Do Service Providers Earn Back Their Cost of Capital?

To the extent that all U.S. broadband networks rely on private capital to invest in new broadband facilities, the question of financial return for such investments is fundamental. After all, telcos, cable companies, satellite and wireless providers go to private markets for the funding to build their broadband networks, and those investors have lots of choices.

If the financial return, and the risk, of broadband facilities investment do not roughly match or exceed what is available from alternative investments, those investments will not be made, and it won't matter much how much people scream about what they can't get.

In that regard, it is fair to note that many investors no longer consider telecom an especially desirable investment. It is rare these days to find a venture capitalist willing to consider backing a new telecom equipment supplier, for example. To the extent that interest remains, it is centered on mobile and mobile applications.

And there are reasons for that investor caution. Any perusal of industry statistics or quarterly or annual financial reports, at least in developed markets, will show stress around the traditional revenue sources most communications or video suppliers rely on. 

Growth rates are down, subscriber trends are negative in many cases, profit margins are lower than has been the case historically, and there is more competition and a shift of value elsewhere in the Internet, broadband and wireless ecosystems. 

In fact, Bernstein analyst Craig Moffett argues that, over the last decade, the returns on invested capital in communications networks in U.S. markets have been anemic, at best. He argues that economic value creation has been, in aggregate, barely positive.

Wireline networks have the weakest returns on invested capital with a 1.5 percent gain over the last decade. Wireless networks had a meager return of 0.3 percent. Cable garnered a 2.5 percent return. Satellite networks had the best return on invested capital at 5.5 percent. Others, including AT&T, Comcast, Dish,Sprint and Verizon, have negative returns, Moffett argues.

You might argue that though low, those are positive numbers. True enough. But there are borrowing costs, and in many cases the cost of "good will" associated with acquisitions. Add those in and returns can go negative pretty quickly.

It probably goes without saying that potential end user shifts in the direction of over the top video entertainment do represent a threat to subscription video revenues now earned by telcos, cable and satellite companies.

A new study by Edelman suggests U.S. consumers are are disenchanted with their entertainment choices. Only about 17 percent of respondents think entertainment sources today provide “very good” or “excellent value.” That should send up a warning flag about the latent potential demand for different video and other entertainment options. 

Declining entertainment value obviously creates a gap that competing providers might be able to exploit. Unlike many other businesses, though, the video entertainment business is unusually controlled by content creators and distributors, rather than distributors. DirecTV, for example, recently had unusual success with its “Sunday Ticket” service delivering National Football League games, says Michael White, DirecTV Chairman, Chief Executive Officer and President.

Those sorts of issues mean there is potential for alternative distribution methods, so long as content providers are willing to cooperate. For fixed-line access providers, there are other issues, beyond a threat to existing video service revenues, though. Some would argue that fixed networks already have trouble earning a return on invested capital that justifies deploying that capital.

Whether or not a provider of goods and services can remain in business is not a consumer's problem, of course. But the apparent difficulty of making money in the fixed-line service provider business is a key concern for service providers, naturally. 

Beyond that, to the extent fixed access networks are seen as a key underpinning of economic growth, and a "national resource," there are key public policy issues. Specifically, if robust and high-speed broadband access is a "public good," inability to earn a return on invested capital is a broader problem. 

Where is the Value of a Fixed Line?

One often hears it said that “broadband is the anchor service” for fixed-line service providers in the future. One also frequently hears that new value-added services would be a healthy antidote to service providers becoming “dumb pipe” access providers. One sometimes also assumes the growing use of "connected devices" benefits mobile service providers (it does), but not fixed-line providers.

All of those statements are true, but analysts and observers might be missing the growing potential of the “dumb pipe” access business, especially as the home and business environments increasingly feature the use of many different “untethered” devices, and as more users get used to switching even their mobile devices to untethered fixed line connections (Wi-Fi). Razorsight Blog


the value of a fixed-line broadband connection will grow as each additional connected device is added.

In August 2011, for example, the share of non-computer traffic for the U.S. market increased to 6.8 percent. The largest percentage from this share came from mobile devices, which drove 4.4 percent of total digital traffic in the U.S. market. The second largest driver of non-computer traffic was the tablet category, contributing nearly two percent of total traffic.



As the share of U.S. non-computer traffic rose over the past four months, the percentage of that traffic driven by tablets has risen from little more than 20 percent to nearly 30 percent. In May 2011, 22.5 percent of non-computer traffic came from tablets. By August 2011 that figure had grown to 28.1 percent, eating into the share of traffic garnered by mobile devices and other web-enabled devices.

That is but one example of how use of connected devices is changing the value and use of fixed-line broadband connections.



In fact, the GSMA expects the number of total “connected” devices to increase from nine billion in 2011 to more than 24 billion in 2020. “Mobile connected devices” (presumably those with a subscriber information module) will grow 100 per cent from more than six billion in 2011 to 12 billion in 2020.

The Voice Revenue Problem

Only 70 percent of households in Marshall County, Indiana have landlines in 2011, a figure that is expected to decrease to 50 percent in the next two years. That statistic is one important facet of the voice services business: people simply are starting to use their mobile devices as their primary “phones.”

The other important angle is less usage of voice communications overall, on both mobile and fixed connections. According to Nielsen, the average number of mobile phone calls we make is dropping every year, after hitting a peak in 2007. And our calls are getting shorter: In 2005 they averaged three minutes in length; now they’re almost half that.

Also, in part because of the prevalence of VoIP services, unit prices are under pressure. Servive provider executives are no dummies. They know all that, and already are moving ahead with initiatives that will replace lost revenue and still provide a growth path.

But there are lots of thorny, practical issues. Consider investment. How much should a rational executive invest in a declining business? How much should it try to innovate? What is the balance between support for growing businesses and networks, and declining businesses? When does network investment become stranded? What should executives do about all that?

The Voice Revenue Problem

Sprint User Base is Different

Lots of people have offered, and will continue to offer, advice about how Sprint can do better in the U.S. mobile market, whether or not the AT&T deal to buy T-Mobile USA succeeds, or not. Advice, one might argue, is easy to give, especially when it concerns how any firm, lead by any set of talented managers, can change its fundamental position in a market whose structure is fairly well fixed.

Though some will question the continued relevance, a long-standing study of firms in many industries, taking a look at market share, quality and profit margin, suggests that it is very hard to change firm position in an established industry. Market share patterns

Though the existence of a correlation is not necessarily a causal relationship, there is relatively significant evidence that markets develop patterns. Pareto_principle Among the more-enduring patterns is a tendency towards market concentration by a handful of leaders.

Some might argue, for that reason, that the current U.S. mobile market structure is not unusual, and might become even more concentrated over time. The informal rule of thumb might be that in any market, most of the share i(80 percent or so) is held by a small number of providers (perhaps 20 percent or fewer).

The U.S. mobile industry is more concentrated than that, but you get the point. It would be difficult under the best of conditions for Sprint Nextel to dramatically change its position in the market. But, that noted, there are some apparent differences of end user behavior that could provide something of an opening.

Some of us would not say the differences necessarily offer Sprint a way to change its market position in a dramatic way, but might offer a way to help solidify its current position. The difference is the apparent preference for Android among Sprint users, or perhaps Sprint’s willingness to bank on Android for some highly-popular devices such as the HTC Evo line.

Note recent Yankee Group surveys indicating that Sprint users are heavy users of Android devices. It is of course possible that the data reflects Sprint’s historic inability to sell the Apple iPhone, forcing Sprint to emphasize the HTC Evo as a lead offer, and thus producing the skew Yankee Group found.

One might similarly argue that Verizon Wireless faced the same problem in the days when it also could not sell the Apple iPhone. If so, it always is possible that the Android preferences illustrated by Yankee Group are a tactical, short term user demand trend that easily could change in the future.

Still, no matter what happens with the AT&T bid to buy T-Mobile USA, Sprint is going to have to work pretty hard simply to solidify some distinctive position in the market, even as a “distant third” provider, compared to Verizon Wireless and AT&T.

It does presently appear, however, that Sprint users consume more data, and use Android, more so than customers of the other top four networks. 

What Keeps Service Provider Executives Awake At Night? A Service Provider Survey by Metaswitch Networks - Thoughts on Carrier Evolution - Carrier Evolution

Service provider executives surveyed by Metaswitch Networks say uncertainty about new services and revenues, plus competition, remain the top concerns over the next decade. That has been true for most of the past decade, and the survey results confirm that the search for new revenue sources and the pressure of competition remain dominant facts of life in competitive and changing marketplaces.

The significant new difference is that telecom regulators—and what they might do—now are among the top three concerns. Of the three top concerns, though, only service innovation and the organizational response to competition are under direct control.

Click the image for a larger view. 

What Keeps Service Provider Executives Awake At Night? A Service Provider Survey by Metaswitch Networks - Thoughts on Carrier Evolution - Carrier Evolution

Telco Choice is Not "Dumb Pipe" or "Service Enabler" or "Service Provider"

There's no question that the fundamental business underpinning of the entire global telecommunications business is undergoing a fundamental change from "voice driven" to "broadband driven," and, to a certain extent, from "services" to "access."

That leads to a fear that the future is one of "dumb pipe" access services providing modest revenue and slimmer profit margins than any existing provider can tolerate, without significant downsizing of operational cost.

Many observers suggest service providers will gradually take on more "application enabler" roles, supporting third-party business partners.

At the same time, there is debate about the degree to which any existing video or voice service provider will be able to continue doing so in the future.

But those three choices are not mutually exclusive. For better or worse, "dumb pipe" access is a permanent foundation for every telco, mobile, cable, satellite or fixed wireless provider. That is precisely what "broadband access" is; a simple "access" service.

That does not mean "only" access will be provided. There likely will be some permanent role for managed video, voice, storage, backup and other services. At some combination of value and price, users simply will prefer to buy such "services" rather than use comparable applications.

At the same time, it is likely service providers will find ways to grow the percentage of their revenue earned by supplying services to business partners. That might include billing services, location and device information, hosted processing or storage services.

"Dumb pipe" access is not the only business of the future, but it is foundational, and permanent. In addition to that, though, today's service providers necessarily will have to grow the proportion of revenue they make from "enabling" services, as they manage a likely decline of "services" such as basic voice communications or multi-channel video.

And it is not necessarily that those services decline because of a shift in user demand. The simple existence of capable competitors means market shifts will occur, irrespective of any conceivable shifts of demand. In other words, one does not have to make a definitive bet on "over the top" voice or video to plan on lower revenue from existing voice or video sources. One simply must assume that capable competitors will take some amount of market share.

In other words, at the level of discrete enterprises, cable executives have to anticipate declining video customer base and revenue contribution, while telcos have to assume declining gross voice revenue. No shift of demand to online video or VoIP need be assumed.

To be sure, those forces likely will be factors. But it is not the case that a stark choice must be made between the "dumb pipe" access provider and the "service enablement" or "service provider" roles. All three will remain parts of the overall revenue stream.

How Important is AT&T's U-Verse?

AT&T books something on the order of $124 billion a year worth of revenue. In the fourth quarter of 2009, AT&T booked U-verse revenues representing an annualized $3 billion. Some will note that this represents about three percent of AT&T's annual revenues.

By way of contrast, wireless already contributes about $56 billion annually. For the quarter, wireless revenues were $12.6 billion and wireless data was about $3.9 billion.

A rational observer might note that U-verse, AT&T's broadband and TV services effort, represents less revenue annually than mobile data does in one quarter. One might also argue that U-verse is not a revenue contributor that really "moves the needle" in terms of overall AT&T revenue performance.

One might also infer that a rational AT&T executive would not spend nearly the time on fiber-to-customer services that he or she would spend on wireless services, given the relatively small contribution U-verse can make to the overall bottom line, even if such broadband services represent the future of the fixed access business.

On the other hand, U-verse services have a much-higher growth profile, growing at about a 32-percent rate in the fourth quarter, where mobile revenues grew at about a nine-percent rate. Wireless data is growing at about a 26-percent rate.

Still, a rational executive might conclude that the gross revenue implications of high wireless data growth rates are vastly more signficant than equally-high growth rates for U-verse broadband services.

Some U-verse growth cannibalizes digital subscriber line revenue. And though video services have room to continue growing, that revenue source is fundamentally bounded by the total size of the U.S. multi-channel video business, where AT&T essentially takes existing revenue and market share away from cable competitors.

The wireline data business essentially can aim to grow to nearly 100 percent of the existing base of AT&T's existing huge installed base of wireless voice customers. AT&T has more than 85 million mobile voice customers.

The entire U.S. cable customer base is about 62.6 million accounts, and AT&T does not have a universal U.S. footprint. AT&T ultimately might cover 30 million U.S. homes out of 115 million total with its U-verse network.

If AT&T often appears to be a wireless company first and foremost, there is a good reason.

Is Google Crazy, or Simply Unusual?

Cable and satellite providers of video entertainment have different financial interests from content providers, even though both are essential parts of the multi-channel video entertainment ecosystem.

Likewise, handets manufacturers, mobile application providers and access providers have distinct financial interests, though all are part of the single mobile ecosystem.

That being the case, conflicts between ecosystem partners are an ever-present reality. The issue is how much cooperation and conflict is possible, and whether enough benefit occurs, despite some conflict.

Google's release of the Nexus One, and its apparent plans to release a Nexus Two and other devices are prime examples. Some observers, including Google's competitors, will note that it is risky for a partner to compete with its other partners in a single ecosystem.

Microsoft of course questions the wisdom of Google's mobile strategy, insisting Google will have trouble attracting and keeping handset partners for its Android operating system now that the company is selling its very own branded devices.

That certainly is the conventional wisdom. But even a valid conventional wisdom can have exceptions. What "most" partners cannot envision, attempt or succeed at is not to say that "all" partners are so limited. Nor are relationships immutable; they can change over time.

Google might be one of the salient exceptions, as is Apple. Several years ago, most telecom executives were more afraid of Google than of cable operators. These days, executives are looking for ways to leverage and work with Google.

Apple has significantly reinvented business frameworks in the music and phone businesses, for example.

The other issue is that Google's relationship with some ecosystem partners can be qutie distinct. At least initially, HTC and Motorola have add a different relationship than other manufacturers, and T-Mobile as a service provider likewise was early to support Android.

Google's other partnerships are a bit more complicated and one has to think Verizon and Motorola are less than thrilled, even though both are key Android partners.

Still, the point is that ecosystem relationships periodically get tested. Content providers and cable and satellite operators are used to the possibility of significant conflict over carriage agreements. Also, at the margin, some distributors also are content owners, while some content owners have been distributors.

Some distributors are part of the equipment supplier segment, as well as distributors. Some equipment suppliers are becoming application providers.

Yes, Google risks some ire by distributing its own branded handset. But ecosystem "messiness" is growing throughout the communications and entertainment ecosystems. And some players can attempt strategies that would be considered suicidal if attempted by less powerful contestants.

There are rules, and exceptions to those rules. Apple and Google might prove to be right or wrong. What is indisputable is that they are different; they can attempt things most other players cannot think about.

What Has Changed Since 2000

A few statistics will illustrate just how much has changed in the global telecom business since 2000. Prior to the turn of the century, most lines in service used wires and carried voice.

By 2007, 74 percent of all lines in service used wireless access or carried data, says the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development.

Mobile alone in 2007 accounted for 61 percent of all subscriptions while standard phone lines have dropped to 26 percent. And the change has come swiftly: in just seven years.

Mobile revenues now account for nearly half of all telecommunication revenues—41 percent in 2007—up from 22 percent 10 years earlier.

Along with the change in access methods and applications is the sheer number of connections. The total number of fixed, mobile and broadband subscriptions in the member nations of the OECD grew to 1.6 billion in 2007, compared to a population within the OECD nations of just over one billion inhabitants.

To put that in perspective, consider that there were seven access paths in use in 2007 for every access path in use in 1980. That includes broadband, wireless and voice connections.

To put those figures in even greater perspective, consider that the percentage of household budgets devoted to communication expenses has climbed only slightly over the last 10 years. In most OECD countries, households generally spend about 2.2 percent and 2.5 percent of household income on communications, year in and year out, though one can note a slow rise since 1998.

The big exception is Japan, where household spending on communications is close to seven percent of household income. That might be something to keep in mind when making cross-national comparisons. It is true that Japan has very-fast broadband and has pioneered any number of mobile application innovations.

But Japanese households spend very close to three times as much as U.S. households on their overall communications. That’s worth keeping in mind. It always is difficult to make meaningful comparisons between nations.

Generally speaking, though, OECD consumers have added seven new connections for every existing connection in 1980, while spending about the same percentage of their incomes on those services. That’s an obvious example of an explosion of productivity.

Much has changed in the Internet access realm as well. Broadband is now the dominant fixed access method in all OECD countries. In 2005, dial-up connections still accounted for 40 percent of fixed Internet connections but just two years later that percentage had fallen to 10 percent.

Also, while many criticize the industry for retarding innovation and behaving as “nasty monopolists,” prices have tended to fall for virtually all communication services on all platforms.

“Over the previous 18 years, residential users saw the real price of residential fixed-linephone service fall roughly one percent per year while business prices fell 2.5 percent per year,” the OECD says.

Mobile subscribers also benefitted from declining prices between 2006 and 2008. The average price of OECD “mobile baskets,” representing a number of calls and messages per year that normalizes features and prices, fell by 21 percent for low usage, 28 percent for medium usage and 32 percent for the heaviest users over the two-year period.

User voice behavior also has changed. The number of minutes of communication per mobile phone is increasing while the minutes on fixed networks are decreasing. In other words, the mobile is becoming for most people the primary voice device while the landline is a backup.

Some might argue that ultimately has implications for pricing. In some real ways, the mobile is the “premium” device and a landline represents a supplemental service. That probably means the value is such that consumers ultimately will think it should be priced as a backup service.

Data between 2005 and 2007 suggest people are making fewer domestic calls on the fixed network in most countries, OECD says. When people do use fixed networks they are increasingly making calls to users of mobile phones.

This trend is well highlighted by Austria where the introduction of flat-rate voice telephony on mobile networks has shifted calls away from the fixed-line network. Voice traffic on Telekom Austria’s fixed network fell 13.3 percent in 2007 as a result of the shift to mobile
communications.

There was an OECD monthly average of 272 minutes of outgoing calls on fixed line telephones in 2007. This is down 32 minutes per month from 2005.

But there was an interesting landline rebound trend appearing recently in a number of OECD countries.

The number of PSTN minutes per line declined until 2005 when the numbers started rising again. For example, French minutes per PSTN line fell until 2004 when they started to increase.

One explanation is the shift in France to flat-rate national calls offered by a number of carriers. That suggests U.S. landline voice providers might stem some of the traffic erosion by offering aggressive, flat-rate, all-distance services within the domestic market, as VoIP providers generally do.

On the mobile side, the OECD average number of outgoing minutes of completed calls on mobile networks was 220 minutes per month in 2007, up 56 percent from 2005.

Subscribers in the United States make far more outgoing calls on mobile phones each month than any other country in the OECD. The average number of minutes per mobile subscription was 443 in 2007, more than double the OECD average. One might argue that is because of the reasonable cost of calling great distances. In Europe, many calls that would be domestic in the United States are international calls.

Broadband prices have fallen as well over the same time. OECD broadband prices declined significantly over the previous three years. Prices declined an average of 14 percent per year for DSL and 15 percent for cable between 2005 and 2008.

The average price of a low-speed connection (2 megabits per second or less downstream) was $32 per month in September 2008. At the other end of the scale, broadband connections with download speeds advertised as faster than 30 megabits per second averaged $45 per month.

Despite the falling price-per-unit trends, telecommunications services, about a trillion dollar market in the OECD, continues to grow at about a six-percent annual rate. That remains to be tested as we finish 2009, but there is reasonable historic precedent for continued growth, though perhaps not at a six-percent rate.

Regarding voice and new mobile and data services, we might as well note that landline voice appears to be a product like any other. That is to say, like any other product, it has a product life cycle.

To be specific, wireline voice looks like a product in its declining phase. Optical fiber-based broadband looks like a product earlier in its cycle, with 56 percent compound annual growth since 2005.

Digital subscriber line and cable modem services likely are further along their curves. DSL grew at a compounded rate of 21 percent per year while cable modem service grew at 18 percent rates between 2005 and 2007.

Mobile voice markets grew by 10 percent each year since 2005 but may be nearing saturation levels in a number of OECD markets. Mobile broadband clearly is early in its product life cycle.

Analog lines, used for voice, facsimile and dial-up Internet access, also seem to be in decline. The number of analog subscribers fell by 34 million between 2005 and 2007.

The decline of Internet dial-up services also means that many households no longer need a second analog line. The same might be true for in-home fax machines. And many additional lines once used by teenagers now have been replaced by mobiles.

Finally, the number of “mobile-only” subscribers has increased as well.

The penetration rate for fixed telephone lines (analog and ISDN) in 2007 was 41 subscribers per 100 inhabitants, which was less than the penetration rate ten years earlier.

Overall, the penetration rate rose from 43 percent in 1996 to a maximum of 47 percent in 2000, only to decline again to 41 percent in 2007. The year 2000 appears to be the turning point in the technological life cycle of fixed-line telephony.

Canada had the highest fixed-line penetration in 2007 with a penetration rate of 54 subscribers for every 100 inhabitants. Sweden, Luxembourg and the United States all

had penetration rates greater than 50 per 100 inhabitants. Mexico, the Slovak Republic and Poland had the lowest penetration rates in 2007.

There’s an interesting observation we can make about those figures. Nobody seems to argue that the United States has a big problem with voice service availability. In fact, availability is not the issue: consumer demand is the issue. One doesn’t hear people complaining about the lack of voice availability in Canada or Sweden. But penetration is in the 50 percent range, per capita.

Nearly all Internet users in the United States use broadband, not dial-up. And yet broadband penetration might well be higher than voice penetration, on that score. People who want the product generally buy it.

That said, there are some methodological issues here. “Per capita” measures might not make as much sense, as a comparative tool, when median household sizes vary. Adoption by households, adjusted to include people who use the Internet only at work or at public locations, or using mobiles, would be better.

Broadband adoption, by people who actually use the Internet, might make the most sense of all. Broadband is a product like any other. Not every consumer values every product to the same degree.

DSL network coverage is greater than 90 percent in 22 of the 30 OECD countries. Belgium, Korea, Luxembourg and the Netherlands report 100 percent.

Cable coverage is extensive in some countries such as the United States (96 percent) and Luxembourg (70 percent), but non-existent in others such as Greece, Iceland and Italy.

An analysis which followed the evolution of broadband plans over four years shows that speeds increased by 28 percent for DSL and 72 percent for cable on average between 2007 and 2008.

A survey of 613 broadband offers covering all OECD countries shows the average advertised speed grew between 2007 and 2008 across all platforms except for fiber. The average advertised DSL speed increased 25 percent from 9.3 Mbps in 2007 to 11.5 Mbps in 2008.

Advertised speed of course is not user-experienced speed at all times of day. Still, it offers some measure of changes in the product.

The average advertised fiber speed actually declined between 2007 and 2008 as operators introduced new entry-level offers at speeds below 100 Mbps.

For example, Dansk Broadband in Denmark offers symmetric broadband offers over fiber at speeds between 512 kbps and 100 Mbps.

The average fixed wireless offer in 2008 was 3 Mbps, up from 1.8 Mbps just a year earlier.

Fixed wireless speeds grew by 64 percent but remain only one-quarter of the average advertised speeds of DSL providers. The average cable offer is five times faster.

There are some insights about mobile broadband in the OECD’s analysis. The amount of data traffic carried over mobile networks remains small in relation to other broadband data networks.

For example, Telstra in Australia reported in a 2008 investor briefing that data consumption increased from 100 kilobytes per month per user in 2007 to 250 kilobytes in 2008. Compare that to the gigabytes consumed on landline connections.

Data from the Netherlands also show relatively low data traffic in the first half of 2008.

Between January and June 2008, Dutch mobile broadband subscribers downloaded 358 gigabytes over mobile networks.

It is possible to calculate an estimate of mobile data traffic per 3G subscriber per month in the Netherlands by making a few assumptions. If the ratio of 3G to total mobile subscriptions in the Netherlands is equivalent to the OECD average of 18 percent, then the average amount of data traffic per 3G subscription per month in the Netherlands works out to be only 18 kilobytes per month.

Of 52 mobile broadband packages evaluated in September 2008, the average headline speed was 2.5 Mbps. Subscribers to these plans were allowed an average of 4.5 gigabytes of data traffic per month.

Much has changed in the global telecommunications business in just seven years. Landline voice might still provide the revenue mainstay, but it is a product in the declining stages of its life cycle.

Even mobile voice, DSL and cable modem service are products at something like the peak of their cycles.
Mobile broadband and optical fiber access are early in their product life cycles. Mobility is becoming the preferred way of consuming voice communications.

That’s an awful lot of change in just seven years. And we haven’t even discussed VoIP, over-the-top applications, content or video.

Telcos More Open to 3rd Party Partners

One difference between 2006 and 2007 was that global telco executives began to shift attitudes about the importance of working with third party application and service providers. Where they might arguably have been more focused in 2006 on cost cutting and other internal measures, 2007 found executives more focused on how to position themselves for new services.

Though there arguably is more recognition that advertising operations will demand partners, there also seems to be more recognition that core communications capabilities can be leveraged as a revenue stream if those features are made available to other application and service providers.

This is a very big and quite important shift in thinking.

Convergence Spells Opportunity for Managed Services | PodTech.net: Technology and Entertainment Video Network

Convergence Spells Opportunity for Managed Services | PodTech.net: Technology and Entertainment Video Network