Plant-Based Meat Products Show Substitution is Hard

It is a truism that substitute products, such as plant-based proteins that mimic meat, must have some obvious value that induces consumers to switch. That might be lower price, clear product advantages or something else.

So far, plant-based meat substitutes have not gotten the formula right. 

source: Good Food Institute

Many would-be buyers arguably still would prefer to substitute plant-based protein for meat. But product improvements and price issues have to be addressed.

So far, though advocates might be repeat buyers, the typical shopper has not found the expected product advantages, nor any cost advantage. 

Plant-based meat has carried a large price gap versus conventional meat of as much as 80 percent. Not many product alternatives with comparable characteristics or value to the target product are going to succeed with a price premium that large. 

But for many buyers, product attributes are not “equal.” Taste and texture seem to discourage buyers.  

Macro pressures (inflation, cost sensitivity) do not help, either. 

Year	Plant-based meat & seafood retail sales (USD)	Unit sales (million units)	Total plant-based retail food sales (USD)	Household penetration (% of U.S. households buying plant-based meat & seafood)
2022	$1.43 B (approx.) — industry retail estimate. The Good Food Institute	270 million units (GFI/SPINS). The Good Food Institute	$8.2 B (GFI/SPINS dataset for 2022). The Good Food Institute	19% (household penetration, 2022). The Good Food Institute
2023	$1.26 B (approx., derived from reported year-over-year change). The Good Food Institute	— (category showed declines vs 2022; SPINS/GFI tracked a drop but official 2023 unit number is in the GFI dataset). The Good Food Institute	$8.1 B (GFI/PBFA reporting for 2023). The Good Food Institute	15% (penetration, 2023). The Good Food Institute
2024	$1.17 B (GFI market overview / SPINS-based figure). The Good Food Institute	195 million units (GFI report: 195M units sold in 2024). The Good Food Institute	≈ $8.1 B (category roughly stable overall; plant-based meat & milk declines offset other growth). The Good Food InstituteThe Food Institute	13% (penetration, 2024). The Good Food Institute

But work continues on a number of fronts, experts say. So early obstacles might be overcome, optimists will insist. And some might argue that a few use cases, such as plant-based substitutes for ground meat (hamburger patties, sausages) have proven most successful so far. 

Category	Method	Purpose	Example Brands / Products
Taste	Protein purification & low-heat processing	Remove off-flavors (beany, grassy, bitter) from pea/soy proteins	Ripple Foods (pea milk), Beyond Meat’s pea protein refinement
	Enzymatic treatment of proteins	Break down bitter peptides, improve solubility	Ingredion (Versawave proteins), Burcon NutraScience
	Yeast & mushroom extracts	Boost umami and savory meat-like flavor	Quorn (mycoprotein), Unilever The Vegetarian Butcher
	Maillard reaction precursors	Create cooked-meat aroma during cooking	Impossible Burger uses amino acids + sugars for aroma
	Cultured fats for flavor release	Provide authentic meat fat flavor during cooking	Mission Barns, Lypid
Texture	High-moisture extrusion (HME)	Align protein fibers to mimic muscle	Beyond Meat, MorningStar Farms Incogmeato, Nestlé Sensational Burger
	Shear-cell technology	Create long fibrous structures without high temp/pressure	Nutreco / Rival Foods partnership
	Blending multiple proteins	Adjust chewiness & elasticity	Gardein (pea + wheat + soy), Lightlife
	Encapsulated fats & emulsions	Simulate marbling & juiciness	Lypid PhytoFat, Beyond Meat marbling
	Layered component assembly	Build steak/chicken textures with different layers	Meati (mycelium-based “whole cut”), Juicy Marbles (plant-based steak)
Visual realism	Natural colorants	Raw-to-cooked color shift	Impossible (soy leghemoglobin), Beyond (beet juice extract)
	Visible marbling inclusions	Mimic animal fat streaks	Juicy Marbles, Chunk Foods
	Heat-reactive appearance	Browning/grill mark simulation	MorningStar Grillers, Beyond Cookout Burger
Advanced / Hybrid	Precision fermentation	Produce animal-identical proteins (heme, whey, casein)	Impossible Foods (heme), Perfect Day (whey protein)
	Cultured fat inclusion	Use real animal fat grown in bioreactors	Mission Barns, Hoxton Farms
	3D food printing	Layer plant proteins for whole-muscle cuts	Redefine Meat, NovaMeat
	Enzyme cross-linking	Modify protein gels for bite & elasticity	Enzymtec, R&D at Kerry
	Hybrid plant + cultivated meat	Improve taste & realism while reducing animal content	Eat Just GOOD Meat, Upside Foods (future planned blends)

Product substitution can take any number of forms, including changes of technology, price, value, performance, problem solved or different materials or construction. 

Technology-driven substitution

New Product	Replaced Product	Why It Succeeded
Smartphones	Feature phones, standalone cameras, MP3 players, GPS devices	Combined multiple devices in one; convenience outweighed cost
Streaming services (Netflix, Spotify)	DVD rentals, CDs, broadcast TV, radio	On-demand access, personalization, lower friction
LED lighting	Incandescent & CFL bulbs	Lower energy use, longer lifespan, better performance
Digital photography	Film cameras & film processing	Instant review, no film cost, easy sharing

Price/value substitution

New Product	Replaced Product	Why It Succeeded
Private-label grocery brands	National branded packaged goods	Comparable quality at lower price; retail shelf control
Refurbished enterprise IT hardware	New OEM hardware	Lower capex; acceptable reliability for many workloads
Budget airlines (Southwest, Ryanair)	Full-service carriers	Lower fares, point-to-point routes

Performance/feature substitution

New Product	Replaced Product	Why It Succeeded
Cordless power tools	Corded power tools	Mobility, convenience, battery improvements
Electric vehicles	Internal combustion engine vehicles (for some segments)	Lower running costs, performance, environmental positioning
Solid-state drives (SSD)	Hard disk drives (HDD) in laptops	Faster performance, lower power, durability

Business process / B2B substitution

New Product / Service	Replaced Product / Service	Why It Succeeded
Cloud computing (AWS, Azure)	On-premise servers	Elastic scaling, reduced capex, speed of deployment
SaaS CRM (Salesforce)	Installed CRM software	Lower IT overhead, constant updates, remote access
E-procurement platforms	Paper-based or email-based purchasing	Speed, transparency, auditability
VoIP telephony	Traditional PBX systems	Cost savings, integration with software platforms

Material & ingredient substitution

New Product	Replaced Product	Why It Succeeded
Aluminum cans	Glass bottles for beverages	Lighter, cheaper to transport, unbreakable
Synthetic rubber	Natural rubber	Stable supply, price stability, performance in varied conditions
Plant-based milks (soy, almond, oat)	Dairy milk (for some buyers)	Lactose-free, perceived health/environmental benefits

Artificial General Intelligence is Not Here, but Could be "Close," (for Such a Major Technology)

How far away is artificial general intelligence? Further away than many now claim, says Google DeepMind CEO Dennis Hassabis. But some might take heart that he estimates we might actually get to AGI in five to 10 years.

For many technology watchers, that would be a breathtakingly fast development for something as sophisticated as AGI.

Granted, "how long" it takes any new technology to develop depends on how we choose to set the "start" date. Optimists might take a shorter view; pessimists might include lots of seminal research in the broader AI field to see the "start" date. 

And then there is the matter of the degree of deployment or use that qualifies as the commercial arrival date. What percentage of humans have to use AGI regularly to allow us to claim commercial deployment at some reasonable scale? 

Of Thee I Sing

For many of us, this still is the promise of America. It's an idea. We need to stand for her. Let the haters hate.

Who "Needs" 6G to be Revolutiionary?

By about 2030, standards bodies and suppliers will have gotten quite a ways down the road of preparing the next generation of mobile networks to succeed 5G. There will be claims about how “revolutionary” it might be, as we heard about 3G, 4G and 5G before. 

So "who" in the value chain gets most "value" from such claims about "revolutionary new features?" Consumers, app suppliers and users perhaps will benefit, but incrementally, in the form of higher speeds and lower latency.

Infrastructure suppliers and service providers, on the other hand, "need" to make such claims. Without dramatic new features, it is hard for infra suppliers to sell new networks. Without the promise of important new features, service providers will have a hard time convincing regulators to grant spectrum to build the new networks.

In other words, 6G will largely be "nice to have" for consumers and app providers. The promise of 6G progress will be "must have" if the networks are to be built.

There will be requirements for additional spectrum, as always has been the case when a mobile next-generation network has launched. The issue is how much new spectrum might be required. 

And even if the general rule is that users consume more data, and therefore use more bandwidth, over time, there are some questions about the degree to which mobile operators will need to spend heavily on new spectrum, though governments who make money selling spectrum will prefer higher amounts and costlier prices. 

Mobile service providers obviously will want to limit their investment in new spectrum resources. Keep in mind that they have other avenues for doing so. They can create smaller cells; they can use more-efficient radios and network elements; better air interfaces and reclaim spectrum supporting older networks that are decommissioned (2G and 3G being the best examples at the moment). 

But offloading demand to fixed networks has become a huge tool as well. 

Wi-Fi handles 70 percent to 80 percent of total smartphone data consumption, with the exact figure varying by region. Wi-Fi data consumption in the United States is about  85 percent to 90 percent, for example, while lower in emerging markets (around 50 percent to 70 percent), according to estimates fromCisco, Ericsson, and OpenSignal, for example. 

Year	Wi-Fi Data Consumption (EB/month)	Mobile Network Data Consumption (EB/month)	Percentage on Wi-Fi
2024	383	164	70%
2025	460	197	70%

Beyond the Wi-Fi role, technologists and operators have gotten better at using older platforms to ease the transition to a next generation of networks, even if that means not all the touted features are available. Network slicing on 5G networks requires “standalone” platforms that in many cases are lightly deployed at the moment, for example. 

On the other hand, the faster speeds and higher bandwidth, plus lower latency of every next-generation network already is producing commercial revenue in significant amounts, such as using 5G platforms to support fixed wireless for home broadband. 

That might not be among the futuristic capabilities 5G was supposed to provide, but it has created new revenue and product possibilities. 

So perhaps some skepticism about the market “need” for 6G, and the resources needed to support it, are reasonable. Already, 6G is touted as supporting a new array of sensory information such as touch, taste and smell. 

Some of us would be that if such innovations actually arrive, it will be about the time 7G arrives, as that has been the pattern for past next-generation network innovations as well: the promised futuristic apps need twice as long to reach commercial success as predicted. 

So promised 3G innovations don’t arrive until 4G; 4G innovations don’t arrive until 5G. That isn’t to deny the practical advantages for each next-generation network: more capacity and lower latency. 

But those improvements are akin to the need fixed network operators have to upgrade copper access to optical fiber; satellite providers to upgrade from geostationary platforms to low-earth-orbit constellations, all of which support higher capacity networks. 

Mobile networks will need to continue to evolve to support higher speeds. The “revolutionary new applications and use cases”  might ultimately be less important. 

"Everyone" Wants More Housing. Just Not "In My Backyard"

Land use regulations including zoning laws, density restrictions, minimum lot sizes, height limits, rules on parking spaces and growth controls increase the cost of housing and limit its construction.

That matters if the U.S. housing supply is 4.7 million homes short of demand. It’s just basic supply and demand economics. And focusing on supply matters.

Local zoning, land use, density regulations and so forth often limit the amount, type, and location of new housing development, effectively constraining supply even as population growth, urbanization, and economic demand for housing rise.

This supply shortage pushes up prices and rents, making housing less affordable, particularly for low- and middle-income households.

For instance, regulations can impose lengthy permitting processes, environmental reviews, or inclusionary requirements that raise development costs, which are then passed on to buyers or renters.

But the bigger problem is simply that such rules are among many reasons more housing is not created.

 

To be sure, the rationale often is compelling: preserving community character, protecting the environment, or preventing urban sprawl.

But those very same rules create disincentives to build affordable housing, as they all restrict housing density or volume. 

Study Title	Authors	Year	Methodology and Key Findings
The Effect of Land Use Regulation on Housing and Land Prices	Keith R. Ihlanfeldt	2007	Used an endogenous index of regulatory restrictiveness across over 100 Florida cities; found greater restrictiveness increases house prices, decreases land prices, and leads to larger new homes.
The Effects of Land Use Regulation on the Price of Housing: What Do We Know? What Can We Learn?	John M. Quigley and Larry A. Rosenthal	2005	Reviewed empirical literature using surveys, econometric models (e.g., OLS, hedonic pricing), and regulatory indices; regulations like zoning and growth boundaries are associated with higher prices, but causality is not firmly established due to endogeneity and data limitations.
Land-Use Reforms and Housing Costs	Christina Plerhoples Stacy et al.	2023	Analyzed a panel dataset of 180 reforms in 1,136 U.S. cities (2000–2019) using machine learning, manual coding, and fixed-effects models; loosening restrictions increases supply by 0.8% over 3–9 years (mainly high-end units), while tightening raises median rents and reduces affordable units.
How Land-Use Regulation Undermines Affordable Housing	Sanford Ikeda and Emily Washington	2015	Reviewed literature and urban policy data; regulations reduce supply relative to free-market levels, increase costs (e.g., 10%+ "regulatory tax" in major cities), and disproportionately affect low-income households, potentially lowering GDP by limiting growth in productive areas.
Regulation and Housing Supply	Joseph Gyourko and Raven Molloy	2014	Literature review with surveys, panel data, and regression analyses (e.g., OLS, instrumental variables); strong positive link between regulation and prices (17–22% increases), reduced construction (4–22%), and lower supply elasticity, leading to volatility.
Zoning, Land-Use Planning, and Housing Affordability	Randal O'Toole	2017	Regression analysis of court decisions as proxies for regulation intensity (2000–2010 data); rising land-use and zoning regulations correlate with higher home prices in 44 and 36 states, respectively, with federal aid flowing more to restrictive states.
The Impact of Zoning on Housing Affordability	Edward L. Glaeser and Joseph Gyourko	2002	Compared house prices to construction costs across U.S. markets; zoning drives prices above costs in high-regulation areas (e.g., NYC, California), suggesting supply restrictions exacerbate affordability issues more than demand alone.
Do Restrictive Land Use Regulations Make Housing More Expensive Everywhere?	John Landis and Vincent J. Reina	2021	Examined 336 metro areas with multiple stringency measures and growth variables; restrictive regulations pervasively raise home values and rents, especially in growing/prosperous economies, but effects on supply vary by market.

"Not in my backyard" remains an important problem as well. We might say we want "X" as a policy. But almost nobody says they want "X" implemented in their own neighborhood. "Do it to somebody else" is the inevitable real-world, up close and personal answer, whatever the loftier images people have of themselves.

And that generally applies to all of us, as we ponder the impact of land use rules. It makes a huge difference whether we are among the "haves" or the "have nots."

Density will not appeal to those already living in low-density areas.

Conversely, density might make all the difference for those entering the owned-housing market.

To be crude, do land use planning rules preserve "privilege" for some at the expense of many others? Of course they do.