Showing posts sorted by date for query alternative assets. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query alternative assets. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Monday, October 28, 2024

Build Versus Buy is the Issue for Verizon Acquisition of Frontier

Verizon’s rationale for acquiring Frontier Communications, at a cost of  $20 billion, is partly strategic, partly tactical. Verizon and most other telcos face growth issues, and Frontier adds fixed network footprint, existing fiber access and other revenues, plant and equipment. 


Consider how Verizon’s fixed network compares with major competitors. 


ISP

Total Fixed Network Homes, Small Businesses Passed

AT&T

~70 million

Comcast

~60 million

Charter

~50 million

Verizon

~36 million


Verizon has the smallest fixed network footprint, so all other things being equal, the smallest share of the total home broadband market nationwide. If home broadband becomes the next big battleground for AT&T and Verizon revenue growth (on the assumption mobility market share is being taken by cable companies and T-Mobile from Verizon and At&T), then Verizon has to do something about its footprint, as it simply does not have enough ability to compete for customers across most of the Untied States for home broadband using fixed network platforms. 

And though Frontier’s customer base and geographies are heavily rural and suburban, compared to Verizon, that is characteristic of most “at scale” telco assets that might be acquisition targets for Verizon. 


Oddly enough, Verizon sold many of the assets it now plans to reacquire. In 2010, for example, Frontier Communications purchased rural operations in 27 states from Verizon, including more than seven million local access lines and 4.8 million customer lines. 


Those assets were located in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia, shown in the map below as brown areas. 


Then in 2015, Verizon sold additional assets in three states (California, Texas, Florida) to Frontier. Those assets included 3.7 million voice connections; 2.2 million broadband internet access customers, including about 1.6 million fiber optic access accounts and approximately 1.2 million video entertainment customers.


source: Verizon, Tampa Bay Business Journal 


Now Verizon is buying back the bulk of those assets. There are a couple of notable angles. First, Verizon back in the first decade of the 21st century was raising cash and shedding rural assets that did not fit well with its FiOS fiber-to-home strategy. In the intervening years, Frontier has rebuilt millions of those lines with FTTH platforms.


Also, with fixed network growth stagnant, acquiring Frontier now provides a way to boost Verizon’s own revenue growth.


For example, the acquisition adds around 7.2 million additional and already-in-place fiber passings. Verizon already has 18 million fiber passings,increasing  the fiber footprint to reach nearly 25 million homes and small businesses​. In other words, the acquisition increases current fiber passings by about 29 percent. 


There also are some millions of additional copper passings that might never be upgraded to fiber, but can generate revenue (copper internet access or voice or alarm services, for example). Today, Frontier generates about 44 percent of its total revenue from copper access facilities, some of which will eventually be upgraded to fiber, but perhaps not all. 


Frontier already has plans to add some three million more fiber passes by about 2026, for example, bringing its total fiber passings up to about 10 million. 


That suggests Frontier’s total network might pass 16 million to 17 million homes and small businesses. But assume Verizon’s primary interest is about 10 million new fiber passings. 


Frontier has estimated its cost per passing for those locations as between $1000 and $1100. Assume Verizon can also achieve that. Assume the full value of the Frontier acquisition ($20 billion) was instead spent on building new fiber plant outside of region, at a blended cost of #1050 per passing. 


That implies Verizon might be able to build perhaps 20 million new FTTH passings as an alternative, assuming all other costs (permits, pole leases or conduit access) were not material. But those costs exist, and might represent about 25 percent higher costs. 


So adjust the cost per passing for outside-of-region builds to a range of $1300 to $1400. Use a blended average of $1350. Under those circumstances, Verizon might hope to build less than 15 million locations. 


And in that scenario Verizon would not acquire the existing cash flow or other property. So one might broadly say the alternative is spending $20 billion to build up to 15 million new fiber passings over time, versus acquiring 10 million fiber passings in about a year, plus the revenue from seven million passings (with take rates around 40 percent of passings). 


Critics will say Verizon could do something else with $20 billion, to be sure, including not spending the money and not increasing its debt. But some of those same critics will decry Verizon’s lack of revenue growth as well. 


But Verizon also sees economies of scale, creating projected cost synergies of around $500 million annually by the third year. The acquisition is expected to be accretive to Verizon’s revenue, EBITDA and cash flow shortly after closing, if adding to Verizon’s debt load. 


Even if the majority of Verizon revenue is generated by mobility services, fixed network services still contribute a quarter or so of total revenues, and also are part of the cost structure for mobility services. To garner a higher share of moderate- to high-speed home broadband (perhaps in the 300 Mbps to 500 Mbps range for “moderate speed” and gigabit and multi-gigabit services as “high speed”), Verizon has to increase its footprint nationwide or regionally, outside its current fixed network footprint. 


One might make the argument that Verizon should not bother expanding its fixed network footprint, but home broadband is a relative growth area (at least in terms of growing market share). The ability to take market share from the leading cable TV firms (using fixed wireless for lower speed and fiber for higher speed accounts) clearly exists, but only if Verizon can acquire or build additional footprint outside its present core region.


And while it is possible for Verizon to cherry pick its “do it yourself” home broadband footprint outside of region, that approach does not offer immediate scale. Assuming all else works out, it might take Verizon five years to add an additional seven million or so FTTH passings outside of the current region. 


There is a value to revenue Verizon can add from day one, rather than building gradually over five years.


Sunday, January 28, 2024

Big New AI Business Models, Use Cases, Industries Will Come from Solving New Problems

One question many of us are asking ourselves is where dangers and opportunities are to be found as artificial intelligence is applied to more processes, functions, products and industries. And it might be quite humbling--but accurate--to say that much remains unknown. 


And that is simply the way new technology tends to unfold. Many firms were created using core technology developed at Xerox PARC, including 3Com, Adobe and Synoptics. But “the success of some of these departing spinoffs was largely unforeseen, and unforeseeable,” said Henry Chesrough in Open Innovation


Consider what innovations the internet brought that likely were unexpected by most of us, such as social media; crowdsourcing, the sharing economy or search, as well as many innovations that already were in place, such as open source. 


Many other forms of disintermediation, where steps in a value chain were removed, are obvious: e-commerce; education, gaming or user-generated content. 


Other unfolding developments, such as virtual reality or cryptocurrency, are less directly-created by the internet, but generally require its use. 


Innovation

Unexpected Value

Use Cases

Revenue Models

Companies & Industries

Search Engines

Democratization of information, knowledge discovery, access to global resources

Finding anything online, researching topics, exploring new ideas

Advertising, affiliate marketing, premium features

Google, Bing, Yandex, Baidu, search engine marketing agencies

Social Media

Connection & community beyond physical limitations

Sharing experiences, building relationships, expressing oneself, marketing & branding

Advertising, subscriptions, data monetization

Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Influencer marketing

Sharing economy (e.g., Uber, Airbnb)

Sharing resources & assets for income generation

Transportation, accommodation, peer-to-peer rentals, skills & services

Transaction fees, commissions, advertising, subscriptions

Uber, Airbnb, Lyft, Turo, TaskRabbit

Crowdsourcing

Collective intelligence and distributed problem-solving

Gathering diverse perspectives, generating content, finding solutions, conducting research

Platform fees, micro-transactions, project funding

Wikipedia, Kickstarter, Upwork, Freelancer

E-commerce

Convenient shopping beyond physical stores

Broader product access, competitive pricing, personalized recommendations, 24/7 availability

Online sales, marketplace commissions, product subscriptions

Amazon, Alibaba, Etsy, Online retail in every imaginable niche

Open-source software

Collaborative development and access to free software

Innovation through community involvement, cost-effective solutions, customization, security patches

Donations, sponsorships, enterprise support, premium features

Linux, Apache, WordPress, Open-source frameworks for various fields

Streaming services

On-demand access to vast entertainment libraries

Cord-cutting from traditional media, personalized recommendations, global content reach

Subscriptions, pay-per-view, ad-supported tiers

Netflix, Spotify, YouTube, Streaming platforms for music, games, podcasts, educational content

Online education

Accessible learning beyond geographical and financial constraints

Flexible learning pathways, personalized courses, diverse instructors, upskilling & reskilling

Course fees, subscriptions, micro-credentials, corporate training

Coursera, Udemy, Khan Academy, Online learning for academic degrees, professional development, personal interests

Cryptocurrency

Decentralized financial system and alternative store of value

Peer-to-peer transactions, global reach, inflation resistance, new investment opportunities

Blockchain technology, transaction fees, mining rewards, DeFi applications

Bitcoin, Ethereum, Stablecoins, Cryptocurrency exchanges, NFTs, Blockchain-based financial services

Blogging & personal branding

Sharing individual voice and expertise with a global audience

Building influence, establishing thought leadership, connecting with communities, potential for income generation

Advertising, sponsored content, affiliate marketing, product sales, consulting services

WordPress, Blogger, Medium, Independent creators across various fields


And perhaps one of the lessons of innovation is that big breakthroughs happen mostly when innovators try to solve new problems, not fix existing problems.


And right now, virtually everything we see and hear about AI is how it can help fix some existing process. That’s useful, to be sure. 


But the big, unexpected new use cases, revenue models and value will happen where we are perhaps least expecting it. 


New technology can create entirely new markets and value chains when it is harnessed to meet unmet needs we did not recognize. We did not “know” we needed search or social media. We did not know we needed mobile computing and connectivity devices or personal computing appliances. 


AI undoubtedly will, in context, be viewed as an app, a use case, a function or a capability. But in other cases it will be viewed as a platform to support new business business models, industries and types of firms. 


We just don’t know--yet--how all that will develop.


Wednesday, April 26, 2023

Beyond Connectivity? Some Do Better than Others

Connectivity service providers might be said to suffer from envy about the valuations earned by application providers compared to mobile operator or telco valuations. After all, a public market valuation creates, or limits, currency that can be used to grow the business. 


On the other hand, firms in distinct industries have different valuation ranges, based in part on revenue growth prospects. And that is where practitioners simply must acknowledge that connectivity operations and asset valuations are closer to those of other capital-intensive, relatively slow-growing businesses including energy utilities, airports, seaports, toll roads, gas and oil pipelines. 


Provider

Expected Revenue Growth Rate

Expected Profit Margin

AT&T

1.5%

10%

Verizon

1.0%

12%

NTT

2.0%

11%

Telefonica

1.0%

9%

Orange

1.5%

10%

BT

1.0%

11%

Deutsche Telekom

1.5%

12%

Telecom Malaysia

2.0%

8%

Jio

3.0%

15%

Vodafone

2.0%

10%


For the better part of two decades, connectivity providers have struggled to recreate themselves as faster-moving entities with higher growth profiles, with mostly modest success. At the very least, firms have tried to position themselves as more-diversified entities with bigger roles in other parts on the internet ecosystem beyond connectivity. 


For the most part, investors harbor few illusions in that regard. Indeed, connectivity assets are valued precisely when they offer the expectation of steady cash flow and some scarcity value. That is the thinking behind private equity and institutional investor interest in “alternative assets” that are relatively uncorrelated with other traditional equity and bond assets. 


The logical implication, however, is that connectivity CxOs--and those who advise them-- probably should stop suggesting that connectivity roles and value are something they are not. 


Which is to say, high-growth vehicles. That does not mean connectivity providers cannot take on additional roles in the value chain: they can. It does mean that even when successful, those assets will likely earn a higher valuation when eventually separated from the connectivity assets. 


In other words, assets often are awarded higher valuations when separated from ownership by entities with lower valuation ratios. Pure plays often are rewarded by higher valuations, compared to the value they bring to owners who have other roles and valuations. 


That might have significant implications for business strategy. If and when connectivity providers move to take on different roles within the value chain, it might also be realistic to assume that, at some point, those assets bring the highest and best value to the owners when the assets can be spun out or sold. 


In other words, moves to create assets in other parts of the value chain should be viewed as assets in a portfolio that always are available for sale, at some point, and not a core operating holding. 


The clear exception is when the new operations are significant enough in magnitude to warrant becoming the foundation of the company’s long-term business. 


We rarely see this in the connectivity business, though. Typically, the newer lines of business are sold or spun out. A connectivity firm does not become a content provider; a retail data center business; an application provider; an entity that earns its core revenue from facilitating transactions, rather than selling connectivity services. 


Firms might change, over time, the services they sell, or the connectivity roles they play. But we have yet to see major evolution away from “connectivity services” to some other permanent role, as the primary revenue driver, for any tier-one telco. 


To be sure, lots of firms might boast significant revenue from services and products other than connectivity. But those always seem to be “nice to have” operations that complement the existing core business.


And even estimates of non-telco revenue can change quickly, as for example when AT&T divested its content, linear video and advertising operations. AT&T's latest quarterly report focuses strictly on connectivity service revenue and operations. In a short year or two period, AT&T can be said to have scaled its “non-telco” revenue back from 19 percent to near zero.  


Even the commonly-cited sources of such “non-telco” revenue are suspect. Jio, for example, is said to make such revenue from home broadband on a fixed network. That makes sense only if Jio is narrowly considered to be a “mobile services” provider, with “non-telco” revenue including any sources on a fixed network. 


That would not be the definition used for other “integrated” providers with both mobile and fixed operations. The same might hold for Telecom Malaysia, BT or KPN. In other cases, non-telco products might also count revenue earned by service provider internal operations that use e-commerce or mobile payment mechanisms. 


Were we to eliminate all other connectivity services, even firms with lots of initiatives in content, apps or devices might show significantly less revenue contribution from non-telco sources. 


Still, JioMart, an e-commerce platform, JioSaavn, the music streaming service and JioMoney could represent 11 percent or more of total non-telco Jio revenues. 


Company

Percentage of Non-Telco Revenue

Examples of Non-Telco Products

Vodafone

18%

Mobile payments, e-commerce, cloud computing, advertising

Jio

30%

Home broadband, DTH, fiber-to-the-home, smart home solutions

Telecom Malaysia

12%

Fixed-line broadband, data center services, cloud computing

Deutsche Telekom

15%

Mobile payments, e-commerce, cloud computing, advertising

BT

10%

Fixed-line broadband, data center services, cloud computing

Orange

14%

Mobile payments, e-commerce, cloud computing, advertising

KPN

11%

Fixed-line broadband, data center services, cloud computing

Telefonica

13%

Mobile payments, e-commerce, cloud computing, advertising

NTT

17%

Mobile payments, e-commerce, cloud computing, advertising

China Mobile

20%

Mobile payments, e-commerce, cloud computing, advertising

China Telecom

18%

Mobile payments, e-commerce, cloud computing, advertising

Verizon

16%

Mobile payments, e-commerce, cloud computing, advertising

AT&T

19%

Mobile payments, e-commerce, cloud computing, advertising


The point is that common citations of “non-telco” revenue tend to be inflated. Connectivity providers “are who they are.” Diversification moves beyond the connectivity function contribute a non-zero amount of revenue. But even that amount tends to be overstated. 


Will AI Fuel a Huge "Services into Products" Shift?

As content streaming has disrupted music, is disrupting video and television, so might AI potentially disrupt industry leaders ranging from ...