World Cup long-term economic effects will be negligible, economists at Goldman Sachs say. That might seem unlikely, given the 2026 FIFA World Cup featuring 48 teams and 104 matches across the United States, Canada and Mexico.
After Goldman Sachs International economists Kevin Daly and Mambuna Njie studied gross domestic product data covering every World Cup since 1982, they find hosting produces a marginally positive but statistically insignificant effect on real output, with long-run impact that is effectively zero.
FIFA and the World Trade Organization disagree. A joint study they published in April 2025, developed by consultancy OpenEconomics, projects a $17.2 billion contribution to U.S. GDP, $30.5 billion in gross output and approximately 185,000 full-time equivalent jobs for the host country alone.
Across all three host countries, the combined GDP estimate reaches $40.9 billion, the report argues.
Different methodologies help explain the differences.
Beer, merchandise and apparel purchased in their own markets does not register in U.S., Canadian or Mexican GDP.
Domestic spending on World Cup-related goods and services may simply be redirected from other consumption categories rather than representing new activity.
There is short-term lift, but no lasting contribution.
Leakage effects also are real: profits from international licensing, sponsorship and supply chains accrue outside the host country’s GDP.
On the other hand, it stands to reason that several industries should benefit, including:
European and US consumer staples (brewing companies including AB InBev, Molson Coors, Constellation Brands, Heineken and Carlsberg)
European consumer discretionary, primarily sportswear (the ones we know: adidas, PUMA)
U.S. retail and softlines (Academy Sports + Outdoors, Dick’s Sporting Goods, Nike)
U.S. lodging and leisure (Hyatt, Marriott, Hilton, Airbnb)
U.S. airlines.
There will be significant industrial impact in those segments of the market, to be sure. Concentrated, time limited but real.
Wider and long-term benefits will likely be negligible, if measurable at all.
In many ways, the impact is similar to that supposedly created by municipally-financed sports stadia.
The claim that government-financed sports stadia act as engines for economic growth is widely contested within the field of economics.
While proponents often cite job creation, increased tax revenues, and regional prestige as primary justifications for public subsidies, empirical research consistently demonstrates that these facilities rarely produce significant, measurable net economic benefits for host cities.
The core economic argument against public financing centers on the substitution effect.
Economic models often fail to account for the fact that a large portion of spending at a stadium is not "new" money introduced into the local economy; rather, it is money that residents would have otherwise spent on other local entertainment options, such as restaurants, movie theaters, or other cultural activities.
Because this spending is simply redirected, there is little to no net increase in total local economic activity.
Furthermore, economic impact studies commissioned by proponents often rely on flawed multipliers that exaggerate the stimulative effect of sports expenditures.
These studies frequently ignore "leakage," where significant portions of the revenue (such as players' salaries) are exported out of the local economy because athletes and owners often do not reside in the city where they play.
Consequently, most independent academic research concludes that the public cost of these subsidies far exceeds any marginal economic growth they may stimulate.
Study / Authors | Findings | Source |
Bradbury, Coates, & Humphreys (2023) | Retrospective analysis confirming that stadiums are poor public investments and that public outlays provide meager benefits. | Link |
Matheson (2018) | Found no evidence that stadium subsidies yield economic growth; suggested that at most 5–15% of public cost might be justified by "public good" (civic pride). | Link |
Bradbury (2022) | Found negligible net increases in sales tax collections and noted that approximately one-third of stadium sales displace other local activity. | Link |
Siegfried & Zimbalist (2002) | Demonstrated that standard impact multipliers exaggerate benefits by over 400% due to consumer substitution and economic leakage. | Link |
Coates & Humphreys (2003) | Econometric analysis finding no evidence of positive economic benefits associated with stadium construction; some results indicated negative impacts. | Link |
