Tuesday, July 30, 2024

How Much Damage Did CrowdStrike Outage Cost the Fortune 500 Firms?

 The CrowdStrike outage of July 2024 had a significant impact across various industries. By some estimates, the total estimated loss to Fortune 500 companies (excluding Microsoft) are estimated at $5.4 to $10 billion.

So it might be considered “worth a shot” for Delta to ponder legal action against CrowdStrike.  


Some believe Fortune 500 healthcare firms suffered $2 billion in losses from the outage. The financial sector might argue it lost around $1.15 billion. Others believe the losses (including hard-to-quantify “reputational damage”) across a range of industries could reach the higher $10 billion figure.  


Industry

Estimated Losses (USD Billion)

Healthcare

1.94

Banking & Finance

1.15

Transportation

1.02

Retail

0.87

Manufacturing

0.78

Government

0.64

Hospitality & Tourism

0.51

Media & Entertainment

0.42

Other Industries

2.68

Total

10.01


Monday, July 29, 2024

AI Capex Concerns are Legitimate, but Also Unrealistic

Concerns about the payback from AI capital investment by hyperscale cloud computing giants including Alphabet, Microsoft and Amazon already have been an issue for equity investors. The day before the Alphabet earnings call (July 22, 2024), the stock price was $183.60. The day after the call the price was $174.37. 


Alphabet lost about $113.28 billion in equity value the day after its July 23, 2024 earnings call, and the total change in equity value for the following week was approximately $145.64 billion.


Similar damage could occur to other hyperscalers in the “cloud computing as a service” space, if investors do not see material increases in revenue and also hear forecasts of continued high capex. 

source: Reuters, LSEG 


Some of us not in the financial analyst business might find such expectations unreasonable. 


In part, that is because expectations for providers of software services generally anticipate high profit margins and relatively quick payback from capex, compared to providers of other services with a more utility-like character.


Even within the cloud computing business, capex might be expected to breakeven in two to four years, but not produce a payback for three to five years. In other capital-intensive industries, breakeven periods routinely range from five to 15 years, with payback taking seven to 20 years. 


Industry

Expected Breakeven Period

Expected Payback Period

Software

1-3 years

2-4 years

Cloud Computing

2-4 years

3-5 years

Communications Networks

5-7 years

7-10 years

Airlines

7-10 years

10-15 years

Real Estate

5-10 years

10-20 years

Utility Industries

10-15 years

15-20 years


Of course, financial analysts get paid to predict quarterly to annual results. Enterprise CEOs are judged on annual performance. But analysts and researchers often work with longer time frames. 


So firms will be punished for what is seen as “excessive” AI capex. What might not be immediately clear is the strategic impact half a decade to 20 years out. And that is the balance the cloud computing hyperscalers must now strike: investing in a prudent manner now while avoiding the risks of underinvesting. 


If AI winds up becoming a general-purpose technology, investing and adoption laggards might suffer to some degree. The problem is that nobody now knows what levels of investment are “too little” and which might be “too much.” 


Cloud computing provider revenues from customers are going to be the real test. But expectations about the degree of financial return, and the magnitude of return, have been unrealistic from the start.


Like it or not, many important capex investments take quite some time to show payback. So expectations of near-term financial gain seem quite unreasonable.


Saturday, July 27, 2024

Concerns about AI Infra Overinvestment are Rational: It has Happened Many Times in the Past

It is quite understandable that financial analysts covering public firms are concerned about the payback period for various forms of artificial intelligence. For example, venture capitalist David Cahn with Sequoia Capital argues that the big hyperscale cloud computing companies must earn about $600 billion in revenue to justify their investments in AI infrastructure, focused only on graphics processor investments and data center facilities and operating costs, plus an expected 50-percent profit margin on software sales. 


That noted, Cahn also says “a huge amount of economic value is going to be created by AI. Company builders focused on delivering value to end users will be rewarded handsomely,” as AI is a potentially “generation-defining technology wave.”


The larger point is that speculative frenzies are part of technology deployment. “Those who remain level-headed through this moment have the chance to build extremely important companies,” says Cahn. “But we need to make sure not to believe in the delusion that has now spread from Silicon Valley to the rest of the country, and indeed the world.”


In other words, the “get rich quick” mentality is going to disappoint, as did the mid-1880s gold rush in California. 


So will there be an AI investment bubble? Yes, he might argue. Such periods of investment frenzy have happened in the past, as well, before the benefits were realized. 


Engines That Move Markets: Technology Investing from Railroads to the Internet and Beyond by Alasdair Nairn describes the recurring investment patterns associated with major technological advancements. He notes that these innovations often follow a cycle, moving from skepticism to enthusiasm. Lots of venture capital investment follows, accompanied by inflated stock prices. 


Eventually, as the technology matures and financial realities set in, many companies fail, stock prices collapse, and naive investors lose money.


If the railroad investment pattern holds, there could be disappointment. Over the long term, investments in railways were not rewarding, he argues. Despite their economic impact, railways provided negative investment returns in real, relative, or absolute terms, however important the economic contribution. 


The point is that it is a safe bet to argue AI overinvestment will occur. That tends to be the pattern for major new technologies, especially those we generally recognize as being general-purpose technologies with wide economic impact. 


After all, huge capital investments in graphics processor units, for example, must be reflected in revenue upside at some point. The issue is whether expectations of near-term return are actually reasonable. 


As always, market forecasters, firm executives and others might lean towards the strategic implications, while financial analysts primarily look at the quarterly performance metrics. 


And, sometimes, investments are more “strategic” than “tactical.” In other words, a telco might have to invest heavily in fiber-to-home facilities simply to stay in business as competitors upgrade their home broadband infrastructures. 


The actual financial return on investment will matter, but might not be the driver. “You get to keep your business” or “you get to stay in business” might be the value, not simply increases in revenue after the investments are made. 


Most new information technologies take some time before we tend to see measurable benefits. That has been true for many technologies. So the issue is whether various forms of AI are more like social media or smartphones or PCs, the internet and automated teller machines. 


Technology

Approximate Lag Time to Measurable Outcomes (Years)

PCs

10-15

Internet

10-15

ATMs

8-10

HDTV

5-8

Cloud Computing

5-7

Wireless/Wi-Fi

5-7

Smartphones

3-5

Social Media

3-5


Applying various forms of AI to various use cases across industries might reasonably produce varied payback periods, from rapid to lengthy, suggesting that investment tied to particular use cases is a reasonable approach.


Most of us likely can imagine clear performance benefits in areas ranging from e-commerce, search and social media recommendations fairly quickly. As AI already is used to support such personalization features. 


Other use cases, including manufacturing or healthcare, might take longer, in part because many parts of the value chain have to be altered at the same time to take advantage of AI. 


Industry/Use Case

Estimated Payback Period

E-commerce (general)

1.2 - 1.6 years 

E-commerce (search optimization)

6 months - 1 year

Social Media & Content

1 - 2 years

Manufacturing

2 - 3 years

Business Services (Law, Accounting, Consulting)

1.5 - 2.5 years

Smartphones (AI features)

1 - 2 years

PCs (AI-enhanced software)

2 - 3 years

Cloud Computing (AI services)

1 - 2 years

Healthcare (AI diagnostics)

2 - 4 years

Financial Services (Fraud Detection)

1 - 1.5 years


Obviously there are many variables. Larger-scale implementations may see faster payback due to economies of scale, so long as they are targeting major functions that can affect financial return. 


Some AI applications, such as fraud detection in financial services, may see quicker returns compared to more complex implementations in healthcare or manufacturing, and also be easier to measure. 


Existing information technology infrastructure and past success integrating information technologies, probably also will matter. Companies that have more-developed IT might see faster payback periods compared to firms whose existing infra is less well developed. 


Fast-moving industries such as  e-commerce and social media might realize benefits quicker than more traditional sectors, simply because they face fewer regulatory issues that must first be addressed. 


Regulatory environment: Industries with strict regulations (e.g., healthcare, finance) may have longer payback periods due to compliance requirements.


As always, the particular use cases will have different payback periods, when implemented at scale. 


Industry

AI Use Case

Payback

Source

E-commerce

Product Recommendation Engines

6-12 months

McKinsey, AI in Retail 

Social Media & Content

Personalized Content & Ad Targeting

12-18 months

Forrester, AI in Marketing

Manufacturing

Predictive Maintenance

18-24 months

PwC, AI in Manufacturing

Business Services

Legal Document Review & Due Diligence

24-36 months

Accenture, AI in Professional Services

Smartphones

Voice Assistants & Virtual Companions

3-5 years (Long-term brand value)

CB Insights, AI in Mobile

PCs & Cloud Computing

Resource Optimization & Server Management

12-18 months

Bain, AI in Cloud Computing 


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