Saturday, October 21, 2023

As Always, Valuation Matters for FTTH Investments by Private Equity

To a large extent, the driver for private equity investments in telco access network assets is the promise of value when those assets are upgraded to fiber-to-home access, particularly in markets where such networks are the “first” FTTH networks in a market. 


But the strategy also requires price appreciation or multiple expansion as well. Assume assets can be acquired for about $1000 per customer, less per location, and then upgraded to FTTH for another $1000 per location. 


The exit plan then assumes that the assets can be sold for more than the cost of the acquisitions and upgrades to FTTH. Recent transactions suggest per-home prices for FTTH assets that are at the high end of historic ranges. 


Year

Transaction value (per home)

Buyer

Seller

2023

$3,250

GIP

Zayo Group

2022

$3,000

Apollo Global Management

Lumos Networks

2021

$2,750

KKR

Hargray Communications

2020

$2,500

EQT

Suddenlink Communications

2019

$2,250

Warburg Pincus

Charter Communications

2018

$2,000

TPG Capital

MetroNet

2017

$1,750

Berkshire Hathaway

OnFiber

2016

$1,500

Goldman Sachs

WaveDivision Holdings

2015

$1,250

Carlyle Group

FiberNet Holdings

2014

$1,000

Providence Equity Partners

Clearwire Communications

2013

$750

Blackstone Group

FiOS Networks


So much hinges on sustainable valuations. But valuations can change over time, both up and down. The upside is sustainable higher valuations. The danger is any significant drop in valuations. 


Year

Acquirer

Target

Transaction Type

Per-Customer Price (USD)

2000

SBC Communications

Ameritech

Merger

3,550

2000

Vodafone

Mannesmann

Acquisition

2,500

2001

Verizon Communications

GTE

Merger

3,000

2003

Deutsche Telekom

VoiceStream Wireless

Acquisition

1,500

2004

AT&T

Cingular Wireless

Acquisition

1,800

2005

Verizon Communications

MCI

Acquisition

600

2006

AT&T

BellSouth

Acquisition

2,000

2007

T-Mobile US

AT&T Wireless

Acquisition

2,000

2008

SoftBank

Sprint Nextel

Acquisition

1,500

2011

AT&T

T-Mobile US

Acquisition

3,900

2013

Verizon Communications

Vodafone Wireless

Acquisition

1,300

2014

SoftBank

T-Mobile US

Acquisition

2,600

2015

Charter Communications

Time Warner Cable

Acquisition

1,800

2018

T-Mobile US

Sprint Corporation

Merger

2,100

2020

Charter Communications

Bright House Networks

Acquisition

1,700

2021

Cox Communications

Suddenlink Communications

Acquisition

1,600



Year

Acquirer

Target

Transaction Type

Per-Passing Price (USD)

2000

SBC Communications

Ameritech

Merger

300

2000

Vodafone

Mannesmann

Acquisition

200

2001

Verizon Communications

GTE

Merger

250

2003

Deutsche Telekom

VoiceStream Wireless

Acquisition

125

2004

AT&T

Cingular Wireless

Acquisition

150

2005

Verizon Communications

MCI

Acquisition

50

2006

AT&T

BellSouth

Acquisition

167

2007

T-Mobile US

AT&T Wireless

Acquisition

167

2008

SoftBank

Sprint Nextel

Acquisition

125

2011

AT&T

T-Mobile US

Acquisition

325

2013

Verizon Communications

Vodafone Wireless

Acquisition

110

2014

SoftBank

T-Mobile US

Acquisition

217

2015

Charter Communications

Time Warner Cable

Acquisition

150

2018

T-Mobile US

Sprint Corporation

Merger

175

2020

Charter Communications

Bright House Networks

Acquisition

142

2021

Cox Communications

Suddenlink Communications

Acquisition

133

Why No "G" So Far Has Dramatically Lifted Mobile Operator Revenue

Lots of observers lament the “failure” of 5G to produce notable innovations so far. But some of us would argue that expectation has made no more sense than the similar claims made for 4G and 3G before 4G. 


That is not to say new use cases will fail to materialize; some might,.as has happened in the 3G and 4G eras. But what has not necessarily happened is the creation of new revenue models whose value is captured by mobile operators directly. 


What mobile operators complain about is not that “innovations have not happened” but that “innovations that make me money in a direct sense have not happened.” 


In one sense, huge changes in revenue always are unreasonable. 


Here’s one way to look at matters. If one asks what percentage of gross domestic product is produced by the mobile service industry, such figures are in the two-percent range. 


Estimate of mobile service impact on GDP

Study name

Date of publication

Venue

5.2 trillion U.S. dollars (2022)

Global mobile industry contribution to GDP

2023

GSMA

9% of global GDP

The Mobile Economy 2022 (includes apps, platforms, services, infra, advertising, e-commerce enabled by mobile)

2022

GSMA

1.8% of U.S. GDP

The Economic Impact of the U.S. Wireless Industry

2022

CTIA

2.1% of GDP in developing countries

The Mobile Economy 2022

2022

GSMA

4.5%

"The Impact of Mobile Telephony on Economic Growth"

2012

World Bank

4.8%

The Economic Impact of the Mobile Economy in the United States

2020

CTIA

By way of comparison, consider estimates of internet contribution to GDP. As important as the internet is, studies generally have estimated impact in the four-percent range. 


Estimate of impact

Study name

Date of publication

Venue

3.7%

The Impact of the Internet Economy on the Global Economy

2022

McKinsey Global Institute

5.5%

The Digital Economy and GDP Growth in the United States

2021

Bureau of Economic Analysis

6.3%

The Role of the Internet in Economic Growth in China

2020

World Bank

3.7%

The Economic Impact of the Internet on the United States

2021

Internet Association

2.8%

The Impact of the Internet on the European Union

2020

European Commission

4.6%

The Economic Impact of the Digital Economy in the United States

2020

ITIF

3.8%

The Impact of the Internet Economy on Chinese GDP

2021

China Internet Network Information Center


The point is simple: the mobile industry, no matter what the generation, only contributes so much to economic activity. And much of the innovation or exciting new apps, services and features that use mobile networks, are more properly considered part of the internet ecosystem. 


We may like or dislike the mobile industry’s business model, profit margins or revenue, but spending on mobile service--in all forms--is limited. To the extent that innovation happens, it tends to take longer than expected, and in any case the rewards and investment are generally made by other participants in the ecosystem. 


In a permissionless app development environment, there is very little in the way of “mobile operator owned” value that can be captured directly. 


5G, still early in its global deployment, has not “failed.” What has “failed” are the grandiose promises of some in the industry who profit from deployment of the new networks; others in the value chain who profit from products sold to infrastructure providers and mobile operators who used the promise of innovation to win additional spectrum from regulators. 


That is not to say 5G is going to be a “failure” longer term, anymore than home broadband investments will prove to be similar failures longer term. If demand for internet data continues to grow as it has for decades, then more capacity is absolutely required. 


Without next-generation mobile networks deployed about every decade, that demand cannot be met. 


The enduring value of 5G, or the next generations to come, is simply that the networks allow mobile operators to remain in business. “You get to keep your business” is far from the most-compelling argument to be made for capacity augmentation. 


But as with fiber-to-the-home investment, the same fundamental logic applies: failure to upgrade copper access to faster platforms and greater capacity leads to business failure. Any ISP that refuses to upgrade speeds and capacity over time will lose out in the market to competitors who do make such investments.


Whether additional revenue can be earned, and how much, are related but separate issues. The bottom line is that capacity upgrades are a requirement for staying in business. Everything else really is secondary.


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