Friday, October 6, 2023

Will Russia Succeed in Blocking All 3rd-Party VPNs?

Russia is said to be preparing to block all third party virtual private networks accessing some content sites in 2024. Some will find that assertion somewhat confusing, as Russia already bans third-party VPNs.


Others might argue that a complete VPN ban is something that is theoretically possible, but arguably quite difficult and expensive to accomplish. Much more likely is a reduction in independent VPN use, but not a complete shutdown. 


Study

Methodology

Findings

The Impact of VPN Bans on Internet Freedom (2022) by Freedom House

The study analyzed the impact of VPN bans on internet freedom in 10 countries: Belarus, China, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Oman, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan.

The study found that VPN bans are effective in reducing the use of VPNs, but they are not effective in preventing people from accessing blocked websites and services. The study also found that VPN bans have a negative impact on internet freedom, as they make it more difficult for people to access information and communicate freely.

The Effectiveness of VPN Bans in China (2021) by the Citizen Lab

The study analyzed the effectiveness of VPN bans in China.

The study found that the Chinese government's VPN ban is effective in blocking most commercial VPNs. However, the study also found that there are a number of ways to circumvent the ban, such as using obfuscated servers or Shadowsocks.

The Impact of VPN Bans on Human Rights (2020) by the United Nations Human Rights Council

The study analyzed the impact of VPN bans on human rights.

The study found that VPN bans can have a negative impact on human rights, as they make it more difficult for people to access information and communicate freely. The study also found that VPN bans can be used by governments to suppress dissent and monitor their citizens.



Study Name

Findings

Publishing Venue

Publication Date

A Study on the Effectiveness of Government VPN Bans

VPN bans are not effective in preventing people from using VPNs.

Journal of Internet Law & Policy

2022

The Impact of VPN Bans on Internet Freedom

VPN bans have a negative impact on internet freedom.

Freedom House

2022

The Effectiveness of VPN Bans in China

VPN bans in China are not effective in preventing people from using VPNs.

Brookings Institution

2021

The Impact of VPN Bans on the Russian Economy

VPN bans in Russia have a negative impact on the Russian economy.

The Atlantic Council

2021

The Effectiveness of VPN Bans in Iran

VPN bans in Iran are not effective in preventing people from using VPNs.

The Center for Human Rights in Iran

2021

The Impact of VPN Bans on Freedom of Expression

VPN bans have a negative impact on freedom of expression.

ARTICLE 19

2021

The Effectiveness of VPN Bans in the Middle East

VPN bans in the Middle East are not effective in preventing people from using VPNs.

The Middle East Institute

2021

The Impact of VPN Bans on Business

VPN bans have a negative impact on business.

The Global Business Coalition for Digital Trade

2021

The Effectiveness of VPN Bans in Africa

VPN bans in Africa are not effective in preventing people from using VPNs.

The African Digital Policy Forum

2020

The Impact of VPN Bans on Education

VPN bans have a negative impact on education.

The Global Education Network

2020

The Effectiveness of VPN Bans in Latin America

VPN bans in Latin America are not effective in preventing people from using VPNs.

The Latin American Center for Internet Rights

2020

The Impact of VPN Bans on Human Rights

VPN bans have a negative impact on human rights.

The United Nations Human Rights Council

2019


A study by the University of Oxford found that the Chinese government's ban on VPNs was effective in reducing the use of VPNs in China by 70 percent.


Russia would not be alone in this effort. Other countries that apparently ban all VPNs (including countries that force users to employ the government-created VPN) include:

  • Belarus

  • China

  • Iran

  • Iraq

  • North Korea

  • Oman

  • Turkmenistan


As many have argued the internet is a tool for people organizing to protect, promote or achieve political freedom, so many have argued VPNs are a similar tool. So in the “war” between governments suppressing free thought, and citizens wishing to do so, what are the challenges the Russian government might face?


In principle, governments can try to block VPNs by:

  • Blocking IP addresses of known VPN servers

  • Blocking ports that are commonly used by VPNs (DNS blocking)

  • Deep packet inspection (DPI) to detect and block VPN traffic

  • Using legislation to ban VPNs or make their use illegal

  • Block all VPN protocols, which are the methods that VPNs use to encrypt traffic and route it through different servers.

  • Prevent users from using other methods to bypass VPN blocks, such as shadowsocks and obscuring proxies.


However, VPN providers can counter these measures by:

  • Using dynamic IP addresses for their servers

  • Using different ports for their VPN traffic

  • Using encryption and obfuscation techniques to make their traffic less detectable

  • Moving their servers to countries where VPNs are legal

  • Use Tor or other anonymization tools and peer-to-peer networks

  • Using obfuscated servers: Obfuscated servers are servers that are designed to hide the fact that they are VPN servers. This can make it difficult for governments to identify and block these servers.

  • Using multiple protocols: VPN providers can use a variety of different protocols to connect to servers. This makes it more difficult for governments to block all VPN traffic.

  • Using split tunneling: Split tunneling allows users to choose which traffic goes through the VPN and which traffic does not. This can be useful for users who need to access websites or services that are blocked by the VPN.

  • Using VPN on demand: VPN on demand is a feature that automatically connects the VPN when the user tries to access a blocked website or service. This can be convenient for users who do not need to use the VPN all the time.

  • Using a VPN aggregator: A VPN aggregator is a service that provides users with access to a large network of VPN servers. This makes it more difficult for governments to block all VPN traffic.

  • Using port forwarding: Port forwarding allows users to forward specific ports on their router to the VPN server. This can be useful for bypassing government blocks on certain types of traffic, such as P2P traffic.

  • Using Shadowsocks or V2Ray: Shadowsocks and V2Ray are open-source protocols that are designed to circumvent government censorship. They are often used by VPN providers to bypass government bans on VPNs.


As with all security measures, there is a never-ending “cat and mouse” game at work, where new security measures get attacked and hacked. A ban on VPNs can be instituted, but it will be difficult to completely enforce. 


Thursday, October 5, 2023

Faster Play Tempo Possible for First Time with AT&T 5G-Enabled Football Helmets at Gallaudet

What Explains Rakuten's Market Share?

Some might argue that mobile operator Rakuten has low market share in the Japanese mobile market because of its “risky” bet on a virtualized network architecture and open approach to radio access networks. 


But others might argue it is as much an example of the rule of three or stable competitive markets


Of course, according to the market share pattern suggested by the PIMS (Marketing Science Institute and Profit Impact of Market Strategies (PIMS)) database, the Japan mobile service provider market remains “unstable” or “in flux” as it does not have the familiar market share structure seen in mature industries, where the relationship between the top three firms has a pattern of 4:2:1. 


Mobile Operator

Market Share (March 2023)

NTT Docomo

41.6%

KDDI (au)

30.5%

SoftBank

27.9%

Rakuten Mobile

1.5%

Other MVNOs

8.5%


In other words, established and stable competitive markets show a pattern where the market leader’s market share is double that of provider number two. In turn, number two has share double that of provider three. 


That is similar to what economists have suggested is true of oligopolistic markets. In a classic oligopolistic market, one might expect to see an “ideal” (normative) structure something like:


Oligopoly Market Share of Sales

Number one

41%

Number two

31%

Number three

16%

source: economicsonline

As a theoretical rule, one might argue, an oligopolistic market with three leading providers will tend to be stable when market shares follow a general pattern of 40 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent market shares held by three contestants.


Under most circumstances, firms that have a higher share of the markets they serve are considerably more profitable than their smaller-share rivals, according to the Marketing Science Institute and Profit Impact of Market Strategies (PIMS) database.


And it is that disparity in profitability that allows the leader to weather pricing attacks, while making disruptive attacks often perilous. Most big markets eventually take a rather stable shape where a few firms at the top are difficult to dislodge.


So it would not be unusual or odd to think telecom markets could be stable, long term, with just three leading providers. The reasons are perhaps very simple. 


Since profit margins also tend to correspond in a linear way with market share, we can argue that--in stable markets--the market leader will have profit margins double that of the number-two provider, and four times that of provider number three. 


If so, it becomes perilous for providers two or three to cut retail costs to take share from the supplier, which generally can easily afford to match the attacker price points for as long as needed, until the attacker simply cannot continue. 


By definition, the leader has twice to four times the revenue and profits of the other firms. Under such circumstances, a price attack by market share holders two or three is going to harm all providers, but generally cannot dislodge the leader. 


In other words, in a mature market, when the stable share pattern has developed, number two and number three market share holders will generally have more to lose than to gain by disruptive attacks launched against the market leader. 


That is, in part, what leads to the market stability. 


So even if the Japan mobile service provider market is not yet so established it cannot change--indeed the share pattern suggests it is not yet finished evolving--Rakuten’s number-four position would be explainable by the rule of three. 


That might suggest an ultimate stable pattern something like 40-30-20 market shares for the leaders, whomever they wind up being, and in what order. That leaves 10 percent share for all the other market contestants. 


So technology and architecture are not necessarily the reason for Rakuten’s market share. Other more-prosaic issues, such as a lack of spectrum, relative to the other providers, also exists. Some would argue it is capacity quantity, not quality, which is the difference between Rakuten and the other leaders. 


Mobile Operator

Mobile Spectrum Holdings (MHz)

NTT Docomo

280

KDDI (au)

210

SoftBank

230

Rakuten Mobile

150

Other MVNOs

30

Total

800

Source: Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (MIC) Japan


Some would point to network footprint being less developed than the networks of the three market leaders. And coverage shortfalls always are issues for mobile service providers. 


Others might also note that Rakuten has no low-band spectrum, which is an issue for indoor signal reception. 


Also, Rakuten is not able to use a “lower price” attack successfully, as the other providers have been willing to meet those attacks, as theory suggests would be the case.


Globally, in markets with four established mobile service providers, the market share pattern would be something on the order of 30-30-15-10 or 40-30-25-20, leaving roughly 10 percent share for all the other providers. 


Globally, the patterns might take the form of:


Provider

Share %

Share %

one

35

30

two

25

25

three

20

20

four

10

15

Top four

90

90


The point is that Rakuten’s market share is not necessarily the result of technology decisions. Lack of spectrum, type of spectrum, capital resources and marketing challenges are equally plausible explanations for the lowish market share.


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