Necessity Drives Strategy at Qwest, Other Firms

Service provider strategy sometimes is dictated by necessity, and to the extent that service providers large and small now face different "necessities," there is an increasing divergence in strategy. Over time, in other words, service providers will "look" different from each other where in the past they all had resembled each other to a striking degree.

Consider Qwest, one of the three former "Baby Bells." Qwest always had a customer geography significantly more rural than the other original seven Bell Operating Companies. But when SBC gobbled up Telesis, Ameritech, AT&T and BellSouth to form at&t; while Verizon was formed from the former Bell Atlantic, NYNEX, GTE and MCI, the differences grew.

Both at&t and Verizon have the leading mobile assets and much-larger scale than any other contestants in the marketplace. Qwest is far smaller, does not own a national wireless network and faces much-larger challenges in the fiber-to-customer area because of lower density serving areas.

So where a triple play offered over owned facilities strategy makes sense for Verizon and at&t, for Qwest it does not. Qwest simply doesn't have the customer volume, density or access to capital that strategy would require. Unlike the other former Baby Bells, Qwest's fiber-to-customer strategy is not anchored by video services, but strictly by broadband data services.

Lacking a mobile network, Qwest originally tried offering services under its own brand, as a mobile virtual network operator. But it now has decided that approach has drawbacks, including some handset limitations, financial returns limited by low volume and, arguably, the lack of a popular "brand name" in wireless.

Qwest also has to maintain a balance between capital investment and shareholder return issues, such as reducing debt load, buying back shares and supporting the payment of dividends.

So Qwest's strategy will embrace partnerships in areas such as video and wireless, in ways that Verizon and at&t will not. In the process of revising its mobile strategy, Qwest also says it will rely on DirecTV for the video services component of its offerings. And where video services will be a key part of the payback for FiOS and LightSpeed, Qwest expects to get its payback strictly from new broadband services.

That's going to necessitate high penetration and new services as well. By 2011 Qwest plans to increase its broadband penetration from 23 percent to 40 percent.

Qwest will "look different" in its strategy because it has to. It doesn't have the scale or resources to become a smaller version of at&t or Verizon. Consider that at&t books about $39 billion annually while Verizon books $24 billion annually.

Qwest books about $13.8 billion a year in annual revenue. Neither does Qwest closely resemble the middle tier of independent telcos, either. Embarq, for example, books about $6.4 billion in annual revenue. Windstream books about $3.3 billion annually. But most independent telcos are far smaller than that, booking millions to hundreds of millions worth of revenue each year.

What makes Qwest different from the mid-tier of telcos such as Windstream and Embarq is that Qwest operates global backbone networks that can feed a more-robust enterprise business. The other providers might more logically be called regional "local" providers. Some competitive local exchange carriers also have a "national local" character, the difference being that such firms generally only serve the business customer segments.

In many ways, the interesting strategic paths will be among the smaller telcos rather than the tier one providers. Very-small independents typically are very interested in offering IPTV services. The middle tier of companies generally are not. The middle tier of companies may have brighter prospects in business customer segments. Very-small providers typically will not. Very-small telcos may not find out-of-region operations too compelling. The middle tier, at some point, virtually has to look at footprint expansion.

Since strategy is the result of multiple background, financial and management factors, we can expect that some of the more-differentiated approaches will be taken by those providers who are particularly challenged in some way. Inability to create the triple play or quadruple play strategy; geographic or demographic limitations or sheer borrowing power will force some managements to strike out on atypical paths from that generally seen as the tier one global provider approach.