To a signficiant extent, all tier-one connectivity service providers are in the same box: trapped in a highly-competitive business with slow to no growth; with declining profit margins and a "return on investment" problem and lacking the capital resources to make fundamental changes.
AT&T’s forays into media continue to be roundly assailed, but illustrate the problem.
The recent acquisitions and divestitures of DirecTV and WarnerMedia bring to mind earlier “grow the company” efforts that were focused on the core connectivity function, and also cratered, for arguably the same reason: AT&T’s debt burden was too high.
The strategy might even have been correct, but AT&T could not survive the debt-fueled strategy. And keep in mind "AT&T" has failed in two incarnations: first as a long distance company trying to create local loop facilities; the second time as an integrated provider trying to move beyond a reliance on connectivity revenues.
In the late 1990s, AT&T made a big move into cable TV, partly to fuel its move into local access services, partly to capitalize on the robust cash flow cable TV was then generating.
Given the success cable operators have had with broadband access and support for voice services (the networks of the early 1980s were one-way) show the strategy was not wildly off the mark.
On June 24, 1998, AT&T acquired Tele-Communications Inc. for $48 billion, marking a reentry by AT&T into the local access business it had been barred from since 1984.
When AT&T bought Tele-Communications, the objective was to use those assets to create a national broadband access capability which AT&T did not at that time possess. Recall that the 1983 divestiture of monopoly AT&T created seven local access companies--the “Baby Bells”--while restricting AT&T to long distance.
When, in 1996 the Telecommunications Act opened all telco markets to competition, AT&T was faced with the challenge of creating a facilities-based local access network capability. That it failed to do so successfully is not too surprising, given the cost of creating an almost-nationwide broadband infrastructure. Think of the continuing cost of creating fiber to home networks nationally.
Having concluded it had neither the time nor the money to create access networks nationwide, AT&T gambled on upgrading TCI’s cable networks. But the strategy was not the issue, the debt was.
AT&T also bought Teleport Communications Group, a $500-million-a-year local business phone company, for $13.3 billion; MetroNet, a Canadian phone system, for $7 billion; and the IBM Global Network, which carries data traffic, for $5 billion, as parts of a move into local access.
But the debt burden was too high and AT&T reversed course in 2004 and sold most of those assets. AT&T Broadband (the former TCI and US West Broadband assets) were sold to Comcast, making that firm the biggest U.S. cable TV company.
The point is that AT&T could not figure out a way to quickly create a massive facilities-based local access network capability to compete with the Baby Bells and all the other newcomers, after passage of the 1996 Telecom Act.
As a related issue, AT&T was not able to replicate the success later shown by Comcast in diversifying its product lines beyond the legacy. Comcast now earns significant revenue from content ownership, subscription video, home broadband, business services and voice, where it once relied exclusively on cable TV subscriptions.
AT&T hoped to replicate that feat. Yes, the strategy failed, twice.
Few--if any--observers note that AT&T has twice been the largest linear video provider in the U.S. market. The first foray in the 1990s made AT&T the largest cable TV company in the U.S. market.
The second foray was the purchase of DirecTV, which again made AT&T the largest supplier of linear video subscription services in the U.S. market.
At the same time, few can recommend any strategy for AT&T--or the other big connectivity providers--that lifts revenue growth beyond a few percent a year. Connectivity is a slow-growth business. If higher growth rates are desirable, that growth almost by definition has to come from outside the traditional connectivity role.
No firm in the global telco-legacy connectivity industry has really succeeded wildly in that regard.
By 2005 AT&T itself was acquired by SBC Communications, which promptly rebranded itself AT&T. Yes, AT&T has twice failed to innovate itself out of a box. But it is a box that has imprisoned virtually all global connectivity providers.
From time to time a segment of the industry, in some regions, is able to grow--for a time--at fast rates. Quite often that growth only compensates for losses in other parts of the business. Mobility growth balancing declining voice revenues is the best example.
The internet has made matters worse, further limiting the value and revenues connectivity providers can reap while driving value “up the stack” to third party providers.
Those who castigate AT&T for its strategic failures are too harsh. Debt has been the issue, as the firm never could afford to spend enough, fast enough, to solve its local access problem, or its revenue source problem.
If any of us were asked whether AT&T could afford to build a national FTTH network--within 10 years--we would rightly doubt it was possible. Even if it had the money, it did not have the time.
No single firm could afford to spend $300 billion over 10 years to connect even 100 million homes, which is the scale of the problem AT&T faced.
The first failure was experienced by AT&T the long distance company. The second failure was that of the former SBC Communications, rebranded as AT&T. It always was an unsolvable problem.
