Mission Creep: When a Problem is Solved, Go Do Something Else

One issue in public life is mission creep, the gradual and often unintended expansion of an entity’s goals, operations, scope or activities beyond the original core mission. It is a big issue for non-profits, but sometimes for logical reasons. 

When an issue is essentially “solved,” a non-profit can disband, as it has succeeded, or institutional vested interests can find a new problem to solve. In other cases, growth itself seems to become its own driver, as the logic seems to be, “if we are doing good things now, how much more impact could we have if we were bigger?”

The new goals may serve the interest of the employees or the management of the organization, who would otherwise be “out of their jobs.”

In cases where the organization’s original goals are already achieved or when the original goals are no longer necessary, goal displacement means organizations direct their energies elsewhere. 

For example an organization which was initially intended to fight polio would find a new disease to fight once the vaccine for polio is invented.

There are other implications for donors and citizens who are not inside an organization, though. There are lots of problems we need, or should work to fix. So spending resources on problems that are already largely “fixed” is wasteful. 

Spending “too much” on problems with less social or economic impact likewise is wasteful; as would be the case of directing excessive effort and resources on one problem, no matter how important, to the exclusion of many other equally-pressing issues. 

For example, some might argue we need to devote serious resources and effort to global warming, even if that means other things (eradicating malaria, improving general health, sanitation or water quality, building more housing, eliminating infant mortality) take a back seat. 

It might seem obvious this is not a good idea. 

We might see some relevance, in that regard, around the “problem” of quality internet access. 

There was a time when “quality” internet access (based on downstream speed) was a bigger problem in the U.S. market. That is not to say there are no issues, but useful internet access does not seem to be much of a problem for most potential users. 

And though we often focus on “supply” issues, “demand” also matters, as some customers choose not to buy fixed network internet access, while others use substitutes. And since price and speed are correlated, customers make decisions all the time about the tradeoff between price paid and typical speed received. 

Making quality internet access available is one problem. Choices consumers make is a separate issue. 

To the extent there are problems, those tend to deal with supply: is quality access available? What consumers choose to buy is not the same “problem,” indeed is simply consumer choice. 

We sometimes see data that suggests customers who buy very-low-speed services are a “problem.” Maybe, maybe not. It’s a problem if the option of buying higher speed services is unavailable. It is not a problem if a consumer makes a rational buying decision. 

Purchased plan tier (down/up)	Approx. share of U.S. broadband households	Rationale snapshot
≤25 Mbps (legacy DSL / low‑end cable)	~10–15%	FCC still tracks a small tail of low‑speed subscriptions; availability of ≥25/3 to ~98% of population suggests remaining low tiers are now a minority.itif+1​
25–99 Mbps	~20–25%	Many cable and FWA “basic” plans fall here; must be below the 53% that are ≥100/20, leaving roughly a quarter of subs in sub‑100 tiers.benton+1​
100–499 Mbps	~30–35%	Parks Associates reports that 100–999 Mbps is the most common tier; combining that with 53% at ≥100/20 implies a large cluster in low‑hundreds plans.benton+1​
500–900 Mbps	~15–20%	Higher cable/fiber tiers in competitive markets; fills the gap between the big ≥100/20 cohort and the 26% at ~940/500.benton+1​
≈940–1000 Mbps (gigabit class)	~20–30%	FCC data indicate ~26% of households subscribe at 940/500 Mbps when available, which is a reasonable center estimate for this tier’s share overall.benton​

One sees this when looking at speed tiers purchased and other variables such as household income, age, educational status or geography. One might argue that supply is a bigger problem in rural areas, but not much of a problem in urban areas. 

Many observers note that incomes tend to be lower in rural areas, which can affect demand. The cost of networks in rural areas also is higher, which affects supply. 

Segment	Indicative dominant tiers (down)	Implied avg purchased Mbps per household	Implied per‑capita purchased Mbps (household Mbps ÷ 2.5)	Key drivers
Urban	Mix skewed to 300–1000 Mbps, with high gigabit availability (82% access to gigabit‑capable).opensignal​	~400 Mbps	~160 Mbps/person	High availability of 100/20 and gigabit, higher income, more competition; urban speeds about 40–45% higher than rural on average.rcrwireless+2​
Rural	Mix skewed to 50–300 Mbps, with less gigabit (46% access), more sub‑100 Mbps and FWA.tlp+1​	~200 Mbps	~80 Mbps/person	Only 72% of rural Americans have access to 100/20; lower gigabit availability and lower observed speeds; fewer providers in many counties.tlp+2​

And household income is a major driver of buyer behavior. Wealthier households tend to buy more-capable speed tiers, just as they tend to buy more and “better” goods in general. 

Approx. income band (U.S. 2024)	Rough income deciles	Likely dominant plan tier (down)	Approx. avg purchased Mbps per household	Estimated per‑capita purchased Mbps
<$35k	Bottom 2–3 deciles	25–100 Mbps (many at 50–100 Mbps; some with no fixed broadband, relying on mobile).tlp+1​	~150 Mbps (conditional on having fixed broadband)	~60 Mbps/person
$35k–$55k	Deciles 3–4	100–300 Mbps	~250 Mbps	~100 Mbps/person
$55k–$85k	Deciles 5–6 (around median $84k)census​	200–500 Mbps	~350 Mbps	~140 Mbps/person
$85k–$130k	Deciles 7–8	300–1000 Mbps (heavy 500–1000 Mbps share)	~500 Mbps	~200 Mbps/person
>$130k	Top 1–2 deciles	500–1000+ Mbps (gigabit default where available)	~600 Mbps	~240 Mbps/person

The other notable demand issue is that a growing percentage of customers seem to buy mobile services as a product substitute for fixed network broadband. That might be especially true of lower-income households and households of younger people. 

In other niche cases, such choices might also happen for single-user households or homes in rual areas where there are fixed network supply issues. 

Customer segment	Typical characteristics and use	Likelihood that mobile‑only is satisfactory	Why mobile‑only can work reasonably well
Low‑income, light‑use households	Limited budget; 1–2 smartphones; little or no PC; usage focused on messaging, social, short video.playablemaker+1​	Medium–High	Mobile data plans and smartphones cover core communication and entertainment needs at lowest total cost.playablemaker+1​
Young adults (18–29), renters	High smartphone dependence; heavy social and app use; often stream video primarily on phones; more mobile than fixed in living situations.playablemaker+2​	High for individuals, Medium for shared households	5G speeds and phone‑centric lifestyles make mobile‑only viable for day‑to‑day use, especially when not sharing with many others.datareportal+1​
Students in K‑12 or college	Need stable connectivity for assignments, research, video classes, uploads.weforum​	Low–Medium	In limited cases, a robust unlimited plan plus hotspot can bridge a temporary gap.datareportal+1​
Remote‑work professionals	Need sustained bandwidth for video calls, large file transfers, VPN, and multi‑device use.weforum​	Low	5G can sometimes support remote work on the move, and as a backup, mobile‑only can be a useful failover.datareportal+1​
Rural households with limited fixed options	May have only expensive satellite or slow DSL; good 4G/5G may be the best available option.weforum+1​	Medium	Mobile broadband can outperform legacy DSL or expensive satellite, especially where modern macro sites or fixed‑wireless offerings exist.datareportal+1​
High‑income, tech‑heavy households	Multiple devices, 4K streaming, gaming, smart‑home gear; often already subscribe to high‑speed fixed broadband.weforum​	Very Low	Mobile is excellent as a secondary/backup or for travel; speeds can rival entry‑level fixed plans.datareportal+1​

The broader point is that internet access, generally speaking, is a problem that is mostly “solved” for most potential users and buyers, though some issues remain. 

As with always, the amount of effort or priority we “should” be devoting to such issues should be proportional to “where” and “why” the problems may continue to exist, tailoring solutions in ways that solve the problems in an efficient way. 

Once supply issues are overcome, we might not want to exert prior levels of effort to take on new missions such as “encouraging” use of the internet, which might not be a substantial problem, or one that really needs much subsidy and effort.

Is Private Equity "Good" for the Housing Market?

Even many who support allowing market forces to work might question whether private equity involvement in the U.S. housing market “has been a good thing.”

The impact on housing supply, rental unit supply or prices for those products is contestable.

And while we might agree that other elements of the housing supply market arguably also are very important (zoning and other regulatory “red tape” issues), we might also agree that, so far, private equity involvement in U.S. housing has not been clearly positive, in terms of increasing supply or producing affordability gains. 

PE firms are estimated to own at least 239,000 single-family rentals, over one million apartment units, and 275,000 manufactured home lots as of mid-2022, representing about 1.6 percent of all rental homes nationwide but up to 12 percent to 20 percent in some markets such as Atlanta or Phoenix. 

To be sure, this activity arguably has some benefits for renters, though that argument remains contestable. 

PE firms focused on rental operations can expand rental options and inject capital into the market, also reduces for-sale inventory, elevates prices, and imposes some higher costs on renters, some argue. 

In some ways, the criticisms are similar to those made of extensive conversion of residential housing to short-term lodging such as provided by AirBnB operations, shifting housing supply from “available for full-time dwelling” to “commercial short-term rentals.”

Arguably, PE investments influence both for-sale and rental supply, often shifting homes from ownership to rental markets. Supporters of PE involvement say the impact is minimal. 

Critics contend it exacerbates scarcity for buyers and does not necessarily create lower prices for renters.

The argument is that PE firms have bulk-purchased distressed or entry-level homes, converting them into rentals. This removes inventory from the for-sale market, particularly affordable starter homes, worsening a national shortage estimated at three million to five million units. Again, the impact might be “at the margin” in many cases. 

Investors bought 26 percent of affordable homes in 2023, outbidding families and pushing first-time buyers out, critics allege. Studies show institutional buyers reduced for-sale stock by one percent to two percent nationally but up to 10 percent to 15 percent in Sun Belt metros post-2020.

On the positive side, PE arguably has expanded rental options by rehabilitating foreclosed properties and investing in build-to-rent developments. 

Since 2012, firms have spent over $25 billion on single-family rentals, adding supply in underserved suburbs and reducing vacancy rates. 

A Federal Reserve analysis notes that PE helped stabilize markets post-2008 by shortening foreclosure timelines and boosting local construction employment. In multifamily, PE owns about 10% of U.S. apartments (over 2.2 million units), including new builds that close supply gaps. Some research indicates this diversifies neighborhoods, lowers segregation by attracting lower-income, diverse tenants, and even nudges rents down through added competition.

While PE claims to boost economic growth by investments such as $280 billion in life sciences-related real estate (with spillover to housing), critics highlight opportunistic tactics, such as deferring maintenance or constraining new builds to keep occupancy high. 

In affordable housing, PE's short-term focus can lead to unsustainable practices, reducing long-term supply quality. Empirical data shows no broad increase in total supply; instead, PE often repositions existing stock for higher-margin rentals, displacing potential owners.

PE's target 20-percent financial returns typically raise costs through higher charges, fees, and market consolidation. However, in some cases, increased rental supply can moderate rents, though evidence leans toward net upward pressure on both ownership and rental prices.

Some argue PE acquisitions have driven up home prices by 40 percent to 50 percent since 2020, partly due to reduced for-sale supply and cash-heavy bidding. Others make the opposite argument.

But PE defenders argue PE is a symptom, not cause, of high prices from underbuilding.

Rents have risen 30 percent nationally since 2020, with PE-linked properties showing aggressive hikes. Firms add fees boosting revenue 12 percent to 16 percent, and studies link PE ownership to 17 percent to 26 percent higher evictions in Minneapolis-St. Paul. 

PE advocates, like the Private Equity Stakeholder Project, emphasize benefits such as $18.4 billion raised for affordable multifamily housing (2019-2024) and professional management improving quality. 

So some might note that PE involvement in rental housing has modestly increased rental supply and significantly reduced for-sale inventory. 

Harder to determine is the specific PE impact on higher home prices (up 40 percent to 50 percent) and rents (up 30 percent), which arguably have climbed for all sorts fo reasons.