Showing posts sorted by date for query growth rate. Sort by relevance Show all posts
Showing posts sorted by date for query growth rate. Sort by relevance Show all posts

Thursday, September 3, 2026

Study Says AI Reshaping Labor Markets

A new Dallas Federal Reserve study suggests generative artificial intelligence adoption is reshaping the Texas labor market, primarily by reducing demand for some types of work, not so much by eliminating existing positions but by reducing demand for recent college graduates. 


“The most exposed occupations are generally in software development, web design and other computer-heavy occupations,” the report says. “Managers, clerical workers, editors and other white-collar occupations are also subject to some of the highest levels of AI task exposure.”


source: Dallas Federal Reserve


“There is strong evidence that GenAI has decreased labor demand for occupations consisting of tasks that can be performed by these new tools,” the researchers say. Still, “the overall effect on aggregate online job posting behavior thus far has been modest.”


“Recent college graduates, whose unemployment rate rose to unusually high levels during this period of rapid GenAI adoption, are where effects of GenAI on employment and earnings are likely to first appear,” the study suggests. 


So far, AI's labor-market effect is that “fewer people get hired into certain jobs,” rather than “large numbers of existing workers fired from those jobs.” 



Study

Data / period

Main finding

Job impact

Brynjolfsson, Chandar & Chen — “Canaries in the Coal Mine” (Stanford, revised 2026)

ADP payroll data, millions of workers, through June 2026

No widespread economy-wide displacement, but employment of 22–25-year-olds in highly AI-exposed occupations is 19% below the counterfactual. Experienced workers show no comparable gap.

Strong evidence for the hiring channel. The authors say the adjustment occurs primarily through reduced hiring of young workers rather than increased separations. (Stanford Digital Economy Lab)

Hosseini Maasoum & Lichtinger — “Generative AI as Seniority-Biased Technological Change” (Harvard, 2026 revision)

65 million résumés, 280,000+ firms

Junior employment falls following GenAI adoption, particularly in highly exposed occupations; senior employment is largely unchanged.

Decline is driven primarily by slower hiring rather than increased separations. (SSRN)

Tucker — “You're (not) Hired” (U.S. Census, 2026)

Matched employer-employee administrative data

Early-career employment in the most AI-exposed industry/state cells fell 12% over 10 quarters after ChatGPT.

The paper finds the decline in employment was primarily caused by a large decrease in hiring. This is perhaps the clearest administrative-data evidence of the mechanism. (Census.gov)

Liu, Wang & Yu — “Labor Demand in the Shadow of Generative AI” (World Bank, 2026 revision)

285 million U.S. online job postings, 2018–2025

Postings for occupations highly vulnerable to AI substitution fell 9% relative to less-vulnerable occupations, with the differential reaching 15% by the third year.

Direct evidence of reduced labor demand, rather than layoffs. Particularly important because it examines vacancies at enormous scale. (SSRN)

Audoly, Guerin & Topa — New York Fed, “Do Job Postings Show Early Labor-Market Effects of AI?” (2026)

U.S. Lightcast postings

Overall hiring has slowed, but they find little evidence of a distinct AI-driven decline in postings for AI-exposed occupations.

Important counterweight: the aggregate slowdown in postings cannot confidently be attributed to AI. (Liberty Street Economics)

Federal Reserve Board — “AI Adoption and Firms' Job-Posting Behavior” (2026)

Firm/industry AI adoption + job postings

No evidence that firms or industries with greater AI adoption have reduced total job postings.

Suggests that if AI is eliminating some positions, firms may be switching hiring toward other jobs, rather than simply reducing total hiring. (Federal Reserve)

Gimbel, Kendall & Nunn — Yale Budget Lab (2026)

Monthly CPS employment/wage data

After controlling for differences between exposed and unexposed occupations, they find no statistically or economically significant aggregate employment or wage effect.

Again, little evidence of broad existing-job destruction. The effects may be concentrated in particular populations. (The Budget Lab)

Humlum & Vestergaard — “Still Waters, Rapid Currents” (NBER, 2025/26)

Danish administrative records + AI adoption surveys

No detectable effect on earnings or hours, even among early adopters and highly exposed workers. But substantial task restructuring and occupational switching occurred.

Little evidence of job elimination so far. Firms appear initially to be reorganizing work rather than cutting employment. (National Bureau of Economic Research)

Chandar — “Tracking Employment Changes in AI-Exposed Jobs” (2025)

U.S. CPS, Q4 2022–Q1 2025

No substantial aggregate employment/earnings difference in highly exposed occupations, although software and customer-service occupations diverge.

Overall employment effects small; evidence of localized employment declines, not economy-wide displacement. (SSRN)

Frank et al. / related job-posting research summarized by Stanford

U.S. job postings

Several studies find greater declines in postings in AI-exposed occupations. But some declines began before ChatGPT and correlate with interest rates/remote work.

Supports reduced postings, but attribution to GenAI is contested. (Brookings)

“Winners and losers of generative AI” (JEBO, 2025)

Online freelance marketplace

About 10% of postings were judged substitutable by GenAI; demand for those skill clusters fell as much as 50% in short-term roles.

Strong evidence of demand substitution in particular tasks, although aggregate freelance demand did not fall. (ScienceDirect)

PwC 2025 AI Jobs Barometer

Lightcast job postings, 2019–2024

U.S. occupations with greater GenAI exposure experienced substantially slower job-posting growth: roughly 2% vs. 20% for less-exposed occupations.

Strong descriptive evidence of slower demand growth, though not necessarily causal evidence of AI. (PwC)


But trends could, or maybe, should, change over time, as actual job displacement or elimination, plus creation of new jobs, happens. 


Effect

Evidence so far

Mass layoffs caused by GenAI

🔴 Little evidence

Economy-wide employment decline

🔴 Little/no evidence

Reduced total hiring because of AI

🟡 Weak/mixed

Reduced hiring in particular AI-exposed occupations

🟢 Increasing evidence

Reduced entry-level hiring

🟢 Significant evidence, but causality disputed

Reduced job postings in AI-substitutable occupations

🟢 Fairly strong evidence

Task substitution/reorganization

🟢 Strong evidence

Productivity increases without employment reductions

🟢 Strong evidence

Wage effects

🟡 Generally small so far

Long-term displacement

❓ Still largely unknown


On balance, it is possible net job creation could happen, as AI creates new jobs and roles, despite AI-induced reductions. 


Study

Period / data

Main finding

Implication

Autor, Chin, Salomons & Seegmiller, “New Frontiers: The Origins and Content of New Work” (QJE, 2024)

U.S., 1940–2018; ~35,000 Census occupations

About 60% of employment in 2018 was in occupations that did not exist in 1940. New work emerged alongside technological change, particularly in professional and service occupations after 1980. (National Bureau of Economic Research)

Perhaps the strongest evidence that technology doesn't simply redistribute a fixed number of jobs. It creates new categories of work.

Autor, “Why Are There Still So Many Jobs?” (JEP, 2015)

Historical review

Automation substitutes for labor in particular tasks but also complements workers, raises productivity and output, and increases demand for labor elsewhere. (TopCat)

Explains why technological progress can eliminate particular jobs without eliminating work generally.

Acemoglu & Restrepo, “Automation and New Tasks” (JEP, 2019)

U.S. historical/employment evidence

Automation creates a displacement effect, but creation of new tasks produces a reinstatement effect that raises labor demand. (AEA Publications)

Provides a theoretical framework for understanding why job creation can offset automation.

Acemoglu & Restrepo, “The Race Between Man and Machine” (AER, 2018)

Long-run economic model

Technology that automates existing tasks reduces labor demand, while creation of new tasks has the opposite effect. (American Economic Association)

Net employment depends on the balance between automation and new-task creation.

Bessen, “Automation and Jobs: When Technology Boosts Employment” (2017)

Historical industries, including textiles, steel and automobiles

Industries experiencing rapid productivity growth sometimes experienced employment growth, because lower costs stimulated demand sufficiently to offset labor-saving technology. The OECD reviews this evidence. (OECD)

Lower prices can create enough additional demand to more than compensate for labor-saving technology.

Mann & Puttmann, “Benign Effects of Automation” (2018)

U.S. counties/industries, patent data

Automation innovations were associated with declining manufacturing employment but increasing employment in services. (OECD)

Job destruction and creation can occur in completely different industries and locations.

Autor & Salomons, “Is Automation Labor-Displacing? Productivity Growth, Employment, and the Labor Share” (2018)

28 industries, 19 advanced economies, 1970–2015

Productivity improvements can reduce employment within an industry, but positive spillovers to other industries more than offset those losses. The OECD summarizes the evidence. (OECD)

This is especially important: you shouldn't look only at the industry where automation occurs.

OECD, Employment Outlook 2019

OECD countries, long historical perspective

Despite substantial technological displacement, overall employment has generally grown. The OECD concludes that historically the net effects of major technological revolutions on employment have been positive. (OECD)

Broad institutional review supporting the historical pattern.

OECD, Technology, Productivity and Job Creation (1998)

OECD historical evidence

Technological change destroys jobs in some industries while creating jobs in others; historically the process produced net job creation as new industries replaced old ones and demand expanded. (OECD)

An earlier, broad cross-country examination reaching the same conclusion.

Tuesday, September 1, 2026

Moral Panics and Data Center Opposition

Moral panics sometimes occur when a society has anxieties about modernization, shifting social roles or perhaps new technologies. 


Opposition to the building of high-performance data centers supporting artificial intelligence operations provides a possible case in point


Yes, there are land use, electricity and water consumption issues. But the actual effects or impacts often are exaggerated.


Data-center electricity use is rising fast because of AI, to be sure.


Globally it was about 1.5% of electrical demand in 2024 (about 415 TWh) and is projected to roughly double to three percent or so by 2030 under IEA base cases, with AI-focused facilities grow faster. 


And data center power demand represents a large fraction of incremental demand growth.


Electricity growth is still a minority of overall demand growth globally and competes with air conditioning, electric vehicle charging, industry, and electrification in general. 


Category

Approximate Annual Electricity Use (US)

Notes / Equivalence

Data centers

~176 TWh (2023); ~180–192 TWh (2024)

~4.4–4.7% of total US electricity. Rising rapidly with AI; projections for late 2020s/2030 often in the 300–800+ TWh range depending on scenario (9–15%+ of US total in higher cases).

Residential / Households

~1,400–1,500 TWh (order of magnitude)

Average US household ~10,000–11,000+ kWh/year. Data centers currently comparable to the electricity use of roughly 15–18 million average households.


Water use for cooling is a big issue in drought-stressed or aquifer-dependent areas. And noise, land conversion, diesel backup generators, and rate impacts (when grid upgrades or generation are socialized) add to the list of issues.


On the other hand, U.S. data-center water use remains a small fraction of total freshwater (perhaps half a percent) and is dwarfed by water used for golf courses and agriculture.


Category

Approximate Annual Water Use (US)

Notes / Equivalence

Data centers (direct consumption)

17–17.4 billion gallons (2023)

Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory and related analyses. Projected to rise (e.g., 38–73 billion gallons by 2028 in some scenarios). Mostly evaporative cooling. Nationally <0.5% of freshwater use. Equivalent to roughly 160,000–580,000 households (varies by per-household assumption).

Golf courses

~531 billion gallons (2024)

1.63 million acre-feet (GCSAA survey). Down ~31% since 2005 due to efficiency and fewer courses. Roughly 30× data-center direct use.

Agriculture / Irrigation

~26.4 trillion gallons (2023)

81.0 million acre-feet applied (USDA NASS 2023 Irrigation and Water Management Survey). By far the largest category; irrigation accounts for roughly 40–50% of total US freshwater withdrawals in recent USGS data. Orders of magnitude larger than data centers.

Residential / Households

Roughly 10–15 trillion gallons (order of magnitude)

Public-supply domestic deliveries are a major share of the ~35–39 billion gallons/day public-supply total. Average household often cited around 100,000–120,000 gallons/year (varies widely by region, family size, outdoor use). Data centers equal a very small fraction of total residential use.


So some might view the concerns as legitimate, but wildly overblown, especially considering all the other value AI and high-performance computing might represent across the whole economy in reducing resource impact. 


Water use for cooling is a big issue in drought-stressed or aquifer-dependent areas. And noise, land conversion, diesel backup generators, and rate impacts (when grid upgrades or generation are socialized) add to the list of issues.


On the other hand, U.S. data-center water use remains a small fraction of total freshwater (perhaps half a percent) and is dwarfed by water used for golf courses and agriculture.


And such concerns do not include benefits such as reduced resource consumption in all other areas of the economy affected by AI and high-performance computing.


Sector / Domain

AI / HPC Application

Mechanism of Resource Reduction

Illustrative Potential Impacts

Agriculture

Precision irrigation, nutrient management, crop monitoring (sensors + satellite + ML models)

Apply water, fertilizer, and pesticides only where and when needed; detect stress early

Water savings commonly 20–50%; fertilizer reductions ~25–30%; higher yields on same or less land

Energy systems / Grids

Demand forecasting, renewable integration, predictive maintenance, flexible load management

Better match supply and demand; reduce curtailment of renewables; shift or curtail flexible loads; avoid unnecessary generation and infrastructure

Lower peak demand, higher renewable utilization, reduced need for peaker plants and excess capacity

Manufacturing

Digital twins, process optimization, predictive maintenance, quality control

Simulate and optimize processes before physical runs; minimize scrap, downtime, and energy waste; right-size material and energy inputs

Energy reductions of 10–30% in optimized plants; lower material waste and fewer defective parts

Buildings & HVAC

Occupancy-based control, predictive climate control, fault detection

Heat/cool only occupied spaces; anticipate weather and usage; detect inefficient equipment early

Significant cuts in heating, cooling, and lighting energy (often 15–30% in smart buildings)

Transportation & Logistics

Route optimization, traffic management, demand prediction, autonomous systems

Reduce empty miles, congestion, and unnecessary trips; improve vehicle utilization and fuel efficiency

Lower fuel/energy use per ton-mile or passenger-mile; fewer vehicles needed for same service

Materials & Chemistry

Accelerated materials discovery and catalyst design (HPC simulation + ML)

Design better batteries, insulation, catalysts, and lightweight materials with fewer experiments

Higher-efficiency products (e.g., better batteries, lower-energy chemical processes) reduce lifetime resource intensity

Water systems

Leak detection, treatment optimization, demand forecasting

Identify and prioritize pipe leaks; optimize chemical dosing and energy in treatment plants

Reduced non-revenue water losses; lower energy and chemical use in water treatment

Supply chains & Circular economy

Demand forecasting, inventory optimization, computer-vision sorting for recycling

Cut overproduction and excess inventory; improve recovery of materials from waste streams

Less waste, lower storage/transport energy, higher material circularity


So a case can be made that current data center expansion concerns are akin to a developing moral panic.


Moral panics are:

  • marked by an increasing concern about a topic

  • characterized by a growing hostility toward the cause of the concern

  • marked by a consensus in the public debate about the nature of the threat

  • led by threats that are disproportionately larger than reality suggests.


Sociologist Stanley Cohen created the phrase. Moral panic is a widespread and exaggerated fear that an evil person, group, or entity threatens a community or society. 


Panic

Time Period

Underlying Cultural Anxiety

The "Folk Devil" or Target

The Salem Witch Trials

1692–1693

Religious anxiety, border warfare, and communal instability in colonial Massachusetts.

Marginalized women and community outsiders accused of witchcraft.

The Comic Book Panic

Late 1940s–1950s

Post-WWII anxiety over juvenile delinquency and the corruption of youth culture by mass media.

Comic book publishers (specifically horror and crime genres) and teenage readers.

Dungeons & Dragons and Satanic Panic

1980s

Fear of changing family structures, secularism, and the rise of youth fantasy subcultures.

Role-playing gamers, heavy metal music fans, and alleged secret satanic cults.

The "Super-Predator" Moral Panic

Mid-1990s

Fear of escalating urban crime rates and changing racial demographics in major cities.

Inner-city youth, particularly young Black males framed as remorseless criminals.


Such panics are relatively short-lived, but intense in the short term, in part because some have incentives to intensify the issue. Politicians; environmentalists; journalists and industry opponents are among them. 


The point is that, in such instances, the threats are exaggerated, often wildly. 


And if concern about data centers does develop into something like a moral panic, history suggests that concern will dissipate. 


The concerns are legitimate, but simply overblown. 


Study Says AI Reshaping Labor Markets

A new Dallas Federal Reserve study suggests generative artificial intelligence adoption is reshaping the Texas labor market, primarily by r...