Showing posts sorted by date for query platform business model. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query platform business model. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Friday, April 25, 2025

Alphabet Suggests AI is Being Monetized, Already

Most observers want to know how  AI contributes to revenue growth at Alphabet and other firms, and the most-recent earnings report issued by Alphabet on April 25, 2025. So what might we conclude, based on that call?


Clearly, Alphabet management positioned AI features as central to Alphabet’s revenue and profit growth.  In the key search business(AI Overviews and Circle to Search), management pointed to significant ad revenue driven by increased engagement, with “stable” monetization. That is presumably meant to reassure investors that monetization, even if indirect, is not cannibalizing traditional search. 


Likewise, the Gemini language model, which powers both consumer and enterprise products, boosts Cloud and Workspace product adoption.


Obviously Waymo leverages AI for operational efficiency but is not a material revenue source, yet. 


The takeaway might be that AI monetization, especially for AI Overviews and Circle-to-Search, already is happening, even if indirectly, and does not cannibalize the core advertising business, which has been a concern analysts and investors have noted. 


Gemini’s enterprise applications likewise are said to be driving Google Cloud revenues. 


AI Overviews, powered by Gemini might have contributed to  double-digit revenue growth in search, with first quarter 2025 Search revenue reaching $50.7 billion, up 9.8 percent year-over-year. 


Ads integrated into AI Overviews are monetizing at roughly the same rate as traditional Search ads, Google indicated, suggesting no cannibalization of revenue.


In Google Cloud, Gemini powers the Vertex AI platform, which saw a five-fold  year-over-year increase in customers in the fourth quarter of  2024 and a 20-fold growth over the full year. Google Cloud’s $12.26 billion revenue in the first quarter of 2025 shows revenues up 28 percent  year-over-year). 


As often seems to be the case, AI monetization is largely indirect, contributing to the growth or profitability of other products using AI. 


Monday, April 14, 2025

Telco AI Monetization on the Revenue Front Will be Difficult

Mobile executives these days are talking about ways to monetize artificial intelligence beyond using AI to streamline internal operations. Generally speaking, these fall into three buckets:

  • Personalizing existing services to drive higher revenue, acquisition and retention (quality of service tiers of service, for example)

  • Creating enterprise or business services (private 5G networks with AI-optimized performance,, for example)

  • AI edge computing services for autonomous vehicles, for example


Obviously, those are AI-enhanced extensions of ideas already in currency. But some of us might be quite skeptical that such “AI services” owned by telcos will get much traction. History suggests the difficulty of doing so. How many “at scale” new products beyond voice have telcos managed to create? Text messaging comes to mind. Mobile phone service also was a big success. So is home broadband. 


All those share a common characteristic: they are network services owned directly by the service providers. Generally speaking, other application efforts have not scaled well. 


Mobile service providers have been hoping and proclaiming such new revenue opportunities since at least the time of 3G. But many observers might agree there has been a disconnect between the technical leaps (faster speeds, lower latency, better efficiency) and the ability to turn those into new revenue streams beyond the basic "sell more data" model. 


That is not to say that service providers have had no other ways to add value. Bundling devices, content and other measures have helped increase perceived value beyond the core network features. 


But the core network as a driver of new products and revenue is challenging for a few reasons. 

  • Open networks mostly have replaced closed networks (IP versus PSTN) 

  • Applications are logically separate from network transport (layers)

  • Permissionless app development is the norm (internet is the assumed network transport)

  • Vertical control of the value replaced by horizontal functions (telcos had full-stack control of voice, but only horizontal transport functions for IP-based apps)


As I have argued in the past, modern telcos have a hybrid revenue model. They are full-stack “service” providers for voice and text messaging. But they are horizontal transport providers for most IP apps and services, and sometimes are app providers (owned entertainment video services, for example). 


The point is that most new apps and revenue cases can be built by third parties without telco or mobile operator permission, which also takes transport providers out of the direct revenue chain. 


So I’d argue there is a structural reason why telcos and mobile service providers do not directly benefit from most of the innovation that happens with apps. Think about all the customer engagement with internet-delivered apps and services, compared to service provider voice and messaging. 


In their role as voice and text messaging providers, telcos are “service providers” (they own and control the full stack). For the rest of their business, they are transport or access providers (capacity or internet access such as home broadband), a horizontal value and revenue stream. ISPs get paid to provide “internet access,” not the actual end user apps. 


And that has proven a business challenge for now-obvious reasons. Once upon a time, voice services were partly flat-rate and partly usage-based. In other words, telcos earned money by charging a flat fee for access to the network, and then variable usage based on number, length or distance of voice calls. 


In other words, greater usage meant greater revenue. But flat-rate voice and texting usage subverts the business model, as  most of the revenue-generating services become usage-insensitive. That is the real revolution or disruption for voice and texting. 


In their roles as internet access providers, some efforts have been made to sustain usage-based pricing. Customers can buy “buckets of usage” where there is some relationship between revenue and usage. 


Likewise, fixed network providers have used “speed-based” tiers of service, where higher speeds carry  higher prices. Still, those are largely flat-rate approaches to packaging and pricing. And the long-term issue with flat-rate pricing is that it complicates investment, as potential usage of the network is capped but usage is not.  


So as much as ISPs hate the notion that they are “dumb pipes,” that is precisely what home or business broadband access is. So internet access take rates, subscription volumes and prices are going to drive overall business results, not text messaging, voice or IoT revenues. 


To be sure, we can say that 5G is the first mobile generation that was specifically designed to support internet of things applications, devices and use cases. But that only means the capability to act as a platform for open development and ownership of IoT apps, services and value. And even if some mobile service providers have created app businesses such as auto-related services, that remains a small revenue stream for mobile service providers.  


Recall that IoT services are primarily driven by enterprises and businesses, not consumers. Also, the bulk of enterprise IoT revenue arguably comes from wholesale access connections made available to third-party app or service providers, and does not represent telco-owned apps and services (full stack rather than “access services”). 


Optimistic estimates of telco enterprise IoT revenues might range up to 18 percent, in some cases, though most would consider those ranges too high. 


Region/Group

Total Mobile Services Revenue 

IoT Connectivity Revenue (Enterprises)

Automotive IoT Apps Share of IoT Revenue

% of Total Revenue from Automotive IoT Apps

Global Average

$1.5 trillion (2025 est.)

10-15% (2025, growing to 20% by 2027)

25-35%

2.5-5.25%

North America (e.g., Verizon)

$468 billion (U.S., 2023, growing 6.6% CAGR)

12-18% (2025 est.)

30-40% (high 5G adoption)

3.6-7.2%

Asia-Pacific (e.g., China Mobile)

$600 billion (2025 est.)

15-20% (strong automotive industry)

35-45% (leader in connected cars)

5.25-9%

Europe (e.g., Deutsche Telekom)

$400 billion (2025 est.)

10-15% (CEE high IoT reliance)

25-35%

2.5-5.25%

Top 10 Mobile Operators

$1 trillion (2025 est.)

12-18% (based on 2.9B IoT connections)

30-40%

3.6-7.2%


Though automotive IoT revenues (again mostly driven by access services) arguably are higher for the largest service providers, their contribution to  total business revenues is arguably close to three percent or so, and so arguably contributing no more than 1.5 percent of total revenues, as consumer services range from 44 percent to 65 percent of total mobile service provider revenues. 


Category

Percentage of Total Revenue

Example products

Services to Consumers

55-65%

Driven by mobile data (33.5% in 2023), voice, and equipment sales; 58% in 2023

Services to Businesses

35-45%

Includes enterprise, public sector, and SMBs; growing at 7.1% CAGR

Business Voice

5-10%

Declining due to VoIP adoption and mobile data preference

Business Internet Access

15-25%

Rising with 5G, IoT (e.g., automotive apps at 2.5-9%), and enterprise demand


The point is that the ability to monetize AI beyond its use for internal automation is likely limited. Changes in the main revenue drivers (consumer and business mobile phone subscriptions and prices) are going to have more impact on revenue and profit outcomes than IoT as a category or automotive IoT in particular.


Wednesday, March 12, 2025

Is $30/Month for Office 365 Copilot Too Much? When and Why

How much incremental value do subscription-based generative artificial intelligence models have to provide to be viewed as reasonable by business users? In other words, if an Office 365 subscription costs X, is an Office 365 Copilot subscription worth 2X, and if so, for what percentage of users at a firm?


In many cases, the value assessment will come in the form of estimated “time saved” metrics, which will vary based on job roles. One study conducted for the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Lous suggests that “among workers who used generative AI in the previous week (21.8 percent of all workers), between six percent  and 24.9 percent of all work hours were assisted by generative AI, for example. 


But usage varies by role. “Among all workers, including those who used it only in the previous month and non-generative AI users, we found that between 1.3 percent and 5.4 percent of total work hours were assisted by generative AI,” the study authors note.


Keep in mind those are end user estimates, with the imprecision that likely includes. But it might be reasonable to note that, at this time, perhaps only 20 percent of a firm’s entire workforce might actually be routinely using generative AI, for example. And those use cases might represent less than five percent of total work hours. 


There are some use cases where value is easier to grasp. Customer support agents might save 19.7 hours monthly with a 14 percent productivity boost, while programmers could save 44.8 hours with AI coding tools cutting time by 56 percent for half their tasks. The value added is calculated as time saved multiplied by the user's hourly rate (e.g., $20–$100/hour), according one McKinsey estimate. 


Much hinges on the assumed hourly labor rates. For example, we might assume $20 for customer support, $50 for general professionals, $100 for high-skilled roles. 


Perhaps the business case is easiest for roles including customer support and coding. It might not be so clear for many other roles. If “time saved” is usefully captured, customer service and coding use cases might justify significant per-user monthly subscription fees. 


Application/Use Case

Estimated Time Savings per Month (hours)

Assumed Hourly Rate ($/hour)

Value Added per Month ($)

Per-Seat Cost Range ($ per Month)

Customer Support

19.68

20

393.6

Up to 394

Programming

44.8

50

2,240

Up to 2,240

General Professional

9

50

450

Up to 450


Of course, you know the drill. As much as proponents and suppliers use such metrics, few customers actually believe the claims. 


 if a feature costs $30 per month and saves nine hours monthly for a user earning $50 per hour, the value added is $450, making the cost reasonable, with the unstated assumption that the saved time is put to some other productive use. If not, the “savings” might be questionable. 


It’s sort of the same exercise we might make when looking at work-from-home productivity. Assume WFH leads to a given worker’s ability to complete the standard “in office” work load in half the time. The firm gains if that time, or some of it, is redeployed for other outcome-producing activities. There actually is no firm gain if the employee simply uses the free time for non-work activities. 


A Thomson Reuters report suggests AI could save a professional four hours a week now, and perhaps up to to 12 hours per week within five years.  But it matters where those time savings are used. 


Consumer users might have a harder time justifying a subscription fee for AI-enabled apps. Few of us would claim language model features increasingly available to work with any existing major platform provide some value, some of the time, whether that is search, customer relationship management, e-commerce, communications, social media or productivity suites. 


For products based on advertising, transaction or pay-per-use models, perhaps the incremental value can be relatively low, so long as the incremental cost (time, attention, clutter or out-of-pocket fees) are low enough. 


That probably is not true for subscription revenue models, though. And that might be a growing issue for subscription-based products where the AI features are offered as an incremental “premium” price to existing subscription products. 


That might be a key issue for some products including Office 365 or other subscription-based products whenever the incremental value of the AI add-on effectively doubles the price “per seat” or per user, since many of us would not see the incremental value of the integrated AI as 2X. 


There is value, to be sure. It is often helpful to have the AI summarize and “take notes” of a videoconference; summarize key points of a document; draft email responses or generate graphics from a spreadsheet. Other functions, such as creating presentations, might yet leave much to be desired. 


But the point is the value-cost evaluation. How valuable are the capabilities; how often are they used and and how do those outcomes compare with the cost of having them, at this point in time? Which workers actually benefit most, and which benefit rarely? 


At least so far, reasonable people might agree that, generally speaking, the value of embedded AI features often is not 2X. But is the reasonable business case 0.2X or 0.1X or some other percentage in some cases, but 0.5X in some cases? 


And whatever value estimation we might make at this point, will perceptions change in the future if more-compelling capabilities are added?


Saturday, January 4, 2025

Meta Pulls Back AI User Move

Controversy over Facebook’s use of artificial-intelligence-created “user” accounts is not unusual in a business that often has to try innovations, some of which are embraced, some of which are rejected by people. Meta and Instagram had proposed allowing users to create AI user accounts that many say are just bots.


Even under the best of circumstances, up to 70 percent of innovations will fail, whether that is digital transformation projects, information technology projects or change programs in general. 


The same general rule holds for venture capital investments as well. 


Two points to note here are that Meta did react quickly to a policy that was highly unpopular, and also that failures on the way to maximizing the use of AI are inevitable. 


Feature/Innovation

Description

User Opposition

Outcome

Beacon Advertising System (2007)

Tracked users' online purchases and shared them as ads.

Privacy concerns; users felt uninformed and exposed.

Apologized; shut down in 2009 after lawsuits and backlash.

Real Names Policy (2014–2015)

Required users to use legal names on the platform.

Criticized by activists and marginalized groups for safety concerns.

Policy softened, allowing alternative verification methods.

Automatic Facial Recognition (2017–2021)

Auto-tagged people in photos using facial recognition technology.

Privacy concerns and fears of biometric data misuse.

Disabled feature in 2021 and deleted facial recognition templates.

Instagram for Kids (2021)

Aimed to create a version of Instagram for children under 13.

Concerns about mental health, safety, and exploitation.

Paused development following criticism from parents and lawmakers.

News Feed Redesigns

Periodic changes to Facebook’s feed algorithm and layout.

Complaints about irrelevant content and lack of chronological order.

Adjustments made to balance user satisfaction and business goals.

Libra/Meta Diem Cryptocurrency (2019–2022)

Proposed cryptocurrency for global payments.

Regulatory opposition over financial stability and privacy concerns.

Project abandoned in 2022; assets sold.

WhatsApp Privacy Policy Update (2021)

Suggested increased data sharing with Meta.

Perceived compromise of encryption and independence; user migration to competitors.

Delayed implementation; clarified policy and encryption commitments.

Facebook Home and Phone (2013)

Custom Android skin integrating Facebook at the center of the smartphone.

Users found the interface intrusive and not broadly useful.

Discontinued after poor adoption.


We might note that Alphabet and Google have had similar issues when innovating. The process is messy, often unsuccessful and requires agility, including willingness to back away when an innovation generates opposition from users. 


Feature/Innovation

Description

User Opposition

Outcome

Google Buzz (2010–2011)

A social networking tool integrated into Gmail, automatically connecting users.

Privacy concerns over automatic contact sharing without consent.

Discontinued in 2011 after legal settlements and backlash.

Google Glass (2013–2015)

Augmented reality smart glasses targeting early adopters and developers.

Privacy concerns, social stigma ("Glassholes"), and high price point.

Halted consumer version in 2015; pivoted to enterprise applications.

Google Wave (2009–2010)

A real-time collaboration and communication platform.

Confusing interface and unclear use case for mainstream users.

Shut down in 2010 after poor adoption.

Project Ara (2013–2016)

Modular smartphone allowing users to swap out components like a camera or battery.

Cost concerns, technical challenges, and lukewarm market interest.

Canceled in 2016 despite initial excitement.

Google+ (2011–2019)

Social network launched to compete with Facebook.

Low user engagement; criticized for forced integration with other Google services like YouTube.

Shut down in 2019 due to data breaches and low adoption.

YouTube Real Name Policy (2013)

Encouraged users to use their Google+ profile (real name) on YouTube comments.

Resistance from YouTube creators and users valuing anonymity.

Policy abandoned; reverted to original comment system.

Google Nexus Q (2012)

Media streaming device with social sharing features.

Criticized for high price, limited functionality, and reliance on Android devices.

Withdrawn shortly after launch; never returned to market.

Google Allo (2016–2019)

Messaging app with smart assistant integration.

Privacy concerns over lack of end-to-end encryption by default and confusion over app purpose.

Shut down in 2019 in favor of Google Messages (RCS-based).

Stadia (2019–2023)

Cloud gaming platform enabling play without a console or PC.

Criticized for lack of exclusive titles, connectivity issues, and unclear business model.

Discontinued in 2023 due to limited market traction.

Sidewalk Labs Toronto Project (2017–2020)

Smart city initiative to develop a tech-driven urban space in Toronto.

Privacy concerns, data governance issues, and opposition from residents and activists.

Abandoned in 2020 amid public resistance and regulatory challenges.

FLoC (Federated Learning of Cohorts) (2021–2022)

Ad tracking system designed to replace third-party cookies.

Privacy concerns from users, advocacy groups, and some web browser developers.

Replaced by the Topics API after significant criticism

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