Like everybody else who follows Alphabet, browsers and search, I have trouble figuring out what the judicial system will force Alphabet to do about its “monopoly” in the search business. Among the possible remedies is a forced divestiture of Google Chrome (the browser), among other possibilities.
That remedy might seem odd in view of the defined problem being a monopoly in “search,” not browser market share. In fact, regulators might have a hard time making the case that “browser monopoly market share” actually matters, in a strict sense, since browser use is “free to use.”
And, of course, traditional antitrust only applies to products that have an actual price, though the line began to blur when the U.S. government took action against the bundling of the Microsoft operating system with Internet Explorer.
Even if the browser was essentially a feature, not a “product,” the monopoly danger was seen to exist in the combination of the operating system with the browser.
So some argue that the remedy in the Google search case has to involve some remedy involving “something else,” as use of search also is “without charge” to the user.
So the “remedies” now center around “doing something” to a product, or products, that are offered to consumers without charge. In other words, we now are dealing with allegations of “consumer harm” where the “harm” cannot be quantified, as the products are offered free of consumer charge.
Traditionally, antitrust law has focused on “consumer harm” in the form of higher prices, reduced output, or diminished quality, though the latter two criteria are subjective and cannot be measured.
So we wind up with ideas that are basically subjective. The alleged monopoly in search is said to reduce innovation on Google’s part. Or, perhaps, Google search could suffer from quality issues, as it might have little incentive to innovate.
If consumers "pay" for free services with their data and attention to ads, perhaps that is among the effects of the “monopoly.”
Others might argue that commercial agreements, such as Google paying Apple to be the default search engine on Safari, harms the competitive process.
Others might say the harm falls on advertisers who have to pay higher prices, and therefore incorporate those costs into consumer prices.
All of those elements might seem logical, but virtually all are subjective or indirect metrics. As always, one has to define “the market” to make a claim of monopolization.
What are the boundaries of a market for a "free" product? Is Google Search competing with other search engines, or with social media platforms or apps that offer direct access to information or something else. It is not clear.
The point is that the Google search monopoly allegation pushes the boundaries of several antitrust concepts.
Digital platforms often operate in "two-sided" or "multi-sided" markets, connecting different groups (users and advertisers, drivers and riders). The complexity lies in how harm on one side (higher ad prices) impacts the other ("free" users) and how market power is assessed across these interconnected groups. That is quite a bit more subjective than the traditional test of higher consumer prices.
Also, the arguments against Google often center on its role as a "gatekeeper" to the internet and how it "forecloses" opportunities for competitors through its widespread defaults and exclusive agreements. This avenue does not rely on consumer harm, but rather supposed harm to other competitors.
Rather than higher consumer prices, which cannot be demonstrated directly, the court focuses on more subjective issues, such as whether dominant firms stifle innovation in the market.
So we wind up in the novel realm of remedies for problems where consumer harm really cannot be demonstrated in any direct form. So even the remedies involve behavioral or structural changes for products with no actual consumer price.
The belief is that, although Chrome generates no direct revenue, it is an important distribution channel for other Google services: search, Gmail, YouTube, and Google Drive. If a structural remedy is sought (forcing Google to divest the Chrome browser, for example), it would seem to involve something other than the actual “problem” of search monopoly.
Divesting Chrome would presumably disrupt this seamless integration, potentially reducing traffic to Google’s other services.
Element | Chrome’s Role | Value to Google Search |
Default Search Engine | Chrome sets Google Search as the default engine for most users. | Drives billions of queries and reinforces Google’s search market share. |
Data Collection | Chrome tracks user behavior (URLs, clicks, performance, device info). | Enhances ad targeting and search ranking precision. |
Search Integration | Omnibox merges the URL bar and search bar. | Increases frequency of search queries, even when users intend direct access. |
Cross-product Reinforcement | Chrome integrates well with Google services (Gmail, Docs, YouTube, etc.). | Keeps users in the Google ecosystem, raising switching costs. |
User Scale | World's most-used browser (65%+ global share). | Provides a massive funnel of user traffic into Google Search. |
Without control over Chrome, Alphabet could lose the ability to set Google Search as the default engine or promote its AI products like Gemini.
Chrome is estimated to contribute significantly to Alphabet’s advertising revenue by driving 35 percent of Google’s search revenue, by driving search activity, enabling data harvesting, ad targeting and therefore ad sales.
The issue is whether the divestiture of Chrome necessarily destroys that value chain. Commercial agreements could be struck allowing Alphabet access to the data that allows the rest of the stack and ecosystem to function.
Indeed, perhaps no new owner would be in position to create as robust a revenue model as Alphabet is able to manage.
Many of us use Google search because we believe it is the best engine. It seems unclear how many of us would switch away from Google no matter what happens to Chrome the browser.
It would be logical to expect a hit to Alphabet’s equity value if such a development occurs. But some might well argue some of that already is baked into Alphabet’s valuation. There is a reason Alphabet has the lowest price-earnings ratio of the “Magnificent Seven” stocks, for example.
In the end, we might not know how much impact a Chrome browser divestiture might have on Alphabet. Some might point to pressure on search advertising, which hasn’t been seen to date, but could well happen if large language models disrupt search revenue models.
The impact on other products in the ecosystem might likewise be hard to pinpoint. Lots of us might already conclude that Gmail, YouTube and other products in the Alphabet ecosystem are preferred and would still be preferred, whether Alphabet owns the Chrome browser or not.
Some of us would guess that some immediate equity market impact would happen, but that hit would be erased over time. Alphabet obviously has contingency plans and would obviously innovate in other areas.
Beyond all that, the principles of antitrust for products that “have no price” are being tested. And the tests are increasingly subjective.
