"Asset Light" Still Does Not Solve Big Problems in the Access Business

Many might lament that the access networks business would be a lot easier if only access networks did not cost so much.

So a reasonable and long-term argument can be made for divesting some fixed assets in the asset-heavy connectivity business, especially those that seemingly offer no business model advantages. Cell tower ownership is among those categories of things. Though essential for the mobile business, little strategic advantage can be gained from owning tower assets. 

At the other end of the spectrum, ownership of scarce fixed network assets has traditionally been deemed a source of business advantage. Such assets are quite expensive to replicate, and therefore form a competitive moat against new competitors. 

So business advantage, to the extent it can be created, then changes if an asset light approach is possible.

The paradox seems to be that the “asset light” approach works better for some business opportunities and entities than others. Asset light works fabulously for application providers, who then get access to potential users without the burden of investing in access networks. 

The problem is that the access business itself remains stubbornly dependent on capital-intensive networks, especially in the case of “fixed” services. Mobile businesses, based simply on the number of deployed infrastructures, are inherently more asset light than cabled networks. 

source: EY 

Of course, all that arguably changes when regulators decide to implement wholesale-based access regimes. By allowing network access, at mandated prices, to all retailers, the scarcity value of the access network is diminished, and advantage must be sought in other areas such as product packaging and marketing skill. 

Since the whole purpose of competition policy is to create supplier incentives to improve product quality and quantity while reducing retail prices, we might as well recognize that lower prices in the core access business are somewhat inevitable. The corollaries are pressures on gross revenue and profit margins as well. 

A competition policy that leads to higher prices, reduced quality and quantity would be deemed a failure. 

All that leads to constant pressure on firm leaders to seek new ways of reducing capital investment and operating costs. And many advocate an “asset light” approach that reduces need to invest in physical networks. 

McKinsey 

In practice, that has meant reliance on one wholesale network and retail competition all using the single network. The mobile virtual network operator business strategy likewise is built on leased access to existing networks. 

One might say this is akin to the “fabless” approach to the microchip businesses, where an entity designs a chipset, but then outsources its manufacturing to a third party. In that analogy, high value is earned by embedded intellectual property. 

The issue for access providers is that it is quite hard to create similar embedded value if relying on a wholesale access and asset-light approach. By definition, differentiation is hard to achieve when every competitor uses the same network, with the same capabilities, at common prices. 

So the “secret sauce,” to the extent it can be created, has to rest elsewhere. The search for enduring value “elsewhere” explains much access provider activity.

How Much More Can Tier-One Connectivity Suppliers Become Asset Light?

Occasionally over the last few decades, it has been proposed that telcos consider ways to become asset light operators. That advice--to monetize assets--continues to be offered. The issue is what portions of the infrastructure can be spun off or sold. 

In the U.S. market, asset light was recommended for competitive local exchange carriers, at one time able to buy “unbundled network element-provisioned” wholesale services at as much as a 40-percent discount to retail prices. 

In many international markets, mobile virtual network operators are a less-risky way to enter a new market. 

In Europe and other markets, bitstream and other forms of unbundled local loop access have been created to allow asset-light wholesale entry into the telecom market. 

From time to time, observers have speculated on the degree to which it might be possible for new competitors to use unlicensed spectrum assets such as Wi-Fi to create competition for mobile or fixed internet access. At the very least, cable operators and outfits such as Fon argue that a shared Wi-Fi network allows offloading of local mobile phone traffic, thus reducing purchases of wholesale mobile connectivity. 

In specialized areas, such as cell tower facilities, many mobile operators have concluded that sharing the cost of base stations with competitors or selling such assets (with leaseback) is a way to unlock value while becoming a bit more asset light. 

The new issue is whether it is possible to unbundle even more elements of a connectivity provider’s asset base, such as optical fiber facilities serving business customers. Attice, for example, recently sold 49.99 percent of its  Lightpath fiber enterprise business to Morgan Stanley Infrastructure Partners. 

Others have suggested that CenturyLink sell its optical network assets, or at least separate the consumer from the enterprise business. Right now, the enterprise part of CenturyLink accounts for 75 percent of revenue, the consumer business just 25 percent. 

source: S&P Global

Some assets are easier to separate than others. Cell towers and data centers are discrete assets many telcos have divested. In principle, the wide area networks could possibly be divested, though owner’s economics would still be an argument in favor of retaining that portion of their networks. As always is the case, volume improves the economics of owning assets. 

In principle, other new assets, such as small cell installations or backhaul facilities, might be candidates for infrastructure sharing, especially when it is possible to separate the value of facilities from the use of those capabilities to support the core customer experience. 

The issue is whether some operators might become so good at creating and monetizing intangible assets that they can risk shifting in the direction of asset-light or non-facilities-based operations on a wider scale. Few tier-one telcos have felt it was wise to divest access networks.

Access network assets remain quite scarce and therefore valuable in most markets and arguably are the hardest parts of the infrastructure to consider divesting. 

“If telcos do not reconfigure their value chains, other parties may step in, as disaggregated telco assets are being valued differently,” consultants at Arthur D. Little have argued. The problem is that creating more value remains a huge challenge, as the ability to enter new parts of the value chain, though risky for any participant, is asymmetrical. 

Connectivity represents about 17 percent of the revenue earned annually by firms in the internet value chain. The bad news is that connectivity share is dropping.

"Smart Cities" Benefits Likely Will be Smaller than Projected

Asset-light business models such as Uber and Lyft are about monetizing dark vehicle assets. Airbnb perhaps is about monetizing dark room and lodging assets, also using an asset-light approach.

Wi-Fi often is an asset-light approach to mobile device access. Netlfix might be considered an asset light approach to video entertainment, at least in terms of access assets.

In other cases, big data and Internet of Things networks aim to enable more efficient use of in-use assets.

Arguably, the most-powerful trends happen when multiple values can be realized, such as combining dark assets with asset-light business models with peer-to-peer transactions and “leasing rather than owning” consumption patterns.

All those potential changes in business models should eventually affect prospects for many proposed Internet of Things services, such as “smart parking.” If vehicle ownership declines as much as some expect, there will be less demand for urban area parking, and therefore less value and demand for smart parking services.

In other words, all currently-projected markets essentially extrapolate from existing conditions. But those conditions will change as IoT and IoT-assisted ecosystems change.

Similarly, smarter transportation systems that allow users to evaluate transportation options in real time will reduce the amount of vehicle congestion the smart systems aim to solve.

Where it comes to the impact of IoT systems, feedback loops will operate, changing the context even as the systems come online. In other words, non-linearity will be a key aspect of future IoT systems. In the process of solving specific problems, the magnitude of the actual problems will diminish.

That likely will mean the expected benefits will be smaller than forecast.

Asset-Light or Asset-Heavier Models for Video Services?

The video content business might be moving, to some extent, towards a more “asset light” model, as it increasingly is possible to supply content directly to consumers “over the top,” without building or owning physical access assets (transmission towers, cable or other broadband networks, satellite fleets, spectrum, rights of way).

On the other hand, content creation and acquisition then become a bigger portion of the total cost model. Where content costs might be 44 percent to 49 percent of costs for a firm such as Comcast, content costs might represent as much as 68 percent to 71 percent of total cost for a firm such as Netflix.

In at least one sense, that higher percentage of total cost attributed to content might be a good thing for OTT providers.

To the extent that original content largely provides the distinctiveness and uniqueness for any video entertainment supplier, ability to spend more on those assets, rather than technology and platform costs, advertising and marketing as well as overhead is an arguable advantage.

So does that mean an “asset light” approach is the best strategy for every contestant? Not necessarily. As Apple famously has demonstrated, there are clear advantages to a “closed” or “integrated and controlled” approach to platforms and services.

Google, originally a big proponent of “open” approaches, now experiences the downside of openness, namely fragmentation of the experience.

“Asset heavier” models that bundle content and apps with services and the access function have advantages as well. Suppliers able to do so have “owners economics” and can better control their costs, while gaining more flexibility in terms of pricing, compared to competitors who lease such services or cannot control access asset performance.

Also, at least in principle, access asset ownership provides another element of data on user behavior, in real time, plus ability to shape experience.

Perhaps oddly, in an era of loosely-coupled networks, larger platform providers increasingly look to integrate experiences that look more like “vertical integration” than “horizontal “ dominance of one function, and reliance on others for other key elements of experience.

Emphasis needs to be placed on “larger.” Webscale firms can think about integrating key functions from content creation/acquisition to access. Smaller firms cannot do so.

source: Accenture

Could Edge Computing Facilities Eventually Help Telcos Become More Asset Light?

The fixed network communications business never will be asset light. On the other hand, the long-term business model almost certainly benefits from becoming less asset intensive, when possible, as this helps lower sunk costs and reduces capital spending.

Edge computing raises a couple of interesting questions, in that regard. Assuming that the best option for most telcos is not to become "edge computing as a service" providers, but instead focus on becoming neutral host providers of edge computing facilities (racks, security, air conditioning, cross connect), new issues around recurring revenue, profit margins and asset creation arise.

At least in principle, edge computing colocation could be a logical line extension for many tier-one connectivity providers. The investments might be incremental, and produce additional revenue.

The other question is whether the edge facilities business could be positioned as an asset for eventual sale, as has been the case for cell towers.

Cell towers and stand-alone data center facilities were easy to separate from the rest of the connectivity business, and could be sold.

That is not so easy when edge computing racks and infrastructure are inside telco buildings and real estate, unless those facilities have been nearly entirely replaced as elements of the communications infrastructure. 

On the other hand, network virtualization could be a way for telcos to position much of their former central office infrastructure as non-core assets, though they might still need to become tenants, if most local central offices were sold. Much as they sell owned towers and then become tenants, the same could, in principle, be done with most central offices once virtualization is possible. 

At least for fixed network operations, those former CO locations would still be needed as aggregation points for the local access network. 

If an entire local access business cannot or should not be sold, the question might then be asked: how much of those physical “access” assets could be positioned for sale? Generally speaking, COs and access networks have been considered mission critical assets, with connectivity providers benefiting from ownership of those facilities. 

So there are some possible new questions. 

To what extent does edge computing infrastructure, like the data center business, create recurring revenue, and to what extent might such assets become mission critical for connectivity providers? 

Even if mission critical, could such assets be packaged for possible eventual sale, using the same sale and lease-back mechanisms previously used for cell towers? 

To the extent that edge computing is integral for connectivity service operations, to what extent could those functions be supplied as a “buy rather than build” input? 

Those could become more interesting discussions at some point, as most service providers seek to become a bit more asset light, if only to reduce the sunk costs of their businesses.

Reemergence of "Structural Separation?"

Structural separation of retail opeations from network ownership was a bigger idea several decades ago than at present, even if a handful of markets have moved that way in a formal sense in Southeast Asia, Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.

The key idea is to create an independent network faciltiies supplier and allow all retail service providers to use that one platform.

Whether mandated by regulators or as a business choice, wholesale access remains contentious in both fixed and mobile segments of the business. Over the decades, one has heard much criticism of the “I build it, you get to use it” argument from facilities providers selling wholesale capacity and services to retail competitors. 

Such complaints happen in a variety of settings, including mobile and fixed network wholesale; whether featuring mandated pricing set by regulators or market mechanisms; and by business strategy and market share (attacking or smaller facilities-based suppliers often see greater advantages than dominant providers). 

It remains unclear how attitudes of underlying carriers could change in the future, if greater functional separation of mobile or fixed assets were to occur, especially if it is not mandated by government authorities. 

In other words, if the ownership of access or core network  facilities continues to evolve, with greater ownership by private equity, institutional investors and other “patient” investors, how much could attitudes shift?

If “core” network assets are only partially owned or even divested by dominant retail suppliers, do attitudes also shift? If core infrastructure no longer is considered strategic by dominant suppliers--as unlikely as that might seem--do most, if not all retail service providers wind up having similar attitudes about the value of wholesale access and their business models?

As an example, what if BT Openreach is fully separated from BT? How does BT’s valuation of core network assets (access, especially) evolve? Does BT not acquire the same positon as any existing wholesale customer of Openreach?

Beyond that, what emerges as the core competency of a dominant retailer once ownership of the scarce access facilities is no longer an issue? The perhaps obvious answers are market share itself, installed name, brand name awareness and value, influence on the regulatory process, other complementary assets and so forth. 

Right now, the mobile virtual network operator business model provides some baselines. 

MVNOs are not legal in every market, but in some markets represent  significant portions of the installed base and market share. That is especially true in Europe. 

source: McKinsey 

Margin potential varies. Simple branded “resellers” who add little additional value also face the least risk, at the cost of expected profit margins. Basically, this business model relies on sales and marketing skill, as the basic “product” is sourced completely from a facilities-based service provider, with no fundamental differentiation. The reseller is not able to set its own retail prices. 

An MVNO operating as a “service provider” assumes more risk, for more potential reward.  A service provider operates its own direct billing and customer care operations and can set its own prices. Revenue is typically earned on outbound traffic. 

The “asset light” MVNO earns revenue on both outbound and inbound traffic, and is obliged to pay the underlying carrier on a pattern similar to the “service provider” MVNO. The main advantage is that this type of MVNO is free to add any sort of additional value and differentiation. 

A “full MVNO” itself supplies all of the infrastructure except the radio access network, which is leased from a facilities-based mobile operator. This model offers perhaps the highest ability to differentiate the user experience, with the highest amount of risk, however. 

As a rule, an MVNO has to have operating costs 30 percent or more lower than the host provider’s cost structure. Perhaps for that reason, the full MVNO model is rarely chosen. The center of gravity is arguably either the service provider or asset light approach. 

Much can hinge on the anticipated gross revenue and  profit margins to the wholesale services supplier. Bulk accounts have their attractions. If some customers want to defect to a lower-cost mobile virtual network operator--and that is the primary attraction for nearly all MVNOs--then supplying access to a retail competitor still makes business sense.

The underlying carrier makes revenue off a “lost” customer account. Some argue that asset-light MVNOs can earn higher profit margins than facilities-based retailers. 

source: Oxio 

If a dominant mobile service provider could achieve margins between 15 percent and 20 percent as do other light MVNOs, but avoid capex and opex, further boosting margins, would that not be a reasonable choice? 

And if so, the historic value of owning scarce access assets decreases substantially, perhaps nearly entirely. So the business model becomes more disaggregated.

Structural separation, in past decades mostly viewed as a regulatory solution, might eventually become a preferred marketplace solution.

What is an Access Provider's Core Competence?

Liberty Global is looking at selling its Belgian tower network. Separately, Liberty and Telefonica are investigating selling  U.K. towers as well. Both deals illustrate the changing value of asset infrastructure in the mobility business. Where once tower ownership was considered essential, it now is considered optional. 

That in turn raises logical questions about the value of towers as business moats. As it turns out, ownership of radios on towers, and not the towers, is considered important. Ownership of spectrum licenses also remains strategic. 

In a tactical sense, mobile operators have found they can raise capital to reduce debt or increase investments by selling tower assets. In a strategic sense, the move to divest towers, create joint ventures or wholesale-only access in the fixed networks business raises questions about the business moats formerly provided by ownership of scarce access networks. 

Many of the same questions could be raised about digital infrastructure assets of other types, including data centers and optical fiber assets. To the extent that owners are willing to sell off all or parts of their infra assets, that suggests a business decision that such actions preserve what is essential to the business while creating greater liquidity. 

But the corollary is that those assets might not be sources of business advantage they once were thought to be, in whole or in part. 

As the asset light business model gains more traction, issues about structural separation, once thought to be a regulatory issue, not become matters of business strategy. In a growing number of cases, access providers are choosing to deemphasize asset ownership in favor of a more asset-light approach. 

Often forced by necessity, such moves still show a belief that some parts of the digital infra asset base can be shed without loss of too much competitive advantage. 

There are other corollaries. Telco executives once claimed that their core competence was “knowing how to run networks.” That makes less sense once ownership of the networks is given up, in part or in whole. 

So “running networks” turns out not to be the core competence. That might come as a shock to many who work in the industry, but is an inescapable conclusion. The ability to shape the regulatory process might arguably be closer to “core competence” than the ability to run networks. 

How Far Can "Asset Light" Model Go?

In addition to network virtualization, private equity and institutional investor interest in communications infrastructure might be part of a reconceptualization of where value lies in the connectivity business, from the standpoint of service providers. 

For investors, fiber assets, for example, represent an alternative asset similar to airports, seaports or other physical infrastructure. For service providers, there are new ways to conceive of where sustainable business advantage can be gained. 

As the competitive era of telecommunications dawned, service providers gradually moved away from developing and creating their own platforms, from switches and access media to applications. They almost universally now rely on third parties for infrastructure. 

So the issue is how far the trend can extend. 

As mobile operators have concluded that owning tower assets does not provide as much value as other uses for cash, if such assets are sold, so there could be new thinking about the value of copper access assets and access networks generally.

Specifically, service providers might decide that, though still valuable, access assets need not be 100-percent owned. Partial ownership might still provide the required business value, but at less overall capital investment. Freed up capital from asset sales might then be applied to other more-strategic growth initiatives. 

That is not to say there is a general rethinking of operating solely on the basis of wholesale access. “Owner’s economics” and the ability to differentiate still flow from network ownership and control. 

Also, mobile operators increasingly are comfortable outsourcing their core network information platforms to public cloud providers, showing yet another way that service providers are rethinking the ownership versus leasing of platforms and capabilities. 

All of this should lead to a rethinking of where sustainable advantage lies, for service providers. How much of the core infrastructure they once developed and owned becomes less strategic over time. How far can the “asset light” approach be carried?

Nomenclature Change Shows Business Change

Private equity firms say they invest in fiber to premises providers instead of “telcos.” That is the key to understanding the restructuring opportunity they see.

Access providers don’t want to be known as “telcos” anymore. They don’t want to be known as “cable TV” companies, either. Instead, they are internet service providers, or home broadband providers. That trend has been nearly two decades in the making and tells us much about how the business has changed. 

But the very fact that private equity firms invest in digital infrastructure also tells us some other possible things about the business.  

Historically, the private equity business model requires acquiring assets that can be transformed in some way to add value. Sale of those assets is the exit. That might imply there is a “problem” of some type with the asset that PE can fix, before flipping the asset. 

 Institutional investors are the other group that traditionally buys real estate type assets ranging from hotels to airports and toll roads to gas pipelines and electrical utilities. They are more interested in predictable cash flow generated from slow-growth assets with some degree of natural advantage in the form of business moats that protect them from competition. 

The issue that we might contemplate is what the new interest in digital infra assets indicates about business models. Some PE investments are vertical: airport operation, gas pipeline operations, toll road operations and produced cash flow are the value. The physical assets underpin operations. 

In other cases, the model is more horizontal. The value of a wholesale broadband access network is the ability to lease access to the network, rather than operating the retail business to generate cash flow. 

The analogy in the classic real estate business is the “asset light” model used by some hotel, hospitality or entertainment businesses where the retail business operates without land ownership, sometimes without building ownership, sometimes without indigenous management or branding. 

So the issue is how far similar concepts can be applied within the connectivity industry. Everyone is familiar with the “asset light” mobile virtual network operator model in the mobile industry. 

Fixed network operators are moving, in parts of their businesses, in that direction, at least in the form of joint ventures that share ownership of access network assets. 

Up to a point, hyperscale app providers have moved vertically, to integrate transport functions (wide area networks). Google Fiber is an example of full vertical integration, in some ways. So are hyperscale data centers. 

Just how far the fixed network unbundling can go is a question, as is the degree of vertical integration by hyperscalers. 

When Apple, Comcast, Facebook All are Key Content Distributors, Something Important Has Changed

One hallmark of market disruption caused by technology revolution, especially when accompanied by deregulation, is that new competitors enter older markets. Often, the most-disruptive new entrants are those from outside the traditional industry boundaries.

Consider that, in new discussions about releasing new movies to the streaming window faster than ever, primary distributors include Comcast and Apple. Such a new “premium movie download” product would allow viewers to watch streamed movie content just weeks after theatrical release.

Obviously, what is important about that pairing of names is that a major device manufacturer and one of the largest linear video distributors are linked. We are used to thinking of cable TV companies, TV and radio broadcasters as “content distributors.”

We are less used to device suppliers occupying that role, any less than we have been used to asset-light firms such as Netflix, Hulu or Amazon being “content distributors” as well.

That same sort of porous boundaries can be seen elsewhere in the communications business. Voice and messaging are supplied asset heavy and asset light, by facilities-based service providers and over-the-top app providers. Internet access sometimes is provided by traditional “access provider connections,” and at other times by Wi-Fi, a private network, in-building signal distribution platform.

In coming iterations, 4G and 5G will be provided simultaneously by “access” and private local area network assets, using Licensed Assisted Access and other methods of aggregating mobile network and fixed network spectrum assets.

The main point is that markets undergoing technology and other disruption often see the emergence of new competitors and rearranged industry structures. So it is that Apple and Comcast both are key content distribution vehicles. Facebook has become an important content distributor as well.

Another hallmark of industries under disruption is that revenue shares and magnitude tend to shift.

That shortened release window for streaming almost inevitably will reduce revenue shares earned by theater owners and increase revenues earned by streaming distributors. The incentive for content owners is a way to boost lost revenues from the DVD release window, which has dwindled.

source: project-disco.org  

source: Moffett Nathanson

How Far can Asset Light Business Models be Extended?

One hears quite a lot about connectivity provider “asset light” business models these days. Aside from new interest on the part of institutional investors and private equity in owning communications infrastructure in alternative asset portfolios, service providers also are pondering new ways to redeploy assets. 

source: American Tower 

An early example was ownership of mobile cell towers, which in all markets is getting traction. There also is high interest in optical fiber infrastructure, including transport and access; consumer and business assets. 

More recently, mobile and fixed network operators have concluded their internal cloud computing operations, necessary to support virtualized networks, can be done using hyperscale cloud computing suppliers, rather than building and owning an internal cloud computing infrastructure.

The Lesser of Two (Maybe Four) Evils

On*Net Fibra, the Chilean digital infrastructure company 60 percent owned by KKR and 40 percent by Telefonica, is buying rival service provider Entel’s fiber to home network for US$358, and will continue to operate as an open access wholesale network. 

Selling your network might seem the lesser of several evils: capital investment one cannot afford; inability to differentitate services; becoming a commodity or maintaining business moats. Basically, Entel is choosing to reduce capex, the virtue, at the cost of the other evils.

Entel’s FTTH network passes 1.2 million homes and businesses. On*Net Fibra will, after the deal closes, pass 3.9 million premises. The goal is to grow home and business passings to 4.3 million by 2024.

Telefonica had sold “non-core” Central America network assets in 2021, selling 40 percent of its towers business Telxius to KKR in 2017 before agreeing to flip the whole business to American Tower for €7.7 billion in 2021. Entel also sold its data centers to Equinix.  

One has to wonder whether an asset-light business model is emerging in many parts of the connectivity business. In addition to operating as would a mobile virtual network operator, some access providers might choose to specialize, narrow the scope of their services or radically reshape their customer-facing marketing, sales and support processes to achieve lower costs. 

source: EY 

Telcos using public hyperscale cloud computing services instead of managing their own private clouds provides another example of this trend. To a degree once unthinkable, access providers are reshaping, in some instances, their roles as infrastructure owners. 

In part, that is because open access fiber-to-home networks enable operating modes that cost less, while still offering required levels of network performance. The trade off is a loss of pricing flexibility, as retail prices have to reflect the wholesale costs of securing access. 

Since all competitors have the ability to purchase the same services, wholesale customers also lose some amount of ability to differentiate service levels. If every ISP offers symmetrical gigabit per second or multi-gigabit-per-second access, that ceases to be an area where competitive differentiation is possible.

So the bad news for access providers going asset light is that their products might become more commoditized than they are today. The “plus” of lower capital investment is accompanied by the “minus” of higher degrees of commoditization. 

But such trade offs have been happening for a while. Access providers have been selling physical infrastructure assets to raise cash to reduce debt, for example. Were debt not a problem, would they sell? Perhaps not. 

But most access providers struggle with the economics of building the next generations of mobile and fixed networks. Getting out of substantial parts of the digital infra ownership business seems the lesser of several evils.