Thursday, June 29, 2023

NextLight Grabs 60-Percent Market Share Competing Against Lumen and Comcast

NextLight, the electrical utility owned internet service provider in Longmont, Colo. says it has gotten 60 percent take rates for its fiber-to-home service, with similar take rates among business customers, after gaining about 54 percent take rates after five years of operation. 


Should many other competitive ISPs achieve such success, incumbent telco and cable operator ISPs could face serious challenges. 


It has been conventional wisdom in U.S. fixed network markets that two competitors are a sustainable market structure, typically featuring one cable operator and the legacy telco, with market shares ranging between a 70-30 pattern (where the telco only has copper access)  to something closer to 60-40 as a rule (where the telco is upgrading to fiber access). 


Telcos hope for market shares approaching 50-50 as FTTH becomes the dominant access platform over time. 


The new issue is additional providers, ranging from municipal or utility-owned ISPs to independent ISPs, including independent ISP operations that cover only parts of a metro area. In a sense, that is the mass market or consumer version of the competitive local exchange carrier strategy adopted decades ago, where suppliers target business customers in major office parks or downtown core areas. 


The American Association of Public Broadband cites 750 municipal internet service provider networks in operation in the United States, mostly serving smaller communities. Not all have full retail operations, though. 


Chattanooga Electric Power claims 175,000 customers in the Chattanooga, Tennessee area. The next-largest 10 such ISPs have fewer customers, often because they are smaller population centers. 


  • City of Salem Electric Department (Oregon): 50,000

  • City of Longmont Power & Communications (Colorado): 40,000

  • Plum Creek Electric Cooperative (North Dakota): 35,000

  • Jackson Energy Authority (Tennessee): 25,000

  • City of Holyoke Municipal Light Department (Massachusetts): 20,000

  • City of Boulder Municipal Electric Utility (Colorado): 18,000

  • City of Dubuque Utilities (Iowa): 17,000

  • City of Lawrence Public Utilities (Kansas): 15,000

  • City of Lexington Utilities (Kentucky): 15,000

 

And other networks are launching in larger population centers. As with any set of contestants in any other industry, not all suppliers will succeed and not all will likely survive. Managerial skill still seems to matter, as do the other prosaic concerns such as managing debt burdens and picking the right areas to serve. 


Many for-profit ISPs now believe they have better opportunities in rural areas, for example, where a new fiber network can be “first” to serve the market. Up to this point few have attempted to compete in a major big city market. ISPs targeting operations in mid-size cities have generally only chosen to serve portions of their cities. 


The obvious broader issues are the roles and strategies traditional retail service providers can envision as their markets are reshaped by competition, new investors and virtualized or other roles beyond the traditional vertically-integrated model. 


The question naturally arises: how many of these new competitors will succeed, and what are the implications for sustainable market shares over time?


In a market with two significant suppliers, each serving the whole market, an ISP might require  market share of at least 30 percent to be sustainable. That has often been the pattern where a cable operator competes against a telco with copper-only access, where the available telco speeds are quite limited in comparison to a cable operator hybrid fiber coax network. In such cases, there is an order or magnitude or two orders of magnitude difference in top speeds. 


In a market with three significant suppliers, an ISP typically needs to have a market share of at least 20 percent to be sustainable, if competition across the full geography is envisioned. Such ISPs also tend to require more efficient operations. 


In a market with four significant suppliers, where we can assume as many as two of the four compete only in a portion of the metro market, an ISP typically needs to have a market share of at least 10 percent (of the full area potential market) to be sustainable, though ISPs serving only a portion of a metro area also probably need take rates higher than 10 percent in the areas they do choose to serve. 


If an independent ISP cannot get 20 percent to 30 percent take rates in its chosen geographical areas of coverage, it probably is not doing well. 


The best suppliers can take so much share from the incumbents (telco and cable) that severe damage to the incumbent business model is possible, turning those competitive areas into loss-making operations. 


A fixed network operator with sufficiently offsetting performance might survive actual losses in a few geographies. In fact, traditional monopoly fixed network suppliers expected permanent losses in rural areas, breakeven or slightly better performance in suburbs and most of the profits from operations in city cores. 


NextLight seemingly has avoided issues of cross-subsidization of internet access service by the electrical utility ratepayers, separating its financial operations from those of Longmont Power Company.


NextLight has its own board of directors, management team, and accounting system.


NextLight seemingly provides service “at cost,” plus a small margin to cover its operating expenses. The objective is to break even, rather than “making a profit.”


NextLight's network is physically separate from LPC's network, though critics might argue NextLight uses power company rights of way and other benefits of having a sponsor with an on-going business, which could translate to financial advantages. 


Others might argue there is some cross subsidy. There is a no-recourse surcharge on LPC's electric bills, used to fund the construction and operation of NextLight, and it is applied to all LPC customers, regardless of whether they subscribe to NextLight service.


That said, NextLight has gotten a legal opinion from the Colorado Attorney General's Office stating that NextLight is not engaging in cross-subsidization, and that the non-bypassable surcharge is a fair and reasonable way to fund the network. 


In fairness, what revenue-generating entity would not look to leverage its current assets to create new lines of business? Cable operators used their video subscription networks to create fully-functional telecom networks; use their fixed network to support their mobile service provider operations; extended their consumer networks to provide business-specific services; used their linear video customer base to leverage a move into content ownership. 


Telcos do the same, when trying to extend their core operations to new services. In the more-regulated era, they had to establish separate subsidiaries to enter non-regulated lines of business. That is less an issue in today’s largely-deregulated markets. 


The city of about 100,000 is about 30 miles north of Denver, so might be considered a suburb by some, a neighboring city by others. Using either characterization, population density varies quite substantially. 


The population density of Longmont, Colorado in its city core is 11,999 people per square mile while the population density of the outlying areas is 1,369 people per square mile  

 

Housing density and population density obviously are key indicators of potential access network cost and revenue possibility. Housing density enables and constrains home broadband market size, while population density is correlated with business revenue potential. 


To a large extent, housing and population density also affect network cost: the lowest-cost-per-passing networks can be built in dense areas while the most costly networks are in rural areas. 


Among U.S. internet service providers, the “average housing density is 400 locations per square mile, with Comcast sitting squarely on that level of density. Smaller telcos tend to serve more-rural areas and have housing densities an order of magnitude or two orders of magnitude less than the largest ISPs. 


Company

Housing Units

Average Housing Density (dwellings per square mile)

Verizon

58.2 million

1,500

AT&T

51.8 million

1,300

Lumen (formerly CenturyLink)

25.7 million

600

Charter

22.9 million

500

Comcast

19.5 million

400

Windstream

14.8 million

300

Brightspeed

1.9 million

40


At least historically, that explains why Verizon was early to invest in fiber to home facilities. It has the most-dense serving areas, so has the best economics. Only recently have many smaller and independent ISPs been able to make a business case for investing in FTTH in rural and exurban areas, though lots of small rural telcos have been doing so for years. 


Housing density

Cost per home passed

40 homes per square mile

$2,000

40 homes per square mile

$800

1,300 homes per square mile

$500


Figures of merit for FTTH construction might range from $1,000 to $1,250 per household at 400 homes per square mile but $1,500 to $2,000 per household at 40 homes per square mile, for example. 


At higher densities of 1,300 homes per square mile, costs might range from $500 to $750 per household. 


The business case also includes less revenue per account potential at lower densities as well. 


All that matters as attacking ISPs and infrastructure investors weigh their odds of success when competing with legacy service providers. To be sure,  FTTH payback models seem to have changed greatly since 2000. 


The economics of connectivity provider fiber to the home have always been daunting, but they are, in some ways, more daunting in 2022 than they were a decade ago. The biggest new hurdle is that expected revenue per account metrics have been cut in half or two thirds. That would be daunting for any supplier in any industry. 


These days, the expected revenue contribution from a home broadband account hovers around $50 per month to $70 per month. Some providers might add linear video, voice or text messaging components to a lesser degree. 


But that is a huge change from revenue expectations in the 1990 to 2015 period, when $150 per customer was the possible revenue target.  


You might well question the payback model for new fiber-to-home networks which assume recurring revenue between $50 and $70 per account, per month, with little voice revenue and close to zero video revenue; take rates in the 40-percent range; and network capital investment between $800 and $1000 per passing and connection costs of perhaps $300 per customer. 


In the face of difficult average revenue per account metrics, co-investment and ancillary revenue contributions have become key. Additional subsidies for home broadband also will reduce FTTH deployment costs. 


The point is that FTTH revenue models, and the ability to sustain a competitive ISP operation, either as an incumbent or attacker, now seem to make possible more competition than was previously thought possible. 


NextLight is a good example.


Wednesday, June 28, 2023

Do Fewer Competitors Necessarily Mean Fewer Consumer Benefits, Lower Investment and Innovation?

It would be difficult to find any economic studies of market structure, competition or investment in the connectivity industry that did not begin with the assumption that less competition leads to higher prices. It would be hard to find any studies that assume fewer competitors leads to higher innovation. 


Indeed, that is what even a casual perusal of past studies would suggest, especially in the mobile segment of the access business, which has been based on multiple facilities-based competitors, since the beginning. The harder scenarios generally revolve around fixed networks, where capital investment barriers are higher. 


In mobile markets, though, there is virtually unanimous agreement that less competition--typically reducing the number of leading facilities-based contenders from four to three--does in fact lead to an increase in consumer prices, lower investment and less innovation, compared to markets with four leading contestants. 


Study

Publisher

Date of Publication

Key Findings

"The Effect of Market Structure on Competition and Investment in the US Mobile Telecommunications Industry"

Federal Communications Commission

2005

Found that a reduction in the number of competitors from four to three led to an increase in prices and a decrease in investment.

"The Effect of Market Concentration on Competition and Consumer Prices in the US Mobile Telecommunications Industry"

The Brattle Group

2010

Found that a reduction in the number of competitors from four to three led to an increase in prices of up to 20%.

"The Impact of Market Structure on Competition and Investment in the European Mobile Telecommunications Industry"

The European Commission

2012

Found that a reduction in the number of competitors from four to three led to an increase in prices of up to 10%.

"The Effect of Market Concentration on Competition and Consumer Prices in the US Fixed Telecommunications Industry"

The Brattle Group

2013

Found that a reduction in the number of competitors from four to three led to an increase in prices of up to 15%.

"The Effect of Market Concentration on Consumer Prices in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry"

Federal Communications Commission

2017

The study found that a decrease in the number of competitors in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry from four to three was associated with an increase in average monthly prices for wireless services.

"The Impact of Market Concentration on Investment in the U.S. Fixed Broadband Internet Industry"

Federal Communications Commission

2018

The study found that a decrease in the number of competitors in the U.S. fixed broadband internet industry from four to three was associated with a decrease in investment in broadband infrastructure.

"The Effect of Market Concentration on Competition in the U.K. Mobile Telecommunications Industry"

Ofcom

2019

The study found that a decrease in the number of competitors in the U.K. mobile telecommunications industry from four to three was associated with a decrease in competition.

"The Impact of Market Concentration on Consumer Prices and Investment in the Greek Fixed Broadband Internet Industry"

Hellenic Competition Commission

2020

The study found that a decrease in the number of competitors in the Greek fixed broadband internet industry from four to three was associated with an increase in average monthly prices for broadband services and a decrease in investment in broadband infrastructure.

"The Impact of Market Concentration on Investment in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry"

The Brattle Group

2011

Found that a decrease in the number of competitors in the U.S. telecommunications industry from four to three led to a decrease in investment of 10-15%.

"The Effect of Market Power on Innovation in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry"

The Brookings Institution

2013

Found that a decrease in the number of competitors in the U.S. telecommunications industry from four to three led to a decrease in innovation of 10-15%.


The caveat is that monopoly “facilities” are not necessarily a barrier to retail competition, in fixed or mobile markets. Where multiple competitors are able to use a single access network provider, facilities monopoly and retail competition coexist. And that option has significant support in many markets. 


So it is not clearly the case that “monopoly” facilities means retail competition is infeasible. Robust wholesale, in fact, has produced lower consumer prices, though arguably at the expense of innovation and investment.  


But excessive competition also can and should lead to less investment and lower innovation, even when consumer prices do benefit, as firm profits are too low to allow for more-robust investment and innovation. 


The problem is that insufficient profits threaten firm survival, and the ability to reinvest or innovate. As with all supply and demand situations for any product, excessive competition and monopoly both are dangers. 


The issue is to create a climate where there is both sufficient competition to drive consumer benefits, but also enough profit to allow service providers to reinvest and innovate. 


And there are some studies that suggest the fertile ground in between the extremes. It seems conceivable that, under some conditions, even a modest amount of competition, such as a duopoly, can produce consumer gains, innovation and investment. 


Study

Publisher

Date of Publication

Key Findings

"Competition and Innovation: A Reconsideration"

Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro

1992

Argued that competition can sometimes lead to less innovation, as firms focus on competing with each other rather than on developing new products or services.

"The Antitrust Paradox"

Robert Bork

1978

Argued that antitrust laws should be used to promote efficiency, not competition, and that mergers and acquisitions that reduce competition can sometimes lead to lower prices and higher innovation.

"The Theory of Contestable Markets"

William Baumol, John Panzar, and Robert Willig

1982

Developed a theory of markets that are contestable, meaning that new firms can easily enter and exit the market. This theory suggests that even if there are only a few firms in a market, competition can still be strong if the market is contestable.

"Competition and Innovation: A Reassessment of the Evidence"

Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro

2012

Found that the relationship between competition and innovation is more complex than previously thought, and that in some cases, less competition can lead to higher investment and innovation.

"The Competitive Advantage of Firms in Concentrated Industries"

David Teece

1984

Argued that firms in concentrated industries can still be innovative, as they can benefit from economies of scale and scope, and can focus their resources on a few key areas of innovation.

"The Competitive Effects of Duopoly in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry"

The Brattle Group

2009

Found that a duopoly in the U.S. telecommunications industry could lead to lower prices, higher investment, and more innovation.

"The Economics of Duopoly in the U.S. Mobile Telecommunications Industry"

The Brookings Institution

2011

Found that a duopoly in the U.S. mobile telecommunications industry could lead to lower prices, higher investment, and more innovation.

"The Effect of Duopoly on Innovation in the U.S. Telecommunications Industry"

The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation

2013

Found that a duopoly in the U.S. telecommunications industry could lead to higher levels of innovation.


As always with such studies, it might be safer to say there is correlation between the degree of competition and outcomes such as consumer benefit, innovation and investment, either positive or negative, and that we cannot be sure the relationship is directly causal, though that is the clear implication. 


Still, though economic theory suggests less competition should produce fewer consumer welfare gains, investment and innovation, that might not always be the case. 


Even “monopoly” facilities can produce retail competition if a robust wholesale framework is in place. Even a “duopoly” could produce consumer welfare gains, with adequate investment, plus innovation. 


And if that is the case, the notion that three leading facilities-based mobile service providers could still produce consumer welfare gains, innovation and investment should not be dismissed. 


Regulators can be expected to protest any reduction of leading competitors in a mobile market from four to three. But it is not clear that outcomes will necessarily be worse if that happens.


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