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Wednesday, January 21, 2026

How Electricity Charging Might Change

It now is easy to argue that U.S. electricity pricing might have to evolve in ways similar to the change in retail pricing of communications services changed in the shift from analog to digital formats


Significantly, retail pricing might change from “consumption” or “usage” to “capabilities” or “access.” In other words, commercial power customers might eventually be charged based on “how much” power is available; where it is available or when it is available. 


Consider the earlier change in connectivity service pricing. 


For the most part, connectivity providers (telcos, mobile operators) no longer price their services on “usage” (minutes, calls, texts, bytes consumed), preferring “capability” and “access” as the key pricing elements. 


For internet access services, consumption does not typically matter. Instead, prices are based on “potential speed.” So a 100-Mbps connection costs the least; a 500-Mbps connection costs more while a gigabit-per-second costs the most.


Electricity still is mostly priced based on consumption (usage). But the economics of paying for the common costs of generation and transmission remain, even as more customers reduce consumption using self generation (solar panels, local generation by businesses).

Electric grid support therefore will become more challenging as user consumption drops, based on substitution of local generation for network-delivered power.


The basic business problem is that this forces a smaller number of customers to bear a larger portion of shared cost recovery, to the extent that common costs are recovered from usage charges. 


Electricity service providers have some tools to reinvent their business models. Load management becomes more important, for example. 


A shift to “access” charges also would help, creating a different model not based on actual account energy consumption but a fee based on ability to use the network. That mirrors the flat monthly fee approach now used by mobile service providers, where prices are not dictated by the number or length of phone calls, the number of text messages sent and received, or the amount of internet access data consumed. 


Instead, one fee, providing access to the network and its services, dominates. 


As with communications companies, customers who want “bigger pipes” would pay more, as do customers who want gigabit internet access service, compared to those who only want to pay for 100-Mbps speeds.

That is important in an era where local generation is going to reduce grid-delivered power consumption. 


Electricity is ceasing to be an “energy sales business” and becoming an infrastructure access business, exactly like telecom. Where “amount of electricity consumed” used to drive the revenue model, the telecom approach would substitute “ability to use the network and its features.” 


Consumer solar users without extensive battery assets then would pay for the ability to use grid power at night, for example, in the same way that a mobile device user “pays for” the ability to use the mobile operator network, rather than the specific amount of consumption of network resources. 


The alternative is continued cross-subsidy collapse, where costs keep rising for customers unable to switch to some form of self generation. 


Common costs (generation and transmission) must be recovered. Self generation threatens the present model. As with communication networks, electrical grids must be designed to support peak demand, not average demand. 


Network revenue models must assume universal service and recovery of all common costs, not simply marginal costs related to actual consumption. 


Traditional pricing assumes energy consumption is equal to grid usage. But distributed generation breaks that assumption. 


Essentially, customers remove themselves, at least partially, from the system, but retain the optionality of using the grid for reliability, backup, and peak load balancing. 


But fixed costs stay embedded in the price of per-kiloWatt hour charges, so rates will rise as sales fall. 


At the same time, new demand driven by high-performance computing and associated data centers increases the need for new investments in transmission infrastructure as well as generation, increasing the fixed costs. 


The business model will break, if not revamped.


Wednesday, August 6, 2025

What is the Value of a Copper Access Line That Cannot be Upgraded to Optical Fiber?

Some of us used to wonder what many telcos were going to do as they phased out their copper access facilities, since many are still covered by older laws mandating they provide service to any customer who asks for it. The problem is that those telcos must still have the means to provide service, even if they cannot use copper or optical fiber facilities. 


Wireless, in some form, always has been the only realistic alternative. Whether that is satellite service, mobile phone service or fixed wireless, untethered platforms might always be the only way to provide universal service in areas where a fixed network using cables is impractical. 


The latest advances allow standard mobile phones to communicate with low earth orbit satellites without any extra gear or software. 


Which still leaves us with the problem of how to value stranded copper assets, which are declining in value, especially when they cannot be upgraded to optical fiber, and as consumers continue to migrate away from use of fixed networks for voice services. 


Many potential fixed network “home broadband” assets owned by smaller telcos must use a blended valuation approach, as such firms generally own a mix of copper access lines that cannot be profitably upgraded to fiber-to-home; copper lines that can be upgraded as well as existing fiber lines that are operational.


Each asset has distinct valuation characteristics, with built fiber lines being the most valuable, non-upgradable copper lines the lowest valuation. 


The big U.S. telcos arguably always have grown more from acquisitions than from organic growth. Verizon, AT&T, Charter, Comcast and T-Mobile, for example, have done so. In the FTTH business, which always is capital intensive, there also is a “time to market” advantage. 


Building lines takes time. And even when built, take rates might remain in the 40-percent range. In other words, up to 60 percent of the assets are essentially stranded, with no revenue produced. So buying lines that do produce revenue (have subscribers on them) has lots of value. 


If building FTTH lines costs between $800 and $1200 per location, and we assume 40-percent take rates, the cost per subscriber can range from $2000 to $3000. 


If we add in marketing and acquisition costs, the full cost of provisioning a line with a customer on it can range from $2350 to $3700, assuming sales and marketing cost between $200 and $400 per sub, plus installation costs between $150 and $300 per subscriber. 


Scenario

Cost per Passing

Take Rate

Cost per Subscriber

Low Cost

$800

40%

$2,000

High Cost

$1,200

40%

$3,000

Average

$1,000

40%

$2,500

If that is the case, then it often makes sense to pay a premium to acquire customers and facilities rather than build them, if “buying rather than building” accelerates cash flow and also allows some additional economies of scale. 

When copper access lines are upgradable, there is additional upside. And even dwindling copper access revenues provide some amount of revenue and cash flow, even if they are declining assets. For providers who own mobile network assets, there additionally is the potential to serve former copper customers with fixed wireless access as well, as a longer-term alternative to using copper access. 

Eventually, that also will change the valuation of access network assets.


Saturday, January 4, 2025

Meta Pulls Back AI User Move

Controversy over Facebook’s use of artificial-intelligence-created “user” accounts is not unusual in a business that often has to try innovations, some of which are embraced, some of which are rejected by people. Meta and Instagram had proposed allowing users to create AI user accounts that many say are just bots.


Even under the best of circumstances, up to 70 percent of innovations will fail, whether that is digital transformation projects, information technology projects or change programs in general. 


The same general rule holds for venture capital investments as well. 


Two points to note here are that Meta did react quickly to a policy that was highly unpopular, and also that failures on the way to maximizing the use of AI are inevitable. 


Feature/Innovation

Description

User Opposition

Outcome

Beacon Advertising System (2007)

Tracked users' online purchases and shared them as ads.

Privacy concerns; users felt uninformed and exposed.

Apologized; shut down in 2009 after lawsuits and backlash.

Real Names Policy (2014–2015)

Required users to use legal names on the platform.

Criticized by activists and marginalized groups for safety concerns.

Policy softened, allowing alternative verification methods.

Automatic Facial Recognition (2017–2021)

Auto-tagged people in photos using facial recognition technology.

Privacy concerns and fears of biometric data misuse.

Disabled feature in 2021 and deleted facial recognition templates.

Instagram for Kids (2021)

Aimed to create a version of Instagram for children under 13.

Concerns about mental health, safety, and exploitation.

Paused development following criticism from parents and lawmakers.

News Feed Redesigns

Periodic changes to Facebook’s feed algorithm and layout.

Complaints about irrelevant content and lack of chronological order.

Adjustments made to balance user satisfaction and business goals.

Libra/Meta Diem Cryptocurrency (2019–2022)

Proposed cryptocurrency for global payments.

Regulatory opposition over financial stability and privacy concerns.

Project abandoned in 2022; assets sold.

WhatsApp Privacy Policy Update (2021)

Suggested increased data sharing with Meta.

Perceived compromise of encryption and independence; user migration to competitors.

Delayed implementation; clarified policy and encryption commitments.

Facebook Home and Phone (2013)

Custom Android skin integrating Facebook at the center of the smartphone.

Users found the interface intrusive and not broadly useful.

Discontinued after poor adoption.


We might note that Alphabet and Google have had similar issues when innovating. The process is messy, often unsuccessful and requires agility, including willingness to back away when an innovation generates opposition from users. 


Feature/Innovation

Description

User Opposition

Outcome

Google Buzz (2010–2011)

A social networking tool integrated into Gmail, automatically connecting users.

Privacy concerns over automatic contact sharing without consent.

Discontinued in 2011 after legal settlements and backlash.

Google Glass (2013–2015)

Augmented reality smart glasses targeting early adopters and developers.

Privacy concerns, social stigma ("Glassholes"), and high price point.

Halted consumer version in 2015; pivoted to enterprise applications.

Google Wave (2009–2010)

A real-time collaboration and communication platform.

Confusing interface and unclear use case for mainstream users.

Shut down in 2010 after poor adoption.

Project Ara (2013–2016)

Modular smartphone allowing users to swap out components like a camera or battery.

Cost concerns, technical challenges, and lukewarm market interest.

Canceled in 2016 despite initial excitement.

Google+ (2011–2019)

Social network launched to compete with Facebook.

Low user engagement; criticized for forced integration with other Google services like YouTube.

Shut down in 2019 due to data breaches and low adoption.

YouTube Real Name Policy (2013)

Encouraged users to use their Google+ profile (real name) on YouTube comments.

Resistance from YouTube creators and users valuing anonymity.

Policy abandoned; reverted to original comment system.

Google Nexus Q (2012)

Media streaming device with social sharing features.

Criticized for high price, limited functionality, and reliance on Android devices.

Withdrawn shortly after launch; never returned to market.

Google Allo (2016–2019)

Messaging app with smart assistant integration.

Privacy concerns over lack of end-to-end encryption by default and confusion over app purpose.

Shut down in 2019 in favor of Google Messages (RCS-based).

Stadia (2019–2023)

Cloud gaming platform enabling play without a console or PC.

Criticized for lack of exclusive titles, connectivity issues, and unclear business model.

Discontinued in 2023 due to limited market traction.

Sidewalk Labs Toronto Project (2017–2020)

Smart city initiative to develop a tech-driven urban space in Toronto.

Privacy concerns, data governance issues, and opposition from residents and activists.

Abandoned in 2020 amid public resistance and regulatory challenges.

FLoC (Federated Learning of Cohorts) (2021–2022)

Ad tracking system designed to replace third-party cookies.

Privacy concerns from users, advocacy groups, and some web browser developers.

Replaced by the Topics API after significant criticism

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