There are several reasons--both supply side and demand side--why U.S. “fiber to home” business models appear to have changed.
Perhaps oddly, fundamental demand for home broadband, though higher than ever, also provides less of the revenue to build the networks.
As important as the fiber-to-home business is, it is responsible for less than 10 percent of AT&T revenues. In the fourth quarter of 2022, for example, mobility drove nearly 69 percent of total revenue.
In the fourth quarter of 2022. AT&T earned $31.3 billion. Mobility generated $21.5 billion of that amount. The fixed networks business generated $8.8 billion. Consumer fixed network services generated $3.3 billion or so.
Of course, not all contestants are similarly situated. For many competitive internet service providers, revenue does largely depend almost exclusively on home broadband. Again oddly, revenue potential for such ISPs also seems to have declined.
Where designers once assumed FTTH per-customer home revenue in triple digits ($130, for example), they now assume revenue in the $50 to $70 a month range. That might seem to eviscerate the business case, if network costs are in the $800 range with additional costs to connect actual customers in the $600 to $725 range, with take rates ranging from 20 percent up to about 40 percent.
Only a firm with low overhead can make money sustainably at 20 percent adoption rates. For larger firms, adoption in the 40-percent range is likely required. At a high level, AT&T has been saying FTTH payback models work at $50 a month ARPU and penetration of 50 percent, though revenue from targeted newbuilds now exceed those figures, AT&T says.
It is one thing for a smaller ISP to contemplate building an FTTH network and sustaining itself solely on such revenues. It is quite another matter for a dominant firm in a local area (Comcast, Charter, AT&T, Verizon, Lumen, Frontier, Brightspeed).
Strategic concerns also matter, however. Even if the fixed networks business generates 10 percent of total revenue, that revenue still matters. Without the FTTH upgrade, AT&T risks losing that revenue and profit margin and cash flow contribution.
In other words, even if never stated so starkly, unless the FTTH upgrade is made, AT&T and others risk losing their fixed networks business to competitors.
At the same time, though harder to quantify, the payback model for deep-fiber networks can come in other ways. If small cell mobile networks require deep fiber networks, then business value comes also from the value of the backhaul network. So “fiber to the tower” and “fiber to the radio site” become elements of the payback model.
Fiber access networks also support the business customer revenue stream. For AT&T, fourth quarter 2022 fixed networks business revenue was $5.6 billion, or about 18 percent of total revenue. So “fiber to the business” arguably drives almost twice the revenue as home broadband does, for AT&T.
In other words, the same network supporting home broadband also contributes to support of the mobility business and business customer revenue streams.
All that makes for a more-complicated payback analysis for any sizable contestant with dominant mobile revenues. Though the home broadband payback has to be there, the value of what we used to call “FTTH” has to be justified in other ways.
Smaller ISPs might be able to justify an FTTH network on the basis of home broadband services alone, with 20 percent take rates. It is not so clear a large dominant service provider can hope to do so unless it can reach 40 percent or higher take rates, assuming revenue per account in the $50 to $70 range.
And even when it does so, total deep fiber network value can hinge on other value contributions.
Still, there are additional considerations. Supply side support from the federal government can reduce the cost of rural networks builds by 20 percent to 30 percent, which aids the payback model.
Joint ventures of various types provide similar benefits, at the cost of possibly further reducing net revenue upside.
And though it is an indirect input, many private equity firms are willing to invest in deep fiber projects with a rather simple formula: buy assets at a five times to six times revenue multiple and upgrade with FTTH to produce an asset selling at 10 times to 11 times revenue multiples.
Demand side drivers also have changed a bit as well, beyond the “need” for internet access.
The Affordable Connectivity Program provides a $30 a month subsidy for low-income buyers. That subsidy can be used to buy basic or faster services, and increases demand for internet access.
In some cases, that means new FTTH facilities benefit both from 20 percent to 30 percent lower build costs, plus $30 a month in consumption subsidies for lower-income households. All those are new elements in payback models that improve the business case on both demand and supply sides.