I Wish We Had a Good Solution for This Problem

James Madison's Federalist Number 10 famously warned about the dangers of political factions, seen as citizens united by a common passion or interest that could work against the rights of others or the interests of the community as a whole.

But Madison was a realist. He did not believe factions could be avoided. But he did believe safeguards that would make it difficult for any single faction to become a tyranny. 

In other words he favored a systemic approach to creating countervailing incentives, such as the three major branches of the federal government. 

President George Washington, in his farewell address, was direct: “Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the Spirit of Party, generally.”

“The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism,” Washington said. 

Both founders warned about factions and parties placing their own interests above the common interest of the nation. 

And political parties emerged quite quickly. 

Founding-era concern	Underlying fear	Modern parallel
Faction	A group puts its interests above the country	Partisan base politics
Party loyalty	Representatives stop exercising independent judgment	Party-line voting
Minority organization	A small but intense group acquires disproportionate influence	Activists, donors, primary voters
Geographic faction	Political divisions become regional identities	Red/blue geographic polarization
Factional retaliation	Each side tries to punish the other	Escalating partisan warfare

The aphorism "show me the incentive, and I will show you the result," seems relevant here. 

Madison and Washington essentially argued that if you create institutions in which factional interests (party loyalty, as a prime example) are rewarded, that is indeed what one gets. 

“Compromise” ideally allows both sides to get something of what they want. But party loyalty demands something else. 

Compromise becomes “you caved to the other side” while resistance in principle to the other side becomes “I stood my ground.” 

So party loyalty becomes “obstruction.” And loyalty to the party replaces “what is good for the nation?” as the guiding principle. 

If party leaders get rewarded for mobilizing fear, loyalty and resentment, we should not be surprised when politics produces fear, loyalty and resentment. 

It is the similar principle to social media: moderate, reasonable content does not get attention. 

Party politics also suggests how polarization can persist even when large numbers of Americans dislike polarization. 

Perhaps Madison was right, and factions cannot be avoided. Perhaps the best we can do is create conditions whereby other factions with competing and opposed interests also exist. 

The problem is that if executive, legislative and judicial branches of the federal government, for example, become factional battlegrounds between Republicans and Democrats, the branches do not necessarily provide countervailing power to the other branches if one party controls all three branches. 

Even if the judiciary is formally non-partisan, some want to politicize it. 

So much of what we seem to get is just Democrats and Republicans intent on gaining and maintaining power for their faction. Whether that is good for the common welfare is debatable. 

If the incentive is “power,” then “party loyalty” will be the outcome we get. 

Maybe we’ll figure out better ways to change the incentives. We probably will get no help from either party.