Comcast, European Cable Operator Growth Strategies Diverge

Virtually all existing communications and video entertainment businesses are in a time of transition from older revenue patterns to new business models that inevitably will include a mix of products, often sold to different customers than in the past.

Beyond that, it remains unclear what revenue contributions might in the future be made by entirely new lines of business. But Comcast’s second quarter 2012 earnings report suggests the upside potential and downside risks.

Also, the latest Solon Survey of European cable operators illustrates a couple salient points about the near term growth drivers for North American and European cable operators. Wireless appears to be a bigger factor for European cable operators, while Comcast’s approach now suggests content will be a bigger source of revenue for the larger U.S. cable providers.

In the near term, European cable operator growth now comes from broadband access, mobile services and business-to-business services.

The key trends are the importance of mobility and services aimed at business customers, which In the 2009 survey were not firmly embraced by cable operators in Europe.

By 2011, sentiment had changed, with operators across Europe highlighting the importance of
commercial and mobile segments in driving near term revenue growth.

On average, cable operators expect to double the share of revenues generated through mobile offerings, while the revenue contribution from business and wholesale activities is forecast to increase by approximately 33 percent. For a business historically serving the consumer segment, the expansion of services to business and enterprise customers is significant.

By 2014, a typical European cable operator will be earning 12 percent of its revenues from business customers. Some cable operators, though, already earn more than 30 percent of total revenues from B2B services.

European cable operators surveyed expect revenue growth of over five percent per year until 2014 and further EBITDA margin expansion by two percentage points up to 48 percent, on average, to 2014.

In large part, that is due to gains in broadband access revenue, which remains the main source of revenue growth for European cable operators, the report suggests. In fact, Solon attributes broadband access revenue for a rebound in operator average revenue per user, which had been dropping.

Revenue earned by offering or higher access speeds, at an average broadband access ARPU of approximately 20€ per month, is the primary reason ARPU now is stable, the Solon report indicates.

Comcast’s revenue, on the other hand, now has tipped towards content. Comcast video revenues have shrunk to about 52 percent of total Comcast revenue, while other access network services now contribute 48 percent, and are growing.

At some point, Comcast will earn less than half its revenue from its legacy video entertainment business. And that is to focus only on Comcast’s “local access” business.

In fact, including the NBC Universal contributions, it already is true that Comcast earns less than half its total revenue from cable TV distribution. In fact, cable TV video distribution operations now account for only 33 percent of total Comcast revenue.

For anybody who has followed the U.S. video entertainment market for some decades, that U.S. cable operator video penetration is as low as 44 percent of TV homes is a shocking statistic. There was a time when penetration was as high as 70 to 80 percent of homes in some areas.

Competition from satellite and telco competitors is the reason for the sharp reversal.

Some 97 percent of U.S. homes own a TV, and about 90 percent of all U.S. homes buy a subscription TV service.

Telco IPTV penetration on a global basis, measured agains the installed base of worldwide broadband subscribers, reached 15 percent in the first quarter of 2012, representing  67 million subscribers and eight percent of the world’s 812 million video entertainment service subscribers, according to TeleGeography.

North American telcos, led by Verizon and AT&T, have succeeded in selling IPTV service to almost 40 percent of their broadband subscriber base. That is not to say telco TV now reaches 40 percent of homes. That statistic means the tier one telcos are selling video entertainment to 40 percent of their customers who buy broadband access.

Since telcos have almost half of all broadband customers, and since broadband is purchased by about 80 percent of U.S. households, you can roughly estimate that telcos now sell video services to perhaps 20 percent of U.S. households.

But keep in mind that telcos are not able to sell video to many locations, using their fixed networks, for technology reasons. Where they can do so, market share could be in the 30 percent range.

Generally speaking, getting a video customer means taking that customer away from a cable TV or satellite TV provider who already had the customer, as household penetration of subscription TV is over 80 percent. The market, in other words, is saturated.

There are some important implications. You might well argue that 40 percent video penetration of a service provider’s own customer base is “about as good as it is going to be,” when strong cable TV and satellite TV competitors own the rest of the customers, and when taking a customer therefore is tough.

In any market with three dominant and well-heeled contestants, you might expect an ultimate market share distribution that could easily be split three ways, with any single contestant getting 20 percent to 40 percent share.

If telcos have 20 percent share, could that share double? In principle, yes. If telcos get 30 percent share, could share then double again? Probably not, if the other two contestants (satellite and cable) continue to perform at a high level. 

But there is one big change in potential market share structure that long has been speculated, namely a purchase of both U.S. satellite companies by one of the tier-one U.S. telcos. That, in principle, could mean telcos then would have as much as 60 percent share of video service customers.

For the moment, telcos are doing about as well as they can, using only their fixed networks.

IPTV and Pay-TV Penetration Rates, Q1 2012

Source:TeleGeography

The 30% Rule Usually Works

I may have an overly-simplistic way of looking at the odds of big mergers in the access business, but there is a simple rule of thumb: antitrust opposition arises in the access business whenever any single provider is poised to exceed serving more than 30 percent of U.S. households.

It’s a simple rule of thumb, but it tends to work. In that regard, the Comcast purchase of Time Warner Cable, had it succeeded, would have given Comcast access to 84 million U.S homes, representing about 70 percent of the entire population, in a market where AT&T, the biggest provider in terms of homes reached, might potentially reach 50 million homes.

If total U.S. homes are about 123 million, and occupied units are about 116 million, then Comcast would have had access to 72 percent of U.S. homes. AT&T, by way of contrast, has access to 43 percent of U.S. homes.

“Access” is different than “active account at that location,” though. Since there are two to four major suppliers of any single service in every market, the market share held by any single provider is a fraction of total addressable homes.

AT&T knows it will not be allowed to increase its fixed network footprint. Comcast positioned its acquisition bid as being primarily about video accounts, where market share would have been held at about 30 percent.

Others had said the relevant “market” was high speed access, not video. Had the deal been approved, Comcast would have had about 57 percent share of the high speed market, and an overwhelming share of accounts in the fastest speed categories, and the widest footprint of gigabit and 2 Gbps service availability.

Verizon Communications, for its part, recently reported it had 42 percent adoption of FiOS Internet access services where FiOS is available, and 30 percent FiOS entertainment video adoption where that service is available.

At AT&T first quarter results were less robust. In the quarter, AT&T had U-verse TV adoption of 22 percent and U-verse  high speed access adoption of 21 percent.

FTTH or Time Warner? It Is Not a Close Call

Would AT&T have generated more incremental revenue if it had not bought Time Warner, and instead had plowed that capital into a massive fiber to home upgrade?

The numbers suggest AT&T made a better choice buying Time Warner.

AT&T spent $85 billion to acquire Time Warner, with an immediate quarterly revenue boost of $8.2 billion. Were AT&T able to invest in fiber to home and then take an incremental five percent share of market everywhere it operates, is perhaps $2.2 billion in annual revenues, assuming $50 a month in gross revenue, or about $180 million a month in incremental revenue.

It is not clear how much upside exists for AT&T, in terms of fixed network internet access revenue, even if it were to dramatically extend its FTTH footprint, but you might argue that the best case for AT&T, for a massive upgrade of its consumer access network, is about 10 percent upside in terms of consumer market share, facing cable operators already leading the market in accounts and speed, with a clear road map for additional speed increases that easily match anything AT&T might propose, and arguably at less cost.

So here’s one take on the alternatives of buying Time Warner or using that capital instead to expand the AT&T FTTH profile. Consider the incremental revenue generated from each alternative.

Assume first that U.S. telcos could take 10 percent more market share from cable TV suppliers. Incremental revenue might then be less than $4.4 billion annually. Consider that AT&T has footprint covering perhaps 69 percent of U.S. homes. So make the incremental revenue for AT&T $3 billion, or $250 million per month.

Also, it would take some years before that degree of new FTTH assets could be put into place. Over any three-month period, AT&T might expect incremental revenue ranging from $540 million to $750 million per quarter, the former figure representing five percent share gain, the latter representing 10 percent share gain.

Neither comes close to the $8.2 billion per quarter AT&T picked up from the Time Warner acquisition.

Verizon has different strategic issues, compared to its main fixed network competitors.

Significantly, Verizon has a small geographic footprint, compared to any of its main fixed network competitors. Verizon homes passed might number 27 million. Comcast has (can actually sell service to ) about 57 million homes passed. Charter Communications has some 50 million homes passed.

AT&T’s fixed network represents perhaps 62 million U.S. homes passed.

Assume there are 138.6 million U.S. housing units, of which perhap 92 percent are occupied (including roughly seven to eight percent of rental units and two percent of homes). That suggests a potential base of 128 million housing units, including rooms rented in homes or apartments, that could buy services from a fixed network supplier.

That implies Verizon has the ability to sell to about 21 percent of homes; Comcast can sell to 45 percent; AT&T can market to 48 percent of occupied homes; while Charter can sell to 39 percent of U.S. occupied homes.

The point is that Verizon has more to gain than AT&T, Comcast or Charter from investing in internet access outside its traditional geography.

In principle, Verizon faces the same issue as does AT&T when weighing alternative uses of scarce capital.

As it deploys 5G fixed wireless, there are two key issues: how much market share and revenue can Verizon gain, and what else might Verizon have done with its investment capital? It all depends on one’s assumptions.

Some argue that, over seven years, Verizon might gain only 11 percent to 18 percent share in markets where it can sell 5G fixed wireless. Verizon believes it will do better, and some believe a 20-percent share is feasible. Verizon itself predicts it can get about 23 percent share, as a minimum, over seven years, representing about 6.3 million accounts.

Assume Verizon fixed wireless gross revenue is about $60 per account (a blend of the $50 from Verizon mobile customers and $70 from non-customers). Assume annual revenue of perhaps $720.

Assume Verizon spends about $800 per location on 5G fixed wireless infrastructure (radios, backhaul, spectrum costs), even if those same assets can be used to support other users and applications.

At 20 percent take rates, that implies a per-subscriber network cost of perhaps $4000.

Assume a cost of perhaps $300, over time,  to turn up service to accounts. That implies a rough break even in months. Assume total capex investment of perhaps $4300 per account. At $720 annual revenue, that implies breakeven on invested capital in six years.

But assume half the cost of the capital investment also supports revenue generation from other users and use cases (mobility, business users, internet of things). In that case the fixed wireless capex is perhaps $$2150 per customer, and breakeven on capex is a bit more than three years, assuming the only revenue upside is internet access revenue.

Logically, one would have to add churn reduction in some cases, and so the lifetime value of a customer; incremental advertising opportunities; some possible upside from voice services or wholesale revenue. None of that is easy to quantify with precision.

The point is that potential return might fall well within a framework of payback in three years.

Whether that is a “good” investment or not depends on what else might have been generated from other capital deployments.

Over a seven-year period, Verizon might have committed $13 billion in capex to generate revenue from six million fixed wireless accounts (about $1.85 billion per year). It is hard to image any alternative use of capital at that level that would result in annual revenues of $4.3 billion in internet access revenues alone.

It is in fact quite hard to create a brand new business generating as much as $1 billion a year in incremental revenues, under the best of conditions.

source: ITU

So, back to the importance of video revenues, as difficult as the Time Warner debt burden might be, the renamed Warner Media already generates $32 billion in annual incremental new revenue for AT&T. Virtually nobody other than its competitors is likely happy about the new $55 billion worth of new debt AT&T has acquired.

Still, the issue is what else AT&T could have done with $55 billion that would immediately create $32 billion in new revenues. Personally, I cannot think of another transaction that would have produced that much new revenue, immediately.

AT&T could have spent that money on fiber to home upgrades, to perhaps gain five percent to 10 percent additional market share in the consumer internet access market, in region, over perhaps five to seven years. The upside, even at 10 percent share gain, does not approach the Warner Media contribution.

How Much Does Fixed Wireless Matter?

You can get a robust debate pretty quickly when asking “how important will 5G fixed wireless be?” in the consumer home broadband market. Will it matter? 

Probably. But it also matters more to some than to others, and will matter even if the net result is installed base market share shifts of just a few percentage points. So there is no actual contraction between cable operators saying “fixed wireless is not a threat” and a few firms arguing it will be highly significant as a driver of revenues. 

Keep in mind that the home broadband market generates $195 billion worth of annual revenue. Comcast and Charter Communications alone book $150 billion annually from internet access services that largely are generated by home broadband customers. 

T-Mobile has zero market share in that market. Taking just two percent means new revenues of perhaps $4 billion annually. That really matters, even if cable operators minimize the threat. 

“Addressable market” is a key phrase. Right now, Comcast has (can actually sell service to) about 57 million homes passed.

The Charter Communications network passes about 50 million homes, the number of potential customer locations it can sell to.

Verizon homes passed might number 18.6 to 20 million. To be generous, use the 20 million figure. 

AT&T’s fixed network represents perhaps 62 million U.S. homes passed. CenturyLink never reports its homes passed figures, but likely has 20-million or so consumer locations it can market services to. 

The point is that, up to this point, T-Mobile has had zero addressable home broadband market to chase. Verizon has had 20 million homes to market for that purpose. AT&T has been able to market to perhaps 62 million homes; Comcast 57 million homes and Charter about 50 million homes. 

So T-Mobile and Verizon have the most market share to gain by deploying fixed wireless. And the value will not necessarily be that fixed wireless allows those two providers to “take half the market.” The revenue upside from share shifts in low single digits will be meaningful. 

Some might counter that early fixed wireless will not match the top cabled network speeds. That is true. But it also is true that half of U.S. households buy broadband services running between 100 Mbps and 200 Mbps, with perhaps 20 percent of demand requiring lower speeds than that. 

So even if fixed wireless offers lower speeds than cable hybrid fiber coax or telco FTTH, it might arguably still address 70 percent of the U.S. market.

It is conceptually possible that untethered access could eventually displace a substantial portion of the fixed networks business, longer term. 

Up to this point, mobile networks have not been able to match fixed network speeds or costs per gigabit of usage. But that should change. 

Mobile network speeds will increase at high rates, with a rule of thumb being that speeds grow by an order of magnitude every 10 years. One might argue that is less capacity growth than typically happens with fixed networks. +

 

source: Voyager8 

But that might not be the relevant context. What will matter is how much speed, at what price points, mobile or fixed wireless solutions must offer before becoming a reasonable choice, compared to fixed access. 

Assume that in its last release, 5G offers a top speed of 20 Gbps. The last iteration of 6G should support 200 Gbps. The last upgrade of 7G should support 2 Tbps. The last version of 8G should run at a top speed of 20 Tbps.

At that point, the whole rationale of fixed network access will have been challenged, in many use cases, by mobility, as early as 6G. By about that point, average mobile speeds might be so high that most users can easily substitute mobile for fixed access.

To be sure, cost per GB also has to be roughly comparable. But, at some point, useful bandwidth at a reasonable enough price could allow wireless solutions to take lots of market share from cabled network providers. 

 

We never get away from debates about “which is the better choice?” in the connectivity or computing industries. Nor do we generally remember that “one size fits all” rarely is the case. Additionally, all choices are conditioned by “when, where, by whom and why” technology must be deployed. 

The global choice of internet protocol rather than asynchronous transfer mode as the foundation for all next-generation networking is among the exceptions. That really did result in an “all or nothing” outcome. 

But few other choices are so stark. Consider access network platforms. Decades ago there were serious--if brief--debates about whether “fiber or satellite” technologies were “better” for wide area networks. There was speculation about whether “Wi-Fi or mobile” was the better platform for phone connectivity.

There were debates about whether fiber to the home or hybrid fiber coax was “better” for consumer broadband access. 

Now there are arguments about whether local connections, unlicensed wide area low power networks or mobile networks are “better” for internet of things sensors. 

Such questions, while valid, always have to be qualified by the issue of “better for whom?” It might not make sense for a public network provider to consider HFC as a foundation access technology. It virtually always is a logical choice for a cable operator, for the moment.

 “At some point,” optical fiber is universally seen as the technology of choice for telcos and other “cabled media” providers. But wireless remains the key approach for satellite, wireless ISPs and mobile operators. 

What is “better” cannot be determined without knowing the “for whom” part of the business context; the “when?” part of the discussion or the “under what other circumstances?” detail. Fiber to the home might be the “ultimate” choice, but “when to deploy” or “where to deploy” also matter. 

U.S. cable operators in 2020 had at least 69 percent share of the installed base of accounts, according to Leichtman Research Group. Telcos likely had something less than 28 percent of the installed base, accounting for share held by independent internet service providers (wireless, fixed and satellite). 

source: FCC, Bloomberg 

Without government support, FTTH might never make business sense, in some locations. In other cases the business case is so marginal and risky that an alternative, such as fixed or mobile wireless, might well be the alternate choice. For a telco, a “fiber” upgrade might make sense when existing copper facilities must be retired in any case, and where need is not driven by revenue upside, merely facilities replacement. 

For a cable operator, an FTTH overlay could make near-term sense to support business customers, but not yet consumers. But fixed wireless might also make sense for cable operator “edge out” operations, and for the same financial reasons that telcos used wholesale as a way to enter geographically-adjacent markets. 

The questions are even broader when looking at total demand for broadband access. In terms of total connections, in the U.S. market 75 percent of all internet access connections use mobile networks. Just 16 percent use cable HFC, while perhaps 8.6 percent of connections use either fiber or copper telco connections, while everything else--including satellite and fixed wireless--represents less than one percent. 

source: FCC

The point is, how much faster do untethered services need to be--assuming roughly equivalent terms and conditions of usage and price--before a significant percentage of home broadband users consider an untethered solution a functional substitute for fixed network access?

Matching headline speeds might not matter, as most consumers do not buy those services. Untethered options simply have to be “fast enough, priced well enough” to contend for significant share of the home broadband market.

Comcast Might Get 12 Million Mobile Accounts in First Few Years

In the early going, Comcast is likely to snag about three percent market share, or about 12 million accounts. That is based on Comcast getting about 10 percent mobile market share in the areas where it actually operates its fixed networks.

Eventually, Comcast theoretically could get 20 percent share of the whole market, but likely not unless it acquires either T-Mobile US or Sprint.

So here’s the thinking.

In the first quarter of 2016, the leading U.S. mobile providers had about 393 million branded mobile accounts in service, with Verizon having 138 million, AT&T 130.4 million, T-Mobile US 65.5 million and Sprint 58.8 million.

For the sake of argument, if Comcast were to grab about 10 percent share in the first few years, that would represent about 39 million accounts.

Eventually, if Comcast gets 20 percent share, that implies something on the order of 79 million accounts.

There are many contingencies. Comcast says it will first concentrate on selling services to its own customer base. Since Comcast networks pass only about 30 percent of U.S. homes, that essentially limits the addressable market to some fraction of the total U.S.mobile market.

So if Comcast gets 10 percent of mobile customers in its own areas, that might equate to some 12 million accounts. To get to 20 percent share of the whole U.S. market, Comcast almost certainly would have to acquire either Sprint or T-Mobile US.

There are, of course, many unknowns. Some believe it is inevitable that Comcast buys T-Mobile US. Some new entity, with marketing muscle and assets, could enter the market and buy Sprint or T-Mobile US.

Dish Network somehow could find a partner to help it build and operate its own network, complicating the market share possibilities even further.

Some believe Sprint and T-Mobile US will try to merge, again.

You can make your own guesses about which competing mobile service providers will be hurt the most, as Comcast enters the market.

In the second quarter of 2016 Verizon had 35 percent share. AT&T had about 32.5 percent share. T-Mobile US had about 16 percent share, while Sprint had about 15 percent share. All other mobile suppliers collectively had about two percent share.

If Comcast were to take share equally, from all the four leading providers, Verizon would lose the most customers. Few likely believe that will be the case. Assuming Comcast enters the market with a low price positioning, it is likely to compete more with Sprint and T-Mobile US.

AT&T, by virtue of its subscriber mass, and its relatively greater loss of subscribers to T-Mobile US, might also be affected more than Verizon.

U.S. Mobile Operator Subs, Q2 2016 (retail and wholesale)
Carrier	Subscribers (millions)	Net Adds (millions)	Service Revenue (US$ millions)
Verizon Wireless	142.754	1.285	$16,741
AT&T	131.805	1.361	$14,912
T-Mobile USA	67.384	1.881	$6,888
Sprint	58.446	-0.360	$5,943

source: Jackdaw Research

U.S. Fixed Network Homes Passed Now Increasingly is Guesswork

With the caveat that there are wide areas of the United States where population density is exceedingly low, no single fixed network service provider has a geographic footprint that covers “most” of the landmass.

Here is Comcast:

source: Comcast

Here is AT&T:

source: AT&T

Here is Verizon:

source: Verizon

Here is CenturyLink:

source: Wikimedia

Here is Charter Communications:

source: Value Ventures

Of course, many will note that what really matters is not landmass but potential customer locations, such as homes and businesses. The Charter Communications network passes about 50 million homes, the number of potential customer locations it can sell to.

Verizon homes passed might number 27 million. Comcast has (can actually sell service to ) about 57 million homes passed.

AT&T’s fixed network represents perhaps 62 million U.S. homes passed. CenturyLink never reports its homes passed figures, but likely has 20-million or so consumer locations it can market services to.