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Showing posts sorted by date for query gigabit. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Monday, October 28, 2024

Build Versus Buy is the Issue for Verizon Acquisition of Frontier

Verizon’s rationale for acquiring Frontier Communications, at a cost of  $20 billion, is partly strategic, partly tactical. Verizon and most other telcos face growth issues, and Frontier adds fixed network footprint, existing fiber access and other revenues, plant and equipment. 


Consider how Verizon’s fixed network compares with major competitors. 


ISP

Total Fixed Network Homes, Small Businesses Passed

AT&T

~70 million

Comcast

~60 million

Charter

~50 million

Verizon

~36 million


Verizon has the smallest fixed network footprint, so all other things being equal, the smallest share of the total home broadband market nationwide. If home broadband becomes the next big battleground for AT&T and Verizon revenue growth (on the assumption mobility market share is being taken by cable companies and T-Mobile from Verizon and At&T), then Verizon has to do something about its footprint, as it simply does not have enough ability to compete for customers across most of the Untied States for home broadband using fixed network platforms. 

And though Frontier’s customer base and geographies are heavily rural and suburban, compared to Verizon, that is characteristic of most “at scale” telco assets that might be acquisition targets for Verizon. 


Oddly enough, Verizon sold many of the assets it now plans to reacquire. In 2010, for example, Frontier Communications purchased rural operations in 27 states from Verizon, including more than seven million local access lines and 4.8 million customer lines. 


Those assets were located in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia, shown in the map below as brown areas. 


Then in 2015, Verizon sold additional assets in three states (California, Texas, Florida) to Frontier. Those assets included 3.7 million voice connections; 2.2 million broadband internet access customers, including about 1.6 million fiber optic access accounts and approximately 1.2 million video entertainment customers.


source: Verizon, Tampa Bay Business Journal 


Now Verizon is buying back the bulk of those assets. There are a couple of notable angles. First, Verizon back in the first decade of the 21st century was raising cash and shedding rural assets that did not fit well with its FiOS fiber-to-home strategy. In the intervening years, Frontier has rebuilt millions of those lines with FTTH platforms.


Also, with fixed network growth stagnant, acquiring Frontier now provides a way to boost Verizon’s own revenue growth.


For example, the acquisition adds around 7.2 million additional and already-in-place fiber passings. Verizon already has 18 million fiber passings,increasing  the fiber footprint to reach nearly 25 million homes and small businesses​. In other words, the acquisition increases current fiber passings by about 29 percent. 


There also are some millions of additional copper passings that might never be upgraded to fiber, but can generate revenue (copper internet access or voice or alarm services, for example). Today, Frontier generates about 44 percent of its total revenue from copper access facilities, some of which will eventually be upgraded to fiber, but perhaps not all. 


Frontier already has plans to add some three million more fiber passes by about 2026, for example, bringing its total fiber passings up to about 10 million. 


That suggests Frontier’s total network might pass 16 million to 17 million homes and small businesses. But assume Verizon’s primary interest is about 10 million new fiber passings. 


Frontier has estimated its cost per passing for those locations as between $1000 and $1100. Assume Verizon can also achieve that. Assume the full value of the Frontier acquisition ($20 billion) was instead spent on building new fiber plant outside of region, at a blended cost of #1050 per passing. 


That implies Verizon might be able to build perhaps 20 million new FTTH passings as an alternative, assuming all other costs (permits, pole leases or conduit access) were not material. But those costs exist, and might represent about 25 percent higher costs. 


So adjust the cost per passing for outside-of-region builds to a range of $1300 to $1400. Use a blended average of $1350. Under those circumstances, Verizon might hope to build less than 15 million locations. 


And in that scenario Verizon would not acquire the existing cash flow or other property. So one might broadly say the alternative is spending $20 billion to build up to 15 million new fiber passings over time, versus acquiring 10 million fiber passings in about a year, plus the revenue from seven million passings (with take rates around 40 percent of passings). 


Critics will say Verizon could do something else with $20 billion, to be sure, including not spending the money and not increasing its debt. But some of those same critics will decry Verizon’s lack of revenue growth as well. 


But Verizon also sees economies of scale, creating projected cost synergies of around $500 million annually by the third year. The acquisition is expected to be accretive to Verizon’s revenue, EBITDA and cash flow shortly after closing, if adding to Verizon’s debt load. 


Even if the majority of Verizon revenue is generated by mobility services, fixed network services still contribute a quarter or so of total revenues, and also are part of the cost structure for mobility services. To garner a higher share of moderate- to high-speed home broadband (perhaps in the 300 Mbps to 500 Mbps range for “moderate speed” and gigabit and multi-gigabit services as “high speed”), Verizon has to increase its footprint nationwide or regionally, outside its current fixed network footprint. 


One might make the argument that Verizon should not bother expanding its fixed network footprint, but home broadband is a relative growth area (at least in terms of growing market share). The ability to take market share from the leading cable TV firms (using fixed wireless for lower speed and fiber for higher speed accounts) clearly exists, but only if Verizon can acquire or build additional footprint outside its present core region.


And while it is possible for Verizon to cherry pick its “do it yourself” home broadband footprint outside of region, that approach does not offer immediate scale. Assuming all else works out, it might take Verizon five years to add an additional seven million or so FTTH passings outside of the current region. 


There is a value to revenue Verizon can add from day one, rather than building gradually over five years.


Friday, August 2, 2024

Many Consumers Will Always Buy "Good Enough Value" Home Broadband

Some question the long-term viability of 5G fixed wireless services, arguing that, eventually, it will prove unable to compete with ever-higher capacities supplied by cabled networks, especially fiber to home platforms. 


Supporters might make the case that “eventually” is the key phrase, as the market potential for fixed wireless between “today” and “tomorrow” is likely to be quite extended. At the moment, perhaps 51 percent or 52 percent of all U.S. homes or dwelling units have service available from at least one provider. 


By 2030 that percentage might increase to 76 percent to 80 percent. 


At the moment, perhaps 10 percent to 15 percent of U.S. homes have FTTH service available from at least two providers, growing to possibly 30 percent to 40 percent by 2030. 


For starters, FTTH is expensive enough that no single service provider can afford to build new networks ubiquitously, even if the customer demand is present. By some estimates, the cost to pass one urban home might be just $1,000, but the cost to pass suburban locations might range up to $3200, while rural passings can easily cost $7,000 or more. 


Area Type

Density

Estimated Cost per Home/Passing

Metropolitan

High

$1,000

Suburb (Flat Terrain)

Medium

$2,700

Suburb (Hilly Terrain)

Medium

$3,240

Rural (Flat Terrain)

Low

$6,300

Rural (Hilly)

Low

$7,000


And that is construction cost only, not including the cost to activate an account, which can add costs between $300 to $500 for each install. 


An equally-important issue is the take rate for such networks. It has been common for any new FTTH provider that is a telco to get up to 40 percent take rates over a few years, with initial uptake in the 20-percent range, often. Independent ISPs competing with both cable operators and a telco might expect take rates not exceeding 20 percent (where the cable operator can offer gigabit service and the telco does not offer FTTH). 


So the longer-term issue is how big the market might be for wireless service offering speeds in the lower ranges (100 Mbps to 200 Mbps now; undoubtedly higher speeds in the future), as more fiber access is available. To the extent that fixed wireless is taking market share from cable operators (perhaps even operators able to sell gigabit-per-second connections), we can infer that a substantial portion of the market is happy to pay the prevailing rates for access at such speeds, especially when able to bundle home broadband with their mobile access services. 


When comparing fixed wireless to either cable modem or FTTH service, many consumers might not be especially interested in services operating the 500-Mbps and faster ranges, much less gigabit ranges, when the slower speeds cost less. 


But demand will continue to shift over time, with most consumers eventually buying services operating faster than 200 Mbps, and in many instances much faster than 200 Mbps (gigabit to multi-gigabit ranges, for example). To be sure, fixed wireless providers are likely to find ways to increase their speed tiers as well, beyond 200 Mbps in the future, even if virtually all observers suggest wireless will continue to lag cabled networks in terms of speed. 


Speed Tier Take Rates, in Percentage

2023

2030

2040

Less than 100 Mbps

20-30

5-10

1-2

100 Mbps to 200 Mbps

30-40

10-20

5-10

Faster than 200 Mbps

30-40

70-80

85-90


Perhaps the best analogy is what cable operators have been able to do with their hybrid fiber coax networks, boosting speeds over time. 


Keep in mind that cable networks and FTTH networks back around 2000 were only offering top speeds in the 10-Mbps range. Fixed wireless networks also will be able to increase speeds over time, if never on the scale of cabled networks. 


Year

Typical Cable Operator Maximum Speed

1996

1.5 Mbps

Early 2000s

10 Mbps

Late 2000s

50 Mbps

2010

100 Mbps

2015

300 Mbps

2016

1 Gbps

2024

2 Gbps


But absolute ability to match cabled network speeds is not the question. The issue is what percentage of customers will, in the future, be willing to buy fixed wireless home broadband, at then-prevailing speeds, prices and offers. 


Wednesday, July 24, 2024

Telcos Poised for Historic Home Broadband Market Share Gains

At least some observers believe the traditional U.S. home broadband market share pattern could be quite different by 2030, though there might be some disagreement about shares held by various ISPs (cable, telco, independent providers). Historically, U.S. cable operators have held as much as 70-percent share of the home broadband market. But that seems unlikely--perhaps impossible--to sustain.


Perhaps the single biggest change could be a shift of share in favor of telcos, using both the fiber-to-home and wireless platforms. Many observers would not be surprised to see a major telco-cable share of about 40 percent each, with others holding the remaining share.


That 20-percent share would be held by ndependent ISPs and smaller telcos.


Traditionally, U.S. cable operators have held about 65 percent to 70 percent share of the market. By some estimates, telcos collectively have held 20 percent to 30 percent share, with satellite, fixed wireless and independent providers having single-digit shares. 


Most observers expect change, the only disagreement being the degree of share to be lost by cable operators and the share to be gained by telcos and other providers. 

source: GlobalData 


Also, some forecasts that look at technology (optical fiber, hybrid fiber coax, fixed wireless, satellite) often obscure the fact that telcos use both optical fiber, fixed wireless and digital subscriber line technologies. 


So a forecast of 20 percent to 25 percent “telco” market share in 2030 might not include all telco FTTH share or fixed wireless (largely provided by the big telcos T-Mobile, Verizon and AT&T. In principle, telcos might have 35 percent to 45 percent share in 2030, based only on use of fixed wireless, DSL and FTTH shares held by Verizon, T-Mobile and AT&T. Other telcos also will have some share (Lumen Technologies, Frontier, others). 


Provider Category

Estimated Market Share in 2023

Expected Market Share in 2030

Cable Companies (Comcast, Charter, Cox, etc.)

45-50%

35-40%

Major telcos (AT&T, Verizon)

25-30%

20-25%

Satellite Providers (Dish, Viasat)

5-10%

3-5%

Fiber Optic Providers (Google Fiber, Frontier, municipal providers)

5-10%

25-30%

Fixed Wireless Access (FWA) (T-Mobile, Verizon, AT&T)

5-10%

15-20%


The point is that it remains likely that telcos and cable operators will continue to hold most of the share (perhaps 70 percent to 85 percent or more), with independent providers gaining share. 


As capital intensive as fiber to the home remains, independent and smaller providers cannot hope to reach significant portions of the U.S. home broadband market very quickly, especially given the fact that, in most markets, up to 96 percent of existing share is held by the incumbent telco and cable operator. 


Even if one discounts the local telco’s ability to respond to a new fiber overbuilder market entry, the new FTTH provider will often face an incumbent cable operator able to offer gigabit-per-second downstream speeds. 


Provider Type

2023 Market Share

Discussion

Cable

~70%

Among cable operators and wireless companies controlling 96% of the U.S. home broadband market, MSOs (cable companies) accounted for nearly 70% market share

Telco

~26%

Estimated based on cable's 70% share of the 96% controlled by cable and telcos

Other

~4%

Includes independent ISPs, fixed wireless, and other providers


Saturday, July 6, 2024

Most Consumers Want "Good Enough" Home Broadband

Though regulators and advocates often focus mostly on availability (coverage) and quality (speed), consumers often prioritize value, preferring a “good enough for my needs” approach where recurring price might be more important than raw performance. 


And that might explain the demand for fixed wireless services in many markets, where FWA offers enough speed at lower prices than services provided by telco digital subscriber line, telco fiber-to-home or cable TV home broadband. 


In the U.S. market, FWA appears to have dented demand for cable services, in particular. 

source: Opensignal 


Though most consumers would likely have a hard time quantifying how much speed their households require, it remains true that beyond a fairly low level of access speed, users gain very little, in terms of performance (quality of experience) when shifting to services offering speeds faster than about 25 Mbps per user in the downstream.  

source: FCC 


To be sure, the percentage of U.S. customers buying gigabit or multi-gigabit services has steadily increased since 2021, while the percentage of customers buying service at speeds below 50 Mbps has dropped.


But it might be worth noting that about 25 percent of the home broadband market continues to buy services at the lower end (200 Mbps or less) of home broadband speeds sold by ISPs. That suggests the market opportunity for FWA is about a quarter of the market, so long as speeds top out around 200 Mbps. 


At the moment, FWA could address more than half the U.S. market if it were upgraded to offer speeds up to 400 Mbps. 


source: OpenVault 


We might well assume that buyers of gigabit-speed services are mostly driven by service “quality” as measured by downstream speed, upstream speed, unlimited data usage and network reliability. That might broadly account for up to 30 percent of the market. 


This segment includes gamers, streamers, professionals with high bandwidth needs and larger families. 


In contrast, perhaps up to 30 percent of customers seem to buy the most affordable option, including students, budget-conscious families, or those with limited online activity. By definition this segment is most price conscious, even if that means lower speeds. 


The broad middle of the market might represent up to 40 percent of customers who balance price and features. This segment prefers “good enough” speeds, sufficient data allowances, and reliable service, at a reasonable cost, somewhere between the most-expensive and most-affordable tiers of service. 


Service Tier

Percentage

Key Driver

Higher-Cost (High Speeds, Unlimited Data)

30 percent

Value-Driven

Median Cost (Balanced Speeds & Data)

40 percent

Balanced Value

Lower-Cost (Lower Speeds, Data Caps)

30 percent

Price-Driven


In many cases, FWA could appeal to both “balanced value” and “price-driven” segments of the market, in particular for single-person households or dual-person households with lower usage. 


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