U.S. Will Adopt 5G Very Fast, Says GSMA

It is not hard to find skepticism about the size of 5G markets, for good reason. Not every market is equally well disposed to generate new revenue sources, at scale, and not every set of service providers in every market has the same level of actual need to find those new revenue sources.

That is why virtually everyone expects 5G to become a commercial reality first in just a handful of countries: the United States, Japan, European Union countries and China. Developed nations plus China, in other words. And some might question how fast most EU markets will adopt.

source: GSMA Intelligence

In part, that early deployment pattern is driven by expectations of financial upside from new applications not possible with 4G. GSMA Intelligence also notes some particularities of the U.S. market that also create a fertile environment.

In other words, opportunities might exist to drive aggressive 5G adoption in the U.S. market.

GSMA Intelligence notes that U.S. customers have been robust adopters of “digital” services using their mobile devices, ranging from internet-based messaging and social media to entertainment content, as well as using e-commerce.

That’s the “pull” of 5G. There also is the “push.” U.S. mobile service revenues have been steadily declining since 2010, and might go negative in 2019. That means the search for additional new revenues is imperative.

So all four leading U.S. mobile operators will be offering 5G mobile services in 2019, with AT&T and Verizon launching mobile 5G services in selected markets in 2018.

According to GSMA Intelligence forecasts, the United States will experience one of the fastest customer migrations to 5G in the world, with 5G reaching 100 million mobile connections in early 2023.

That will make 5G the leading mobile network technology in the United States by 2025, with more than 190 million 5G connections (accounting for around half of total mobile connections), excluding use of 5G to support fixed operations.

But more than supply will drive that deployment speed.

Aggressive millimeter wave spectrum allocations will be key enablers, especially for AT&T and Verizon.

But there are other fundamental reasons for the push into 5G. Simply put, the U.S. mobile market has exhausted its growth model, based on 4G. If one extrapolates from steadily declining revenue growth since 2010, it is possible revenue growth in the core mobile business might actually go negative in 2019.

Since revenue growth is a virtual necessity for firms that are publicly owned, that represents a crisis.

source: GSMA Intelligence

Though new revenue sources will have to be created, 5G offers some opportunity for services that actually have not existed on earlier platforms, including 4G. Though everyone expects early revenue upside to come in the area of “enhanced” (much faster) internet access, that expectation must be qualified.

Since 4G adoption is virtually ubiquitous in the U.S. mobile business, customers who adopt 5G access will, by definition, be replacing primary reliance on 4G. So there is substitution going on, replacing 4G accounts with 5G.

There may or may not be incremental upside from such substitution. In the early days, some incremental upside is likely.

Longer term, the hope is that brand new revenue streams can be created in the internet of things (sensor communications) area. There also is hope some new classes of apps can be created in the ultra-low-latency area. Connected cars or 4K and 8K video, plus other latency-dependent apps such as remote surgery come to mind.

The important point is that U.S. mobile operators are going to be aggressive about 5G because the 4G business model has become exhausted.

Internet Access Universal Service is Always an Issue for the Last 2% of Locations

Universal funding of “essential” telecom services always is difficult and expensive, since, by definition, there often is no private sector business model for rural areas. In large part, that is because there are too few potential customers, in relation to the cost of assets to serve those potential customers. In the continent-sized U.S. market, for example, the universal service problem largely is a matter of rural areas.  

Assuming a standard fixed network investment cost, that might not produce a positive business case over a 20-year period, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission has suggested.  And almost nobody makes investments with a 20-year payback in telecom, anymore. That is tantamount to “no investment return.”

In the United States, the cost of serving the last one percent of locations is astronomical, for example.

source: FCC

High infrastructure costs  are among the reasons wireless access is likely to play a bigger role in such universal service plans. Fixed networks cost too much in rural areas, in other words.

Consider many U.S. states where rural population density ranges between 50 and 60 locations per square mile, and ignore the vast western regions east of the Pacific coast range and west of the Mississippi River or 100th meridian,  where population density can easily range in the low single digits per square mile.

Assume 55 locations per square mile, and two fixed network suppliers in each area. That means a theoretical maximum of 27 customers per square mile, if buying is at 100 percent. Assume for the moment that buying rates really are at 100 percent. Two equally skilled competitors might expect to split the market, so each provider, theoretically, gets 27 accounts per square mile.

At average revenue of perhaps $75 a month (perhaps a generous assumption), that means total revenue of about $2025 a month, per square mile, or $24,300 per year, for all the customers in a square mile.

The network reaching all homes in that square mile might cost an average of $23,500 per home, or about $1.3 million.

At 50 percent adoption, that works out to network costs of roughly $47,000 per account in a square mile, against revenue of $900 per account, per year. Over 10 years, revenue per account amounts to $9,000. Over 20 years, revenue might be a bit more than $18,000.

The business case does not exist, without subsidies.

In the United Kingdom, Ofcom, the U.K. communications regulator, is planning a minimum 10 Mbps internet access floor for all locations in the United Kingdom. That probably is an issue for the last one to two percent or so of U.K. locations.

Ofcom estimates a per-location cost of £3,400, enabling coverage to around 99.8 percent of premises. Consumers outside this threshold will be able to get a satellite connection. That figure is a blend of higher-cost (and relatively speaking) lower-cost locations.

Long Term Revenue Growth of "Access" and Transport Cannot Exceed Low Single Digits, Annually

Despite current growth of mobile revenues in some markets (Asia, Africa in particular), it will be difficult to sustain long-term mobile operator growth at rates much higher than growth of gross domestic product (GDP).

Eventually, every customer that wants to use mobile services will do so. Eventually, every customer that wants to use the internet will do so, and will pay only so much for that privilege.

And competition will not lessen. New platforms and new suppliers, with lower price points, will keep coming.

source: GSMA

Subscriber growth in developed markets is largely over, and while there is some incremental revenue growth from higher mobile internet spending, long term growth will largely be limited to growth of gross domestic product, which tends to be in low single digits.

For public companies, and most tier-one telcos are public, that is insufficient to retain investor support at a level that drives up equity value.

source: GSMA

That means most public service providers will have to look beyond connectivity services to grow revenue faster. As hard as that will always be, there is no practical alternative.

Some might argue telcos are misguided in deploying resources to gain new positions in the content and applications parts of the ecosystem. Some regulators seem intent on preventing such vertical integration.

Those views arguably are misguided. Without investment beyond “dumb pipe,” providers of retail telecom services face a difficult future. A public company growing revenue at one to three percent annually is not going to get attractive valuations.

Beyond that, it is not clear that even those rates of revenue growth are possible on an organic basis. In other words, without major acquisitions, even low-single-digit rates of revenue growth might be difficult.

The old “telecom” business is changing. Survivors in the retail segment will have multiple revenue streams beyond data access.

Even in the wide area networks business, including the subsea segment, much of the revenue potential now (growth) now is capped by the growing reliance on enterprise owned and operated  private networks.

By 2016, more than 70 percent of all internet traffic across the Atlantic was carried over private networks, not on public WAN networks.

On intra-Asian routes, private networks in 2016 carried 60 percent of all traffic. On trans-Pacific routes, private networks carried about 58 percent of traffic.

That is one manifestation of how important it ultimately will be to move revenue streams away from a sole reliance on bit transport (internet access, WAN data transport) supplied to end users (business and consumer).

Video Streaming: Growing Mismatch Between Buyer and Seller Expectations

At least in the U.S. market, consumers are showing an apparently conflicting set of views about the value of their video subscription services. On one hand, use of streaming services, including cases where customers buy multiple subscriptions, is increasing.

Use of linear services is decreasing. On the other hand, the remaining customers of the linear services seem to report growing satisfaction and value over the past four years, according to TiVo survey data.

There is a simple explanation for that reported satisfaction and perception of value: as unhappy customers defect for streaming alternatives, a growing percentage of the remaining customers are those who see higher value in their linear choices. That is why, in fact, they do not defect.

Between 2014 and 2017, the percentage of “very satisfied” linear video customers actually has risen from 20 percent to 30 percent, while the percentage of “unsatisfied” customers has dropped from 24 percent or so to 18 percent or so.

That does not mean the erosion of linear accounts will stop. We can see the same trend in satisfaction scores of landline telephone service. As the unhappy customers (or customers who find mobile is a functional substitute)  leave, the remaining customers--who value the service more--will tend to raise satisfaction scores.

source: TiVo

Of course, suppliers might still be unhappy about the apparently-growing “satisfaction” scores, as one reason more survey respondents are satisfied is that they are able to buy skinny bundles that cost less. In other words, the value proposition (fewer channels but lower price) is better with a skinny bundle than a full bundle of channels.

But it also is possible to see a mismatch between consumer expectations and supplier beliefs about the value of any single channel and its corresponding expected price.

Over the past couple of decades, one fact has stood out: consumers generally rate the value of any single TV channel as being worth less than those TV channels believe they are worth.

A recent survey by TiVo confirmed--again--that U.S. consumers generally believe a subscription to a single TV channel “should” cost about $2 a month, with a few channels perhaps having a “fair” price up to $3 a month.

source: TiVo

But no single TV channel contemplating a streaming service (at least so far) will price its service at that rate. Instead, prices are generally an order of magnitude higher ($11 a month or so).

That is a big disconnect.

For any product purchased by any consumer, both value and price matter. Up to this point the price of popular streaming products has not been a particular issue, as value (some amount of popular content) has a far-lower recurring cost (perhaps $11 a month compared to a linear package that offers more content, but also can cost $80 a month or more).

Once consumers start buying multiple streaming channels, the total cost obviously grows. For many consumers, a reasonable benchmark might be $40 a month, the pricing level for skinny bundles.

A consumer buying three streaming services at $15 a month spends more than single skinny bundle linear subscription. If, as some predict, every present channel will be offered on a direct streaming basis, the “value versus cost” evaluation is going to change radically.

In that scenario, buying just three services costs more than a skinny bundle would cost. It is not hard to predict that few channels will gain scale, at that pricing level. Nor is it hard to predict that new forms of bundling are going to become more popular.

source: TiVo, eMarketer

But change will come. As more consumers find they are buying multiple streaming subscriptions, at some point, a customer winds up spending just as much money as they might if they bought a single linear subscription.

To the extent that the value of a streaming subscription is that it “costs less” than a linear subscription, suppliers then will face a new problem, namely that buyers will start to compare not the cost of a single streaming subscription against the cost of a single linear service, but the total cost of all purchased streaming subscriptions against the cost of linear.

At that point, perceptions of value could change, as will buying behavior. Bundles are going to look better, again.

"Dumb Pipe" is Dangerous if You Want Your Telco Business to Survive

It is fairly easy to illustrate the shift in value generation within the internet ecosystem. The phrase “dumb pipe” nicely encapsulates the broad problem, which is that, in the internet era, network access--while essential--is not where most of the value and revenue is being created.

In technology terms, that is by design. The whole point of internet protocol, in the early days, was to protect information and content transmitted across networks from the impact of network disruptions.

The whole point of internet protocol as “the” next-generation network platform of choice is that it offers a low-cost way to deliver information, content and services of any type over a single integrated network.

But internet protocol also logically separates ownership of networks from control of applications that use the networks. That is why voice over IP, over the top messaging and video services have been disruptive. IP allows third parties to create apps and services that provide the value of carrier apps. And, in many cases, those third parties have business models not built on earning direct revenue from providing those features.

In the past monopoly era, telcos created and owned content, services devices, infrastructure and actual service revenue. These days, all that is disaggregated.

And even connectivity no longer is a “monopoly” of network service providers.

source: GSMA

In other words, it is hard to sell a product or feature many other suppliers will happlily give away for free. That raises the “dumb pipe” notion, referring to the process whereby traditional network service providers become suppliers of relatively low-value internet access, but not necessarily the applications, products and services that all other entities create and deliver over those access networks.

That is why equity valuations of big internet app companies are growing so much faster than the valuations of “telcos.”

source: GSMA

Longer term, revenue growth is highest for suppliers of apps, content and services delivered over public IP networks (we used to call them “telcos”). Granted, service provider revenue still is growing in Asia, Africa, and parts of Latin America, as more humans buy mobile services and use data access.

But the long-term trend is that once nearly every human uses mobile devices and internet access, revenue opportunities will slow.

So unless you really believe your retail telecom services business can thrive on the strength of internet access revenues, supplemented by some amount of voice or messaging revenue, a move elsewhere within the internet ecosystem is required.

Incremental revenue growth (and profit margins) will migrate up the stack over the next decade, and probably forever.

The caveat is that not every segment of the telecom industry sells to end users (enterprise, smaller business or consumers), and not every segment relies so much on access or transport services. But the classic "telco" serving retail customers really has to worry about surviving on the strength of access revenues increasingly tied to internet access.

source: GSMA

That value “problem” explains why many tier-one service providers are looking for ways to create new value by moving “up the stack” and becoming application providers (again), not as partners but as equity owners.

Who are Tomorrow's Telcos?

Most people who work in the telecom industry do not really need to know too much about industry trends, as much as some of us like to think they do. Most people have jobs that do not require such knowledge, as important as such knowledge might be for those in “C” suites, industry and financial analysts, and some on the staffs of banks and equity underwriters.

Sales forces who actually have direct contact with customers do need some industry knowledge, but more product focused. A salesperson might well need to know at a high level if, when and how a software-defined wide area network (SD-WAN) complements or replaces MPLS, for example.

A salesperson might need to have some high level knowledge of how enterprise conferencing systems work, and the advantages or disadvantages of cloud versus premises solutions, based on enterprise size and workforce deployment.

So at the risk of being irrelevant, here’s a look at just one of the biggest business model changes shaping the fortunes of what we used to call the “telecom” industry (again, with the caveat that not even C-level executives in every single segment of the business need to know this).

Perhaps the most-startling change is that the “telecom” providers are not necessarily the only entities now providing telecom services. In the internet of things arena, there are specialized IoT networks such as SigFox that operate on unlicensed spectrum.

In some countries, Google or Facebook operate as commercial internet service providers. In the United States, Google is a fixed network and wireless internet services provider. In some markets there might also be local government-owned or supported internet access, voice and video networks.

Also, in the 5G era, large enterprises and venues will be able to build and operate their own private 4G and 5G networks, operating very much as enterprise Wi-Fi networks presently work, using unlicensed or in some cases licensed spectrum (Citizens Broadband Radio Service in the United States, other similar shared spectrum possibilities in Europe and elsewhere).

There will other changes. In the coming era of software-defined networks (SDN) and network functions virtualization (NFV), connectivity will be something akin to an object, as that concept is used in modern programming.

To create functionality, a developer combines various objects (compartmentalized functions). There are many advantages, aside from the ability to reuse existing code. Object-oriented programming allows developers to spend more time thinking about what they want applications to do, and less time creating the code to do so.

The frequent metaphor is an automobile. People can drive cars without knowing how engines and transmission systems work.

Here’s the application to telecom services: in a virtualized context, an entity can assemble full connectivity functionality by assembling pieces of discrete existing networks, without building a new physical network.

That might allow an enterprise to assemble all the building blocks of a global network, creating a virtual network that acts like a physical network.

Source: Nokia Bell Labs

In case the implications are not clear, it will be possible for an Amazon, Apple, Facebook, Google or any other enterprise to create its own telecom network services by assembling the functions and integrating them.

Open networks, virtualized networks, software-defined functions and physical facilities that might be owned by any number of providers (traditional telecom and others) will enable such capabilities.

source: GSMA

source: GSMA

5G Capex: In Line with 4G, Higher than 4G or Less Than 4G?

Some 5G skeptics believe 5G is risky, in terms of early deployment (perhaps all would agree 5G is a reasonable bet in a decade) because incremental new revenue is insufficient to pay for the network, or that capital investment will be too high, in relation to the revenue potential.

Those fears are reasonable enough, if more true in some markets than others, though. Consider only capital investment requirements.

If the number of cell sites to provide coverage grows by to two orders of magnitude (100 times), that has capital investment implications. Plus, many argue, all those new radio sites require backhaul or fronthaul, which means more investment on the transport network.

(Brief note, backhaul refers to the part of the network that moves traffic between the core network and the edge of the network. That includes traffic to and from the cell site or the last active network element before the subscriber location.  Fronthaul is a form of “backhaul” that refers to the part of the network that moves traffic from centralized radio base stations to antenna sites. For most people, the distinction between fronthaul and backhaul is immaterial.)

Were all things equal, that expansion of cell sites would imply huge increases in capital investment, leading to a doubling to tripling of investment, some might argue. Others would say there will be an increase in capex, but only on an incremental basis (low single digits increase).

A growing number of observers might actually argue there will be flat to lower capex requirements, based on use of open source, virtualized platforms, reuse  or deployment of existing assets (tower sites, fallow spectrum), plus ability to aggregate (bond, essentially) licensed and unlicensed spectrum assets, plus huge amounts of new spectrum, including lots of unlicensed spectrum or lower-cost shared spectrum.

source: European Commission

It is reasonable to expect specific 5G spending to ramp up as the networks are built. The issue, in part, is what that will cost, per tower or per potential customer. And that is where there is significant uncertainty.

source: Edge of Cloud

Also,  tier-one service providers generally spend about the same amount, every year, on overall capex. What tends to change is the destination of that spending. And though capex climbs in the early years of a new mobile network build, that is accompanied by reductions in other areas.

The point is that firm capex tends to be relatively flat, year to year. That suggests mobile operators will find ways to keep capex within limits (as a percentage of revenue, for example). “Overall, capex for North America over the period is likely to grow slowly, slightly below the rate of revenue growth, at an annual average rate of 0.5 per cent per year between 2014 and 2020,” GSMA has said.

Skeptics will say that does not include a ramp up to build 5G, though.

source: Jeffries

source: Mobile World Live

Though 5G will use “all of the above” frequency assets (there will not be, as in prior networks, fixed bands to support the network), the use of huge amounts of new millimeter wave spectrum is key.

Basically, we will be able to use an order of magnitude (10 times) to two orders of magnitude (100 times) more spectrum than presently is available to support all mobile operations that had previously been unusable for technical reasons: earlier analog and digital platforms would have been too expensive.

Moore’s Law, small cell architectures, open source and spectrum aggregation (unlicensed spectrum used directly with licensed spectrum) now mean those assets can be deployed commercially.

The point is that 5G is perhaps as likely to represent incremental capex levels (“like” 4G in terms of capex) as it is to represent some hypothetical “huge increase” in capex. History suggests actual practice is more likely to represent continuity with past spending than a break with past practice (much higher investment for 5G).