Wednesday, December 5, 2018

Correlation Between GDP and Telecom Revenue Growth is Problematic

Since telecom industry revenue is fairly directly linked to gross domestic product, over the long term, telecom service provider connectivity revenues will be closely linked to growth of GDP, all other things being equal.

Of course, all other things are not equal. There is more growth lying ahead in Africa and Asia than in North America and Europe, for example. Eventually, as markets saturate, the correlation with GDP becomes more pronounced.

Were the industry stable, single-digit revenue growth might not be such an issue. In an environment where product substitution is high and likely growing, and where end users increasingly are finding ways to remove demand from the public network services market, single-digit growth is a big challenge. 

It does not take much shift in demand to tip connectivity revenue to a negative growth profile.  In fact, flat revenue growth seems to be the global trend. 



Monday, December 3, 2018

Data Cost Per Bit Implications

Data per bit has huge business model implications that will be more obvious in the 5G era. Consumption of video is the biggest new design issue for mobile networks, since video
is the app that requires the most capacity.


And it should be obvious by now that when access costs fall--either to a fixed price for unlimited usage, a fixed price for “what you typically use” levels, or even close to zero, as in the use of public Wi-Fi, behavior changes.


That was true for AOL when it switched from usage-based dial-up access to “unlimited” access, and is true in the era of public Wi-Fi as well. Big usage allowances mean consumers are willing to use Netflix and other streaming services. But, up to this point, such offers were hard to support on mobile networks, simply because cost per bit on most mobile networks has been an order of magnitude higher than on cabled networks.


But the principle remains: people consume more data, and especially video content, when they do not have to worry about the cost of doing so.


And that is why 5G will be revolutionary. It will, in a growing number of instances, break the traditional cost barrier that has prevented mobile access from becoming a full substitute for cabled (fixed) network internet access.




Since video arguably is the app with the most-stringent revenue per bit profiles, especially when the internet access provider earns no direct revenue from enabling video access (ISP supplies access bandwidth and usage, but no direct video app revenue), the ability to supply lots of bandwidth for video is a prerequisite for any wireless access platform competing with cabled networks.


Voice and messaging arguably have the highest revenue per bit profiles (possibly as high as dollars per gigabyte) with web browsing somewhere in between (cents per gigabyte).


General purpose internet access arguably has the “best” combination of revenue and cost, though even there a cabled network might earn (retail prices) less than US$1 per gigabyte. Mobile bandwidth  generally costs $5 to $8 per per gigabyte (retail prices), lower than the $9 to $10 it cost in 2016 or so, for popular plans, and less than that for plans containing higher amounts of usage. Higher usage plans might feature costs per gigabyte closer to $3.


That is an internal business model issue for any mobile operator. But more than that is going to change in the 5G era.




If you assume the mobile network cost of delivering a gigabyte will drop 50 percent or more from 4G to 5G, fueled by new spectrum, use of shared and unlicensed spectrum and small cells, then the cost of using a gigabyte of “mobile” access will be closer to the cost of using a gigabyte of “fixed” access, especially on an “actual consumption” basis.


And that is going to open up many new use cases where mobile is a substitute for fixed access. Customers who routinely work from multiple locations, especially on the go, might already find mobile is a functional substitute for fixed access. As prices continue to fall, a greater number of consumers will find their own use cases can be supported with with a fixed or mobile access plan.


If you assume mobile access costs, especially in fixed mode, reduce costs by up to an order of magnitude, then the wireless 5G option might well become a full functional substitute for a cabled network access service.


And that means, for the first time in industry history, that mobile or wireless platforms will be able to compete close to directly against fixed and cabled networks as suppliers of consumer internet access.

Long Distance Provides Example of What Will Happen with Subscription Video

What might happen with linear subscription video depends on the popularity of product substitutes and the degree of competition in the market, as was the case for U.S. long distance calling after the breakup of the Bell system in 1985.

Also, much depends on which the market positions of various providers. The history of long distance calling provides an instructive example. Though competition shifted shares of market for two decades, the arguably bigger change came in 2000, when demand for “long distance” was cannibalized sharply by mobile phone service.


For two decades, though average prices continued to decline, the big change was market share shift. Then, for two decades, the big change was product substitution.

The application to linear video is that competition has been shifting market share for a few decades (first from fixed to satellite; then cable to telco). What we should anticipate in the coming decade is a change of dynamic from market share shifts to product decline and substitution (decline of linear and replacement by streaming alternatives).


The whole point of deregulation is to shift market share from incumbents to challengers. In the U.S. market, regulatory support meant that attackers (the Baby Bells) steadily gained share, while AT&T lost share, from 1985 to about 2000.

Sometimes, though, unforeseen consequences are encountered. Virtually nobody thought long distance would almost disappear, to be replaced by mobility as the industry profit driver.

The long slow decline, when incumbents such as AT&T simply sought to control the pace of decline while trying to create a different business model, held for quite some time. But then a quantum change happened, and the whole market virtually collapsed.


After 2000, all fixed network providers lost share, as demand shifted to mobility, largely because AT&T introduced its Digital One Rate plan, which made domestic long distance calling as affordable as local calling.

The point is that the speed of such changes depend on the degree of regulatory support for challengers; technology shifts and shifts of end user demand.


As applied to the video subscription business, we have reached the equivalent of the 2000 peak of long distance revenues, which implies a long process of declining revenues. Where efforts to gain or protect market share were paramount for a few decades, the new challenge is to create alternative products.

As mobile calling became the substitute for both long distance and local calling, so over-the-top streaming services are destined to replace linear subscription products. There is one crucial difference, however.

It was, relatively speaking, easy to create free and low-cost communication alternatives. Video entertainment has substantial “cost of goods” issues, however, in the form of expensive content rights. It might be true that “bits are bits” where it comes to communication services or apps.

It is never true in the video entertainment business, as content is highly differentiated, as well as expensive.

In the first nine months of 2018, some 23 percent of broadband households served by fixed network providers did not subscribe to a linear video service, according to S&P Global Kagan.

Over the first nine months of 2018, 2.8 million fewer linear video subscriptions were sold, with the biggest drops coming in the satellite segment of the distribution business.


By 2022, analysts at UBS predict, such streaming alternatives will represent 25 percent of all video subscriptions.

UBS projects there will be 9.2 million video streaming subscribers by the end of 2018.  UBS predicts there will be 24 million accounts by the end of 2022.


The new issue is what products will emerge to replace linear video, including streaming services that are optimized for mobile delivery as well as fixed network versions.

SD-WAN Growth Rate 37%

SD-WAN traffic will grow at a CAGR of 37 percent compared to three percent for traditional MPLS-based WAN, Cisco predicts. As a result, SD-WANs will carry 29 percent of WAN traffic by 2022.



CDNs Will Carry 72% of Total Internet Traffic by 2022

Content delivery networks (CDNs) will carry 72 percent of total Internet traffic by 2022, up from 56 percent in 2017, Cisco predicts. That is one indication of the importance edge computing is likely to assume, as most CDNs cache content at the edge of the wide area network.

The other clear trend is that private networks built and operated directly by enterprises such as Google, Amazon, Facebook, and Microsoft will carry a greater percentage of total traffic. In some ways, that trend mirrors the shift of retail applications (consumer and enterprise) away from connectivity providers to loosely-coupled, over the top apps.

At a high level, it can be said that more of the value of any communications-related application, service or process value is moving out of the “connectivity provider” realm. In other words, “becoming a dumb pipe” is but one impact of loosely-coupled app architecture. The other trend is that even the dumb pipe functions are taken directly by big app providers.

One way of measuring the importance of edge computing is to look at the percentage of total network capacity (wide area, metro, region and metro) used to support internet traffic.

Metro capacity is growing faster than core-capacity and will account for 33 percent of total service provider network capacity by 2022, up from 27 percent in 2017.


The obvious implication is that less data will cross WANs than otherwise would be required.




Sunday, December 2, 2018

Will 65% of Customers Buy Gigabit by 2023?

Supply can drive demand, if prices for a desired product are low enough. Rethink Technology Research, for example, estimates 40 percent of consumers are willing to pay a price differential up to US$20 for a gigabit internet access connection, growing to 65 percent of consumers as gigabit becomes a ubiquitous offer.

“We expect Asia to reach 233 million 1-Gbps lines, Europe 59.6 million, the US 37.7 million and Latin America just 10.7 million,” says Rethink Technology Research. “China alone is expected to have 193.5 million.”

Where take rates for gigabit connections in most countries remain in the “three percent to four percent of homes” range, gigabit adoption rates in most countries will grow to to well above 30 percent on average, and in countries such as France, Switzerland and South Korea, more than 50 percent of households will buy gigabit broadband services by 2023, Rethink predicts.

China will improve gigabit subscription rates from four percent of its 456 million households to close to 42 percent, Rethink predicts.


Price matters, though. The general trend is for access speeds to be increased while price remains constant. So the issue is how many consumers will be content with gradually faster speeds for the same price, versus upgrades to the faster speed available.

Service provider strategy also matters. Some ISPs might try selling one speed only (gigabit). Others will prefer a multiple speed tiers strategy. Historically, that strategy has had most consumers opting for the mid-tier offers, rather than the fastest or budget speed tiers.

As speeds climb, and unless new “bandwidth hog” applications become popular (beyond entertainment video), value will remain with the budget and standard tiers of service, one might argue.

Network Slicing Might Shift Value of Networks

Network slicing might ultimately be more important driver of business strategy than many expect, with both potential revenue upside and downside for connectivity providers. The upside is the potential ability to create customized wide area networks with features preserved to the radio edge of the network. In principle, that turns a commodity connection into a value-added platform.

The downside is that network slicing also might be used by enterprises and carriers to further commoditize the value of physical networks. `

Consider this diagram from ETSI, explaining the architecture of network slicing, as used by potential customers of network services. The “tenant” is the customer. The network slice provider is an aggregator of network services.

The network slice agents are the sales agents for any network’s slices. The network infrastructure providers are what we now call telcos or service providers.



It does not take much imagination to predict that some tenants (network service providers, enterprises, app providers, transaction platforms, device providers) can stitch together regional or global networks with assured performance (latency, bandwidth) by buying network slices from many network service providers.

The early analogy is the way Google Fi uses Wi-Fi, Sprint, T-Mobile US and U.S. Cellular networks for access. Where Wi-Fi is available, Google Fi devices default to Wi-Fi. Where not available, devices sense whether Sprint, T-Mobile US or U.S. Cellular have better signal, and default automatically to that network.

In a network slicing environment, a tenant will essentially do the same thing, using network slices to to create a complete network, possibly with performance assurance. Potentially, tenants might also dynamically shift slices, based on any number of potential business rules (cost, quality, bandwidth, congestion).

The bottom line is that the way tenants (enterprises or carriers) build networks could change, in ways that shift value to the integrator of slices, whether that integrator is the enterprise itself or an agent working on behalf of the tenant.

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