Tuesday, October 6, 2026

AI Might Result in Biggest Infra Buildout Ever

Financing the AI buildout projects that AI investment in data center buildings, power systems, networking infrastructure, and specialized chips and other equipment will total an enormous $10.3 trillion from 2025 to 2032, or an average of 3.63 percent of U.S. gross domestic product per year, according to Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh, Columbia University professor and author of Financing the AI Buildout, a study published by Brookings.


“The projected buildout would be larger relative to the economy than the major U.S. canal, railroad, electrification, highway, and telecommunications investment booms,” says Van Nieuwerburgh.

source: Brookings, Financing the AI Buildout


And, as many note, opacity is growing as hyperscalers increasingly shift debt financing from their own balance sheets to third parties.


Morgan Stanley estimates that more than half of the roughly $2.9 trillion required to meet hyperscalers’

Incremental compute needs over 2025–2028 will come from outside capital, the study says.


Hyperscalers often direct a large share of their internal capital toward IT equipment, while data center shells, power infrastructure, and related real estate are financed through project-level debt, leases, and other asset-backed structures, the study says. 


The upshot is that leverage is removed from hyperscaler balance sheets and shifted elsewhere. The central issue is not simply that AI infrastructure is exposed to technological and operating risks, but that the sector’s financing structure can transmit and amplify those risks, the study rightly notes. 


The severity of any adverse shock will therefore depend not only on the underlying economics of AI demand, but also on where leverage resides and how losses are allocated across tenants, asset owners, and creditors, the author says. 


“The relevant question is therefore not whether AI infrastructure is already systemically risky, but under what conditions project-level losses could become correlated and propagate across firms and financial institutions,” Van Nieuwerburgh argues. 


All that noted, looking at Price/Earnings-to-Growth (PEG) ratios might suggest that some parts of the AI value chain might be considered undervalued, relative to their growth rates. Alphabet, Amazon and Nvidia provide cases in point. 


A PEG ratio of 1.0 implies that a particular equity is valued at market averages. Conversely, PEG ratios above 1.0 imply high valuation relative to the overall market. PEG ratios below 1.0 suggest a particular firm is undervalued, relative to its growth rate and valuations of all other public firms in the market. 



AI value-chain layer

Representative company

PEG

P/E

Recent EPS growth used

Interpretation

AI accelerators

NVIDIA

0.23

28.5x

125%

Very low PEG because extraordinary earnings growth is currently outrunning the P/E

AI accelerators

AMD

1.26

157.6x

125%

Much more expensive relative to current growth than Nvidia

AI semiconductors / ASICs

Broadcom

~0.46

46.1x

99.8%

High P/E but enormous AI-related EPS growth

AI infrastructure / cloud

Oracle

0.49

23.1x

47.7%

AI-cloud growth has materially improved the growth/valuation relationship

Semiconductor equipment

Lam Research

1.39

53.4x

38.5%

AI-driven equipment growth is strong, but valuation has risen faster

Semiconductor equipment

Applied Materials

~1.1

—

—

Roughly around the 1x PEG neighborhood

AI networking

Arista Networks

2.44

64.1x

23.2% forward

Significant valuation premium relative to earnings growth

Hyperscaler / AI platform

Alphabet

0.15

—

Very high TTM growth

Extremely low trailing PEG, partly reflecting unusual earnings-growth base effects

Hyperscaler / AI platform

Amazon

0.23

—

—

Low trailing PEG

Hyperscaler / AI platform

Microsoft

0.87

—

—

Near 1x

Hyperscaler / AI platform

Meta

N/M / negative

—

EPS comparison distorted

Large AI capex but PEG becomes unhelpful because of earnings-base effects

AI software / applications

Salesforce

1.07

21.7x

—

Approximately market-like growth-adjusted valuation

AI software

ServiceNow

2.52

87.9x

—

Substantial growth premium

AI software / data

Palantir

2.62

163.9x

—

Very large valuation premium despite rapid growth

AI ecosystem

Representative AI infrastructure basket

—

~27x

—

T. Rowe Price found AI infrastructure valuations around 27x forward earnings in April 2026

Broad market

S&P 500

~1.09*

19.5x

17.8%

Approximate market PEG

Nasdaq-100

Index

—

21.4x

—

Higher P/E than S&P 500

Semiconductors

Index

—

20.2x

—

Surprisingly modest aggregate P/E despite AI exposure

Monday, October 5, 2026

Lies, Damned Lies and Statistics

American novelist Samuel Clemens is said to have popularized the aphorism that there are "lies, damned lies, and statistics," pointing out the ways data can be misinterpreted.


Denver Water officials, for example, likely are disappointed that water use by households dropped only about nine percent during the 2026 drought year, even if a 20-percent reduction was the target. 


The degree of water conservation is understated. 


The Denver metro area has added a very large number of people and homes since 2000, so demand is naturally higher than it was two and a half decades ago. 


Denver Water's historical data show that total treated-water consumption in its entire service area was 83.6 billion gallons in 2000, when it served about 1.036 million people. By 2024 it was about 68.1 billion gallons, serving 1.301 million people. Thus, total consumption fell about 18.5 percent even while the population rose 25.6 percent.


The per-capita calculation is even more striking:


2000: 220 gallons/person/day

2024: 143.5 gallons/person/day

decline: 34.8 percent. 


From 2000 to 2024, for example, though housing units increased 48 percent, per-unit water consumption dropped 51 percent. 


Denver city

2000

2024

Change

Residential water sold

17.81 billion gal.

13.01 billion gal.

−27.0%

Housing units

251,069

372,123

+48.2%

Residential water per housing unit

70,934 gal./yr.

34,952 gal./yr.

−50.7%

Equivalent gallons/day per housing unit

194.3

95.8

−50.7%


There also is evidence that Denver Water’s consumption drops are not unique. 


Provider / region

2000 benchmark

Recent figure

Reduction

What it tells us

Denver Water — entire service area

220 gallons per capita per day

143.5 gpcd (2024)

−35%

Large decline despite 26% population growth

Denver city — residential, per housing unit

70,934 gal./yr.

34,952 (2024)

−51%

Best direct housing-unit comparison

South Metro Water Supply Authority

215 gpcd

~120 gpcd (2019/recent)

−44%

Particularly large reduction despite substantial population growth

Aurora Water

2000 baseline

Recent consumption >30% below 2000

>30%

Total water treated is now lower despite population growth

Englewood

2009: 149 gpcd

2019: 150 gpcd

roughly flat

Much less conservation progress in this particular period


The point is that residential water users have been reducing water consumption for decades, even as the population has grown and housing units grew 48 percent.

Water users also are not “rewarded” for that behavior. Since all fixed costs of water infrastructure still have to be supported, water rates actually climb as customers use less water. 

Of course, that might be the longer-term incentive for the water supplier. Any economist will agree that, for mass market goods (luxury goods are different), raising the price reduces the demand. So higher prices will create incentives for consumers to buy less. 


But the incentives are somewhat perverse. The reward for behaving responsibly is higher prices.


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