Consumers Are Not Tired of Deals

A survey of nearly 1,000 U.S. online users by Utpal Dholakia, professor of management at Rice University finds that they are not yet tired of daily deals. Quite the opposite: Shoppers who tend to purchase the most daily deals continue to remain enthusiastic about them.

Only 13 percent of experienced and heavy daily-deal users agreed with the statement: "I buy daily deals less often than I used to," according to the study, published in conjunction with Cornell University. Only eight percent agreed with the statement: "I have lost interest in daily deals over time."

BAI/Kelsey, a local media and ad research firm, also has raised its forecast for daily deal revenue. U.S. consumer spending on deals, including daily deals, instant deals and flash sales, will grow to $4.2 billion in 2015 from $873 million in 2010. While the bump in its 2015 projection is only up slightly, the projection for 2011 revenue was revised to $2 billion, up 66% since the March estimate.

Think Consumers Are Tired of Deals?

Social Media Conversion Rates Low, But Worth It?

Marketers continue to believe that Twitter and Facebook are worth the effort. A new report from RichRelevance states that online retail shoppers who click through from Facebook only convert 1.2 percent of the time. If you think that’s bad, Twitter’s number is only 0.5 percent.

But Twitter shoppers actually spend more money when they do order.


Online conversion rates—the ratio of purchase sessions to shopping sessions—has remained relatively unchanged between 2010 and 2011, based on a year-on-year comparison of mass merchants. This rate was 2.1 percent in August 2010 and remained 2.13 percent in August 2011.


Overall online average order value has dropped from $128.27 to $116.58 in this period. The decline may be attributed to several factors, including increased cost consciousness and increased shipping efficiencies that encourage smaller purchases.


Shoppers behave very differently depending on how they arrive at the retail site. For example, while fewer shoppers come from Twitter than anywhere else, they spend more per order once they are on the site.

Twitter Conversions, Spending

A Look at Mobile Commerce

If you take a look at all the things that are happening in the mobile space, it should be clear that a developing "mobile commerce" ecosystem is developing that is bigger than advertising, promotion, payments, loyalty, credentials, gaming, shopping and mobile applications.

What Apple Knows, and Why "Choice" is an Issue

"Too much choice" can be as bad as "not enough choice." Ironically, having some choices generally is viewed as a positive by most consumers. But overwhelming choice is paralyzing. Those of you familiar with the Class 5 switch, and the modern business phone system, know something of the matter. Both types of switches offer hundreds to thousands of discrete features. But most end users, business or consumer, use only a handful of features.

You might wonder why suppliers both to add all those generally unused features. The reason is that a few key customers say they "need them." See Choice can be a problem or choice can paralyze

Apple always has taken one approach to features, while Microsoft and the "open source" communities generally have taken a different approach. For decades, developers have argued for and against unlimited choice or "openness." At the moment, it appears Apple's choices might be winning the argument.

When Google Android developers complain of "fragmentation," that's a downside, or problem, with "open" approaches. Apple always has taken the other view. It limits openness, limits choices, in order to enhance user experience. Where an open source or Microsoft approach is "you can do that," Apple essentially asks "why do you need to do that?" 

With so many projects, if the customer is willing to go without a small subset of the functionality they think they need, it can save a massive amount of effort, cost, and complexity and result in a much more elegant, hassle-free solution that makes them much happier in the long run, some would now argue.

Apple’s customers are often the sort of people willing to make these tradeoffs, because that’s how most of Apple’s products are designed: if you can compromise on some of the features and capabilities you think you need, you can get a product that works better and makes you happier with far less aggravation. And for most people, the benefits will outweigh the missing features.

Granted, there are trade-offs, as there always are in all engineering projects. “We know what’s best for you," Apple essentially says.

People who aren’t willing or able to compromise on their needs regularly are much more likely to be Windows customers. The Windows message is much more palatable to corporate buyers, committees, middlemen, and people who don’t like to be told what’s best for them.

But the world seems to be moving a bit more in Apple's direction. 

Apple might have it right

No Matter What Happens with AT&T Bid, Consolidation Continues

The issue at hand for antitrust regulators at the Department of Justice, when evaluating the consumer impact of an AT&T acquisition of T-Mobile USA, is whether the deal would exceed a rule of thumb about market concentration. Some would argue that, no matter what happens with this particular deal, that concentration in the mobile business will continue. See DoJ guideline or more on the algorithm.

“The gap between the haves — AT&T and Verizon — and the have-nots, which is essentially everybody else, is only getting wider,” said Kevin Smithen, an analyst for Macquarie Securities.

Craig Moffett, an analyst at Sanford C. Bernstein, agreed, saying: “This market is going to consolidate one way or another.”

Will Consumers Benefit if T-Mobile Stands Alone?

Netflix Lowers Subscriber Estimates

In the consumer markets, price increases virtually always have the effect of reducing demand, as economists predict will happen. When Netflix decided to "entice" customers to shift from DVD rental to streaming, a significant price increase for some consumers, particularly those that wanted both unlimited DVD rentals and unlimited streaming, was part of the strategy. Consumers who only wanted unlimited streaming or DVD rentals, but not both, actually saw bills drop. Plan changes to cost one million customers

Netflix now says it expects to lose about one million customers because of the pricing plan changes. The company, which split its streaming and DVD-by-mail services two months ago, now expects a total of 24 million subscribers in the third quarter, down from the 25 million it forecast in July 2011.

Netflix expects 21.8 million people to subscribe to its streaming service, either with or without also getting DVDs in the mail. That's down from an expected 22 million it forecast earlier. And Netflix expects 14.2 million people to subscribe to mail-order DVD rental service, with or without streaming. That's down from its July forecast of 15 million.

Some will fault Netflix for making a risky move. Others might say the move is a bold signal that Netflix is about to get into a new business, not simply based on streaming instead of DVDs, but a change of business from "movie rentals" to "television."

That is the big change, not the pricing shift. Netflix is betting it can primarily become a provider of streamed TV content, instead of a provider of movie content. Some might say the difference is that where Netflix used to compete with Blockbuster Video, in the future it will compete with Hulu. At a secondary level, where Netflix used to compete with premium cable TV networks such as HBO, in the future it might start to compete with cable TV.

Netflix chief content officer Ted Sarandos says the company ran into trouble with its forecasts for streaming video and DVD rental subscriptions because it’s still adjusting to the decision in July to turn them into separate products. “Being able to precisely forecast and predict the behavior of that many people on a fairly radical change is something we’ll get better at all the time.” Forecast miss

The key point is that Netflix is about to embark on a business model change much more substantial than simply "how" movie content gets delivered to its customers. Netflix now will try to become a substantial provider of TV content. Some would argue that is the real challenge.

Although “the DVD business has a long life in middle America,” Sarandos says “it’s just not part of our future.” That's a clear signal.

Metaswitch "Perimeta" is a Classic Business Case Study

The entry by Metaswitch Networks into the session border control business has been described by some as a move “into a crowded market.” "Crowded" market

Metaswitch would describe it as a move into a rapidly-growing market where customers are asking for choices. According to Infonetics Research, service providers are spending $350 million a year buying SBCs. By 2015 (just four years) they will be buying $1 billion a year worth of SBCs.



Acme Packet furthermore reports gross margins of about 82 percent. Huge gross margins

“Candidly, service providers are asking for alternatives,” says Patrick Fitzgerald, Metaswitch Networks VP.



Acme Packet has for years pointed to its dominant market share. Infonetics estimated that Acme Packet had 52 percent of the SBC market in 2009,  almost four times that of any competitor. Dominant market share Dell’Oro Group in 2010 estimated hat Acme Packet had 55 percent of the SBC market.



Metaswitch says Acme Packet has 65 percent to 70 percent share of the service provider and enterprise markets for SBCs.



Some 38 Metaswitch customers already have placed orders for “Perimeta” devices, says Fitzgerald. Perimeta



In many ways, the move into the SBC market illustrates some enduring issues in business strategy. In recent days, as intellectual property lawsuits have escalated in the mobile handset business, we have gotten a reminder of the potential importance of patents and intellectual property ownership. Patent lawsuits proliferate


In fact, some believe the older pattern, where many device manufacturers simply licensed operating systems, might be changing. Some believe it is possible that the dominant pattern will be “essentially proprietary” strategies where each major platform consists of bundled OS and device, on the Apple model.



Keep in mind that Metaswitch Networks has, for many years, been a supplier of the underlying original equipment manufacturer software at the heart of an SBC. In other words, as Microsoft powers many PCs, and Android powers many smart phones, Metaswitch already powers many SBCs.



That isn’t to say the smart phone or PC OS model will develop in the SBC market, but only to suggest that intellectual property ownership confers strategic advantages that are not always immediately obvious in the earlier stages of some markets, but can emerge as strategic advantages later.



Some might note that the move into SBCs illustrates another enduring business issue, namely “channel conflict.” There are many instances in the telecommunications business where a supplier has to make difficult choices. Where a supplier operates in both the wholesale and retail parts of a business, there always is some potential for conflict between a firm’s wholesale partners and the supplier’s own retail efforts. Channel conflict


The analogy is the growing suggestion that device manufacturers ranging from HTC to Samsung might have to develop or acquire their own operating systems as other significant portions of the market evolve.



Android now has a “special” relationship with Motorola Mobility. Microsoft has a favored relationship with Nokia. Apple is Apple. Research in Motion always has used its own proprietary OS.



Some would note that Metaswitch now faces channel conflict in a way it has not, in the past. But that’s part of the enduring business strategy discussion. What should any firm do when it is an OEM supplier, and end users start asking it to develop its own retail products based on the underlying intellectual property?



It is easy to say a firm should avoid channel conflict. But there often are cases where end users (the market) asks or demands that an OEM supplier also supply retail products. There might be other cases where an OEM simply sees strategic value of such scope that some amount of channel conflict is the price to be paid for some important strategic step.



In fact, Microsoft and Google both face some degree of risk in developing favored relationships with a particular contestant in the smart phone market, even as the advantages also are clear. The point is that Metaswitch faces classic business issues of the case study sort.



The analogy is that Metaswitch supplies an operating system the way that Google or Microsoft do. Both those firms have important business models built on supplying “open” software to many partners. But both those firms also have significant relationships with a single retail brand in the end user market. Metaswitch now will have that same sort of relationship in its OEM business and as a supplier of the “Perimeta” line of SBCs.



No firm would casually risk such channel conflict were the potential rewards not large enough to offset the risk. In this case, Metaswitch is making strategic moves on a number of fronts to reposition its business. Virtually all of those moves carry some degree of risk.



But it is hard to ignore 82 percent profit margins in a retail business where the firm already supplies the intellectual property, nor a business where Metaswitch routinely has sold and installed SBCs on behalf of its retail customers for quite some time, giving it a view of the real world deployment issues and perspectives of its retail customers, in the SBC space.



It is hard to ignore a product whose value is such that sales volumes could triple in four years. And it is hard to ignore getting into a business when a firm’s customers say they want the firm to do so. Channel conflict is one sort of issue. Ignoring the clear requests of a firm’s customers is another sort of danger.



It’s a classic business case study.