Monday, October 4, 2021

Are App Stores Distributors or Platforms?

Are a few dominant mobile app stores better understood as being distributors or platforms? And if either case, what are the implications for antitrust or competition policy, if any?


Regulators care about such things, as monopoly or oligopoly power can exist in any supply chain. Perhaps few distributors tend to have market power over a whole supply chain, though it is conceivable. Almost every platform that operates at scale has power. 


A distributor traditionally moves products or services between a supplier and an end user or customer; part of the supply chain


A platform is a marketplace or exchange, when used as a business model. In another sense, as traditionally used within the computing industry, a platform is software or hardware upon which other software or hardware can be built. 


We typically think of supply chain market power as existing either on the final end consumer or product or service producer sides of any supply chain. The classic exceptions are electricity, natural gas, water supply or sewage suppliers, which tend to be viewed as natural monopolies


source: Grupo Hera 


Telecom services once were viewed as natural monopolies globally until the mid-1980s, when a wave of deregulation and privatization began to sweep the industry.  What is salient is that telecom service providers are distributors. 


One might argue that telcos also create some products, such as voice communications, messaging or data transport. 


source: Bharti Airtel 


That is true, though the ability to do so also rests on infrastructure supplied by others in the value chain to the left of the distribution function. 


Telcos also use indirect distribution partners as well as direct sales to customers. 


The point is that market power in a supply chain (monopolies or oligopolies) can exist at many points in a supply chain. And though it is not the first instance that comes to mind, it can be possible for end user consumers to have something like “monopoly” power in a supply chain. The best example is military products, which might essentially have “one” or “just a few” potential buyers. 

source: Cengage Learning 


The issue is, as some argue, that in some cases, supply chains are no longer the central aggregator of business value. “What a company owns matters less than what it can connect,” some might say. 


All that might matter for regulators. Distributors might, or might not, have power in a supply chain. A dominant platform--by definition--typically does have market power.  


Two angles are worth noting. While app providers chafe at the revenue sharing that dominant app stores, for example, have charged (as much as 30 percent, in the past, perhaps 15 percent now), that arguably is a “cost of distribution” expense for any particular app owner. 


In other industries, the cost of distribution might range from five percent to 80 percent of retail sales amounts. The point is that if the dominant app stores represent distribution and retail costs, then there is an argument to be made that 15 percent to 30 percent is not necessarily outrageous at all. 


Average retail margin and distribution cost

Product category

Distributor

Retailer

Total

Fast moving consumer goods

3-%

8-40%

11 to 43%

Clothing and apparel

15-30%

20-50%

35 to 80%

Electronics like mobile phones

3-7%

3-7%

6 to 14%

Cars


5-15%

5-15%

Furniture


30-50%

30-50%

Jewelry


30-60%

30-60%

Electrical equipment and lights

5-7%

15-25%

20 to 32%

source: Alliance Experts 


Whether a product is “digital” or not, there still are sales, marketing and distribution costs. Clothing and apparel products typically have high distribution costs (including sales, marketing and logistics). But online sales are more profitable than other retail-based distribution methods such as “in store” sales. 


source: Transport Geography 


In the case of software distribution, a mobile app store platform adds significant value by slashing distribution and sales costs by as much as two orders of magnitude. The argument that a 30-percent revenue share is inherently unfair does not stand up to reason. The distribution cost is sliced by two orders of magnitude. That is worth a considerable amount. 

source: OECD


The second issue worth noting is that powerful app stores also arguably have market power. That seems a more-serious issue, as the inability to appear in Apple’s or Google’s app stores would force app developers to create their own marketing and distribution channels. 


That is not a problem for enterprise or business-focused app suppliers, who normally create their own distribution and marketing and sales channels. 


It arguably is a huge problem for small developers who create consumer apps. And that is where monopoly danger arguably lies. 


As an aside, the concern expressed over the last decade about internet service provider monopoly dangers seems almost comical, in retrospect. ISPs not only face competition, they play only small roles in the application ecosystem. 


They are not gatekeepers in the same way as Google Play or the Apple app store have become. They cannot block a lawful application. They cannot prevent a lawful app from being distributed. 


To reflect on the original question--whether app stores are distributors or platforms--they seem to be both. App stores are a dominant way app developers market their products. So app stores are distribution. They also are marketing and direct sales channels. 


But app stores resemble platforms in some ways. They connect buyers and sellers. 


Viewed as distributors, a commission or fee of 15 percent to 30 percent has never struck me as unfair, given the percentage of revenue earned by the suppliers of distribution functions in other industries. 


Viewed as platforms, the danger of monopolization and anti-competitive behavior always has seemed much clearer.


Friday, October 1, 2021

How Big is the LAN Market?

It is difficult to pinpoint just how much new spending is directed towards cabled local area networks outside of the data center market these days. 


For smaller organizations Wi-Fi almost always is the default. Some estimate infrastructure sales to amount to about $9.4 billion, growing in excess of 17 percent annually.


The enterprise network infrastructure market represented about $52 billion in sales in 2020 and is growing at about seven percent according to Market Study Report. 


Cisco reported in 2019 that IDC projections for enterprise network equipment would reach $48 billion, including both wide area network and all forms of local area network equipment. 


source: Cisco 

 

Others believe sales may be substantially lower. The enterprise network equipment market was valued at $9.83 billion in 2020 and is expected to reach $15.48 billion by 2026, at a cumulative annual growth rate of 7.85 percent between 2021 to 2026, says Mordor Intelligence. 


By way of comparison, IDC projects global revenue attributable to the sales of private 4G and 5G infrastructure will grow from $945 million in 2019 to an estimated $5.7 billion in 2024 with a five-year compound annual growth rate of 43 percent. This includes aggregate spending on radio access networks, core, and transport infrastructure.


Is "Digital Transformation" Simply the Latest Buzzword for Decades Worth of Applied Digital Technology?

Skeptics or cynics might argue that much of what passes for today’s digital transformation is simply the latest buzzword for applying technology to business processes. The buzzword desired outcomes might include agility, personalization, automation, data-driven decision making, improved customer experience or any other set of information technology outcomes. 


source: Fujitsu 


Of course, businesses and organizations and consumers have been adding digital products to their everyday lives for decades. And it would be hard to clearly differentiate any of the desired outcomes of technology deployment since the mid-1980s with the outcomes of digital transformation


source: Fujitsu 


Of course, the problem is that all information technology becomes commoditized. Any single firm would gain sustainable advantage if it were the only firm in its industry to adopt a particular technology.


The problem is that never is possible. Eventually, all competitors in any industry have access to, and use, all the relevant technologies. Though efficiency or effectiveness might arguably be improved, it does so for all competitors in the market, eventually negating any first-mover advantage a single firm might have tried to gain. 


The other problem is that applying technology does not often seem to yield tangible advantages in terms of productivity. This productivity paradox has been noted since the 1980s, when enterprises began to apply lots of digital technology to their businesses. 


Many technologists noted the lag of productivity growth in the 1970s and 1980s as computer technology was introduced. In the 1970s and 1980s, business investment in computer technology were increasing by more than 20 percent per year. But productivity growth fell, instead of increasing. 


So the productivity paradox is not new.  Massive investments in technology do not always result in measurable gains. In fact, sometimes negative productivity results. 


Information technology investments did not measurably help improve white collar job productivity for decades in the 1980s and earlier.  In fact, it can be argued that researchers have failed to measure any improvement in productivity. So some might argue nearly all the investment has been wasted.


Some now argue there is a similar lag between the massive introduction of new information technology and measurable productivity results, and that this lag might conceivably take a decade or two decades to emerge. 


The Solow productivity paradox suggests that applied technology can boost--or lower--productivity. Though perhaps shocking, it appears that technology adoption productivity impact can be negative


The productivity paradox was what we began to call it. In fact, investing in more information technology has often and consistently failed to boost productivity. Others would argue the gains are there; just hard to measure. Still, it is hard to claim improvement when we cannot measure it. 


Growth is the Paramount Industry Imperative

Projected global communications spending from 2019 to 2025 by Gartner illustrates one key constraint in the telecommunications business: spending is relatively flat, with declining rates of growth forecast from 2021 to 2025.


 

source: Gartner, ZDnet 


Other forecasts predict about one percent annual growth or two percent annual revenue growth globally. If one assumes any amount of inflation in the range of one percent to three percent annually, real revenue growth will most likely be negative. 


Wednesday, September 29, 2021

India Fixed Network Broadband Problem Might Not be "No Network" as Much as We Think

India’s fixed network broadband penetration remains low and is heavily skewed towards urban areas.  While 65 percent of people live in rural areas, Telecommunications Regulatory Authority of India data shows that they account for a mere 5.6 percent of total fixed broadband connections. 


Paradoxically, that disparity is not as great as the figures suggest, looking at how facilities measure up, in terms of potential speed. 


A comparison of Speedtest Intelligence data against rural and urban locations (based on India’s 2011 census) fails to show a large disparity between the two when looking at TRAI’s new speed categories, with 58.7 percent of connections in urban areas falling within the “Basic” speed category, compared to 61.7 percent in rural areas.


The new definitions of fixed broadband speed are::

  • “Basic” (2-50 Mbps),

  • “Fast” (50-300 Mbps) and

  • “Super-fast” (>300 Mbps)


As always, there is a difference between supply and demand; ability to buy service and the actual buying behavior; network passings and customer take rates. Looking at actual customers across rural and urban locations shows a disparity between urban and rural, but nowhere as great as population alone might suggest. 

ookla_consumer-percentage_india_urban_0921-01


 source: Ookla Speedtest 


In fact, rural customers over index and lower speeds and under index at the highest tier of speeds, but even there within a few percentage points of difference. 


 source: Ookla Speedtest 


One conclusion here is that supply is an issue, but demand is the bigger issue. Where networks are available, take rates are driven by conditions other than presence of the network. 


The Ookla data suggests fixed network availability in rural areas is not the main reason take rates are lower than in urban areas.


Tuesday, September 28, 2021

How Does Starlink Stack up Against Fixed Wireless and Geosynchronous Satellite Service?

Low earth orbit satellite constellations such as Starlink promise higher bandwidth, lower latency internet access that eventually might cover every part of the earth’s surface. With Starlink’s early commercial launch, how does the service stack up against other alternatives--fixed and wireless--in terms of value?


Starlink users in the United States and Canada have seen 50.5 Mbps download speed, 14 Mbps upload speed, and 52.5 ms latency, reports Speedcheck. Latency performance is better by an order of magnitude, according to Speedcheck. 


Compared to existing geosynchronous satellite offers, Starlink beats HughesNet for maximum downlink speed and trails Viasat. But value is a combination of performance and price. 


The Starlink price is arguably lower than HughesNet at 25 Mbps and Viasat at its top speed as well. But Starlink does not cap usage, as do Viasat and HughesNet. 


Company-

Starlink

Viasat

HughesNet

Price

Dish $499 + S&H,

$99 per month

$299.99

(life time lease),

$30-$150

(for the first 3 months)

$499.99,

$59.99-149.99

(requires 24 months agreement)

Data Cap

No data cap- Unlimited

Yes, (12-300 GB/month)

Yes, (10-50 GB/month)

Speed

15 - 107 Mbps DL (Measured),

*22.99 Mbps UL

12 - 100 Mbps DL (Advertised)

Up to 25 Mbps DL (Measured),

3 Mbps

Latency

* 33 ms, (Measured)

600-800 ms,

(Advertised)

600-800 ms,

(Advertised)

Accessibility

Limited-Only some cities of US

and 11 other countries

All 50 states

Mostly Southern Sky.

US, Brazil, Columbia, Peru,

Ecuador, Alaska, India, parts of Europe

source: Speedcheck


Starlink also might be considered a reasonable value choice when compared to 4G fixed wireless access supplied by Verizon, but a bit less reasonable where Starlink competes against 5G fixed wireless. 


Both fixed wireless versions cost less than Starlink and do not require a satellite dish. But both fixed wireless options by Verizon also supply less bandwidth. 


All the services offer unlimited usage. But Starlink offers more downlink and uplink bandwidth. Latency performance is comparable to 4G but less than 5G. At the moment, Starlink and 5G fixed wireless do not overlap much in terms of coverage, while Starlink’s footprint covers southern Canada and the northern United States. 


Verizon 5G fixed wireless is only available in large urban areas of the U.S. Northeast. 


Company

Starlink

4G (Verizon)

5G (Verizon)

Price

Dish $499+S&H, and $99 per month

$80/month

$80/month

Data

Unlimited

Unlimited

Unlimited

Speed

50 Mbps DL, 13 Mbps UL

17 Mbps DL, 3.84 Mbps UL

40 Mbps DL, 9.74 Mbps UL

Latency

57 ms

58 ms

39 ms

Accessibility

Limited to parts of North America

Nationwide coverage

Only in big cities

source: Speedcheck


As is typically the case, Starlink will not compete well with fiber to home or cable modem services running at speeds up to a gigabit per second. 


Satellite remains a niche. “Because of the higher relative cost of bandwidth transmitted via satellite versus terrestrial technologies, satellite is currently primarily used in situations where fiber optic cables and other high-capacity technologies are not financially viable due to low population densities and large distances between high-capacity networks and last-mile networks,” the Asian Development Bank rightly notes. 


source: Asian Development Bank 


Low earth orbit satellite constellations such as Spacelink will allow satellite broadband provides to serve 3.5 million subscribers in 2021, growing at an eight-percent compound annual growth rate to reach 5.2 million users in 2026, according to ABI Research.


To keep that in perspective, in 2021 there are about 4.93 billion regular internet users, using 1.2 billion fixed connections and upwards of seven billion mobile internet subscriptions, supporting mobile phone users, PCs and internet of things devices.


The point is that, as important as LEO constellations might be, they will remain a niche supplier of internet access services. By 2026, says ABI Research, LEO service revenue might reach US$4.1 billion. 


In 2020 fixed network internet access in the United States alone generated more than $100 billion in annual revenue in 2013, by some accounts. 


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