Tuesday, April 11, 2023

Video Calling Now Among the Top-three Mobile Phone Activities

Technology forecasts can be notoriously incorred, but on timing and adoption. Consider video calling, something that consumers do fairly regularly now.


Despite the many predictions about video calling, that use case was not a mass market and routine use case until recently, when the Covid pandemic forced people to start using it. 


AT&T, for example, demonstrated Picturephone at the 1964 World’s Fair, but adoption never happened. 


source: Time


Not until the Covid pandemic forced people to work from home and students to learn from home was there mass adoption of video calling services such as Zoom


A recent survey of user behavior in 2021, however, shows that video calling follows only instant messaging and voice calling as an activity on a mobile phone.   


source: GSMA Intelligence

How Much is Home Broadband About Physical Media?

Knowing what physical media is used by an access network does not necessarily tell one much about actual capacity or expected customer speed experiences, on any access network. Nor does physical media necessarily drive customer choices in an exclusive way. 


Personally, I’d buy a gigabit service provided by any network compared to an FTTH network supplying less capacity than that. Media does not matter, in that regard. Of course, price, upstream capacity and other issues play a part in such decisions. 


The point is that we sometimes fetishize FTTH, when we should be looking also at speed and other elements of the customer experience. Before FTTH became available, I’d assumed most people would prefer to buy it. In the abstract, that makes a good deal of sense: it’s the better network, right?


But price-value relationships matter. FTTH availability is one matter; buying decisions are driven by a much-wider set of considerations. 


Even though we conventionally assume fiber to home is much faster than copper access, with other platforms such as geostationary satellite, low earth orbit satellite, fixed wireless or hybrid fiber coax somewhere between copper and fiber home broadband platforms, FTTH networks can be activated at a range of speeds. In some cases, FTTH might not represent the fastest-available home broadband choice. 


So comparisons and targets are, in one sense, better evaluated in terms of speed capabilities and price-value relationships, matched by consumer buying behavior. What a policymaker wants is gigabit speeds or multi-gigabit per second speeds, not access media as such. 


There always seems a gap between customer preferences and internet service provider offers. In markets with strong cable operator competition, for example, FTTH tends to get between 40 percent penetration and 45 percent adoption after about three years of marketing. Some FTTH ISPs hope to reach a terminal adoption rate of 50 percent, but that is about the extent of expectations. 


source: IDATE, TelecomTV


Data from other European markets shows similar gaps between facilities deployment and take rates, where take rates hover between 45 percent and 47 percent. And that is a view of physical media choices, not necessarily speed tiers chosen by customers. 


In the U.S. markets, as well, many consumers choose not to buy the “fastest” tiers, but rather tiers someplace in the middle between fastest and slowest. 


source: OpenVault


The point is that enabling fast home broadband networks is one matter; customer demand is another matter. At any given point in time, it is likely that a majority of customers buy services in the middle ranges of capability; not the fastest and not the slowest. 


Consider U.K. fiber to premises networks, where “superfast” networks, by definition, operate at a minimum of 24 Mbps to 30 Mbps. Perhaps 42 percent of U.K. premises can buy FTTH-supplied home broadband. 

source: Uswitch 


Project Gigabit is a UK Government program aimed to bring £5 billion worth of investment to the country’s home broadband infrastructure. The aim is to bring gigabit-capable coverage to 85 percent of the U.K., and maximize coverage in the 20 percent of  hardest-to-reach locations by 2025. 


Based on past experience, it is safe to predict that, at some point, most customers will buy services at the gigabit per second level, just as most now buy services operating at about 30 Mbps. Just as safely, we can predict that, at some point, most customers will buy multi-gigabit per second services as well. 


We sometimes forget that during the dial-up era, people bought services topping out at perhaps 56 kbps in 1997. By 2000, typical speeds had climbed to 256 kbps; by 2002 reaching 2.544 Mbps. 


source: NCTA 


By 2005, typical speeds were in the 8 Mbps range; by 2007 speeds had climbed to about 16 Mbps. By about 2015 we began seeing advertised speeds of 1 Gbps. 


In all those eras save the dial-up period, the top speeds were not purchased by most people. Capabilities are important, to be sure. But consumer demand also matters. 


It is not necessarily a policy failure if most customers choose not to buy a particular product. 

source: Uswitch 


In competitive markets where gigabit alternatives are available on other platforms, FTTH take rates often hover around 40 percent of locations passed. If FTTH were clearly the superior choice, in terms of price-value, take rates would be higher. 


How that changes in the future is a reasonable question, especially in markets with facilities-based competition. In markets with but a single network provider, but multiple retail competitors using one network, FTTH take rates could be much higher, even if market share held by any single contestant 


Monday, April 10, 2023

Why Industry Rebranding Will Mostly Fail

"The more things change, the more they stay the same" might well apply to the connectivity business, despite all efforts to rebrand and reposition the industry as having a value proposition based on something more than "we connect you."


Consider the notion that 6G mobile networks will be about “experience,” as suggested by Interdigital and analysts at Omdia. At some level, this is the sort of advice and thinking we see all the time in business, where suppliers emphasize “solutions” rather than products and virtually all suppliers seek to position them as providers of higher-order value. 


The whole point of home broadband or smartphones with fast internet access is that those capabilities support the user experience of applications. 


And many have been talking about that concept for a while. “The end of communications services as we know them” is the way analysts at the IBM Institute for Business Value talk about 5G and edge computing, for example. 


To be sure, connectivity is not the only business where practitioners are advised to focus on end user benefits, solutions or experiences. But connectivity is among businesses where perceived value, though always said to be “essential” to modern life, also is challenged by robust competition and the ability to create product substitutes. 


One of the realities of the internet era is that although end user data consumption keeps climbing, monetization of that usage by communications service providers is problematic. Higher usage might lead to incremental revenue growth, but at a rate far less than the consumption rate of growth.


That is the opposite of the relationship between consumption and revenue in the voice era, when linear consumption growth automatically entailed linear revenue growth. Though there was some flat-rate charging, most of the revenue was generated by usage of long-distance calling services. 


“On the surface, exponential increases in scale would seem like a good thing for CSPs, but only if pricing keeps pace with the rate of expansion,” the institute says. “History and data suggest it will not.”


Indeed, Nokia Bell Labs researchers have been saying for some time that "creating time" 

is one way of illustrating the difference between core value propositions in the legacy and today’s market. “We connect you” has been the traditional value prop. But that could shift to something else as “connectivity” continues to face commoditization pressures. 

source: Nokia Bell Labs  


The growing business model issue in the internet era is that conventional illustrations of the computing stack refer only to the seven or so layers that pertain to the “computing” or “software” functions. Human beings have experiences at some level above the “applications” layer of the software stack, and business models reside above that. 


Likewise, physical layer communication networks and devices make up a layer zero that underpins the use of software that requires internet or IP network access. The typical illustration of how software is created using layers only pertains to software as a product. 


Software has to run on appliances or machines, and products are assembled or created using software, at additional layers above the seven-layer OSI or TCP/IP models, in other words.


So we might call physical infra and connectivity services as a “layer zero” that supports software layers one to seven. And software itself supports products, services and revenue models above layer seven of the software stack. 


Some humorously refer to “layer eight” as the human factors that shape the usefulness of software, for example. Obviously, whole whole business operating models can be envisioned using eight to 10 layers as well.  


source: Twinstate 


The point is that the OSI software stack only applies to the architecture for creating software. It does not claim to show the additional ways disaggregated and layered concepts apply to firms and industries. 


source: Dragon1 


Many have been using this general framework for many decades, in the sense of business outcomes driving information and computing architecture, platforms, hardware, software and communications requirements. 


source: Wikipedia

 

In a nutshell,  the connectivity industry’s core problem in the internet era is the relative commoditization of connectivity, compared to the perceived value create at other layers. 


Layer zero is bedeviled by nearly-free or very-low-cost core services that have developed over the last several decades as both competition and the internet have come to dominate the business context. 


Note that the Bell Labs illustration based the software stack on the use of “free Wi-Fi.” To be sure, Wi-Fi is not actually free. And internet connectivity still is required. But you get the idea: the whole stack (software and business) rests, in part, on connectivity that has become quite inexpensive, on an absolute basis or in terms of cost per bit.  


Hence the language shift from “we connect you” to other values. That might include productivity or experience, possibly shifting beyond sight and sound to other dimensions such as taste and touch. The point is that the industry will be searching for better ways to position its value beyond “we connect you.”


And all that speaks to the relative perception of the value of “connections.” As foundational and essential as that might be, “mere” connectivity is not viewed as an attractive value proposition going forward. 


It remains to be seen how effective such efforts will be. The other argument is that, to be viewed as supplying more value, firms must actually become suppliers of products and solutions with higher perceived value.


And that tends to mean getting into other parts of the value chain recognized to supply such value. If applications generally are deemed to drive higher financial valuations, for example, then firms have to migrate into those areas, if higher valuations are desired.


If applications are viewed as scaling faster, and producing more new revenue than connectivity, and if suppliers want to be such businesses, then ways should be sought to create more ownership of such assets. 


The core problem, as some might present it, is that the “experience” benefits are going to be supplied by the apps themselves, not the network transporting the bits. It is fine to suggest that value propositions extend beyond “connectivity.” 


source: Interdigital, Omdia


The recurring problem is that, in a world where layers exist, where functions are disaggregated, connectivity providers are hard pressed to become the suppliers of app and business layer value. So long as connectivity exists, value and experience drivers will reside at higher layers of the business stack. 


Unless connectivity providers become asset owners at the higher levels, they will not be able to produce the sensory and experience value that produces business benefits. Without such ownership, the value proposition remains what it has always been: “we connect you.”


If so, the rebranding will fail. Repositioning within the value chain, even if difficult, is required, if different outcomes are to be produced.


So long as humans view the primary communications industry value as "connections," all rebranding focusing on higher-order value will fail. It is the apps that will be given credit for supplying all sorts of new value.


Saturday, April 8, 2023

How Much can Meta Compress its Hierarchy?

Meta’s effort to flatten management does raise logical questions about effective span of control in technology organizations. The span of control refers to the number of direct reports any single manager can effectively handle.  


In this simple illustration, a larger organization has multiple layers of direct reports, while a simple organization might have only one layer of direct reports. Any large organization is going to have a “tall” structure. 

source: OrgChart 


But the span of control is always limited to a small number of direct reports, usually described as topping out around seven people. Any large organization, therefore, is going to have lots of people who are essentially "managing managers." 


To be sure, spans might differ from firm to firm, based on the functional activities each engages in. The military span of control, for example, might be different from that of technology organizations.


The actual span of control arguably varies by the type of tasks to be managed. Highly unstructured work might have a limit of three to five direct reports. 


Highly-structured work, such as in call centers, might allow spans as large as 15 or more. The point is that the span of control is always sharply limited. So any large organization is going to have many people who are essentially managing other managers.

Can

How Much Can Tech Firms Flatten Span of Control?


Meta’s effort to flatten management does raise logical questions about effective span of control in technology organizations. The span of control refers to the number of direct reports any single manager can effectively work with.


To be sure, spans might differ from firm to firm, based on the functional activities each engages in. The military span of control, for example, might be different from that of technology organizations.


But span of control always is limited to a small number of direct reports, usually described as topping out around seven people. Any large organization, therefore, is going to have lots of people who are essentially "managing managers." 


The actual span of control arguably varies by the type of tasks to be managed. Highly unstructured work might have a limit of three to five direct reports. 


Highly-structured work, such as in call centers, might allow spans as large as 15 or more. The point is that spabn of control is always sharply limited. So any large organization is going to have many people who are essentially managing other managers.



Classic Platform Business Model Revenue Still a Science Project for Most Big Connectivity and Cloud Computing Firms

Network as a service, computing, storage or infrastructure as a service might easily be confused with a platform business model. After all, platform business models tend to involve use of remote or cloud computing, an application for ordering, provisioning, payments and customer service. So do many XaaS offerings. 


XaaS can provide value including reduced cost; greater agility and security that is maintained at industry leading levels. Sometimes XaaS also can provide advantages in terms of innovation or potential customer scale. 


But the difference in business models is not “buy versus build” or “virtualized” access, scale or innovation but the mechanism by which revenue is earned. A virtualized service offered by a “pipeline” business model provider is still an example of a traditional pipeline model: the seller creates the service and sells it to the customer. 


Amazon Web Services computing and storage functions, for example, are “sold as a service,” but that does not make those AWS products part of a platform business model. The Amazon Web Services Marketplace, on the other hand, is an example of a platform business model.


The marketplace supports transactions between third-party sellers to Amazon customers where Amazon earns a commission on each sale.


The general observation is that, at this point, though many firms are trying to add platform business model operations, those operations remain at a low level, compared to traditional pipeline operations. 


Classically, a platform earns revenue by earning a commission for arranging a match between buyer and seller. AT&T’s online marketplace, for example, allows third parties to offer internet of things products available for purchase from AT&T customers. 


AT&T also once hosted its own advertising platform Xander, which was sold to Microsoft. It allowed firms to place advertising on AT&T’s websites and apps. 


So far, revenue contributions have been small enough not to identify as distinct revenue streams. 


Likewise, Verizon once operated Verizon Media that placed ads on Verizon content assets, but that business was sold to Apollo Funds.


Some might consider the use of application programming interfaces evidence that a platform business model is in operation, but that is incorrect. APIs might be used to support a platform business model, but use of APIs, in and of itself, does not change the business model. 


APIs, though, are often a capability exploited by business model platforms, to connect users of the platform; to allow third-party developers to contribute value; to collect user data or to create revenue by charging fees for use of the APIs.


The GSMA Open Gateway initiative supporting APIs usable across networks supports a traditional pipeline model, where the firms create, support and sell their products directly to customers. 


So at least so far, few tier-one connectivity providers have shifted a significant portion of their operations to platform business models, or made it the key strategic direction. Recent asset dispositions by AT&T and Verizon suggest that approach remains experimental and non-core. 


Tuesday, April 4, 2023

Pulse FTTH in Loveland, Colo. Has Unusual Revenue and Cost Drivers

Loveland, Colo. fiber to home network Pulse--owned by the city’s water and power utility--began marketing in early 2022. The municipal-owned network projected first year revenues of $10 million and seems to have hit that milestone. The network expects to hit breakeven in its third year, which would be fast, compared to most other FTTH payback models. 


As always, there are caveats. Pulse early marketing has been aimed at business customers, with expected monthly charges ranging from $110 to $450 per month, substantially above the range of $50 to $70 a month typically charged for consumer accounts


Pulse also sells voice services to business customers, representing perhaps $50 a month in revenue per line. For consumers, Pulse sells video entertainment for prices ranging from about $38 a month up to $108 a month.  


Compared to most independent internet service providers, Pulse therefore has the ability to earn revenue from multiple services, not simply internet access. That has potential to boost per-account revenue, but also adds additional cost elements. 


Still, the Pulse revenue model has more drivers than home broadband. And ownership by the local power and water utility could, in principle, also mean lower costs.


The business plan is based on a 42 percent terminal take rate and a 32 percent business take rate. In practice, higher than expected build rates, lower than expected interest income and higher than expected infrastructure and equipment costs have caused some deviations from plan.    


The network should be fully built by the end of 2023, Pulse says.

Rogers Has about 60% Home Broadband Share, Leading 30% Share in Mobility

The completed merger of Rogers and Shaw does not really change the home broadband market share held by cable operators in Canada, but does create one new leader. The new firm likewise does not change the relative share of home broadband accounts held by cable operators in Canada, but does create a new industry leader, with about 60 percent share. 


source: Our Commons


That would be a dominating amount of share in any market. 


Likewise, the merger does not change the share of mobile phone accounts and share in Canada, either. But Rogers does emerge with slightly more share, roughly 30 percent, which is enough to make it the market leader in mobility share. 


source: Our Commons



Alibaba Breakup Illustrates Sum of Parts Valuation

Alibaba's impending breakup into six different companies sheds light on the valuation of conglomerate firms. The Chinese e-commerce giant is splitting into six distinct firms: Cloud Intelligence Group, Taobao Tmall Commerce Group, Local Services Group, Cainiao Smart Logistics Group, Global Digital Commerce Group and Digital Media and Entertainment Group. 


So the result would be firms focused on domestic e-commerce, cloud computing, international e-commerce and media, among others. The smallest unit might be conceptually related to X lab, Alphabet’s development unit. And there would be firms focusing on food delivery and logistics. 


Even as Alibaba carries a single valuation figure, no matter which metric is used, each of the six lines of business has a different set of potential metrics, based on existing market evaluations of media, e-commerce and cloud computing, for example. 


source: Reuters  


A sum of the parts valuation of the broken-up Alibaba, using a price/sales method, might 

Value Alibaba's core e-commerce business at $100 billion, while the cloud computing business is valued at $50 billion. 


The media business might be valued at about $25 billion, while the logistics unit is valued at perhaps $15 billion.


Using an EV/EBITDA method, Alibaba’s e-commerce business might be worth $250 billion, while the cloud computing business is valued at $100 billion. 


The media business might be worth about $50 billion, while the development unit is valued at about the same level. 


One might make the same observation about Amazon, which might be broken out into perhaps six distinct lines of business, each presumably also potentially valued differently from the other components. Growth rates, also a key factor in valuation, also differs wildly, from the online e-commerce growth rate of about two percent to the 20 percent growth of Amazon Web Services, 23 percent growth rate of advertising and 24 percent growth rate of third party fulfillment services. 


source: Deep Tech Insights 


source: Deep Tech Insights 


Some, such as Ben Alaimo of Deep Tech Insights, would value the e-commerce operations at a price/sales ratio of 2.4, while AWS is valued at a six times P/S ratio, for example. 


Other valuation metrics might include free cash flow generation, enterprise value or discounted cash flow. In 2022, for example, AWS might have had an EV/EBITDA ratio in the range of 43, while the rest of Amazon carried a ratio closer to 21. 


In 2022, AWS produced about $53 billion in free cash flow, while the rest of Amazon produced perhaps $14 billion. 


In 2022, AWS produced a bit more than twice the discounted cash flow as did the rest of Amazon. 


Alibaba's cloud computing operations do not produce as much value for that firm as Amazon Web Services does for Amazon. Cloud operations represent about nine percent of total revenue for Alibaba, while AWS constitutes about 16 percent of Amazon total revenue. 


AWS arguably represents all of the profit for Amazon, while cloud computing drives about 24 percent of Alibaba profit.


Cloud computing revenues are perhaps 22 percent of Microsoft revenue. It is unclear to me what percentage of profit cloud computing contributes. Google's cloud operations generate perhaps nine percent of total revenue, and nothing (yet) to Google profits. 


The point is that many firms in the media, software, online services and data center or access businesses are functionally conglomerates, with lines of business with distinct growth profiles, revenue contributions and profit margins. 


Blending all those sources shows the possible value of creating new pure play assets.


How Electricity Charging Might Change

It now is easy to argue that U.S. electricity pricing might have to evolve in ways similar to the change in retail pricing of communication...