Friday, June 7, 2024

Consumer "Internet Downtime" is Hard to Assess

It is nearly impossible to measure the amount of uptime or downtime any single consumer experiences with internet-based experiences on an annual basis, but we frequently see estimates of app availability, or network or device availability that separately look fairly reasonable, usually in minutes per year when a particular app is not available, for example. 


And that includes planned downtime for major software upgrades or maintenance, for example. And, generally speaking, most of us, most of the time, might agree that our internet-based app experiences are robust. We normally expect them to be there, and to work.


Value Chain Segment

Uptime (%)

Downtime (Minutes per Year)

Network Outages (Average ISP)

99.95%

29.2

Application Downtime (Average)

99.90%

52.56

Device Issues (Estimated)

99.50%

21.9

Total Value Chain Availability

Varies

Varies

Akamai State of the Internet/Connectivity Report

-

2880 - 5760 Minutes (2-4 days)

ThousandEyes

-

4380 - 7200 Minutes (3-5 days)


There are a few caveats. Downtime for planned outages might be greater than we assume, because we are sleeping when those planned outages happen. Also, some apps, networks or devices might be down, but not in use by any single user at any single time, so the “outages” are not experienced. 


In other words, if an outage happens to an app or service I am not using, I do not notice it. A thousand apps I do not use can have lots of outages; I'd never notice. Conversely, I am quite apt to notice an outage of my most-favorite and most-used apps. 


Also, end user experience is not simply a matter of app availability, but all other sources in series, including one’s devices, the internet access and transport networks, data center servers and local power, for example. 


Outages of some magnitude from all of those sources must be combined to derive a full picture of internet experience availability, across all experiences any single user has in a year. 


During a recent planned 48-hour local power outage, I could not use the internet in any AC-powered context. The apps, networks and devices might have been available, but local AC power was not available. Uptime for all the apps, devices and networks might have been quite high, yet my experience of “outage” happened anyhow. 


“Observability” therefore matters. Outages I do not encounter do not matter. Outages caused by local power outages do matter, even when there is no problem with the apps, devices or networks enabling internet experiences. 


The point is that the end user experience of internet-enabled experiences is conditional and cumulative; a function of what one does and doesn’t do, and when, across the full accumulated range of possible failure points.


"Apple Intelligence" is Coming

Apple's Worldwide Developers Conference (WWDC) this month should provide an indication of what Apple is working on in the generative AI area. Apple Intelligence is said to be the branding of Apple’s AI offerings. But it seems clear enough Apple will focus on on-board processing capabilities related to smartphone apps.


Given the importance of Siri, it would not come as a surprise to hear something about Siri AI features. Other areas where Apple’s on-board processing approach could support AI could include summarization features, photo editing or chatbot features. 


All that would make sense with the arrival of iOS 18, the next major update to the iPhone operating system. 


But lots of apps should get a boost, including:

  • Apple Music: Auto-generated playlists and smarter song transitions.

  • Apple News: AI-generated news article summaries.

  • Health: New features powered by AI

  • Keynote and Pages: AI-powered features for auto-generating slides in Keynote, writing faster in Pages

  • Mail: Incoming email categorization, and suggested replies to emails, as well as email thread summaries and text composition assistance.

  • Messages: Per-word effects, suggested replies, custom emoji, message recaps..

  • Notes: A built-in audio recording tool and audio transcriptions

  • Notifications: AI-generated notification summaries.

  • Photos: AI-powered photo retouching.

  • Safari: Browsing assistant that can summarize web pages, and a "Web Eraser" tool.

  • Spotlight: More intelligent search results and improved sorting.

  • Voice Memos: Audio transcriptions.


Though Apple is widely considered to be “behind” in generative AI leadership, that perception is likely misplaced. Recall Apple’s traditional approach to technology innovation: it rarely is the “first” to deploy any new technology. Instead, it has excelled at packaging new technology in better, more user-friendly or elegant ways. 


In fact, it would have been a shock had Apple emerged early as a generative AI leader. 


Where Apple should emerge as a force is on-device AI, given its leadership in devices and device functions, where AI already has been deployed to support smartphone operations related to imaging and cameras; user voice input; voice-to-text translation or facial recognition. 


Use Case

Description

Facial Recognition (Unlocking Phones)

Faster and more secure authentication compared to server-based verification.

Image/Video Processing (Filters, Editing)

Real-time filters and effects applied directly on the device, without needing to upload and download media files.

Voice Recognition (Offline Assistants)

Offline access to voice commands for basic tasks like setting alarms or making calls.

Sensor Data Analysis (Fitness Trackers)

Real-time processing of biometric data for personalized health insights and fitness coaching.

AR/VR Applications (Overlays, Interactions)

Enhanced responsiveness and lower latency for a more immersive augmented or virtual reality experience.


The advantages of on-the-device edge processing include latency performance, battery life improvements and privacy and security, as well as the ability to work when internet connectivity is lost. 

On-Device AI Processing Advantage

Value

Faster Response Times

No need to send data back and forth to the cloud, leading to quicker results, especially for real-time applications.

Lower Power Consumption

Processing data locally reduces reliance on network connectivity, saving battery life on mobile devices.

Improved Privacy, Security

User data stays on the device, minimizing privacy concerns and potential security risks associated with cloud storage.

Offline Functionality

Works even without an internet connection, essential for situations with limited access.


Thursday, June 6, 2024

How Big a Problem are Industry Revenue Growth Rates?

In most industries, it is probably safe to argue that under-par performance is the existential problem, not in-line performance. Executives don't get fired unless their outcomes are sub-par, compared to industry averages.


Is low connectivity service provider revenue growth a problem? It might seem obvious that it is a problem, but whether it is an existential problem is probably the better way to frame the question. Different industries have different growth rates, profit margins and roles in the value chain. Noting such differences might be highly useful for firm and industry strategy.


It might simply be unreasonable to expect traditionally-slow-growing industries to alter those patterns, just as we might be skeptical about firms in traditionally fast-growing industries that do not seem to exhibit the “industry standard” growth rates. 


The exception is if a given firm in a given industry is able to deploy or acquire assets in different parts of an industry value chain that have distinctly-different growth characteristics. That is the logic behind the “move up the stack” argument. 


As a management professor once advised us, “if you have a choice, choose a fast-growing industry.” The reason is that similar amounts of effort and skill (the same effort by a single individual in different settings) will produce different outcomes when applied to declining, slow-growing or fast-growing industries and firms. 


source: KPMG 


The point is that annual growth rates are a “problem” in any industry only when the trend worsens and growth slows over time. But that is not necessarily an issue management can fix, in any one company in any single industry. Over time, profit margins or growth rates in many industries have slowed, in part because of market saturation and competition. 


Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find an industry whose revenue growth rates have not declined over time. 


Industry Sector

Historical Average Growth Rate (%)

Projected Long-Term Growth Rate (%)

Technology

8-10%

5-7%

Healthcare

5-7%

4-6%

Consumer Staples

3-4%

2-3%

Consumer Discretionary

5-6%

3-5%

Financials

6-8%

3-5%

Industrials

4-6%

2-4%

Materials

5-7%

3-5%

Energy

4-6%

2-4%

Utilities

3-5%

2-4%

Telecommunications

5-7%

2-4%

Retail (except E-commerce)

2-4%

1-2%

E-commerce

10-15%

7-10%

Education

4-6%

3-5%


And with the caveat that different segments and firms might have different growth rates, industries with utility-like characteristics show the same slower revenue growth rates as seen in most other industries. 


Industry Sector

Historical Average Growth Rate (%)

Long-Term Growth Rate (%)

Telecommunications

5-7%

2-4%

Cable

4-6%

1-3%

ISP (Internet Service Providers)

6-8%

3-5%

Satellite Communications

8-10%

4-6%

Electric Utilities

3-5%

2-4%

Water Utilities

3-4%

2-3%


The point is that slow growth rates, or slower growth rates, are not necessarily an existential problem. Expected growth rates might simply reflect the near-universal slowing of industry growth rates in virtually all industries over time. 


And to the extent that utility-type industries and connectivity businesses traditionally have growth rates in the middle of all industries, continued “slow growth” is not unexpected, nor unusual, nor an imminent threat. 


That is simply the nature of the business. To be sure, not every provider in every segment has the same growth rate. But the reasons for such divergences are hard--if not impossible--to replicate. Younger firms tend to grow faster than older firms. Non-dominant firms sometimes get help from regulators to increase competition with dominant firms. Some segments of an industry grow faster than others. 


Sure, every executive would prefer faster growth rates over slower growth. But there are rational limits to how much that is subject to managerial skill.


An 80-Year-Old Gift

80 years ago these young men began purchasing some very-expensive real estate on beaches, fields, farms and towns in Normandy, France. But not for themselves. Thank you. We do not forget the gift.

Wednesday, June 5, 2024

AI is Like the PC OS Business Model in Some Ways

In some key ways, the artificial intelligence business is developing in quite a different manner than did the internet, at least at the level of foundational models that might be likened to operating systems. 


Or, to use another analogy, the large language model business stack is built on the actual LLMs. And there is a possible divergence between the internet, built largely on open source or marketplace standards including TCP/IP and Ethernet, and generative AI, built more on the model of the personal computer operating system platforms. 


The internet's development--at the key application level--was largely driven by startups and entrepreneurs. GenAI is largely driven by a relatively small number of large and established firms, even if startups abound at the app layer. 


Building internet apps and services often required less initial investment compared to GenAI, such as the cost to build and train an application’s generative AI capabilities and inferences. 


Application user experience and scalability arguably were more important than access to capital, in part because capital was so abundant at that time and also because the ability to scale (users) was seen as key. 


AI models are dependent on vast access to data; the internet apps were not. So as mechanisms develop to codify “fair use” and licensed access, more capital is going to be required for access to quality data sources. 


There are other angles as well. The early internet was powered by private data centers of modest size. But AI is powered by “cloud computing” mechanisms. 


By most estimates, about 65 percent of the capacity in global data centers is owned by just three companies: Amazon, Google, and Microsoft. That matters for artificial intelligence provided “as a service,” as much of the digital infrastructure required to support AI will be provided by the handful of hyperscale “computing as a service” suppliers. 


And some might note that one value of investing in an AI startup are the agreements to use a particular cloud computing provider. 


Startups get investment, but also agree to use the investing cloud computing giant’s infrastructure. 


Also, some note that Google, Microsoft and Amazon are actively investing in hundreds of AI start-ups, as well.  In 2023, Google, Microsoft and Amazon invested as much as two-thirds of the $27 billion for AI startups, a report argues.  


Ignoring for the moment the matters of governance or competition in markets, there are possible systemic dangers related to firm revenue and profits. In the internet bubble at the turn of the century, for example, many firms exaggerated their revenues or capital bases using various forms of financial excess. 


Internet capacity providers engaged in a practice called "capacity swapping." They bought and sold unused bandwidth from each other, artificially inflating their reported capacity and network reach. This created the illusion of high demand and fueled investor confidence. But it was an illusion. Actual end user demand was not as high as it seemed. 


Many internet app startups relied heavily on vendor financing. Vendors would extend credit to these companies in exchange for stock options. This allowed startups to show reduced costs while vendors could report higher sales. 


Some companies also resorted to creative accounting practices to inflate their revenue figures or provide growth metrics. Companies might record barter agreements, where they traded services or advertising space instead of receiving cash, as actual revenue. This inflated their top line without reflecting any real cash flow.


Some companies recognized revenue from multi-year contracts  upfront,  treating the entire value of the  contract as income in the current year.  This practice distorted their current financial health and overstated immediate profitability.


Companies might capitalize expenses related to marketing, website development or customer acquisition  as assets instead of showing them as expenses.  This artificially inflated reported profits. 


Some companies recorded revenue for services even if the customer hadn't paid yet, again inflating reported revenues. 


The point is that the AI business is developing in quite a different way than the internet. At least until the spigots shut off, there was plenty of investment capital available during the internet bubble. I recall being quite shocked when told by a startup’s founders not to worry about some parts of a business plan I was working on, as there was “plenty of money.” 


AI is different, at the model or platform level.  It is extremely capital intensive at a time when capital arguably is not plentiful or affordable. So barriers to entry are quite significant for model builders. In that sense, GenAI more nearly resembles the PC operating system model than the internet.


Directv-Dish Merger Fails

Directv’’s termination of its deal to merge with EchoStar, apparently because EchoStar bondholders did not approve, means EchoStar continue...