DirecTV Boosts 2014 Revenue, Earnings, Free Cash Flow

Even if one believes streaming services are about to begin taking more market share in the subscription TV and video business from linear providers, that does not mean every provider is losing customers, market share, or revenue.

In its most recent quarter, DirecTV grew Latin America full year revenues three percent, to $7.1 billion, largely by adding 903,000 net new subscribers.

Full year U.S. revenue grew five percent  to $26 billion, driven by average revenue per user growth of 4.7 percent and annual subscriber growth of 99,000 accounts.

Full year 2014 earnings per share Increased 12 percent, while free cash flow grew 21 percent to $3.1 billion.

What AT&T, in the process of acquiring DirecTV, cares about is the free cash flow, even more than the incremental revenue and the ability to sell entertainment video, plus its other mobile services, nationwide.

AT&T Makes Big Strategy Shift

As a long term matter, it has seemed logical that tier one telcos globally would begin to shift revenue focus from the consumer to the business segment, especially where competition in the fixed network segment was particularly robust.

That trend seems to be emerging clearly for AT&T.

Our transactions with DIRECTV and Mexican wireless companies Iusacell and Nextel Mexico will make us a very different company, said AT&T CEO, Randall Stephenson. “After we close DIRECTV, our largest revenue stream will come from business-related accounts , followed by U.S. TV and broadband, U.S. consumer mobility and then international mobility and TV.”

Consider the magnitude of the changes. In 2014, AT&T reported earning nearly 60 percent of total revenue from mobile services. AT&T meanwhile earned about a quarter of its revenue from business customers.

Consumer landline revenue was less than 20 percent of total.

Assuming AT&T’s acquisitions of Iusacell, Nextel Mexico and DirecTV are approved, AT&T will earn about 45 percent of total revenue from business customers and about 20 percent from consumer mobility services.

About 30 percent of revenue would be earned from U.S. consumer high speed access and video entertainment.

For perhaps the first time, AT&T revenue would be driven by business accounts, not consumer services.

For the first time, AT&T would emerge as a leader in the subscription video market.

Contributions from the mobility segment would not wane, but AT&T would be far less exposed to competition in the consumer mobile segment.

All of that has key implications. AT&T will reduce reliance on U.S. market revenues and consumer “communications” revenues, to a significant extent, with a bigger reliance on video entertainment.

One might argue that diversification lessens the threat AT&T faces from cable TV, T-Mobile US and Sprint, CLECs, Google Fiber and other emerging independent ISPs.

One obvious question is what Verizon might do. So far, it has made a different bet, banking heavily on the U.S. mobile market for growth. Whether that will remain the case over the next decade is the issue. Some might argue the fundamental strategy will have to change.

The extent to which the pattern emerges elsewhere around the globe is the larger issue. Some might argue the pressure to focus on business accounts is less, since “cable TV” tends not to be a rival industry but a platform owned by tier one telcos, where it is a factor in the markets.

Also, few markets have the degree of facilities-based competition on the U.S. model.

Still, there are any number of reasons why tier one service providers ultimately might want to shift attention to business accounts. Larger revenue per account is one good reason.

Also, higher profit margins are another advantage. That is one reason why U.S. competitive local exchange carriers generally focus on business accounts only when they move out of market and compete with other telcos.

Also, to some extent, there is less competition in the business segment, compared to the consumer segment. Few competitors can compete with tier one telcos, other than other tier one telcos, in the international communications segment, or even in national large enterprise account markets.

There arguably is more competition in the mid-market segment, but growing competition in the small business (mass markets) end of the market, especially as both cable TV companies and CLECs compete in the small business market.

In consumer markets, there is fierce competition from satellite and cable TV providers. In fact, in the U.S. market, it increasingly looks as though cable TV companies are emerging as the leading providers of fixed network triple play services, not telcos.

Even in the mobile services segment, long dominated by telcos, heightened competition is occurring, putting pressure on gross revenue and profit margins. And more competition is expected,

T-Mobile US "Kills It" in Fourth Quarter 2014

The quip by John Legere, T-Mobile US CEO that “we killed it” pretty much sums up T-Mobile US fourth quarter 2014 results. Adjusted earnings (EBITDA) of $1.8 billion, up 41 percent,  beat analyst expectations of $1.62 billion.

Service grew 13.6 percent year over year in the fourth quarter, and were up nine percent in 2014, compared to 2013.

Total revenues were up 19 percent in the fourth quarter and stronger by 13 percent annually.

In fact, T-Mobile US it won nearly 80 percent of industry postpaid phone growth in the fourth quarter,and nearly 100 percent of phone account net growth in 2014. That could happen because AT&T and Verizon account growth is substantially driven by tablet account additions.

T-Mobile US added 2.1 million net new accounts, including 1.3 million branded postpaid accounts.

In 2014, T-Mobile US added 8.3 million net accounts to end with 55 million total. Of the total branded postpaid net adds in 2014, T-Mobile US added more than four million phone net adds and 0.8 million mobile broadband accounts.

Branded postpaid average billings per user grew 5.1 percent to a record $61.80. Branded postpaid phone average revenue per user was $48.26.

T-Mobile US expects to add another 2.2 million to 3.2 million net branded postpaid accounts in 2015.

Will Title II Lead to App Provider Charges Even Higher than "Paid Prioritization?"

Unintended consequences are among the reasons why intended policies rarely work as expected.

Is there a danger content providers would have to pay Internet access providers termination charges if Internet access is regulated as a common carrier Title II service? Yes, say economists and analysts as the Phoenix Center for Advanced Legal & Economic Public

Policy Studies.

“Reclassification turns edge providers into customers” of access providers, argue George Ford, Phoenix Center chief economist, and Larry Spiwak, Phoenix Center president.

This new “carrier-to-customer” relationship (as opposed to a “carrier-to-carrier” relationship) would then require all access providers (telephone, cable, and wireless) to create, and then

tariff, a termination service for Internet content under Section 203 of the Communications Act, Ford and Spivak argue.

Though skeptics will argue that is not going to happen (that the Federal Communications Commission will not impose such obligations, though it can), the potential outcome could be far worse than the hypothetical “content delivery network” fees some have argued should be outlawed.

With the caveat that the arguments--however important--are “in the weeds” for most people, the FCC  “would likely be prohibited from using its authority under Section 10 of the Communications Act to forbear from such tariffing requirements because the Commission has labeled all BSPs as ‘terminating monopolists.’ Spiwak and Ford argue.

In other words, the FCC cannot avoid having ISPs impose such charges, even if the FCC now claims it can apply a “light touch” Title II regime that does not create such obligations.

Historically, edge providers (application providers) have not been considered “customers” of

the Internet access providers.

By reclassifying broadband as a telecommunications service, this termination service becomes a common carrier telecommunications service, thereby formalizing this “customer” relationship between application providers and ISPs whose facilities they use, Phoenix Center argues.

In other words, application providers are customers of the ISPs, just as end users are.

What the “just and reasonable” tariffs ought to be, and how much application providers must pay, is the issue. The only certainty is that the tariff cannot be “zero.”

In a perhaps terrifying new development for content and application providers, it could turn out that most of the revenue IPSs earn will come from content and app providers, not end users.

That unanticipated outcome could be the worst outcome of any Title II regulation for application providers, though oddly enough ISPs could benefit. Ultimately, the ecosystem would suffer, as economics suggests higher prices will lead to lower usage.

Unstable U.K. Mobile Market About to Become "Stable?"

Given regulator preference for four leading mobile players, rather than just three leading providers, it has to be noted that regulators are deliberately opting for a market that is inherently unstable, compared to the likely structure of a three-provider market.

The reason is that the mobile business arguably and ultimately is an oligopolistic industry, even if the markets can, for a period of time, apparently diverge from that pattern. As a theoretical rule, one might argue, an oligopolistic market with three leading providers will tend to be stable when market shares follow a general pattern of 40 percent, 30 percent, 20 percent market shares held by three contestants.

Up to this point, the U.K. mobile market has featured EE and O2, each with 29 percent market share, followed by Vodafone with 23 percent share, trailed by Hutchison’s 3 at 12 percent.

That four-provider structure is roughly similar to the U.S. mobile market, where AT&T and Verizon each tend to have 30 percent share, while Sprint has about 17 percent and T-Mobile US has about 14 percent share.

If one assumes a stable oligopoly market structure has the leading provider with about 40 percent share; the number-two supplier with about 30 percent share and the third player a share of about 20 percent, the U.K. market would, with a Hutchison acquisition of O2, be functionally stable.

That still leaves open the question of whether Vodafone ultimately is acquired, but that change of ownership would not make the market unstable.

Looking only at the mobile market, BT has 40 percent share. If Hutchison were to acquire Telefónica assets, Hutchison would have about 29 percent share. Vodafone would have about 23 percent share. That fits the stable oligopoly market pattern almost perfectly.

Whether it still will make sense in the future to evaluate fixed and mobile markets as distinct entities is the issue. In reality, the consumer services market has become reliant on a bundled services approach that initially has been anchored by voice, video entertainment and high speed access, but is moving to a quadruple play approach that includes both fixed and mobile services.

Vodafone, which with a Hutchison acquisition of O2 would fall to fourth place among mobile operators, is shifting from its historic mobile-only strategy to a quadruple play approach.

As a rule, there are two kinds of companies in the telecom business: strategic buyers and strategic sellers.

After disposing of its U.S. Verizon Wireless stake and SFT to Vivendi in France, Vodafone might have been seen as a strategic buyer. But some have considered Vodafone a strategic seller. In the near term, Vodafone might be a buyer, even if it ultimately winds up being a strategic seller.

The point is that it might soon be misleading to assess market share in the mobile segment as distinct from share in the fixed services segment. If the market shifts to quadruple play, with a mix of fixed and mobile assets, share across networks and services will matter most.

Telecom Revenue Growth Slows in Every Region

“Overall, growth in telecom revenue continues to slow in every geographic region,” according to  Stéphane Téral, Infonetics Research principal analyst.

Europe’s five largest service providers—Deutsche Telekom, Orange, Telecom Italia, Telefónica, and Vodafone—continue to experience declining revenue, though less pronounced than in the past three years, he noted.

Global mobile service revenue barely budged in the first half of 2014, up just 0.5 percent from the same period a year ago, Infonetics says.

But mobile data services (text messaging and mobile broadband) rose in every region in the first half, driven by the increasing usage of smartphones.

Mobile broadband services grew 26 percent year-over-year, enough to offset the decline of text message revenue declines, Infonetics reported. On the other hand, that sometimes was not enough to offset losses of voice revenue.

In Latin America, mobile data will not replace lost voice revenues. Orange voice revenue declined 3.3 percent in 2014. In Japan, DoCoMo says a change in voice tariffs might mean NTT does not make money on voice until 2017.

High speed access revenue still drives growth in mobile and fixed line segments, but revenue will “begin to stabilize” between 2015 and 2016, if  “our competitors behave, said Ramon Fernandez, Orange CFO.

Vodafone now is focusing on fixed network broadband for revenue growth, as its mobile business is declining.

On the video entertainment side of the business, there also are warning signs.

Only 40 percent of Millennials (people roughly 18 to 34) in the U.S. watch live TV each month, Forrester Research.

ComScore said in October 2014 that 24 percent of 18- to 24-year-olds do not have a traditional pay TV service.

Of those survey respondents, 13 percent previously had subscription TV service but have disconnected, while 11 percent have never subscribed to a linear subscription TV service at all.

Nielsen found in December 2014 that U.S. adults spent 60 percent more time in the third quarter of  2014 watching streaming video than they did the year before.

Traditional TV viewing, which had been falling among viewers ages 18 to 34 at around four percent a year since 2012, tumbled 10.6 percent between September 2014 and January 2015, according to Nielsen.

All of that illustrates fundamental revenue challenges in all the key products sold by communications service providers, fixed or mobile.

Acquisitions will help, as service providers buy growth in new product segments or geographies. Still, some big new revenue stream eventually will have to be found. That explains the interest in a variety of new businesses, largely centered around the Internet of Things.

Mobile is Becoming the Way Lower Income Users Access the Internet

Reasonable people will disagree about whether specific mergers or acquisitions should be approved, as well as about the merger conditions appropriate when such mergers or acquisitions are deemed reasonable.

What does seem odd and unwise, though, are conditions that mandate specific and high adoption rates of specific services as a condition of an acquisition. One example is a proposed condition specifying that 45 percent of low-income consumers buy a "lifeline" Internet access service from Comcast. 

Service providers cannot guarantee that specific numbers of consumers will buy any specific service. The details of the offer, aside from mandatory buy rates, are reasonable areas for discussion.

But it would be hard to ensure that 45 percent of potential consumers buy any specific products at all, under the best of circumstances. 

There is a growing body of research indicating that the most logical consumers of such a service actually rely on mobile access for Internet service, for example. The point is that mobile access is emerging as the preferred way of using the Internet. 

For that reason, it is possible demand for a lifeline Internet access service could be limited.