business Solutions (now part of Discovery), AT&T Cybersecurity, Fleet Management Solutions

3

Verizon Communications

USA

136.9

27%

Verizon Business (IT solutions & services), Verizon Connect (fleet management), cloud services

4

NTT Group

Japan

103.5

25%

Dimension Data (IT solutions & services), NTT Communications (global network services)

5

Orange Group

France

52.5

23%

Orange Business Services (IT solutions & services), cybersecurity, cloud services

6

Vodafone Group

UK

44.4

20%

Vodafone Business (IT solutions & services), Managed Security Services, IoT platforms

7

Telefonica

Spain

43.4

18%

Telefónica Tech (IT solutions & services), Cloud & Security Services, Big Data solutions

8

China Telecom

China

54.8

16%

Tianyi Cloud (cloud services), enterprise IT solutions, system integration

9

América Móvil

Mexico

53.2

15%

Claro Business (IT solutions & services), data center services, cybersecurity

10

SoftBank Group

Japan

89.3

14%

Yahoo Japan Business Solutions, Arm Technology (chip technology), enterprise IT solutions

11

Deutsche Bahn

Germany

43.6

13%

Schenker Logistics IT services, Arriva IT solutions, DB mindbox (IT consulting)

12

KDDI

Japan

44.2

12%

au Business Solutions (IT services), data center services, system integration

13

Bharti Airtel

India

34.5

11%

Airtel Business (IT solutions & services), cloud services, data center services

14

Telecom Italia

Italy

17.0

10%

TIM Enterprise (IT solutions & services), Noovle IoT platform, cloud services

15

Telenor Group

Norway

20.2

9%

Telenor Connexion (IoT solutions), dtac Enterprise (Thailand), Grameenphone Enterprise (Bangladesh)

16

Proximus

Belgium

6.0

8%

Proximus Flex (flexible work solutions), B2B IoT solutions, IT managed services

17

Ooredoo Group

Qatar

13.6

7%

Ooredoo Managed Services, cloud services, cybersecurity services

18

Telia Company

Sweden

5.1

6%

Telia Innova (IT solutions), Cloud Services, IT consulting

19

Swisscom

Switzerland

8.4

5%

Swisscom Enterprise (IT solutions & services), cloud services, IT consulting

20

Telekom Austria Group

Austria

7.3

4%

A1 Digital (IT solutions), A1 Business Cloud, IoT solutions

21-25

Other Telcos

N/A

N/A

<4%

IT solutions & services, data center services, security solutions



Rank

Company

Country

Total Revenue (USD Billion)

Non-Connectivity Revenue (%)

Examples of Non-Connectivity Services

1

Deutsche Telekom

Germany

81.0

32%

Cloud services, IT solutions, media & entertainment

2

AT&T

USA

170.8

28%

WarnerMedia (now part of Discovery), DirecTV, cybersecurity services

3

Verizon Communications

USA

136.9

25%

Oath (now Verizon Media), cloud services, Verizon Connect for fleet management

4

NTT Group

Japan

103.5

22%

Dimension Data (IT services), Docomo Bike Sharing, Docomo Healthcare

5

Orange Group

France

52.5

20%

Orange Business (IT solutions), Orange Money (mobile finance), cyberdefense services

6

Vodafone Group

UK

44.4

18%

VodafoneZiggo (cable TV & broadband), M-Pesa (mobile money), IoT platforms

7

Telefonica

Spain

43.4

16%

Movistar Play (streaming service), cloud solutions, Telefónica Tech (IT services)

8

China Mobile

China

114.5

15%

Migu Music (music streaming), cloud services, mobile advertising

9

China Telecom

China

54.8

14%

Tianyi Cloud (cloud services), enterprise IT solutions, smart city projects

10

América Móvil

Mexico

53.2

13%

Claro video (streaming service), Telcel IoT solutions, financial services

11

KDDI

Japan

44.2

12%

au Smart Pass (loyalty program), au WALLET (mobile payments), home security systems

12

SoftBank Group

Japan

89.3

11%

Yahoo Japan, Arm Holdings (chip technology), Sprint (now part of T-Mobile US)

13

Bharti Airtel

India

34.5

10%

Airtel Payments Bank, digital TV services, data center services

14

Telecom Italia

Italy

17.0

9%

TIMvision (streaming service), cloud services, Nuvola IoT platform

15

Telenor Group

Norway

20.2

8%

Telenor Connexion (IoT solutions), dtac (Thailand), Grameenphone (Bangladesh)

16

Ooredoo Group

Qatar

13.6

7%

Ooredoo Money (mobile wallet), managed IT services, smart city projects

17

Deutsche Bahn

Germany

43.6

6%

Schenker Logistics, Arriva (public transport), DB mindbox (IT solutions)

18

Proximus

Belgium

6.0

5%

Proximus Flex (flexible work solutions), IoT connectivity, TV production services

19

Telia Company

Sweden

5.1

4%

Telia Innova (IT solutions), Bonnier Broadcasting (media), TV4

20

Swisscom

Switzerland

8.4

3%

Bluewin (internet hosting), cloud services, IT consulting

21

Telekom Austria Group

Austria

7.3

2%

A1 Digital (IT solutions), A1 Xplore TV, A1 IoT services

22

MTN Group

South Africa

16.0

1%

MTN MoMo (mobile money), digital entertainment platforms, enterprise IT solutions

23

Vodacom Group

South Africa

9.0

1%

M-Pesa (mobile money), Vodacom Business (IT solutions), financial services

24

Liberty Global

UK

7.9

0%

Cable & internet services, Virgin Media O2 (UK), Telenet (Belgium)

25

Millicom

Luxembourg

4.0

0%

Tigo Money (mobile money), cable & internet services, digital media offerings


Of course, many telcos also earn revenue from consumer services including subscription entertainment video services. -/*


Rank

Company

Country

Total Revenue (USD Billion)

Video Entertainment Revenue (%)

Examples of Video Services

1

AT&T

USA

170.8

12%

Earnings from WarnerMedia DirecTV ownership

2

Verizon Communications

USA

136.9

8%

Oath (now Verizon Media), Yahoo Screen (streaming)

3

Orange Group

France

52.5

7%

Orange TV (pay-TV), OCS (streaming), Canal+ (France)

4

Vodafone Group

UK

44.4

6%

VodafoneZiggo (cable TV & broadband), Horizon TV (Ireland)

5

China Mobile

China

114.5

5%

Migu Video (streaming), IPTV services

6

América Móvil

Mexico

53.2

4%

Claro video (streaming), IPTV services

7

Telekom Italia

Italy

17.0

3%

TIMvision (streaming), Infinity TV (pay-TV)

8

SoftBank Group

Japan

89.3

3%

Hulu Japan (streaming), SoftBank TV (satellite TV)

9

Bharti Airtel

India

34.5

2%

Airtel Xstream (streaming), IPTV services

10

KDDI

Japan

44.2

2%

au Smart Pass (loyalty program with video content), UULA VOD service

11

Deutsche Bahn

Germany

43.6

1%

DB Play (streaming platform), TV channels on ICE trains

12

Ooredoo Group

Qatar

13.6

1%

beIN SPORTS (regional sports network), IPTV services

13-25

Other Telcos

N/A

N/A

<1%

IPTV services, partnerships with streaming platforms, niche video offerings


The point is that larger internet service providers with voice, messaging and other operations (telcos, cable operators and others) operate both “dumb pipe” internet access as well as applications businesses (voice services, text messaging, business applications, systems integration, data center services).


Focusing on the “core business” therefore is a complicated, double-edged sword. Focusing strictly on “internet access, voice and text messaging” might be quite limiting in an environment where growth is slow and profit margins are thin. 


But moving into different roles within the ecosystem is always challenging, and telcos often have met with limited success when attempting to do so. 


So execution risk is always significant. And some telcos arguably have done a better job of diversifying.


Telco

Business

Year Launched

AT&T

Data centers (AT&T Global Network Services)

2011

Deutsche Telekom

System integration (T-Systems)

1995

Orange

Cybersecurity (Orange Cyberdefense)

2015

Singtel

Digital advertising (Singtel DASH)

2012

NTT Docomo

Smart cities (Docomo Smart City)

2017

Telefonica

IoT solutions (Telefonica Tech)

2011

Telstra

Digital health (Telstra Health)

2018

Vodafone

Enterprise software (Vodafone Business Solutions)

2016

KT

AI and robotics (KT AI & Robotics)

2018


Telco failures also are common. 


Telco

Business

Year Launched

Outcome

Reason for Failure

AT&T

Cloud computing (AT&T Cloud)

2013

Sold to Amazon in 2017

* Late entry into the market. * Difficulty competing with established cloud providers like Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft Azure.

Deutsche Telekom

App store (T-Mobile Zone)

2002

Shut down in 2005

* Lack of compelling content and applications. * Competition from established app stores like Apple App Store and Google Play.

Orange

Music streaming (Orange Music)

2003

Shut down in 2007

* Difficulty competing with established players like Spotify and iTunes. * Limited user base and content library.

Verizon

Video streaming (Verizon FiOS TV)

2005

Sold to Frontier Communications in 2016

* High cost of content acquisition and infrastructure deployment. * Limited market share compared to cable and satellite TV providers.

Singtel

Social networking (Singtel Circle)

2009

Shut down in 2012

* Failure to attract a critical mass of users. * Competition from established social networks like Facebook and Twitter.

NTT Docomo

Mobile payments (Docomo Mobile Wallet)

2010

Shut down in 2014

* Low adoption rate among users. * Competition from existing payment methods like credit cards and digital wallets.

Telefonica

Home security (Telefonica Movistar Home)

2011

Sold to Securitas Direct in 2015

* Difficulty scaling the business beyond core customer base. * Competition from established security companies.

Telstra

Digital TV (Telstra BigPond TV)

2007

Shut down in 2013

* High content acquisition costs and low profitability. * Competition from streaming services and satellite TV providers.

Vodafone

Mobile advertising (Vodafone Mobile World)

2009

Shut down in 2012

* Difficulty attracting advertisers and developers. * Lack of critical mass of users.

KT

Online gaming (KT GamePark)

2000

Shut down in 2004

* Failure to compete with established online gaming platforms. * Limited content and user base.


As a general rule, telcos have had better success with business-focused services than consumer-focused services. That possibly explains the higher expectations mobile service provider executives have for business revenue upside from 5G, for example,.compared to consumer services. 



Study Source

Date

Business Focus

Consumer Focus

Top Revenue Opportunities

GSMA Global Mobile Trends Report

Q1 2023

Enterprise IoT, Fixed Wireless Access (FWA), Network Slicing

Enhanced Mobile Broadband (eMBB), Mobile Entertainment, AR/VR

eMBB, Enterprise IoT, FWA

Ericsson Mobility Report

Nov 2023

Private networks, Industry 4.0, Cloud RAN

Video streaming, AR/VR, Gaming

Industrial IoT, eMBB, Private Networks

Capgemini

Oct 2023

Edge computing, Network as a Service (NaaS), Cloud Gaming

AI-powered services, Immersive experiences, Health & Wellness

Industrial IoT, NaaS, AI-powered services

Deloitte

Sept 2023

Smart cities, Augmented Reality (AR) applications, Predictive maintenance

Cloud gaming, Immersive entertainment, Social media

Smart cities, eMBB, Cloud gaming

PwC

July 2023

Connected vehicles, Cyber security, Digital twins

Personalized content, On-demand services, Healthcare applications

Connected vehicles, Cybersecurity, Industrial IoT

McKinsey & Company

June 2023

Smart agriculture, Remote healthcare, Education & Training

Personalized AR/VR experiences, Connected homes, Education platforms

Smart agriculture, eMBB, Personalized AR/VR

Gartner

May 2023

Predictive analytics, Blockchain, Supply chain optimization

Virtual Reality (VR) experiences, Enhanced security, On-demand entertainment

Business process optimization, eMBB, VR experiences

Accenture

Apr 2023

Digital workforce solutions, Smart retail, Manufacturing automation

Personalized entertainment, Connected car services, E-commerce & Retail

Workforce automation, Smart retail, eMBB

KPMG

Mar 2023

Smart grids, Energy management, Environmental monitoring

Social media platforms, Connected devices, Location-based services

Smart grids, eMBB, Connected devices

Bain & Company

Feb 2023

Healthcare data analytics, Financial services, Logistics & transportation

Immersive gaming, Social media with AR/VR integration, Online education

Healthcare analytics, Logistics & transportation, eMBB

Boston Consulting Group

Jan 2023

Autonomous vehicles, Robotics, Remote manufacturing

Virtual reality tourism, Personalized learning, Connected home ecosystems

Autonomous vehicles, eMBB, Robotics

Friday, January 12, 2024

Video Streaming Business Model is Tough for Many Reasons

Lack of advertising revenue might seem to explain why video streaming services except for Netflix struggle with profitability, but many other issues also seem to matter as well. 


Consider content rights. At least to this point, streaming services have made heavy investments to acquire or produce original content, compared to broadcast TV channels. That might not be the most-important comparison, though. Streaming services might be more accurately compared to cable TV services (channels). 


Platform Type

Example Platforms

Content Focus

Estimated Annual Content Rights Spending (USD Billion)

Key Drivers of Spending

Video Streamers

WarnerBros Discovery, Netflix, Prime Video, Disney+

Original content, acquired films & TV series, documentaries

80-100

- Global competition for subscribers - Differentiation through original content - High demand for popular titles - Upfront investments for original productions

Linear Channels

ABC, CBS, NBC, FOX (excl. ESPN)

Broadcast rights for live sports, acquired films & TV series, syndicated shows

30-40

- Regional/national markets for content acquisition - Established viewership base - Less reliance on original content - Long-term broadcast rights deals


Perhaps the “best” comparison is with the “premium” cable channels that are subscription-free, including HBO, Showtime or Starz. Those services have tended to spend between $15 billion and $20 billion annually on content acquisition. Sports rights tend to have the highest content rights costs, while all-news channels tend to have the lowest content rights burdens. 


Platform Type

Platform Examples

Content Focus

Estimated Annual Content Rights Spending (USD Billion)

Key Drivers of Spending

Video Streamers:

WarnerBros Discovery, Netflix, Prime Video, Disney+

Original content, acquired films & TV series, documentaries

80-100

- Global competition for subscribers - Differentiation through original content - High demand for popular titles - Upfront investments for original productions

Premium Linear Channels:

HBO, Showtime, Starz

Original content, acquired films & TV series, exclusive sports rights

15-20

- Subscription-based revenue model, less reliant on advertising - Targeting dedicated niche audiences - High competition for premium content - Investing in high-quality, prestige productions

General Sports Channels:

ESPN, TNT

Live sports rights, original sports programming, acquired sports documentaries

20-25

- High cost of live sports rights, particularly major leagues - Dependence on viewer engagement for advertising revenue - Investing in sports personalities and marquee events

News Channels:

Fox News, CNN

News production, acquired documentaries, original investigative programs

5-10

- Focus on news gathering and reporting - Reliance on advertising revenue for profitability - Less need for expensive acquired content - Potential for cost-sharing through syndication agreements


But there are additional issues. Though most TV broadcast and linear subscription video services operate in a single nation (primarily), the largest video streamers aim for global distribution and scale, bringing additional costs. That multiplies content acquisition costs. 


Up to this point, it also has been very easy for customers to terminate their video streaming services, leading to high churn rates, which directly affect profitability and marketing costs. 


Also, at least up to this point, video streaming providers have relied on exclusive, high-quality or original content that viewers can't find elsewhere. Linear channels have been better able to rely on content libraries, as the value proposition for each service in a linear bundle is its focus on a genre: childrens’ programming; news; reality TV; adventure; drama; comedy; music; sports; family-oriented programming and so forth.


In that sense, a subscription video streaming service such as Netflix is more analogous to a “premium, ad-free” linear channel such as HBO, and such channels long have emphasized original and exclusive content as a way of differentiating themselves from competitors. 


Streaming services also, up to this point, have had fewer revenue sources than linear channels that are part of subscription bundles. Linear channels are paid by distributors for the rights to use content. Linear programmers also can rely on advertising revenues. 


Up to this point, streaming services have had to rely on subscription fees alone. The “cost” of generating those subscription fees also varies. Linear channels negotiate multi-year contracts with distributors. That means fewer costs related to “customer acquisition.” There are a limited number of potential customers to deal with. 


Retail streaming services, on the other hand, must compete for retail customers one by one, rather than being able to rely on wholesale distribution. For example, a linear channel gets paid a “carriage fee” on a  “per subscriber” basis. 


If a channel receives $1 per subscriber on a contract for 10 million subscribers, its annual customer acquisition cost is $0.10 per user. As generally is the case, “wholesale” distribution is relatively less costly than a retail approach.


If a streamer spends $100 million on marketing and acquires one million new subscribers, its annual customer acquisition cost is $100 per user. 


In other words, customer acquisition in this case--wholesale versus retail--amounts to several orders of magnitude higher costs “per customer.”


On the other hand, a distributor in a linear framework will be negotiating multiple such contracts with content suppliers, so the distributor’s total content costs will be much higher than that. 


Also, up to this point, streamers have relied on a subscription fees model, and have not generally relied on advertising support, though that is changing. 


Operating costs also are higher for streamers, compared to linear channels. In the linear model, content providers rely on the distribution partner who supplies access infrastructure (cable TV, ISP, telco or satellite and terrestrial networks. 


Streamers have some distribution costs related to use of content delivery networks, data center hardware, software and real estate, plus cloud computing infrastructure. 


And where any single linear channel can rely on its distribution partners for significant marketing effort, a video streamer must undertake its own direct marketing activities, and cannot rely on the distribution partner. 


Wednesday, January 10, 2024

Watch What People and Firms Do, Not What They Say

According to a survey of service providers--who provided about 41 percent of the responses--artificial intelligence, digital transformation and internet of things will be the three highest “priorities” for investment in 2024. 

source: Telecoms.com 


Do you really believe that?


And if so, what are the assumptions you would have to make? Most likely, you’d assume “priority” refers to new effort, or incremental effort, not the actual amount of investment. So “priority” likely refers more to “new things we are paying attention to and working on” and less “how much money we are actually spending” as a percent of total investment. 


It is highly doubtful any mobile or fixed network services provider is going to spend more on AI, IoT and DX than on repairs to networks; network extension and capacity upgrades, for example. 


You would have to assume that “investment” refers only to capital investment in software, hardware, spectrum or services investment, not all the other elements of capital or operational investments such as people, rolling stock, capacity and so forth.  


You would also need to filter responses that were provided by the 60 percent of respondents that do not work for service providers, 37 percent of whom work for infra suppliers or consultancies, both categories where actual work priorities are going to be weighted towards adding AI to services and products, creating and supplying IoT or other “digital products” to their customers. 


Infra suppliers and system integrators also reflect their product lines, new product investment and the engagements service providers and other customers have asked them to undertake. Cloud computing suppliers also clearly are investing in GPUs and other infra to support “AI as a service” capabilities. 


You would also have to acknowledge that the survey spending categories offered as options also were aimed at mobile operators, not fixed network operators, for whatever difference that might have made. 


The artificial intelligence “priority” might be explained by efforts to integrate large language models into parts of the business, for example. “Digital transformation” is a nebulous term that could include all sorts of effort and spending including AI and IoT, for example. 


In principle, DX could include:

  • Cloud computing

  • Cybersecurity

  • Data analytics and visualization

  • Internet of Things (IoT) and sensor technologies

  • Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning

  • Customer relationship management

  • Enterprise resource planning

  • Digital marketing and analytics

  • E-commerce platforms and online marketplaces

  • Collaboration and communication

  • Employee training and development

  • Culture change initiatives

  • Agile and DevOps methodologies

  • Data governance and privacy.


Many other types of effort and spending could be added as well. 


The survey responses also are shaped by whether you think about service providers only; infrastructure suppliers only or consultants and all the others allied to the field? How many firms supplying PR support, engineering services, HR and headhunting or legal services really are going to invest in AI, DX and IoT, for example?


The point is not to dispute the actual survey responses. The point is that methodology always matters when crafting such surveys. 


Compared to everything you know about service providers, infra suppliers and consultancies, is it believable that spending and outcomes actually will track the reported “priorities?” 


And if not, how much do we really learn from the responses, in context?


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