Private equity firms have poured hundreds of billions of dollars into enterprise software firms over the last few decades, on the assumption that terminal values and growth rates were sizable.
But artificial intelligence has raised existential questions about enterprise software valuations because it raises the issue of positive feedback loops, which are inherently stability disrupting.
A positive feedback loop is a process where the output of a system amplifies or intensifies the initial stimulus, driving the system further away from its original state. A negative feedback loop, on the other hand, allows the system to adjust.
Unlike negative feedback that maintains stability, positive loops often cause exponential change in a single direction, without the corrective feedback that allows the system to stabilize itself.
In the context of what AI might do, it could, in principle, reduce employment. Reduced employment might lead to less consumer spending. Less consumer spending should put pressure on gross revenues and profit margins.
That might increase reliance on AI to reduce operating costs, which in turn further reduces employment and spending, and therefore firm revenues and profits.
If AI agents can write code and execute complex workflows autonomously, what happens to the software companies built on charging per human "seat" or user?
What happens to cash flows, and the valuation models built on those cash flows?
How much enterprise software value creation will happen in the future, compared to other segments of the market? And what does that imply for asset holding periods and exits?
The sort of interesting issue is that lots of observers have wanted to shift pricing from a more-commodity-like “seats” model to a “success-based” or “outcomes” pattern, the thinking being that this approach provides higher margins and perceived product value.
Such an approach, in principle, makes more revenue sources available to suppliers: not just a share of the information technology budget but a share of saved labor costs; revenue shrinkage; customer acquisition; churn; marketing or other operations costs.
To use a simple example, instead of selling shovels, one sells “holes.” In some ways, it is similar to the shift from “product” pricing to “services” pricing. Instead of selling a car, one sells transportation services, with recurring fees rather than one upfront purchase.