Gigabit Networks are a Real Challenge in Rural Areas

Unless something fairly dramatic happens, gigabit networks will be unevenly deployed around the United States. No matter what might be done in suburban and urban markets, rural areas still have very long loop lengths (which raises network cost) and low-density populations, which both raises network cost and limits revenue potential.

Frontier Communications, which operates rural telco networks in a number of states, reports that 80 percent of its users buy 6 Mbps Internet access services.

About 75 percent of all locations can buy 6 Mbps service. About 54 percent can buy 12 Mbps service. About 42 percent of locations can buy 20 Mbps service.

And that roughly hints at the magnitude of any decision to upgrade networks more in line with gigabit networks that will be the future standard.

There are both “demand” issues and “cost of supply” issues. Current demand seems to be gravitate to 6 Mbps, even when 12 Mbps and 20 Mbps services are available. So demand for gigabit networks might seem a stretch.

One might argue that the take rates for higher-speed services would be higher if the price were lower, and that is true. Whether Frontier, with its current cost structure and revenue requirements, would find that an easy matter is quite unclear.

But cost of supply is the other huge issue. Some studies suggest fiber to the home cost can range from $5,000 per site to $20,000 or more, per site.  

The Broadband Availability Gap study suggested serving seven million underserved U.S. homes would require an inducement of about $23.5 billion, over and above the actual costs of construction, to create incentives for service providers to make the investment, estimated at $32.4 billion.

If one really wanted to build fiber to home networks for 130 million U.S. homes, with active bandwidth of 100 Mbps, the cost could range up to $670 billion, the study suggested. Gigabit networks, offering an order of magnitude more bandwidth, would cost more.

And Frontier has better prospects than most independent rural telcos. It is larger and generates more actual customer revenue than the typical rural telco.

About 2005 Frontier made a decision not to rely so heavily on “regulatory revenues” such as universal service, and to instead focus on actual customer revenue.

Since then, Frontier’s contribution from non-customer sources, which was as high as 60 percent, has fallen to less than 10 percent. Much of that change, one might argue was a decision to focus more heavily on business customer revenues, in or out of region.

At December 31, 2011, Frontier had 3,103,800 residential customers and 309,900 business customers.

Business revenue tells the story, though. For the six-month period ending Dec. 31, 2011, Frontier earned $692 million in business customer revenue, and $544 million in consumer revenue.  In other words, business customers generated 56 percent of total revenue.

Or, to put it another way, the nine percent of business customers generate 56 percent of Frontier revenues.

For Windstream, a firm that is similar in some ways, the reliance on business customer revenue is even more pronounced. Business revenue in the fourth quarter of 2011 was $888 million, while consumer revenues were $118 million. So Windstream generated 88 percent of revenue from business customers, not consumers.

Those results are driven by acquisitions. Windstream bought PAETEC, a major business-focused competitive local exchange carrier. Frontier bought a huge chunk of former Verizon Wireless assets.

Both acquisitions had the effect of boosting business customers and business revenue to unusual levels for any rural telco.

The point is that whatever problems policymakers and service providers might think they face now, just trying to get broadband of 4 Mbps to 10 Mbps to rural homes, the problems will be tougher when the standard gets moved to a gigabit.

FCC to Test Mobile Substitution

The idea that faster mobile networks can displace some amount of fixed network broadband is not a new idea, just an idea that is more realistic as networks beginning with Long Term Evolution become widespread, allowing mobile substitution to replicate the experience of fixed network access, if not the same pricing, terms and conditions of service.

The Federal Communications Commission itself plans to examine wireless substitution as part of its wider studies of transition issues from the legacy public switched network to new IP networks.

In fact, the FCC wants to conduct an actual field trial, where a mobile network would provide a home wireless voice product or data product or both, intended as a replacement for

a customer’s existing home voice and broadband data services.

The FCC wants to test such a mobile substitute offer in at least one geographic area within each participating local exchange carrier’s service territory and at least one geographic area outside of each participating LEC’s wireline service territory.

That sort of flexibility, though not universally welcomed, could eventually result in a more flexible policy towards “ends” rather than “means,” allowing service providers to use any mix of network technologies that make sense in any area, instead of requiring use of specific platforms.

In an environment where users essentially are integrating their own access from multiple sources (fixed, mobile, public Wi-Fi, work networks), that makes sense.

None of that means mobile networks or fixed wireless networks everywhere and always will be complete substitutes for fixed network access. Gigabit networks will be expensive for all ISPs, but will be especially challenging for users of wireless approaches (satellite, mobile, fixed wireless).

That suggests providers of fixed gigabit access service and mobility access will be complementary as much as substitutes. The greater challenge will lie in between. Either full mobility (with reduced bandwidth) or huge bandwidth (gigabit networks) are the easy segments of the market.

Offers in between will have to work to define the specific value propositions. That's typical in most markets, though. The easiest positions are "high value, high price" and "reasonable value, low price."

It's offers in the middle that have to work at establishing a clear position in the consumer mind.

Unstable Fixed Network Business Open to Assault from "Start-Up" Style Value Propositions

The U.S. fixed network business is unstable, and becoming more unstable. In part, that is because revenue is shifting to the mobile networks, stranding assets owned by the largest fixed network providers. That means fixed network operators have a revenue problem.

Add to that the increased burden placed on each remaining customer as high fixed costs have to be shared across a shrinking base of customers. That means operating costs must be slashed.

Rural service providers have other problems, namely shrinking support funds and a new emphasis on broadband access, not voice.

Still, the main problem is that mobile networks generate about two thirds of global industry revenue.

So no matter what is spent on the fixed networks, they only generate a third of total revenue. And that assumes the revenue ratios do not tilt in the direction of mobile even more than at present.

U.S wireless revenue in 2012 of about $335 billion represents about 66 percent of communications revenues.  Fixed network voice revenue was about $132 billion, with an additional $38 billion in broadband access revenue and $6 billion in television revenue, for a total of about $176 billion in fixed network revenue.

U.S. mobile revenues as a percentage of total revenues have been climbing for a decade. The only issue has been the precise year of crossover, when wireless surpasses fixed network revenue. That will happen in 2013, some believe.

To be sure, the executives running fixed networks are smart. They will redeploy capital into other lines of business, such as Comcast already has done. They will use bundling and packaging to protect legacy services. They will adjust pricing. They will try to create new services. They will buy assets to substitute for organic growth.

Still, all of that essentially amounts to running in place.

But market instability also creates opportunities for other providers. Those with lower operating costs or a radically-different value proposition will have advantages. Some incremental advantage will be claimed by service providers able to offer “same value, lower price.”

But major changes in market share will require more than that. In the start-up business, the notion has been that challengers need an order of magnitude better value-price advantage to take on legacy market leaders.

And that is precisely the danger Google Fiber represents. On either value or price-per-bit metrics, Google Fiber offers an order of magnitude improvement in end user experience.

But that probably also illustrates what might be needed if a serious challenge to current ISP market share is to happen. Competitors will have to move from "same value, lower price" to the metric used by start-ups: an order of magnitude better value, same or lower price."

Video Consumption Now Has Strategic ISP Implications

Based simply on the volume of traffic, you might argue that all transport and access providers now are in the business of delivering video entertainment bits to end users, with the greatest proportion of that content using real time streaming.

In part, that drives investment in networks that support higher bandwidths. Just as significantly, real-time video will challenge ISPs on the cost front. Even after capital investment to support higher access bandwidth, IP transit costs will skyrocket.

The dominant facilities-based ISPs largely will avoid those costs, since they can peer with each other.

As once was the case for dial-up access providers, where the advent of broadband essentially destroyed the former dial-up business, a shift to gigabit networks will have strategic implications for smaller and independent ISPs.

Basically, gigabit networks will favor tier one providers at the expense of virtually all wireless providers, much as broadband favored facilities-based providers at the expense of over the top dial-up ISPs.

Mobile service providers will continue to compete, even when “speed challenged,” compared to fixed networks, because the key value still will be mobility, not speed.

Real-time entertainment (streaming video and audio) already is the largest traffic category on every network, in every region, (more than 68 percent of downstream bytes during peak period, compared with 65 percent at the end of 2012), according to Sandvine.

Already, more than 25 percent of all streaming audio and video bytes delivered to mobile devices are delivered to those devices in the home.

In fact, more than 20 percent of all traffic on fixed networks in North America already is generated by a smart phone or tablet.

And Apple devices (iPads, iPhones, iPods, AppleTVs, and Mac computers) account for over 45 percent of all streaming audio and video on fixed access networks in North America, Sandvine  notes.

In North America, mean usage (simple arithmetic average) on fixed networks was 44.7 GB, a 39 percent year-over-year increase from 32.1 GB for the same period of 2012.

In Asia-Pacific, demand likewise is driven by entertainment, which accounts for 51.2 percent of total downstream traffic during peak period. But the Asia-Pacific region unusual because peer-to-peer apps are highly popular.

Additionally, Asia-Pacific is the only region where BitTorrent was the top application during peak period.

The median (half used more, half used less) monthly usage on fixed networks grew 56.5 percent, from 10.3 GB to 18.2 GB.

Netflix accounts for 32.3 percent of downstream traffic during peak period.

YouTube, which in the first half of 2012 accounted for 13.8 percent of downstream traffic, now accounts for over 17.1 percent of traffic. Sandvine believes the increase in YouTube traffic is caused by the continued growth of smart phones and tablets inside the home.

Amazon represents 1.31 percent and HBO Go had 0.34 percent of traffic.

And, as has been the prevailing pattern, in North America, the top one percent of subscribers who make the heaviest use of the network’s upstream resources account for 34.2 percent of total upstream traffic.

The heaviest one percent of downstream users account for 10.1 percent of downstream bytes. The lightest 50 percent of users account for only 6.4 percent of total monthly traffic.

Mobile network usage likewise has grown substantially. Over the past year, mean North American monthly usage increased from 312.8 MB to 390.1 MB, an increase of 25 percent.

Mean monthly usage in Asia-Pacific grew from 659.3 MB to 700.4 MB since the end of 2012. Real-Time Entertainment accounts for half of total downstream traffic during peak period in the Asia-Pacific region.

What is unique to the Asia-Pacific region is that real-time entertainment is

the top upstream category accounting for 28 percent of traffic. The primary driver

behind the popularity of real-time entertainment in Asia-Pacific is the use of the popular peercasting application PPStream (available on PC, tablets, and smartphones) which sends and transmits video simultaneously over the network.

Median North American mobile usage more than doubled from 25.5 MB to 58.7 MB, year over year.

YouTube represents 25 percent of all North American traffic on mobile networks during peak period. And use of Netflix is growing as well.

Netflix’s downstream traffic share in North America almost doubled from 2.2 percent to 4.0 percent, year over year.

In Asia-Pacific, the heaviest one percent of users account for 41.1 percent of upstream traffic, 23.2 percent of downstream traffic and 24.2 percent of aggregate bytes each month. Significant use of PC air cards and tethering likely accounts for the heavier European and Asia-Pacific mobile data consumption, compared to North America.

Predictions of Mobile Data Growth Cut in Half

Most forecasts of mobile data consumption over the last couple of years until 2012 were consistent in the prediction that bandwidth demand would grow between 25 times to 26 times over roughly a five year period.

But the latest estimate by Cisco suggests growth of something like 13 times over the next five years. The revisions are not unusual. It frequently has been the case that linear extrapolations have suggested bandwidth growth more robust than eventually developed.

One might assume that is typical of any growth rate, for any product, as adoption matures. One might also assume there are changes in both supplier and end user behavior, though, that change the demand curve over time.

Suppliers learn to promote offload of mobile data to the fixed networks, and users learn how to do that on a consistent basis.

A 2010 view:

A 20

11 view:

A 2012 view:

Google Fiber Keeps Lead Atop Netflix ISP Speed Index

Though you might argue the advantages are not so great, Google Fiber seems to be opening up a consistent “experienced bandwidth” advantage compared to all other fixed network providers, according to the latest Netflix analysis of typical streaming speeds for Netflix content.

The reason Google Fiber does not have a much-wider advantage is that Netflix prefers to stream at constant rates, rather than adapting to the highest access bandwidth it might find it has access to.

For video experience, constant rates are most helpful.

Gigabit Mobile Networks?

For practical reasons, each successive generation of mobile networks has used higher and different frequencies, at least at first.

The reasons are simple enough. The new network has to be built and then operated at the same time that the older network or networks remain in operation. 

Over time, the older frequencies are reclaimed, but the principle has been clear enough: each new network uses higher frequencies.

Also, as a rule, each new succeeding network has required bigger channels. Where analog networks used 30 kHz, 2G used up to 200 kHz. 3G networks used allocations up to 5 MHz, while 4G networks can use channels as big as 40 MHz (though typically paired 10 MHz or paired 20 MHz appears already to be most common). 

In some cases, it is possible to reuse existing spectrum, as regulators in the United Kingdom expect to be able to do by converting former TV spectrum to mobile applications in the 700-MHz bands.

In other markets, that option likewise could exist, but one issue could be the time and expense of "clearing" existing users from the spectrum. In some cases, where new spectrum is available, it might be reasonable to use that new spectrum, including spectrum mostly in the past considered most suitable for microwave backhaul. 

That of course has propagation and bandwidth implications. As a rule, the basic trade off is distance and bandwidth: lower frequencies propagate further, but higher frequencies can carry more information, for any given amount of spectrum. In other words, 10 MHz at 700 MHz travels much further than 10 MHz worth of signals at 2 GHz. 

That has engineers working on ways to compensate for propagation characteristics of much-higher frequencies expected to be used for future fifth generation 5G networks that will follow 4G in roughly a decade. 

Samsung says it now has an experimental system supporting 1 Gbps in the 28 GHz band using adaptive array transceiver technology with 64 antenna elements. Samsung believes 10 Gbps is feasible using the approach. 

In the past such frequencies were considered unsuitable for access applications, though more suitable for backhaul. In the United States, the LMDS service, originally conceived of as a way to provide fixed wireless "cable TV,"  occupies the following spectrum blocks:

27.5 – 28.35 GHz
29.1 – 29.25 GHz
31.075 – 31.225 GHz
31.0 – 31.075 GHz
31.225 – 31.3 GHz

Though there were failed attempts to re-purpose LMDS spectrum for communications use around the time of the Internet bubble, those efforts failed, partly for technology cost reasons and partly because of lack of demand. But technology gets better over time. So does cost. 

So the issue is whether higher frequencies, in addition to supporting mobile industry needs, might also be allocated for non-licensed users as well. If regulators really want more competition to the dominant ISPs, on a facilities-based basis, they will have to look at that. 

ESPN Considers Subsidizing Mobile Data Plans

ESPN is at least considering a scenario where it would pay for bandwidth consumed by mobile users of its content and apps, removing a barrier to usage, as ESPN content consumption would not count against a user's data cap. 

In principle, that is similar to the business arrangement Amazon has with AT&T to deliver Kindle content to tablet users. Amazon downloads are paid for by Amazon, so the end user does not incur usage that counts against a consumption cap. 

Such a move by ESPN would be quite significant, as it would effectively create a new revenue stream for mobile ISPs while removing a barrier to end user consumption of highly-valued content. 

Under one scenario, the company would pay a carrier to guarantee that people viewing ESPN mobile content wouldn't have that usage counted toward their monthly data caps.

Some will object to such business deals between ISPs and app providers. The logic is that it potentially creates an uneven playing field for ESPN and other providers of similar content. Others will argue such deals are not dissimilar from app provider use of content delivery networks to enhance end user experience. 

App providers using CDNs do have an experience advantage over other firms that do not use CDNs. 

But such a plan would have clear consumer benefits, would create another revenue stream for mobile ISPs clamoring for such new revenue sources and would remove a key barrier to use of ESPN content on a mobile device, principally the usage implications. 

Some might say the possible new approach is a reasonable application of the notion that innovations within the ecosystem should occur as parties see mutual benefit, and not from rules imposed from the outside. 

Still, many app providers would resist such a precedent, and some think the Federal Communications Commission would almost certainly conclude it has to evaluate such deals as possibly requiring application of "network neutrality" rules to mobile networks, even though mobile networks presently are exempt from the "best effort only" approach applied to fixed network providers. 

Opinions of course will vary. Some believe network neutrality should not apply to any ISPs, since it prohibits creation of features end users might themselves want, such as quality of service guarantees, preference for voice, videoconferencing or video entertainment streams, when those are used. 

Others believe network neutrality rules are fairer to small app providers and will help prevent marketplace abuses, such as ISPs favoring their own content over similar content provided by unaffiliated parties.

Others would argue that if online content providers are to garner advertising revenues commensurate with viewership and engagement, then impediments to viewership need to be overcome. And there is no question but that data caps discourage usage. 

Large Internet service providers have in the past pointedly suggested that application providers pay them for access to their networks and customers. The argument, in part, rests on the fact that some apps, especially video entertainment apps, represent unusually large demands on the network. 

The wider context is that shares of revenue within the Internet ecosystem are viewed as disproportionate, at least by ISPs. But the possible ESPN approach simultaneously provides end user benefit, value for ESPN and mobile ISPs. 

It's a big deal.

Top Line Revenue is Today's Telco Problem; Will Tomorrow's Problem be Bankruptcy?

It would not be unfair to note that most European fixed line telcos now are facing a revenue decline of significant proportions. BT Group’s revenue fell five percent, year over year, for the period ending March 31, 2013. 

Underlying revenue excluding transit, was down three percent . 

Deutsche Telekom revenue declined 4.5 percent, year over year, its most-recent earnings report showed.

Telefónica had similar issues in the first quarter. Revenues were down 8.8 percent, or down 1.6 percent on an organic basis, not including currency effects. The bright spot was Telefónica Latinoamérica, which accounted for 51 percent of consolidated revenues and grew nearly three percent, year over year.

To be sure, European telcos are dealing with unhelpful changes in wholesale tariffs and roaming revenue, plus sluggish economic conditions. The longer term issue is what will constitute a “turnaround” in fortunes, and whether such a turnaround is possible.

Executives remain optimistic: they have to. Telcos can point to tough economic conditions, which is true enough. They will rightly note the impact of mandatory price reductions in the wholesale part of their businesses. 

But consumers are behaving differently: they are talking less, texting less, dropping landline service. 

European telco executives argue that consolidation is needed to help shore up business cases. That's likely true enough. Also, operating costs are simply too high, and it isn't so clear how much control the carriers might have in that regard. Most tier one service providers have huge pension obligations and many face pressure from governments not to cut jobs. 

But the bigger problem is the erosion of customers and the gap between new revenue sources and legacy sources. No major telco has gone bankrupt yet. But that is not an impossibility. 

McCain Introduces Bill for 'a la Carte' Cable TV

Bills get introduced in Congress all the time, for lots of reasons. Not all, in fact, quite few, have any chance of passage. A new bill to force unbundling is probably not going to result in new legislation. Broadcasters, programming networks and cable operators all will oppose it.

Many of us would say we prefer unbundling. But the implications are less certain than many think. For many consumers,  prices probably would not change.  Most people watch a dozen channels.

At $10 per channel, most consumers would not see savings (assuming sales are channels, not shows or series).

Choice still would be nice. But some wouldn't expect savings, for every consumer,  with every selection of channels.

Lots of other things would change as well. Smaller networks would go user direct. And the shift to online delivery would accelerate.

http://feedproxy.google.com/~r/Mashable/~3/busXwInONMU/

Telecom P/E Multiples Overextended?

"Bubble" is too strong a word. But multiples are too high.

http://on.barrons.com/10d3aRG

Aio Wireless Differentiates Prepaid from Postpaid

The big deal for a large mobile service provider, when addressing the prepaid segment of the market, is to differentiate, protecting the perceived value of postpaid service while still offering an option for customers who prefer prepaid.

Aio Wireless, the new AT&T prepaid brand, will do so by not offering Long Term Evolution access. Aio expects the service to roll out in multiple markets across the United States during 2013, with an initial launch in Houston, Orlando and Tampa. 

Messaging Apps Do Not Take SMS Share; They Destroy the Market

Text messaging might be worth about $140 billion annually over the next three years for mobile service providers. 

But use of over the top messaging apps is growing. On the other hand, that doesn't mean the revenue earned by messaging app providers is anywhere close to that of text messaging. 

The analogy likely will be the impact of Skype on international long distance revenue. 

Skype displaces some amount of international long distance revenue. But it displaces a huge amount of usage. 



In other words, even as Skype is a substitute for much international long distance, Skype doesn't just take share. Skype essentially destroys the international long distance market, exchanging usage pennies for former usage dollars. 

Usage is not revenue, for voice or messaging. 

BII

Disruption of Access Pricing Will Be Necessary

In a competitive market, the lowest-cost competitor tends to win, all other things being equal. Nobody would question the notion that tier-one telcos tend to be the highest-cost providers in any market.

In the U.S. market, cable operators operate at lower costs than their telco foes can. Many ISPs operate at lower costs than cable operators.

All of that should have some drop dead simple implications. Tier one telcos will have to keep cutting costs. So it is no surprise that the UNI Europa ICTS union now estimates that European carriers will probably cut their workforce by 30 percent by about 2018.

Within a decade, industry employment will be cut in half, the group also says. In large part, that is only an effort to benchmark against more efficient North American carriers.

But that isn’t good enough. That only makes a very-high-cost European carrier as efficient as the high-cost providers in the North American market.

To be sure, access networks always have been expensive. But as cable and mobile networks now have demonstrated, there are ways to significantly trim access network costs. The big challenge now is whether it is possible to disruptively lower access costs.

Google Fiber, it might be argued, is not so much disrupting network cost as it is disrupting user expectations about the value-price relationship for Internet access. But Google Fiber does not appear to have massively disrupted the actual cost of building an access network.

Recent experience with municipal Wi-Fi has been disappointing, but perhaps more for revenue than cost of network reasons. In other cases, as for rural wireless ISPs, middle mile backhaul can be a bigger business model input than the cost of access networks.

But the economics of WISP networks have gotten better in recent years. Improvements in the price-performance of radio gear are largely the reason.

So the issue is whether disruption of high-quality access markets is possible. Right now, it isn’t clear whether it can be done, or how it might be done. But that doesn’t mean it can’t be done.

And the fixed network is the key problem for other reasons, not least of the problems being that mobile networks generate about two thirds of global industry revenue.

So no matter what is spent on the fixed networks, they only generate a third of total revenue. And that assumes the revenue ratios do not tilt in the direction of mobile even more than at present.

U.S wireless revenue in 2012 of about $335 billion represents about 66 percent of communications revenues.  Fixed network voice revenue was about $132 billion, with an additional $38 billion in broadband access revenue and $6 billion in television revenue, for a total of about $176 billion in fixed network revenue.

U.S. mobile revenues as a percentage of total revenues have been climbing for a decade. The only issue has been the precise year of crossover, when wireless surpasses fixed network revenue. That will happen in 2013, some believe.

As those trends continue, it is going to be harder than ever to create a good business case for fixed network access. And yet it must be done. For that reasons, some of us think disruption is going to be necessary.

Users Now Want an Order of Magnitude More Speed

User expectations matter in virtually all markets. At any point in time, there is a bundle of values that constitute the minimum acceptable offer for any product. The obvious example is all the component parts and features of an automobile that are essential as part of the basic product. 

The same is true for end user expectations of what constitutes a minimum acceptable level of broadband access service. Back in 2008, policymakers routinely spoke of 2 Mbps as a minimum threshold. 


There is a reason. Historically, "broadband" was defined as any speed at or above 2.5 Mbps. These days, user expectations outstrip the original industry definitions. 

A new poll by thinkbroadband of U.K. respondents finds that about a third think 20 Mbps is the minimum speed for any universal service requirement.

That is an order of magnitude increase over the 2008 levels of expectation that were commonly cited by policymakers as a floor. But it appears policymakers might already have underestimated expectations by close to an order of magnitude. 

That is why it is dangerous for ISPs to assume too much about what customers want, and how fast expectations can change.

That, in fact, is precisely what Google Fiber intends to achieve: a disruptive increase in end user expectations about what a minimally acceptable offer is, in the area of Internet access. 

There are huge implications for ISP investment decisions. There are equally huge implications for the future roles of various types of networks. The point is that end user and customer expectations apparently are highly elastic. 

Elastic expectations mean ISPs must be prepared not just for higher speeds, but rapidly-changing end user expectations as well.