Showing posts sorted by date for query ftth cost fixed wireless. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query ftth cost fixed wireless. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Monday, October 28, 2024

Build Versus Buy is the Issue for Verizon Acquisition of Frontier

Verizon’s rationale for acquiring Frontier Communications, at a cost of  $20 billion, is partly strategic, partly tactical. Verizon and most other telcos face growth issues, and Frontier adds fixed network footprint, existing fiber access and other revenues, plant and equipment. 


Consider how Verizon’s fixed network compares with major competitors. 


ISP

Total Fixed Network Homes, Small Businesses Passed

AT&T

~70 million

Comcast

~60 million

Charter

~50 million

Verizon

~36 million


Verizon has the smallest fixed network footprint, so all other things being equal, the smallest share of the total home broadband market nationwide. If home broadband becomes the next big battleground for AT&T and Verizon revenue growth (on the assumption mobility market share is being taken by cable companies and T-Mobile from Verizon and At&T), then Verizon has to do something about its footprint, as it simply does not have enough ability to compete for customers across most of the Untied States for home broadband using fixed network platforms. 

And though Frontier’s customer base and geographies are heavily rural and suburban, compared to Verizon, that is characteristic of most “at scale” telco assets that might be acquisition targets for Verizon. 


Oddly enough, Verizon sold many of the assets it now plans to reacquire. In 2010, for example, Frontier Communications purchased rural operations in 27 states from Verizon, including more than seven million local access lines and 4.8 million customer lines. 


Those assets were located in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia, shown in the map below as brown areas. 


Then in 2015, Verizon sold additional assets in three states (California, Texas, Florida) to Frontier. Those assets included 3.7 million voice connections; 2.2 million broadband internet access customers, including about 1.6 million fiber optic access accounts and approximately 1.2 million video entertainment customers.


source: Verizon, Tampa Bay Business Journal 


Now Verizon is buying back the bulk of those assets. There are a couple of notable angles. First, Verizon back in the first decade of the 21st century was raising cash and shedding rural assets that did not fit well with its FiOS fiber-to-home strategy. In the intervening years, Frontier has rebuilt millions of those lines with FTTH platforms.


Also, with fixed network growth stagnant, acquiring Frontier now provides a way to boost Verizon’s own revenue growth.


For example, the acquisition adds around 7.2 million additional and already-in-place fiber passings. Verizon already has 18 million fiber passings,increasing  the fiber footprint to reach nearly 25 million homes and small businesses​. In other words, the acquisition increases current fiber passings by about 29 percent. 


There also are some millions of additional copper passings that might never be upgraded to fiber, but can generate revenue (copper internet access or voice or alarm services, for example). Today, Frontier generates about 44 percent of its total revenue from copper access facilities, some of which will eventually be upgraded to fiber, but perhaps not all. 


Frontier already has plans to add some three million more fiber passes by about 2026, for example, bringing its total fiber passings up to about 10 million. 


That suggests Frontier’s total network might pass 16 million to 17 million homes and small businesses. But assume Verizon’s primary interest is about 10 million new fiber passings. 


Frontier has estimated its cost per passing for those locations as between $1000 and $1100. Assume Verizon can also achieve that. Assume the full value of the Frontier acquisition ($20 billion) was instead spent on building new fiber plant outside of region, at a blended cost of #1050 per passing. 


That implies Verizon might be able to build perhaps 20 million new FTTH passings as an alternative, assuming all other costs (permits, pole leases or conduit access) were not material. But those costs exist, and might represent about 25 percent higher costs. 


So adjust the cost per passing for outside-of-region builds to a range of $1300 to $1400. Use a blended average of $1350. Under those circumstances, Verizon might hope to build less than 15 million locations. 


And in that scenario Verizon would not acquire the existing cash flow or other property. So one might broadly say the alternative is spending $20 billion to build up to 15 million new fiber passings over time, versus acquiring 10 million fiber passings in about a year, plus the revenue from seven million passings (with take rates around 40 percent of passings). 


Critics will say Verizon could do something else with $20 billion, to be sure, including not spending the money and not increasing its debt. But some of those same critics will decry Verizon’s lack of revenue growth as well. 


But Verizon also sees economies of scale, creating projected cost synergies of around $500 million annually by the third year. The acquisition is expected to be accretive to Verizon’s revenue, EBITDA and cash flow shortly after closing, if adding to Verizon’s debt load. 


Even if the majority of Verizon revenue is generated by mobility services, fixed network services still contribute a quarter or so of total revenues, and also are part of the cost structure for mobility services. To garner a higher share of moderate- to high-speed home broadband (perhaps in the 300 Mbps to 500 Mbps range for “moderate speed” and gigabit and multi-gigabit services as “high speed”), Verizon has to increase its footprint nationwide or regionally, outside its current fixed network footprint. 


One might make the argument that Verizon should not bother expanding its fixed network footprint, but home broadband is a relative growth area (at least in terms of growing market share). The ability to take market share from the leading cable TV firms (using fixed wireless for lower speed and fiber for higher speed accounts) clearly exists, but only if Verizon can acquire or build additional footprint outside its present core region.


And while it is possible for Verizon to cherry pick its “do it yourself” home broadband footprint outside of region, that approach does not offer immediate scale. Assuming all else works out, it might take Verizon five years to add an additional seven million or so FTTH passings outside of the current region. 


There is a value to revenue Verizon can add from day one, rather than building gradually over five years.


Thursday, September 5, 2024

Verizon Flips Assets: Selling then Buying Frontier Communications

Asset flipping in any business is not unheard of, but Verizon’s history with Frontier still seems instructive. In 2010, for example, Frontier Communications purchased rural operations in 27 states from Verizon, including more than seven million local access lines and 4.8 million customer lines. 


Those assets were located in Arizona, California, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Washington, Wisconsin and West Virginia, shown in the map below as brown areas. 


Then in 2015, Verizon sold additional assets in three states (California, Texas, Florida) to Frontier. Those assets included 3.7 million voice connections; 2.2 million broadband internet access customers, including about 1.6 million fiber optic access accounts and approximately 1.2 million video entertainment customers.


source: Verizon, Tampa Bay Business Journal 


Now Verizon is buying back the bulk of those assets. There are a couple of notable angles. First, Verizon back in the first decade of the 21st century was raising cash and shedding rural assets that did not fit well with its FiOS fiber-to-home strategy. In the intervening years, Frontier has rebuilt millions of those lines with FTTH platforms.


Also, with fixed network growth stagnant, acquiring Frontier now provides a way to boost Verizon’s own revenue growth. The acquisition means Verizon’s FTTH  connections will jump from approximately 7.4 million to 9.6 million, a gain of about 23 percent in one fell swoop. And since home broadband is the primary revenue growth driver for fixed networks these days, that matters. 


source: Verizon 


There are other takeaways. As in the mobile communications business, where Verizon and AT&T, for example, had been focusing on urban footprints and customers, market saturation has forced both firms to plumb rural areas and customers as well as the mobile virtual network operator business and prepaid accounts, where the main focus had been postpaid branded accounts, market saturation has forced the major providers to search in new areas for growth. 


As a byproduct, Verizon might, in some cases, be able to leverage its new fixed network assets to support its mobile network as well (fiber backhaul, for example). 


It is possible there are other strategic considerations as well. T-Mobile, which started out with zero share of the fixed network home broadband market, now is growing based on its use of fixed wireless services provided by its mobile platform.


But T-Mobile is making its first steps towards adding some amount of fixed network access provided by cabled networks as well. For example, T-Mobile has partnered with EQT, a global investment firm, to acquire Lumos, a fiber-to-the-home platform.


T-Mobile also formed a joint venture with KKR, another global investment firm, to acquire Metronet, a leading fiber-to-the-home provider. That acquisition also will expand T-Mobile’s fixed network home broadband market share.


And while it has seemed unlikely that T-Mobile would contemplate moves such as acquiring Frontier Communications or other firms such as Brightspeed itself, that outcome--at least regarding Frontier--is closed. 


On the other hand, the pressure to grow footprint to grow market share remains intact. Brightspeed does appear to have substantial overlap with Verizon’s new fixed network footprint, but duplicated assets might be sold. 


And Verizon appears to face little danger of antitrust action were it to acquire additional fixed network assets, given its modest coverage of U.S. homes. By some estimates, prior to the Frontier acquisition,   

Verizon homes might have numbered less than 25 million, possibly as low as 20 million. 


That is far fewer than top Verizon competitors might claim. 


Comcast has (can actually sell service to ) about 57 million homes passed. AT&T’s fixed network represents perhaps 62 million U.S. homes passed. 


Charter already passes more than 32 million locations, including homes and businesses. 


CenturyLink never reports its homes passed figures, but likely has 20-million or so consumer locations it can market services to.


The point is that additional Verizon acquisitions of fixed network assets, to reach more U.S. homes, might not pose antitrust issues. The Frontier acquisition adds between five million to 10 million potential new fixed network locations (not all upgraded for FTTH, yet, and including business locations). That potentially increases Verizon’s “locations passed” footprint by as much as a third. 


Using Verizon’s recent assertion that, after the Frontier acquisition, Verizon will reach 25 million homes, Verizon would still have some ways to go before it passes as many homes as AT&T, Comcast or Charter, its larger fixed network competitors. 


Frontier is said to have a network reaching 15 million locations, including homes and businesses. A reasonable guess is that at least 10 million of those locations are homes. 


Most of those locations are arguably not good candidates for FTTH investment, which is why firms such as Verizon and Lumen sold off rural footprints in the past. 


If Verizon’s “homes passed” footprint, after the acquisition, is only 25 million, there remains room to add more homes by acquisition.


Brightspeed’s network seems to pass about 6.5 million locations. Most are homes, but not all. Assuming 90 percent are residential, that implies less than six million locations are homes. So even adding Brightspeed assets would only bring Verizon up to perhaps 31 million or so homes, still far less than reached by AT&T, Comcast and Charter. 


The point is that the strategy of selling off rural assets and re-acquiring them later, once a critical mass of FTTH passings and accounts have been created, seems a logical strategy. Verizon’s cost to acquire the Frontier footprint (not customers, but network passings) is north of $1,000 per location, and possibly in the $1500 per passing range. 


Many observers expect that the former Frontier FTTH passings will double within a couple of  years. At current take rates, that also implies a potential additional two million or more FTTH accounts being added. 


Asset flipping remains part of the connectivity business. But it is rare to see a seller reacquire its sold assets.


Friday, August 2, 2024

Many Consumers Will Always Buy "Good Enough Value" Home Broadband

Some question the long-term viability of 5G fixed wireless services, arguing that, eventually, it will prove unable to compete with ever-higher capacities supplied by cabled networks, especially fiber to home platforms. 


Supporters might make the case that “eventually” is the key phrase, as the market potential for fixed wireless between “today” and “tomorrow” is likely to be quite extended. At the moment, perhaps 51 percent or 52 percent of all U.S. homes or dwelling units have service available from at least one provider. 


By 2030 that percentage might increase to 76 percent to 80 percent. 


At the moment, perhaps 10 percent to 15 percent of U.S. homes have FTTH service available from at least two providers, growing to possibly 30 percent to 40 percent by 2030. 


For starters, FTTH is expensive enough that no single service provider can afford to build new networks ubiquitously, even if the customer demand is present. By some estimates, the cost to pass one urban home might be just $1,000, but the cost to pass suburban locations might range up to $3200, while rural passings can easily cost $7,000 or more. 


Area Type

Density

Estimated Cost per Home/Passing

Metropolitan

High

$1,000

Suburb (Flat Terrain)

Medium

$2,700

Suburb (Hilly Terrain)

Medium

$3,240

Rural (Flat Terrain)

Low

$6,300

Rural (Hilly)

Low

$7,000


And that is construction cost only, not including the cost to activate an account, which can add costs between $300 to $500 for each install. 


An equally-important issue is the take rate for such networks. It has been common for any new FTTH provider that is a telco to get up to 40 percent take rates over a few years, with initial uptake in the 20-percent range, often. Independent ISPs competing with both cable operators and a telco might expect take rates not exceeding 20 percent (where the cable operator can offer gigabit service and the telco does not offer FTTH). 


So the longer-term issue is how big the market might be for wireless service offering speeds in the lower ranges (100 Mbps to 200 Mbps now; undoubtedly higher speeds in the future), as more fiber access is available. To the extent that fixed wireless is taking market share from cable operators (perhaps even operators able to sell gigabit-per-second connections), we can infer that a substantial portion of the market is happy to pay the prevailing rates for access at such speeds, especially when able to bundle home broadband with their mobile access services. 


When comparing fixed wireless to either cable modem or FTTH service, many consumers might not be especially interested in services operating the 500-Mbps and faster ranges, much less gigabit ranges, when the slower speeds cost less. 


But demand will continue to shift over time, with most consumers eventually buying services operating faster than 200 Mbps, and in many instances much faster than 200 Mbps (gigabit to multi-gigabit ranges, for example). To be sure, fixed wireless providers are likely to find ways to increase their speed tiers as well, beyond 200 Mbps in the future, even if virtually all observers suggest wireless will continue to lag cabled networks in terms of speed. 


Speed Tier Take Rates, in Percentage

2023

2030

2040

Less than 100 Mbps

20-30

5-10

1-2

100 Mbps to 200 Mbps

30-40

10-20

5-10

Faster than 200 Mbps

30-40

70-80

85-90


Perhaps the best analogy is what cable operators have been able to do with their hybrid fiber coax networks, boosting speeds over time. 


Keep in mind that cable networks and FTTH networks back around 2000 were only offering top speeds in the 10-Mbps range. Fixed wireless networks also will be able to increase speeds over time, if never on the scale of cabled networks. 


Year

Typical Cable Operator Maximum Speed

1996

1.5 Mbps

Early 2000s

10 Mbps

Late 2000s

50 Mbps

2010

100 Mbps

2015

300 Mbps

2016

1 Gbps

2024

2 Gbps


But absolute ability to match cabled network speeds is not the question. The issue is what percentage of customers will, in the future, be willing to buy fixed wireless home broadband, at then-prevailing speeds, prices and offers. 


Wednesday, July 24, 2024

Telcos are Generally "Not Good" at Predicting Sources of New Product Revenue

The mobile and telecom industries have rarely been good at predicting the actual "new product" value of each next-generation mobile network. The switch to 2G, the first digital platform, was seen as increasing the efficiency of spectrum use; improving voice reliability; enhancing security and increasing capacity.


The use of Signaling System 7 also allowed sending of control data “out of band” (separately from the voice channel) to manage the network. Aside from security advantages, that also provided faster call set up and tear down. 


SS7 supports a wide range of then-advanced telecommunication services, such as call forwarding, caller ID, call waiting, and short message service (SMS or text messages). It is reasonable to say that telco executives primarily expected operating efficiencies from SS7, as well as the ability to embed voice handling features in the network. 


To be sure, some “new products and capabilities” were anticipated for 3G and 4G, ranging from mobile internet access in 3G to video entertainment and video conferencing (3G and 4G). But many more-exotic use cases failed to develop. In fact, many would attribute the one-time leadership of smartphones by BlackBerry devices and Research in Motion as an example of the role of email value. 


In fact, some might argue that mobile e-mail was a more salient outcome of 3G than “web access,” which remained painfully slow on 3G networks. Likewise, some might argue that “turn by turn” navigation apps were a clearer “new use case” for 4G, early on, than video conferencing or video entertainment. 


Later 4G development of ride sharing apps is an example of a new use case not envisioned by 4G architects. 


The point is that we are not very good at predicting what new use cases, revenue drivers and value users will see in each next-generation network, beyond an order of magnitude increase in bandwidth and a similar improvement in latency performance (which most users will not be able to identify). 


Likewise, virtually nobody predicted that fixed wireless would be the first “at scale” new revenue opportunity 5G enabled. 


Despite the fact that fixed wireless was hardly ever mentioned as among the new features and capabilities 5G would bring, it has, so far, proven to be the best example of a new use case that generates significant new revenue for mobile service providers selling it. Over the past few years fixed wireless has generated virtually all the net new home broadband connections in the U.S. market, for example. 


Some might point to consumer dissatisfaction with cable-provided home broadband as one reason for the growing adoption of fixed wireless, where the value proposition might well turn on lower prices rather than an increase in speeds, in some cases, while being based on higher speeds and lower prices in other cases. 


The former might be the driver in urban areas where fixed wireless provides lower prices; the latter the driver in rural areas, where fixed wireless might actually be faster than DSL but also less costly than cable. 


The point is that the value proposition in urban areas is “good enough” speed and lower price; while in rural areas the value proposition might be “faster speed, lower price.”


J.D. Power surveys actually suggest that fixed wireless consumer satisfaction are comparable to optical fiber and cable home broadband, and actually higher than satisfaction with fiber-to-home services. By definition, that means the value proposition for fixed wireless is based on price and speed, as FTTH always is much faster. 


2023 U.S. Residential Internet Service Provider Satisfaction Study

J.D. Power

Fixed wireless, especially 5G FWA, leads in customer satisfaction scores compared to fiber optic and cable. FWA outperforms fiberoptic by over 20 points on a 1,000-point satisfaction scale.

October 2022 - August 2023

2023 HSI Customer Satisfaction Survey

HighSpeedInternet.com

Fixed wireless customers gave the highest overall satisfaction ratings, particularly in pricing and customer service.

September 8, 2023

CableTV Survey

CableTV

Fixed wireless and fiber providers scored highest in overall satisfaction, with cable providers lagging, especially in price satisfaction.

2023

S&P Global Market Intelligence

S&P Global Market Intelligence

Fixed wireless is particularly popular and satisfying among rural customers, where it often represents the most reliable option.

2023


Price seems important. “T-Mobile’s current FWA (fixed wireless access) plan retails for $50/month, but that falls to $30/month for customers subscribing to its Magenta MAX mobile plan,” analysts at Ookla say. “Verizon prices at a slight premium to T-Mobile, with its FWA service currently retailing for $60/month, but falling to $35/month with select 5G mobile plans.”


Speed might be less important in urban areas, but perhaps more important in rural areas. The median download speed across the United States for all fixed providers combined in the third quarter of  2023 was 207.42 Mbps, Ookla says. The median speeds for Verizon and T-Mobile fixed wireless was 122 Mbps, Ookla notes. 


  

source: Ookla 


And though fixed wireless has traditionally been viewed as an attractive platform in rural areas, 5G home broadband gains are driven by consumers in urban markets. Both T-Mobile and Verizon are getting 80 percent of their gross additions in urban locations, Ookla says. 


Among the key takeaways from 5G home broadband is that the value proposition--as always--is a mix of drivers, including both speed and price. Consumers seem willing to accept less of the former to get more of the latter. 


If the success of 5G home broadband shows anything, it is that the consumer estimation of home broadband value can change when a new value proposition is available (faster speed and lower price).


According to Nerdwallet, the most-popular home broadband service plans in 2023 cost $41.31 per month for 104 Mbps in the downstream direction. According to OpenVault, in the first quarter of 2024 about 33 percent of U.S. home broadband customers purchased service plans operating between 200 Mbps and 400 Mbps. Some 11 percent purchased service plans operating between 100 Mbps and 200 Mbps. 


The download speed provided in this top-selling category was 104 Mbps.


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