Traditional antitrust violations that cause identifiable or potential “consumer harm.” The key concept here is “consumer harm,” not “producer harm.” That notion underlies consumer protection policies of all sorts, including actions to break up companies to promote more competition.
And that is where the emergence of “free to use” services and applications raises new questions for some, especially a shift of focus from protecting consumers to protecting producers. In other words, regulatory intervention is justified not because consumers are harmed in the old sense of high prices possible because of monopoly power, but despite the ability to quantify such harm.
Consider the classic case of antitrust action against Standard Oil, which at one point might have had 90 percent market share.
“Between 1870 and 1885 the price of refined kerosene dropped from 26 cents to 8 cents per gallon. In the same period, the Standard Oil Company reduced the [refining] costs per gallon from almost 3 cents in 1870 to 0.452 cents in 1885,” observers have noted.
In other words, consumers clearly benefited. But antitrust action was taken despite evidence of consumer harm, to help other competitors, not to protect consumers from high prices.
In essence, many argue for a return to such policies of helping suppliers, not consumers, since consumer harm cannot be clearly demonstrated.
It is debatable whether policies aimed at protecting suppliers work long term. Still, to the extent new antitrust action might be taken, it will be using non-direct and non-quantifiable measures of harm. Privacy protection seems the most-obvious new culprit.
So the new tack is to enshrine new tests--privacy protection, mostly--of monopoly power that have no historic justification.
Many call this the New Brandeis school of antitrust, which argues that what matters is market structure, not consumer harm, since Internet era firms including Google, Facebook and Amazon provide consumer benefits at zero prices, or have demonstrably contributed to lower prices.
The subject of antitrust then becomes market structure itself, not consumer harm in the form of higher prices, for example. Some call this a shift to antimonopoly, rather than antitrust, with benefits that are more social and political than economic.
The enemy is “bigness,” not consumer welfare, though some might argue “bigness” is not the problem as much as the ability to exploit bigness. As a practical matter, the real-world test will be bigness itself. How well that will work, if at all, remains to be seen.
Historically, one might note that prior efforts to break up industry power have always resulted in reaccumulation of market share. Market structures do not remain fragmented, but reconcentrate. That is what happens when any competitor creates products that buyers consider superior.
One might note the European telecom regulatory community essentially moved in that direction in mandating wholesale policies for producers in the connectivity business, allowing multiple retailers to use a monopoly network.
Parenthetically, one might also ask what becomes of contestants in global markets, where scale matters, if “bigness” itself becomes grounds for antitrust or anti-monopoly action. Sometimes, scale is necessary to compete.
