Showing posts sorted by relevance for query homes passed. Sort by date Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by relevance for query homes passed. Sort by date Show all posts

Tuesday, September 18, 2018

Verizon as Disruptor

As accustomed as we might be to seeing Google, Netflix, Amazon, Facebook, cable TV companies, wireless internet service providers, metro fiber specialists or T-Mobile US as market attackers and share takers, we are unaccustomed to seeing either AT&T or Verizon in such roles.

But Verizon is about to take that role, in fixed networks.

Verizon is launching Verizon 5G Home, its 5G fixed wireless service, on October 1, 2018 in parts of Houston, Indianapolis, Los Angeles and Sacramento, providing the first U.S. real-world test of customer demand for 5G fixed wireless.


And Verizon has specific business reasons for doing so. Simply, footprint, or homes passed, in its fixed networks business is a key driver for Verizon. Simply put, Verizon has far fewer homes passed than its major fixed network competitors.



Comcast has (can actually sell service to ) about 57 million homes passed. Charter Communications has some 50 million homes passed.


AT&T’s fixed network represents perhaps 62 million U.S. homes passed. Verizon, on the other hand, passes perhaps 27 million homes passed.


As dominant as Verizon is in the mobile services segment, it lacks scale in the fixed networks segment. And that means Verizon can gain revenue by taking market share in the fixed network business.


The companion issue is simply that, similar to Spring and T-Mobile US, Verizon’s revenue is heavily weighted to mobile services. As much as 69 percent of Verizon’s revenue is earned from mobility services. That is less than Sprint or T-Mobile US earn from mobile services, but is highly significant, as it means Verizon, the biggest revenue producer in U.S. mobile, has less room to grow.


As cable companies have fueled growth by taking market share in voice services, business services and internet access, so Verizon expects to take share in fixed network internet access.

Thursday, September 5, 2024

Verizon Flips Assets: Selling then Buying Frontier Communications

Asset flipping in any business is not unheard of, but Verizon’s history with Frontier still seems instructive. In 2010, for example, Frontier Communications purchased rural operations in 27 states from Verizon, including more than seven million local access lines and 4.8 million customer lines. 


Those assets were located in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia, shown in the map below as brown areas. 


Then in 2015, Verizon sold additional assets in three states (California, Texas, Florida) to Frontier. Those assets included 3.7 million voice connections; 2.2 million broadband internet access customers, including about 1.6 million fiber optic access accounts and approximately 1.2 million video entertainment customers.


source: Verizon, Tampa Bay Business Journal 


Now Verizon is buying back the bulk of those assets. There are a couple of notable angles. First, Verizon back in the first decade of the 21st century was raising cash and shedding rural assets that did not fit well with its FiOS fiber-to-home strategy. In the intervening years, Frontier has rebuilt millions of those lines with FTTH platforms.


Also, with fixed network growth stagnant, acquiring Frontier now provides a way to boost Verizon’s own revenue growth. The acquisition means Verizon’s FTTH  connections will jump from approximately 7.4 million to 9.6 million, a gain of about 23 percent in one fell swoop. And since home broadband is the primary revenue growth driver for fixed networks these days, that matters. 


source: Verizon 


There are other takeaways. As in the mobile communications business, where Verizon and AT&T, for example, had been focusing on urban footprints and customers, market saturation has forced both firms to plumb rural areas and customers as well as the mobile virtual network operator business and prepaid accounts, where the main focus had been postpaid branded accounts, market saturation has forced the major providers to search in new areas for growth. 


As a byproduct, Verizon might, in some cases, be able to leverage its new fixed network assets to support its mobile network as well (fiber backhaul, for example). 


It is possible there are other strategic considerations as well. T-Mobile, which started out with zero share of the fixed network home broadband market, now is growing based on its use of fixed wireless services provided by its mobile platform.


But T-Mobile is making its first steps towards adding some amount of fixed network access provided by cabled networks as well. For example, T-Mobile has partnered with EQT, a global investment firm, to acquire Lumos, a fiber-to-the-home platform.


T-Mobile also formed a joint venture with KKR, another global investment firm, to acquire Metronet, a leading fiber-to-the-home provider. That acquisition also will expand T-Mobile’s fixed network home broadband market share.


And while it has seemed unlikely that T-Mobile would contemplate moves such as acquiring Frontier Communications or other firms such as Brightspeed itself, that outcome--at least regarding Frontier--is closed. 


On the other hand, the pressure to grow footprint to grow market share remains intact. Brightspeed does appear to have substantial overlap with Verizon’s new fixed network footprint, but duplicated assets might be sold. 


And Verizon appears to face little danger of antitrust action were it to acquire additional fixed network assets, given its modest coverage of U.S. homes. By some estimates, prior to the Frontier acquisition,   

Verizon homes might have numbered less than 25 million, possibly as low as 20 million. 


That is far fewer than top Verizon competitors might claim. 


Comcast has (can actually sell service to ) about 57 million homes passed. AT&T’s fixed network represents perhaps 62 million U.S. homes passed. 


Charter already passes more than 32 million locations, including homes and businesses. 


CenturyLink never reports its homes passed figures, but likely has 20-million or so consumer locations it can market services to.


The point is that additional Verizon acquisitions of fixed network assets, to reach more U.S. homes, might not pose antitrust issues. The Frontier acquisition adds between five million to 10 million potential new fixed network locations (not all upgraded for FTTH, yet, and including business locations). That potentially increases Verizon’s “locations passed” footprint by as much as a third. 


Using Verizon’s recent assertion that, after the Frontier acquisition, Verizon will reach 25 million homes, Verizon would still have some ways to go before it passes as many homes as AT&T, Comcast or Charter, its larger fixed network competitors. 


Frontier is said to have a network reaching 15 million locations, including homes and businesses. A reasonable guess is that at least 10 million of those locations are homes. 


Most of those locations are arguably not good candidates for FTTH investment, which is why firms such as Verizon and Lumen sold off rural footprints in the past. 


If Verizon’s “homes passed” footprint, after the acquisition, is only 25 million, there remains room to add more homes by acquisition.


Brightspeed’s network seems to pass about 6.5 million locations. Most are homes, but not all. Assuming 90 percent are residential, that implies less than six million locations are homes. So even adding Brightspeed assets would only bring Verizon up to perhaps 31 million or so homes, still far less than reached by AT&T, Comcast and Charter. 


The point is that the strategy of selling off rural assets and re-acquiring them later, once a critical mass of FTTH passings and accounts have been created, seems a logical strategy. Verizon’s cost to acquire the Frontier footprint (not customers, but network passings) is north of $1,000 per location, and possibly in the $1500 per passing range. 


Many observers expect that the former Frontier FTTH passings will double within a couple of  years. At current take rates, that also implies a potential additional two million or more FTTH accounts being added. 


Asset flipping remains part of the connectivity business. But it is rare to see a seller reacquire its sold assets.


Saturday, September 10, 2016

Are FTTH Take Rates Really 50%?

According to the Fiber to the Home Council, half of homes passed by fiber actually buy service.

That seems too high, and is almost certainly a statistical artifact caused by a Verizon sale of assets that subtracted millions of copper-served homes from the actual “homes passed” base.

Verizon supplies most FTTH connections in the United States, so any big change at Verizon will affect the whole market (AT&T’s FTTH passings are growing, and other ISPs operate, but Verizon is the dominant provider of fiber-to-home connections.

In the first quarter of 2016, Verizon FiOS Internet access connections reached 7.1 million accounts, on a base of about 15 million homes. So adoption of FiOS Internet services could be as high as 47 percent.

It all depends on how many homes passed Verizon has. Prior to asset sales to Frontier Communications, there were 19.8 million homes passed by FiOS networks, so take rates for customers able to buy it were once about 36 percent.

Then Verizon sold 4.8 million lines (and more homes passed than that) to Frontier Communications. After the asset sales, Verizon now passes about 15 million homes.

In other words, because Verizon sold assets that mostly did not have FTTH activated, the denominator was reduced more than the numerator when calculating fiber adoption. But nothing really changed in terms of Verizon adoption rates or availability.

It is correct to say that Verizon FTTH take rates (Internet and video) are about 50 percent, where the services are available for purchase.

Still, it has to be noted that other competitors will find it hard to match those levels of adoption. Verizon FiOS has been marketed the longest in the U.S. market, and generally has faced access competition primarily from cable operators. If Verizon gets 47 percent adoption, then cable could potentially get 53 percent.

We will see what happens as competition grows, especially as Comcast activates gigabit capabilities that operate faster than FiOS. Eventually, we also should see additional fixed wireless and mobile competition, plus potential independent ISP market entry in a few instances.

Wednesday, January 2, 2019

U.S. Fixed Network Homes Passed Now Increasingly is Guesswork

With the caveat that there are wide areas of the United States where population density is exceedingly low, no single fixed network service provider has a geographic footprint that covers “most” of the landmass.

Here is Comcast:


Here is AT&T:


Here is Verizon:


Here is CenturyLink:


Here is Charter Communications:

Of course, many will note that what really matters is not landmass but potential customer locations, such as homes and businesses. The Charter Communications network passes about 50 million homes, the number of potential customer locations it can sell to.

Verizon homes passed might number 27 million. Comcast has (can actually sell service to ) about 57 million homes passed.

AT&T’s fixed network represents perhaps 62 million U.S. homes passed. CenturyLink never reports its homes passed figures, but likely has 20-million or so consumer locations it can market services to.

Monday, November 12, 2018

FTTH or Time Warner? It Is Not a Close Call

Would AT&T have generated more incremental revenue if it had not bought Time Warner, and instead had plowed that capital into a massive fiber to home upgrade?

The numbers suggest AT&T made a better choice buying Time Warner.

AT&T spent $85 billion to acquire Time Warner, with an immediate quarterly revenue boost of $8.2 billion. Were AT&T able to invest in fiber to home and then take an incremental five percent share of market everywhere it operates, is perhaps $2.2 billion in annual revenues, assuming $50 a month in gross revenue, or about $180 million a month in incremental revenue.

It is not clear how much upside exists for AT&T, in terms of fixed network internet access revenue, even if it were to dramatically extend its FTTH footprint, but you might argue that the best case for AT&T, for a massive upgrade of its consumer access network, is about 10 percent upside in terms of consumer market share, facing cable operators already leading the market in accounts and speed, with a clear road map for additional speed increases that easily match anything AT&T might propose, and arguably at less cost.

So here’s one take on the alternatives of buying Time Warner or using that capital instead to expand the AT&T FTTH profile. Consider the incremental revenue generated from each alternative.

Assume first that U.S. telcos could take 10 percent more market share from cable TV suppliers. Incremental revenue might then be less than $4.4 billion annually. Consider that AT&T has footprint covering perhaps 69 percent of U.S. homes. So make the incremental revenue for AT&T $3 billion, or $250 million per month.

Also, it would take some years before that degree of new FTTH assets could be put into place. Over any three-month period, AT&T might expect incremental revenue ranging from $540 million to $750 million per quarter, the former figure representing five percent share gain, the latter representing 10 percent share gain.

Neither comes close to the $8.2 billion per quarter AT&T picked up from the Time Warner acquisition.

Verizon has different strategic issues, compared to its main fixed network competitors.

Significantly, Verizon has a small geographic footprint, compared to any of its main fixed network competitors. Verizon homes passed might number 27 million. Comcast has (can actually sell service to ) about 57 million homes passed. Charter Communications has some 50 million homes passed.

AT&T’s fixed network represents perhaps 62 million U.S. homes passed.

Assume there are 138.6 million U.S. housing units, of which perhap 92 percent are occupied (including roughly seven to eight percent of rental units and two percent of homes). That suggests a potential base of 128 million housing units, including rooms rented in homes or apartments, that could buy services from a fixed network supplier.

That implies Verizon has the ability to sell to about 21 percent of homes; Comcast can sell to 45 percent; AT&T can market to 48 percent of occupied homes; while Charter can sell to 39 percent of U.S. occupied homes.

The point is that Verizon has more to gain than AT&T, Comcast or Charter from investing in internet access outside its traditional geography.

In principle, Verizon faces the same issue as does AT&T when weighing alternative uses of scarce capital.

As it deploys 5G fixed wireless, there are two key issues: how much market share and revenue can Verizon gain, and what else might Verizon have done with its investment capital? It all depends on one’s assumptions.

Some argue that, over seven years, Verizon might gain only 11 percent to 18 percent share in markets where it can sell 5G fixed wireless. Verizon believes it will do better, and some believe a 20-percent share is feasible. Verizon itself predicts it can get about 23 percent share, as a minimum, over seven years, representing about 6.3 million accounts.

Assume Verizon fixed wireless gross revenue is about $60 per account (a blend of the $50 from Verizon mobile customers and $70 from non-customers). Assume annual revenue of perhaps $720.

Assume Verizon spends about $800 per location on 5G fixed wireless infrastructure (radios, backhaul, spectrum costs), even if those same assets can be used to support other users and applications.

At 20 percent take rates, that implies a per-subscriber network cost of perhaps $4000.

Assume a cost of perhaps $300, over time,  to turn up service to accounts. That implies a rough break even in months. Assume total capex investment of perhaps $4300 per account. At $720 annual revenue, that implies breakeven on invested capital in six years.

But assume half the cost of the capital investment also supports revenue generation from other users and use cases (mobility, business users, internet of things). In that case the fixed wireless capex is perhaps $$2150 per customer, and breakeven on capex is a bit more than three years, assuming the only revenue upside is internet access revenue.

Logically, one would have to add churn reduction in some cases, and so the lifetime value of a customer; incremental advertising opportunities; some possible upside from voice services or wholesale revenue. None of that is easy to quantify with precision.

The point is that potential return might fall well within a framework of payback in three years.

Whether that is a “good” investment or not depends on what else might have been generated from other capital deployments.

Over a seven-year period, Verizon might have committed $13 billion in capex to generate revenue from six million fixed wireless accounts (about $1.85 billion per year). It is hard to image any alternative use of capital at that level that would result in annual revenues of $4.3 billion in internet access revenues alone.

It is in fact quite hard to create a brand new business generating as much as $1 billion a year in incremental revenues, under the best of conditions.



So, back to the importance of video revenues, as difficult as the Time Warner debt burden might be, the renamed Warner Media already generates $32 billion in annual incremental new revenue for AT&T. Virtually nobody other than its competitors is likely happy about the new $55 billion worth of new debt AT&T has acquired.

Still, the issue is what else AT&T could have done with $55 billion that would immediately create $32 billion in new revenues. Personally, I cannot think of another transaction that would have produced that much new revenue, immediately.

AT&T could have spent that money on fiber to home upgrades, to perhaps gain five percent to 10 percent additional market share in the consumer internet access market, in region, over perhaps five to seven years. The upside, even at 10 percent share gain, does not approach the Warner Media contribution.

Friday, January 31, 2020

AT&T, Comcast and Verizon Collectively Generate about $212 Per Home Passed, Annually

It is not easy to run a big fixed network business these days. As Verizon CEO Hans Vestberg said on Verizon’s fourth quarter earnings call, Verizon faces a “secular decline in wireline business that is continuing.” 

Secular means a trend that is not seasonal, not cyclical, not short term in nature. For multi-product companies such as AT&T, Verizon and Comcast, it can be argued that "everything other than the core business is doing a lot worse than the core business, both at Comcast and at AT&T and at Verizon.

One supposes the “core business” for AT&T and Verizon is mobility, while the core business for Comcast is fixed network broadband. The conclusion analyst Craig Moffett of MoffettNathanson reaches is that AT&T, for example, will have to be broken up. 

The suggestion to focus on the “core business” often produces financial returns when conglomerates are broken up. 

What might not be so clear is how breaking up triple play assets, or separating mobile from fixed assets necessarily helps the surviving connectivity assets to generate greater revenue and profits. 

Is it logical to assume that the AT&T and Verizon businesses would all do better if the fixed network assets, mobile assets and media assets were separated? Would Comcast’s financial returns be better if the content assets were separated from the fixed network, or the video entertainment business separated from the network connectivity business?

Given the “secular decline” of the fixed network business, could a fixed services only approach (internet access, voice and perhaps video entertainment) actually work, at the scale the separated Comcast, AT&T or Verizon assets would represent?

The issue is not whether a small firm, with a light cost structure, might be able to sustain itself in some markets selling internet access alone, or internet plus voice. The issue is whether an independent AT&T fixed network or an independent Verizon fixed network business could sustain itself. 

The answers arguably are tougher than they were twenty years ago, when a telco and a cable company faced each other with a suite of services including internet access, voice and entertainment video. Basically, they traded market, at best. Telcos ceded voice share, but cable lost some video share, and both competed for internet access accounts. 

At a high level, the strategy was that both firms would trade share, but by selling three services on one network, instead of one service on each network, the numbers would still be workable.

But the math gets harder when every one of those three services faces sustained declining demand and falling prices. 

That being the case, it is hard to see how a sustainable business can be built on connectivity services alone, especially for either AT&T or Verizon. Perhaps Comcast could survive with a strong position in internet access and smaller contributions from voice and possibly video entertainment. 

In the fourth quarter of 2019, Comcast Cable generated $14.8 billion in revenue.  Total revenue that quarter was $28.4 billion. 

Verizon’s fixed network business, on the other hand, generated about $7 billion, out of total revenue of nearly $35 billion. 

AT&T had fourth quarter 2019 total revenue of nearly $47 billion. AT&T’s fixed network, plus satellite TV, generated about $18 billion in revenue.  AT&T’s “fixed network plus satellite” operations generate 38 percent of revenue. Perhaps $8 billion or so of that revenue comes from the satellite operations. So the fixed network business might generate $10 billion in revenue. 

Comcast Cable passes 58 million consumer and business locations. Comcast has 26.4 million residential high-speed internet customers, 20.3 million residential video customers and 9.9 million voice accounts, generating average cash flow (EBITDA) of $63 per unit. 

At a high level, the problem is that Verizon’s entire fixed network operation generates about 20 percent of total revenue. AT&T’s fixed network generates perhaps 21 percent of revenue. Comcast, which has a small mobile operation, generates close to $15 billion from the fixed network. 

And that, it seems to me, illustrates the problem. Comcast, AT&T and Verizon all put together generate about $32 billion in fixed network revenue, and revenue is likely to remain flat to negative. 

Verizon homes passed might number 27 million. Comcast has (can actually sell service to ) about 57 million homes passed.

AT&T’s fixed network represents perhaps 62 million U.S. homes passed. 

CenturyLink never reports its homes passed figures, but likely has 20-million or so consumer locations it can market services to. 

Looking only at Comcast, AT&T and Verizon, $32 billion in annual fixed network revenue is generated by networks passing about 146 million U.S. homes. That works out to about $212 per home passed, per year. 

How that is sustainable is a clear challenge.

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