AI Might Not Diminish Critical Thinking, But Vested Interests Often Do

One sometimes hear it argued that fewer homes will "get internet" because of changes to Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment Program rule changes. One also hears arguments that increased use of artificial intelligence will reduce critical thinking skills. 

Sometimes those arguments are highly questionable. There are other reasons why reality, truthfulness or factuality can be challenged, and it has nothing to do with human critical thinking or using AI. Instead, the issue is vested economic interest. 

Advocates for local or state government, for example, have a vested interest in increasing the share of federal resources they can deploy to solve problems. And sometimes they have vested interests in particular ways of solving problems. 

Consider arguments for how to bring better home broadband services to rural areas. For decades, the preference has been for a particular solution, namely optical fiber to the home, with opposition to using other arguably more-affordable and immediately-deployable solutions including satellite service and using mobile networks rather than cabled networks. 

Nobody disagrees that optical fiber to the home is the most “future proof” solution, providing it is economically feasible. The problem is that feasibility often is precisely the issue. 

FTTH Deployment Environment	Typical Homes Passed per Mile	Cost per Mile (All-In)*	Cost per Location (Homes Passed)	Key Cost Drivers
Urban (High Density)	80 – 150+	$50,000 – $100,000	$500 – $1,200	Shorter drops, existing duct/conduit, shared trenching, many users per mile
Suburban (Moderate Density)	30 – 70	$40,000 – $80,000	$1,200 – $2,500	Mix of aerial and buried, moderate trenching cost, fewer homes per mile
Rural (Low Density)	5 – 20	$25,000 – $60,000	$3,000 – $10,000+	Long distances, expensive trenching, new poles/conduit, very few users per mile

Very-rural areas might require investment so high no payback is possible. 

That is the reason a rational argument can be made that FTTH should not be built “everywhere,” and that feasible solutions must include satellite or mobile network access. The argument that “work from home” is not possible unless FTTH is deployed is almost always false. 

I have “worked from home, full time” on connections including symmetrical gigabit per second broadband and on connections offering less than 100 Mbps downstream and single digits upstream. My work has never been adversely affected. 

To be sure, my work does not routinely involve upgrading large files on a sustained basis. But most of us do not require a home-based server role, do not create long-form 4K video content all day and need to upload those files continually. 

So if it is said that changes to BEAD rules mean “fewer households will get high speed internet,” the statement is misleading or false. Fewer households might get internet access using FTTH, but that does not mean they will not get internet. And whether such access is “high speed” or not depends on the definitions we choose to use. 

Beyond that, “high speed” might not actually provide any user-perceivable advantage beyond a few hundred megabits per second in the downstream direction. Whether it makes any difference in the upstream direction might be a more-relevant issue, but even there, actual users might not find their work from home impeded. 

We sometimes forget that society has any number of pressing problems to be solved, and internet access is just one of those problems. Investments we make in any area have opportunity costs: we cannot spend the money to solve additional problems. 

Any engineering problem involves choices. Any allocation of societal resources likewise requires choices. Those choices have consequences. 

It is a perfectly logical and appropriate issue to suggest that serving more people, right now,  is a value as great as serving them with a particular solution or capability. Likewise, being efficient in the use of public resources also is a value we tend to believe makes sense. Virtually nobody ever advocates “waste, fraud and abuse.” 

But as a practical matter, it might well be a waste of scarce resources to insist on one particular solution for all home broadband requirements, when other workable solutions exist. 

For every public purpose there are corresponding private interests. Critical thinking might be said to aid decision making when scarce resources must be committed. And that critical thinking might include weighing claims that certain approaches mean “fewer homes will get internet,” when the truth is that the claim only means “fewer homes will get internet using FTTH:

• in areas where other providers already exist

• where there are locations that might not actually require access (an area might have business users but no home users)

• there are other reasons why subsidized service will still be available

• In areas too expensive to serve using FTTH.

In our justified zeal to ensure that critical thinking skills are not diminished by AI, we should not forget that critical thinking skills often are ignored when vested interests interpret reality in ways that serve those interests.

"Speeds and Feeds" for Home Broadband: It's the PC Story

Though definitions of “broadband” matter for regulators, advocates and suppliers, in most cases “broadband capability” matters quite little for most users of internet access services. Internet access matters quite a lot, in comparison. 

The analogy perhaps is what happened with personal computers. Suppliers used to compete on clock speed and other performance metrics. Then we got to a point where performance across a broad range was "good enough" that it stopped making as much sense to keep touting performance. 

We are getting to that point with home broadband services. 

Use of a Chromebook, for example, absolutely requires internet access. But whether use of a Chromebook requires “broadband,” defined as 100 Mbps downstream, 20 Mbps upstream” is highly questionable, if true at all. 

I’ve used a Chromebook on a symmetrical gigabit-per-second connection and on Wi-Fi connections of varying quality but with downstream speeds not exceeding 100 Mbps and upstream in the mid-single digits. 

Was the user experience on Wi-Fi as good as on my symmetrical gigabit connection? No. But was it a major issue? Also, no. Keep in mind, I do no gaming, do not upload or download large files routinely, have no other users on my connection and might watch 4K but never 8K video. 

Though we often use the terms interchangeably, “internet access” is not the same as “broadband.” 

Internet access is the ability to connect to the internet, regardless of the speed or platform used. 

"Broadband" is a moving target describing internet access at defined minimum speeds. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission defines “broadband” as 100 Mbps download and 20 Mbps upload. 

So, strictly speaking, many access services do not operate at “broadband” speeds, as the definition requires. That does not mean the access is deficient, simply that it might not meet the minimums. Wi-fi access on airplanes or in public locations are typical examples where internet access is available, but not at “broadband” speeds in both directions.

In fact, even cable modem services I have used can fail to meet the definition, even when offering gigabit-per-second downstream speeds, as upstream speeds did not hit 20 Mbps. 

For most of us, the issue is whether such failures matter. Often, they do not matter much, if at all. People can do all the things they want to on many connections that fail to meet the broadband definitions. `

As a practical matter, past a certain point, “broadband” matters relatively little in terms of user experience. 

Verizon Fixed Wireless Keeps Growing Subscriber Base: What That Suggests About Demand

Most of us "dumb end users" of home broadband have probably realized the value-price proposition for broadband outweighs the "raw bandwidth" claims we are urged by internet service suppliers to consider. The success of relatively bandwidth-constrained fixed wireless is a case in point.

In a market where headline speeds are pushing past 2 Gbps and up to 5 Gbps, it might be easy to dismiss claims that far-lower speeds are adequate for many households and use scenarios. In fact, for most end users, the number of users in a household, and the number of their devices, have more to do with suitability than the actual applications those people engage with on a routine basis.

Verizon, for example, reported fixed wireless net additions of 278,000 in the second quarter of 2025, growing the base to over 5.1 million fixed wireless access subscribers. Keep in mind that those connections tend not to operate faster than about 300 Mbps in most areas where Verizon has not activated its millimeter wave spectrum assets.

Though nobody outside of Verizon actually knows, it is possible that 30 percent to 50 percent of those fixed wireless connections operate at less than 100 Mbps delivered bandwidth. It is possible that 30 percent to 40 percent of accounts can use bandwidth up to about 300 Mbps.

And possibly 10 percent to 20 percent of customers have access to speeds faster than 300 Mbps.

The point is that a growing number of households find those speed ranges to be adequate for their needs and budgets.

The company says it is positioned to achieve the next milestone of eight million to nine million fixed wireless access subscribers by 2028.

Though definitions of “broadband” matter for regulators, advocates and suppliers, in most cases “broadband capability” matters quite little for most users of internet access services. Internet access matters quite a lot, in comparison. 

Use of a Chromebook, for example, absolutely requires internet access. But whether use of a Chromebook requires “broadband,” defined as 100 Mbps downstream, 20 Mbps upstream” is highly questionable, if true at all. 

I’ve used a Chromebook on a symmetrical gigabit-per-second connection and on Wi-Fi connections of varying quality but with downstream speeds not exceeding 100 Mbps and upstream in the mid-single digits. 

Was the user experience on Wi-Fi as good as on my symmetrical gigabit connection? No. But was it a major issue? Also, no. Keep in mind, I do no gaming, do not upload or download large files routinely, have no other users on my connection and might watch 4K but never 8K video. 

Though we often use the terms interchangeably, “internet access” is not the same as “broadband.” 

Internet access is the ability to connect to the internet, regardless of the speed or platform used. 

"Broadband" is a moving target describing internet access at defined minimum speeds. The U.S. Federal Communications Commission defines “broadband” as 100 Mbps download and 20 Mbps upload. 

So, strictly speaking, many access services do not operate at “broadband” speeds, as the definition requires. That does not mean the access is deficient, simply that it might not meet the minimums. Wi-fi access on airplanes or in public locations are typical examples where internet access is available, but not at “broadband” speeds in both directions.

In fact, even cable modem services I have used can fail to meet the definition, even when offering gigabit-per-second downstream speeds, as upstream speeds did not hit 20 Mbps. 

For most of us, the issue is whether such failures matter. Often, they do not matter much, if at all. People can do all the things they want to on many connections that fail to meet the broadband definitions. `

As a practical matter, past a certain point, “broadband” matters relatively little in terms of user experience.

Good Outcomes Beat Good Intentions: How Dumb Are We?

Good intentions clearly are not enough when designing policies to improve home broadband availability in underserved areas. In fact, since 2021, more than three years after its passage, the U.S. Broadband Equity, Access, and Deployment (BEAD) program has yet to install a single new connection.  

It seems we were determined to make the perfect the enemy of the good, preventing construction until we mostly were certain our maps were accurate. A rival approach would have proceeded on the assumption that residents and service providers pretty much know where they have facilities and where they do not; where an upgrade can be conducted fast and easily, and where it cannot. 

And perhaps (despite the clear industry participant interests that always seem to influence our decisions) we should not have insisted on the “fastest speed” platforms. Maybe we’d have prioritized “good enough” connections that could be supplied really fast and enabled the outcomes we were looking for (getting the unconnected connected; getting the underserved facilities that do not impede their use of internet apps). 

This is not, to use the phrase, “rocket science.” We have known for many decades that “good enough” home broadband can be supplied fast, and affordably, if we use satellite (geostationary or low earth orbit, but particularly now LEO) or wireless to enable the connections. 

To those who say we need to supply fiber to the home, some of us might argue the evidence suggests relatively-lower speed (such as 100 Mbps downstream) connections supply all the measurable upside we seek, for homework, shopping, telework. The touted gigabit-per-second or multi-gigabit-per-second connections are fine, but there is very little evidence consumers can even use that much bandwidth. 

Study/Source	Key Findings
Distinguishing Bandwidth and Latency in Households' Willingness to Pay for Broadband Internet Speed (2017)	Consumers value increasing bandwidth from 10 to 25 Mbps at about $24 per month, but the additional value of increasing from 100 Mbps to 1 Gbps is only $19. This suggests diminishing returns for speeds beyond 100 Mbps.
Are you overpaying for internet speeds you don't need? (2025)	Research indicates that many Australians are overspending on high-speed internet connections they don't need. Most households can manage well with a 50 Mbps plan unless they engage in high-bandwidth tasks like 4K streaming or online gaming.
Simple broadband mistake costing 9.5 million households up to £113 extra a year (2024)	Millions of UK households are overpaying for broadband by purchasing higher speeds than necessary. Smaller households often need speeds up to 15 Mbps but pay for over 150 Mbps, wasting £113 annually.
ITIF (2023)	- US broadband speeds outpace everyday demands - Only 9.1% of households choose to adopt 250/25 Mbps speeds when available - Clear inflection point past 100 Mbps where consumers no longer see value in higher speeds
ITIF (2020)	- Average existing connections comfortably handle more than typical applications require - A household with 5 people streaming 4K video simultaneously only needs 2/3 of current average tested speed - Research shows reaching a critical threshold of basic broadband penetration is more important for economic growth than faster speeds
European Research (2020)	- Full fiber networks are not worth the costs - Partial, not full end-to-end fiber-based broadband coverage entails the largest net benefits
US Broadband Data Analysis	- Compared to normal-speed broadband, faster broadband did not generate greater positive effects on employment
OpenVault Q3 2024 Report	- Average US household uses 564 Mbps downstream and 31 Mbps upstream - Speeds around 500 Mbps sufficient for most families
FCC Guidelines	- 100-500 Mbps is enough for 1-2 people to run videoconferencing, streaming, and online gaming simultaneously - 500-1000 Mbps suitable for 3 or more people with high bandwidth needs

We might all agree that, where it is feasible, fiber to home makes the most long-term sense. But we might also agree that where we want useful home broadband speeds, right now, everywhere, with performance that enables remote work, homework, online shopping and all other internet apps, then any platform delivering 100 Mbps (more for multi-user households, but likely not more than 500 Mbps even in the most-challenging use cases) will do the job, right now. 

Good intentions really are not enough. Good outcomes are what we seek. And that often means designing programs that we can implement fast, at lower cost, with wider impact, immediately or nearly so. “Better” platforms that cost more and are not built are hardly better.

Build Versus Buy is the Issue for Verizon Acquisition of Frontier

Verizon’s rationale for acquiring Frontier Communications, at a cost of  $20 billion, is partly strategic, partly tactical. Verizon and most other telcos face growth issues, and Frontier adds fixed network footprint, existing fiber access and other revenues, plant and equipment. 

Consider how Verizon’s fixed network compares with major competitors. 

ISP	Total Fixed Network Homes, Small Businesses Passed
AT&T	~70 million
Comcast	~60 million
Charter	~50 million
Verizon	~36 million

Verizon has the smallest fixed network footprint, so all other things being equal, the smallest share of the total home broadband market nationwide. If home broadband becomes the next big battleground for AT&T and Verizon revenue growth (on the assumption mobility market share is being taken by cable companies and T-Mobile from Verizon and At&T), then Verizon has to do something about its footprint, as it simply does not have enough ability to compete for customers across most of the Untied States for home broadband using fixed network platforms. 

And though Frontier’s customer base and geographies are heavily rural and suburban, compared to Verizon, that is characteristic of most “at scale” telco assets that might be acquisition targets for Verizon. 

Oddly enough, Verizon sold many of the assets it now plans to reacquire. In 2010, for example, Frontier Communications purchased rural operations in 27 states from Verizon, including more than seven million local access lines and 4.8 million customer lines. 

Those assets were located in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia, shown in the map below as brown areas. 

Then in 2015, Verizon sold additional assets in three states (California, Texas, Florida) to Frontier. Those assets included 3.7 million voice connections; 2.2 million broadband internet access customers, including about 1.6 million fiber optic access accounts and approximately 1.2 million video entertainment customers.

source: Verizon, Tampa Bay Business Journal 

Now Verizon is buying back the bulk of those assets. There are a couple of notable angles. First, Verizon back in the first decade of the 21st century was raising cash and shedding rural assets that did not fit well with its FiOS fiber-to-home strategy. In the intervening years, Frontier has rebuilt millions of those lines with FTTH platforms.

Also, with fixed network growth stagnant, acquiring Frontier now provides a way to boost Verizon’s own revenue growth.

For example, the acquisition adds around 7.2 million additional and already-in-place fiber passings. Verizon already has 18 million fiber passings,increasing  the fiber footprint to reach nearly 25 million homes and small businesses​. In other words, the acquisition increases current fiber passings by about 29 percent. 

There also are some millions of additional copper passings that might never be upgraded to fiber, but can generate revenue (copper internet access or voice or alarm services, for example). Today, Frontier generates about 44 percent of its total revenue from copper access facilities, some of which will eventually be upgraded to fiber, but perhaps not all. 

Frontier already has plans to add some three million more fiber passes by about 2026, for example, bringing its total fiber passings up to about 10 million. 

That suggests Frontier’s total network might pass 16 million to 17 million homes and small businesses. But assume Verizon’s primary interest is about 10 million new fiber passings. 

Frontier has estimated its cost per passing for those locations as between $1000 and $1100. Assume Verizon can also achieve that. Assume the full value of the Frontier acquisition ($20 billion) was instead spent on building new fiber plant outside of region, at a blended cost of #1050 per passing. 

That implies Verizon might be able to build perhaps 20 million new FTTH passings as an alternative, assuming all other costs (permits, pole leases or conduit access) were not material. But those costs exist, and might represent about 25 percent higher costs. 

So adjust the cost per passing for outside-of-region builds to a range of $1300 to $1400. Use a blended average of $1350. Under those circumstances, Verizon might hope to build less than 15 million locations. 

And in that scenario Verizon would not acquire the existing cash flow or other property. So one might broadly say the alternative is spending $20 billion to build up to 15 million new fiber passings over time, versus acquiring 10 million fiber passings in about a year, plus the revenue from seven million passings (with take rates around 40 percent of passings). 

Critics will say Verizon could do something else with $20 billion, to be sure, including not spending the money and not increasing its debt. But some of those same critics will decry Verizon’s lack of revenue growth as well. 

But Verizon also sees economies of scale, creating projected cost synergies of around $500 million annually by the third year. The acquisition is expected to be accretive to Verizon’s revenue, EBITDA and cash flow shortly after closing, if adding to Verizon’s debt load. 

Even if the majority of Verizon revenue is generated by mobility services, fixed network services still contribute a quarter or so of total revenues, and also are part of the cost structure for mobility services. To garner a higher share of moderate- to high-speed home broadband (perhaps in the 300 Mbps to 500 Mbps range for “moderate speed” and gigabit and multi-gigabit services as “high speed”), Verizon has to increase its footprint nationwide or regionally, outside its current fixed network footprint. 

One might make the argument that Verizon should not bother expanding its fixed network footprint, but home broadband is a relative growth area (at least in terms of growing market share). The ability to take market share from the leading cable TV firms (using fixed wireless for lower speed and fiber for higher speed accounts) clearly exists, but only if Verizon can acquire or build additional footprint outside its present core region.

And while it is possible for Verizon to cherry pick its “do it yourself” home broadband footprint outside of region, that approach does not offer immediate scale. Assuming all else works out, it might take Verizon five years to add an additional seven million or so FTTH passings outside of the current region. 

There is a value to revenue Verizon can add from day one, rather than building gradually over five years.